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ABSTRACT
Virtue, Friendship, and Polis: A Reading of Paul's Letter to the Philippians
Virtue requires moral knowledge, moral perception, moral choice, practical wisdom, strong will,
moral practice, moral exemplar, moral goal, and moral training. In the Christian community,
these elements are either supplied by God, or by Christ, or by fellow-believers. The goal of
bringing these elements together is to produce virtuous people who think and act like Christ.
Friendship, according to Paul, should be based upon this Christ-oriented virtue. In Philippians,
Paul exemplifies this type of virtuous friendship through the friendships ofChrist and God, Paul
and Timothy, and Paul and Epaphroditus. In Paul's view, the Christian polis can be saved only
through the formation of this virtuous friendship. As such, Paul's letter to the Philippians is
written as a piece of deliberative rhetoric to persuade the Philippians to save the community
through virtuous firiendship.
This thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 shows that stasis is one of the most
important themes in the Greco-Roman ethical-political discourse. Chapter 2 shows that Greco-
Roman authors sought to dispel vice (especially the desires for honor and gain), faction, and
stasis through virtue, friendship, and concord. In their understanding, virtue and fHendship saves
the polis from destruction. Chapter 3 argues that Paul's letter to the Philippians is a deliberative
rhetoric on concord. Chapter 4 claims that Paul, like other Greco-Roman authors, intends to
promote concord through virtue and friendship.
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University Press, 1987.
PD Epicurus, Principle Doctrines
VS Epicurus, Vatican Sayings
iv
INTRODUCTION
Many interpreters find correlations between Paul's ethical teaching and that of the
Greco-Roman moral philosophers.' However, not all scholars are convinced of these
correlations' significance for the understanding ofPauline ethics. Most studies on Pauline
ethics retain their focus on the dialectical relationship between the indicative and the
imperative and the relationship between theology and ethics.^ Certainly, a clear
understanding of those relationships is important and crucial for the understanding of
Pauline ethics. It is true also that many of the supporting arguments and the sustaining
motives behind Paul's ethical teaching are grounded theologically and are embedded
deeply in the Judeo-Christian worldview. However, these truths should not eclipse the
importance and significance of the influence ofHellenistic ethics upon Paul's ethical
teachings.
The Hellenistic influence on Paul is noted most palpably in the literary forms Paul
chose to communicate his message. Some of his letters, for example, resemble Greco-
Roman paraenesis, frank speech practices, and protreptic discourse.^ Other letters
' Abraham J. Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," mANRW 2.26.1 (New York:
de Gruyter, 1992), 267-333; Gregory E. Sterling, "Hellenistic Philosophy and the New Testament," in
Handbook to Exegesis of the New Testament (ed. Stanley E. Porter; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 313-58.
^ Classically articulated by Victor P. Furnish: "the study ofPauline ethic... is the study, first of all, of
the theological convictions which underlie Paul's concrete exhortations and instructions and of the way those
convictions shape his responses to practical questions of conduct" {Theology and Ethics in Paul [The New
Testament Library; Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 2009], 21 1-12). See also Richard B. Hays, The
Moral Vision of the New Testament: A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics (San Francisco:
HarperSanFrancisco, 1996), esp. 18-9.
^ For paraenesis, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Paul: Hellenistic Philosopher or Christian Pastor?" in
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resemble Greco-Roman rhetorical speeches, arranged according to rhetorical conventions.
Paul also adopts classical topoi for the edification of the church."* Also, he employed
various minor literary forms in his letters, including diatribe, epicheireme, household codes,
virtue/vice lists, and hardship lists.^
In addition to shared literary forms, Paul and the Greco-Roman ethicists also share
similar moral terminologies. For example, in Philippians, Paul uses terms and concepts
such as xkkoQ (Phil 3: 12- 16a; also the concept of "the day of Jesus Christ"), auxapKTic (Phil
4:11), 4)poyea) (Phil 1:7; 2:2, 5; 3:15, 19; 4:2, 10), apetii (Phil 4:8), ^poKOTTii (Phil 1:25; and
the athletic metaphor in 3:12-16), mpprjOLa (Phil 1:20), ^vlm (Phil 1:27; 2:2-3, 19-30),
6TTLeu|iLa (Phil 1:23), v6\io^ (Phil 3:5-6), KOLvcovia (Phil 1:5, 7; 2:1; 3:10; 4:14f), toIlc (Phil
1:27; 3:20), and other terms related to political strife. These terms and concepts are
commonly found in the moral-political writings of the Greco-Roman world.
Given these multiple contact points between Paul and the Greco-Roman ethical
tradition, it is surprising how little scholars have done to read and understand Pauline
ethics in the context of the Greco-Roman ethical discourse.
Paul and the Popular Phlosophers (ed. Abraham J. Malherbe; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 67-77. For
protreptic discrouse, see David E. Aime, The Westminster Dictionary ofNew Testament andEarly Christian
Literature andRhetoric (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 2003), 383-6; Richard N. Longenecker,
IntroducingRomans: Critical Issues in Paul 's Most Famous Letter (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 201 1),
193-200. For frank speech, see below 4.3.2.
Abraham J. Malherbe, Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook (Library ofEarly
Christianity; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 144-61.
^ For diatribe, see Stanley K. Stowers, The Diatribe andPaul 's Letter to the Romans (Chico, Calif.:
Scholars Press, 1981). For epicheireme, see Fredrick J. Long, "From Epicheiremes to Exhortation: A Pauline
Method for Moral Persuasion in 1 Thessalonians," in Rhetoric, Ethic, andMoral Persuasion in Biblical
Discourse: Essays from the 2002 Heidelberg Conference (ed. Thomas H. Olbricht and Anders Eriksson; New
York: T & T Clark International, 2005), 179-95. For hardship lists, see John T. Fitzgerald, Cracks in an
Earthen Vessel: An Examination of the Catalogues ofHardships in the Corinthian Correspondence (SBL
Dissertation Series; Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1988).
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Three important themes characterize ancient Greco-Roman ethics. (1) Greco-Roman
ethics focuses on the formation of character. Like all other ancient ethics, it insists that
moral actions can flow only from a well-formed character. Moreover, character ethics
always builts upon the concept of happiness (euSaiiiovLa; human-flourishing or the well-
being of a person). Character ethics always asks, "What it means to be a true human being?"
In addition, character ethics asks, "What characters must one develop to become a mature
and frill-grown human being?" In other words, the quest for morality is bound inevitably
and intimately with the quest for humanity. Virtue and character relate directly to the
vision of the good life or the t^Xoq of the human life. In short, to live morally is to live in
conformity to the vision of the ideal human being.
(2) Ethics involves discussions on friendship. Nietzsche once wrote, "Das Hochste,
was bewuBte Ethik der Alten erreicht hat, ist die Theorie der Freundschaft."^ Indeed,
friendship is one of the most frequently discussed and most well-developed themes in the
Greco-Roman ethical tradition. Aristotle notably devotes two chapters ofhis Nicomachean
Ethics on friendship and explores "friendship" in greater depth than "justice." Many well-
known philosophers of the Greco-Roman period have written works on friendship. Notable
writings on friendship include: Plato's Lysis, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics chapters 8
and 9, Theophrastus' On Friendship, Cicero's De Amicitia, Seneca's Moral Epistles 3, 9,
63, 103, 109, Epictetus' Discourses 2.22 {On Friendship), Plutarch's essay "How to Tell a
Flatterer from a Friend," "On Having Many Friends," and Lucian's Toxaris. These works
raise questions concerning the nature of friendship, types of friendship, making friends,
whether friendship can exist only among equals, maintaining friendship, the relationship
* Friedrich Nietzsche, Nietzsche 's Werke 9: Nachgelassene Werke (Leipzig: Naumann, 1903), 67.
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between self-love and friendship, dealing with friends in times of difficulty, and ending
friendships. These questions are crucial and important, for friendship was regarded widely
as "one of the most indispensable requirements of life" (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.1.1).
(3) Ethics in Greco-Roman tradition always relates to politics.^ For example,
according to Aristotle's understanding, the aim ofpolitics is producing good citizens, and
enabling them to attain happiness and good life. In other words, the aim ofpolitics is
human goodness. On the other hand, achieving human happiness (�u6aL|ioyLa), which
requires the cultivation of virtue, requires a person to enter into the social-political sphere,
since only in that sphere can one's social virtues, such as justice, develop fully. This whole
idea can be summarized succinctly by one single assertion: human beings are political
animals. Thus, to live ethically (i.e., to achieve human excellence) one must lead a political
life.
These three themes are interrelated. The best kind of friendship is based on virtue.
The best kind ofpolis is made up of citizens bound together by fi-iendship.^ These three
themes together form a major chord in the Greco-Roman ethical-political discourse.
^ Alasdair Maclntyre rightly claims, "A moral philosophy...characteristically presupposes a
sociology. For every moral philosophy offers explicitly or implicitly at least a partial conceptual analysis of
the relationship of an agent to his or her reasons, motives, intentions and actions, and in so doing generally
presupposes some claim that these concepts are embodied or at least can be in the real social world" {After
Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory [3rd ed.; Notre Dame, Ind.: University ofNotre Dame Press, 2007], 23). For
the Greco-Roman people, that social world was the polis. Similarly, Wayne Meeks notes, "The morality that
we know from the Greek and Roman world is indigenous to the city" {The First Urban Christians: The
Social World of the Apostle Paul [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983], 37-51, here 37).
* Horst Butter notes: "[P]olitical life was conceived primarily in terms of friendship and enmity.
Friends were considered indispensable for a successfiil public life. The meaning ofpolitics lay in the
fulfillment of friendships. The entire free citizenry of the polis was held to be related in the manner of a
friendship. Politics came thus to be seen as the means for the exercise of friendship" {Politics as Friendship:
The Origins ofClassical Notions ofPolitics in the Theory andPractice ofFriendship [Waterloo, Ontario:
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1978], 25). Similarly, Eric Brown notes: "every Greek philosopher who
discusses how apolis would ideally be constituted seeks to explain how the citizens of thepolis could be
friends" ("Politics and Soceity," in The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism [ed. James Warren; New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009], 182nl7). Likewise, John Heyking and Richard Avramenko
open their book Friendship andPolitics with the following sentence: "Throughout the greater part of the
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Nonetheless, many New Testament scholars have not appreciated such themes.^
Little has been done to situate Pauline ethics within this background of virtue ethics,
despite the appearance of virtue in almost every ethical treatise of this period.
'�
Also, little
attention has been given to the importance ofpolitics in Paul's ethics and how politics
affects the moral life of the early Christians. Although scholars recently reveal great
interest in Paul's confrontation against the Roman Empire and in his critique of the Roman
Empire, giving due weight to the political dimension ofPaul's teaching, these works,
however, tend to neglect the positive and constructive aspect ofPaul's political teaching
and focus too narrowly on the combative or confrontational use of "the political."' '
Therefore, the influence ofGreco-Roman ethics (as it relates to politics and character
formation) on Pauline ethics needs fiirther examination.
Literature Review
This section will provide a brief review of the works written on Philippians related to
themes such as: (1) friendship; (2) virtue; and (3) concord.
history ofpolitical philosophy, friendship has occupied a central place in the conversation.... It is only in the
modem era that friendship has lost its prominence and been relegated to the backbenches ofpolitical
philosophy" {Friendship & Politics: Essays in Political Thought [Nofre Dame, Ind.: University ofNotre
Dame Press, 2008], 1).
' Richard Hays, for example, has no entry for "virtue," "friendship," and "polis/politics" in the index
ofhis book The Moral Vision ofthe New Testament: A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics.
This thesis does not dispute with Hays that cross, community, and eschatology are essential to Paul's moral
reasoning. These concepts, however, should be grounded in (and enriched by) the emic language ofvirtue,
friendship, and telos.
Julia Annas, in her important book on ancient ethics, writes, "The ancient concern for virtue
occupies in the most important respects the same place in people's thoughts as is occupied today by concern
for morality, and the importance, for the ancients, of determining the place ofvirtue in one's final end is like
the importance, for us, of determining the place ofmorality in one's life" {The Morality ofHappiness [New
York: Oxford University Press, 1993], 47).
" With the notable exception ofBruno Blumenfeld, The Political Paul: Justice, Democracy and
Kingship in a Hellenistic Framework (JSNTSup 210; London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001).
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(1) Friendship. Friendship is one of the most important social phenomena of the
ancient world. Greco-Roman authors wrote extensively on this subject.'^ David Konstan's
book Friendship in the Classical World examines the different understandings of
friendship beginning from the archaic period (Homer) through the fourth century A.D.'^ He
describes friendship as "a mutually intimate, loyal, and loving bond between two or few
persons that is understood not to derive primarily from membership in a group normally
marked by native solidarity, such as family, tribe, or other such ties."'"* John T. Fitzgerald's
book Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship collects essays concerning friendship from
the works ofAristotle, Peripatetic philosophers, Cicero, Neopythagoreans, Plutarch,
Lucian, Greek Papyri, Philo, and the New Testament.'^ Also, there are monographs on
specific philosophers exploring their view on friendship, especially that ofAristotle.'^
The study of friendship has been largely neglected by NT studies until the late 1980s,
when Peter Marshall published his dissertation entitled Enmity in Corinth}^ The field of
research advanced in the 1990s with publications authored and edited by John T.
Since the 1970s, a revival in the philosophical interest in friendship has occurred. Neera Kapur
Badhwar, Friendship: A Philosophical Reader (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), 2. For
bibliography see David Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World (Key Themes in Ancient History;
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 174-76; Heinz-Horst Schrey, "Freundschaft," in
Theologische Realenzyklopddie (ed. Gerhard Miiller, Horst Balz, and Gerhard Krause; Berlin: De Gruyter,
1976-2004), 11:591-99.
Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World.
Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World, 1.
John T. Fitzgerald, Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship (Resources for Biblical Study; Atlanta,
Ga.: Scholars Press, 1997).
Michael Pakaluk, Nicomachean Ethics. Books VIII and LK {C\w&a.don Aristotle Series; Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998); Lorraine Smith Pangle, Aristotle and the Philosophy ofFriendship
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); A. W. Price, Love andFriendship in Plato andAristotle
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Suzanne Stem-Gillet, Aristotle 's Philosophy ofFriendship (Suny
Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy; Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 1995).
Peter Marshall, Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul's Relations with the Corinthians
(Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 2 Reihe; Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1987).
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Fitzgerald.'^ Friendship in the Gospel of John has since received a substantive amount of
attention.'^ There are also a number of similar publications on Paul and on Acts.^�
Philippians in particular exhibits richness in regard to friendship terminology.^' As
such, some scholars have categorized this letter as a letter of friendship.^^ The terms,
concepts, and themes related to friendship in Philippians include: same mind,^^ same
soul,^"* the ow-prefix (passim),^^ fellowship (Phil 1:5; 2:1; 3:10; 4:15),^^ dying for a
John T. Fitzgerald, ed. Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness ofSpeech: Studies on Friendship in the
New Testament World (NovTSup; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996); Fitzgerald, Greco-Roman Perspectives on
Friendship. Nonetheless, in 2007, Fitzgerald speaks of "an insufficient appreciation of friendship as an aspect
ofPaul's thought" ("Christian Friendship: John, Paul, and the Philippians," Int 61 [2007], 287).
Martin M. Culy, Echoes ofFriendship in the Gospel ofJohn (New Testament Monographs;
Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2010); J. Massyngberde Ford, Redeemer-Friend andMother: Salvation in
Antiquity and in the Gospel ofJohn (MinneapoUs: Fortress, 1997); Craig S. Keener, The Gospel ofJohn: A
Commentary, 2 vols. (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2003), 1002-16; G. R. O'Day, "Jesus as Friend in the
Gospel of John," Int 58 (2004), 144-57; Sharon H. Ringe, Wisdom 's Friends: Community and Christology in
the Fourth Gospel (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 1999).
General survey of friendship in NT: Fitzgerald, "Christian Friendship," 284-96; Luke Timothy
Johnson, "Making Connections: The Material Expression ofFriendship in the New Testament," Int 58 (2004):
158-71; Craig S. Keener, "Friendship," in Dictionary ofNew Testament Background {qA.. Craig A. Evans and
Stanley E. Porter; Dovraers Grove, 111.: InterVarsity Press, 2000), 380-88; Hans-Josef Klauck, "Kirche Als
Freundesgemeinschaft? Auf Spurensuche Im Neuen Testament," MTZ 42 (1991): 1-14; Alan C. Michell,
"'Greet the Friends by Name': New Testament Evidence for the Greco-Roman Topos on Friendship," in
Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship (ed. John T. Fitzgerald; Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1997), 225-
61.
^' Alan C. Michell speaks of it being the "richest Pauline treasure of friendship" ("Greet the Friends by
Name," 233). Hansen provides a list of ten expressions of friendship language in Philippians: G. Walter
Hansen, The Letter to the Philippians (The Pillar New Testament Commentary; Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Eerdmans, 2009), 8-11.
To name just a few: David Arthur DeSilva, An Introduction to the New Testament: Contexts,
Methods & Ministry Formation (Downers Grove, 111.: InterVarsity, 2004), 635; Gordon D. Fee, Paul's Letter
to the Philippians (NICNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1995), 13; John T. Fitzgerald, "Philippians in
the Light of Some Ancient Discussions ofFriendship," in Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness ofSpeech:
Studies on Friendship in the New Testament ffbrW (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 144; Stanley K. Stowers,
"Friends and Enemies in the Politics ofHeaven: Reading Theology in Philippians," in Pauline Theology,
Volume I (ed. Jouette M. Bassler, David M. Hay, and E. Elizabeth Johnson; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991),
107-8. But there are dissenters: John Reumann, "Philipians, Especially Chapter 4, as a 'Letter ofFriendship':
Observations on a Checkered History of Scholarship," in Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness ofSpeech:
Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World (ed. John T. Fitzgerald; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 83-106.
See below 4.5.1.
See below 4.4.4.
See below 4.4.5.
See below 4.2.1.
7
friend, frank speech,^^ sharing in affection (e.g., joy), giving and receiving (1 :3-l 1;
4:10-20),^*^ and the sharing of common enemy.^' Although friendship in Philippians has
been widely explored, studies have tended to focus on the friendly relationship between
Paul and the Philippians, and often overlook how friendship ftinctions as a means toward
the unity of the community. Also the relationship between virtue and friendship remains
unexplored. This neglect is not surprising, since virtue always has played a minor role in
NT studies.
(2) Virtue. Studies on virtue rarely go beyond the exploration of the literary use of
virtue and vice list. However, recently, a few preliminary works have sought to bridge the
gap between Paul and the Greco-Roman virtue ethics. Among these works is Daniel J.
Harrington and James F. Keenan's book Paul and Virtue Ethics?^ While this book does
explore the relationship between Paul and the Greco-Roman ethicists, its main focus,
however, as its subtitle indicates, is on the relationship between Paul and moral theology,
referring above all to the theology of Thomas Aquinas. Another work addressing this gap
is Luke Timothy Johnson's article: "Transformation of the Mind and Moral Discernment
Audrey Lynn Sharon West, "Whether by Life or by Death: Friendship in a Pauhne Ethic of Death
and Dying" (Ph.D. Thesis, Duke University, 2001). Also, see below 4.7.2.
See below 4.3.2.
See below 4.2.6.
^� Gerald W. Peterman, Paul's Giftfrom Philippi: Conventions ofGift-Exchange and Christian Giving
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Peterman acknowledges "giving and receiving" as the
foundation ofGreco-Roman friendship. However, he argues that Paul rejects such relationship and presents
himself as "a great benefactor to his converts" (199-200). Paul has indeed in many ways altered the Greco-
Roman convention of "giving and receiving;" however, this altering does not imply that Paul rejects
friendship and seeks for instead a fellowship in the Spirit. Also, Peterman' s thesis places too much emphasis
on the relationship between Paul and the Philippians, and underestimates how Phil 4:10-20 might contribute
to the overall thesis ofPhilippians�^the unity of the church.
^' Marshall, Enmity in Corinth, 1-69. See below 4.4.6.
Daniel J. Harrington and James F. Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics: Building Bridges between New
Testament Studies andMoral Theology (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010).
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in Paul." His article, however, focuses only on one aspect of virtue ethics, namely moral
discernment. Also, his article focuses mainly on the book ofRomans.^^ Recently, N. T.
Wright has published a monograph on the virtue ethics of the NT.^"* His book is one of the
first monographs on this subject. This book, however, lacks citation and is not written for
the scholarly community. Its aim is to provide ethical guidance for the church today.
Another book showing sensitivity towards character ethics is Stephen Fowl's commentary
on Philippians.^^ In his commentary. Fowl repeatedly refers to (jjpoyeo) as "practical
reasoning" and fully acknowledges it as a means toward character formation.^^ However,
without an in-depth background study of ancient virtue ethics, Fowl overlooks various
other themes related to virtue formation and can grapple only with the relationship between
virtue, fi-iendship, and polis in an intuitive manner.
(3) Polis and Concord. Almost all scholars acknowledge that Philippians includes an
urge for the concord of the church.^^ Nonetheless, the importance and extent of this theme
in Philippians is debated. This thesis will argue that the urge for concord is the primary
" Luke Timothy Johnson, "Transformation of the Mind and Moral Discernment in Paul," in Early
Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor ofAbraham J. Malherbe (ed. John T.
Fitzgerald, Thomas H. Olbricht, and L. Michael White; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2003), 215-36.
N. T. Wright, After You Believe: Why Christian Character Matters (New York: HarperOne, 2010).
The book is published in England under the title Virtue Reborn. Wright earlier published an article on the
same subject: N. T. Wright, "Faith, Virtue, Justification, and the Journey to Freedom," in The Word Leaps
the Gap: Essays on Scripture and Theology in Honor ofRichard B. Hays (ed. J. Ross Wagner, Christopher
Kavin Rowe, and A. Katherine Grieb; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2008), 472-97.
Stephen E. Fowl, Philippians (The Two Horizons New Testament Commentary; Grand Rapids,
Mich.: Eerdmans, 2005).
Practical reasoning is also emphasized by Wayne A. Meeks in his short but important article "The
Man fi-om Heaven in Paul's Letter to the Philippians," in The Future ofEarly Christianity: Essays in Honor
ofHelmut Koester (ed. Birger A. Pearson, et al.; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 329-36. It is mentioned also in
Cousar's commentary, but not with the same degree of emphasis. See Charles B. Cousar, Reading Galatians,
Philippians, and 1 Thessalonians: A Literary and Theological Commentary (Reading the New Testament;
Macon, Ga.: Smyth & Helwys, 2001), 130, 50-63, 65, 71, 83.
" See below 3.1.3.
9
purpose ofPhilippians. All other themes are subsumed under this one dominant purpose.
"Subsume" means that while Paul wrote with different purposes in mind, he tailored them
all to serve this one most important purpose�^the concord of the church. For example,
informing the Philippians ofhis own situation is one of the purposes of his letter (Phil
1 : 12-26). But the way Paul articulates his report transforms it into a moral exemplar to
teach the moral virtue that would help sustain the concord of the church. In other words,
concord is the unifying theme summarizing the entire letter. Philippians, in short, is a
speech on concord.
Philippians is not the only treatise on concord extant from Paul. Mitchell Margaret
describes First Corinthians as a deliberative rhetoric on concord.^^ Elna Mouton asserts the
same for Ephesians;''^ loop Smit and Ben Witherington, for Galatians."*' Philemon also can
be viewed as a deliberative rhetoric on concord.
See below 3.2.
Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric ofReconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the
Language and Composition of I Corinthians (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 1993). See also the
earlier work of L. L. Welbom, Politics and Rhetoric in the Corinthian Epistles (Macon, Ga.: Mercer
University Press, 1 997).
'^^ Elan Mouton and Te-li Lau have argued that Ephesians is a deliberative rhetoric on concord. Elan
Mouton claims that Ephesian's pragmatic intent is "for the readers, to live according to their Christ
confession, to live as 'members ofGod's household' . . .by being made new in the attitude of their mind"
("The Communicative Power of the Epistle to the Ephesians," in Rhetoric, Scripture and Theology: Essays
from the 1994 Pretoria Conference [ed. Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht; Sheffield: Sheffield
Academic Press, 1996], 304). Applying MargaretMichell's methodology, she demonstrates that Ephesians,
containing the four common features of deliberative rhetoric, is deliberative (280-307).
Te-Ii Lau's intent is to compare "representative sections ofEphesians with classical Greek and
Roman political thought as found in a broad range of ancient texts. ... By comparing lexical parallels and the
development of themes, I argue that Ephesians can be profitably read as a political letter. It contains political
subjects, terms and topoi. Furthermore, I argue that these political materials serve the deliberative function of
promotingpeace within the eKKlrioCa" (emphasis mine; The Politics ofPeace: Ephesians, Dio Chrysostom,
and the Confucian Four Books [NovTSup; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2010], 79-80). Instead of a narrowing his
comparison on rhetorical features, Lau broadens his perspective to examine themes common to Greco-
Roman political thought. He identifies in Ephesians five common political topoi, including concerns for: (1)
ethnic reconciliation; (2) political unity; (3) ethical injunctions; (4) household management; and (5) warfare
preparation (76-156). Lau in a sense treats Ephesians more as a treatise than as a situation-driven rhetoric.
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statement of Research Issue
The purpose of this study is to argue that Paul's letter to the Philippians is best
understood against the background ofGreco-Roman ethical-political discourse and that
Philippians is a discourse on concord. And concord, as Paul understands it, and as this
thesis will argue, can be achieved only through friendship based on virtue, especially the
virtue ofhumility. Virtue, friendship, and communal harmony are the three binders that
hold Philippians together as a whole.
Neither Mouton nor Lau provides a compositional analysis ofEphesians, yet compositional analysis is
crucial. A tentative structural division for Ephesians is proposed as follows: (1) exordium (Eph 1:1-3:20); (2)
propositio (Eph 4:1-6); (3) probatio (Eph 4:7-9); (4) peroratio (Eph 6:10-20).
Joop Smit notes that "the enumeratio and the amplificatio both lead to the conclusion that in Christ
the Jews are called to unity with the Gentiles (5:6; 6:15). The unity of the Christian community twice forms
the end and goal ofPaul's entire line of thought In the end the highest ideal he aims at is 'the Israel ofGod'
(6:16). God's purpose with his people has now been realized in Christ as 'the Israel ofGod' uniting Jews and
Gentiles within itself Paul's eloquence is at the service of that goal" ("The Letter ofPaul to the Galatians: A
Deliberative Speech," in The Galatians Debate [ed. Mark D. Nanos; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2002],
58).
Ben Witherinton argues that "Galatians is an example of deliberative rhetoric" {Grace in Galatia: A
Commentary on St. Paul's Letter to the Galatians [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998], 27) and that "One of the
ultimate aims of Paul's discourse in this document is to avoid the further fragmentation of the body ofChrist,
and in fact restore harmony, concord and unity in the Galatian assemblies disrupted by the agitators" (36).
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1 THE PROBLEM OF STASIS
This chapter will show that stasis is viewed as an evil not only in the Greco-Roman
literature (1.1), but also in the NT (1.2). This chapter will explore also some of the social-
political factors that contribute to this view (1.3). These understandings will lead then to
Chapter 2, where the explorations of various literary texts will demonstrate that Greco-
Roman authors are eager to promote virtue, friendship, and concord to eliminate the evil of
stasis.
1.1 Stasis in the Greco-Roman World
Many living around the Mediterranean viewed stasis as one of the worst and most
frightening scenarios imaginable.' The famous classical scholar M. I. Finley once noted
that for the Greeks, "faction is the greatest evil and the most common danger."^ He also
notes that among the Greek political writers, "whatever the disagreements among them,
they all insist that the state must stand outside class or otherfactional interests" (emphasis
mine).^ A few quotes from the ancient authors will help demonstrate the truth ofFinley's
words:
'
Stasis, therefore, stands at the centre of ancient Greek historical writing and political thought. Peter T.
Manicas, "War, Stasis, and Greek Political Thought," Comparative Studies in Society andHistory 24 (1982),
673.
^ M. I. Finley, Democracy Ancient and Modern (London: Rutgers University Press, 1985), 44.
^
Finley, Democracy Ancient andModem, 45. According to Finley, all Greek political writers
acknowledge that stasis can be avoided "only by education, moral conduct (especially on the part of those in
authority), morally correct legislation, and the choice of the right governors" (ibid.).
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For all agree that war is the greatest of all evils, just as peace is the greatest of all
goods, and yet stasis is as much a greater evil than war as war is than peace; for in an
external war men die preserving their father land, but in a civil war they die killing
each other, and neither the slayers nor the slain gain any glory. When we fight others,
we fight for our friends, and when we conquer others we make new fiiends; but when
we fight ourselves, we lose even those friends we already have. It would take a large
amount time to relate in detail all that can happen: pillaging of the country,
destruction of property, pleasure for one's enemies, and misfortune for one's fiiends.
(Crifias)"*
There are two kinds [ofwar], the one being that which we all call stasis, which is of
all wars the most bitter (iravTcov voXk\xov xaXeTTcoxaTog),. . . .while the other kind, as I
suppose we shall all agree, is that which we engage in when we quarrel with
foreigners and aliens�a kind much milder than the former. (Plato, Leg. 629d)
Stasis is a harder thing than war to the extent that war has a successfiil outcome
through concord (6|iovoiac;), but peace (elprivri) is destroyed by stasis.... Indeed,
stasis ends peace, but sometimes war ends stasis. So much more preferable is war
than stasis. Actually where there is stasis, here there is also war against oneselves
(irpoc; auToug); but where there is proper war, the danger is both simple and easier.
Indeed, there are two sides to the question ofwar: whether it should or should not be
waged. But no one has ever dared to say that it would be better if stasis would take
place. ... Concerning wars some say that they should not be ended, but concerning
stasis no one has ever openly said that it is unnecessary for it to be stopped as quickly
as possible. With good reason. Wars have in the past conferred a reputation for
moderation and courage upon those who have waged them and have increased their
power, and indeed have allowed them a sense of security for the future. . . But stasis
is, as it were, the sum of all things which are shamefiil and evil (aloxpwv Kal KaKwv),
and far from letting men be superior to others, it does not even let them be equal to
themselves. (Aelius Aristides, De pace 55-57)
All three authors compare stasis with war and come to the conclusion that stasis is much
worse than war.^ Despite war's bitterness and evil, it still can produce a good result. As
such, glory, honor, and virtue can result from war. However, nothing comes from stasis,
except for shame and evil. "All" agree that stasis is the greatest evil and "no one" would
like to see it present. The tone is assertive and comprehensive. Also, all three authors
distinguish war and stasis based on the identity of the enemy. In a war, one fights against
Michael Gagarin and Paul Woodruff, Early GreekPolitical Thoughtfrom Homer to the Sophists
(Cambridge Texts on the History ofPolitical Thought; Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1995), 269.
^ See also Herodotus, Hist. 8.3; Polybius, Hist. 1.71.7; Josephus, J. W. 5.254-6.
13
"others," against "foreigners," and against "aliens." In a stasis, one fights against "each
other," against "oneselves," and against "friends." War is the destruction of the other;
stasis is the destruction of the self No one with a sane mind destroys himself or herself
Self-destruction is abnormal. Like a disease, it defies the normal course of action. As such,
stasis is the sum of all things evil, an evil beyond the greatest evil.^
Contrary to the evil of stasis is the good of concord.^ In a speech to end the civil war
among the Sicilian cities, the orator Hermocrates identifies concord (6|j,oA.eYco) as that
which "all men agree is a most desirable thing" (Thucydides, Hist. 4.57). A similar
assertion is found in the work ofXenophon:
It is generally agreed to be the greatest blessing a state can have. Cabinets and
leading citizens regularly tell the people to achieve unity of purpose. Everywhere in
Greece there exists a law that the people must swear to pursue the same ends in
common purpose; everywhere they take this oath. . . .without homonoia no state and
indeed no family could be in a healthy condition. (Xenophon, Mem. 4.4.16)
Likewise, Isocrates claims that no one needs to remind another "how great is the blessing
of concord (6|i6yoLa) or how great a curse is civil war (oiaoLc;)" (Isocrates, Callim. 44).
Also, Plato claims that "Homonoia is the greatest blessing a state can have, and stasis is
the origin of all our troubles" (Plato, Lys. 18.17). The same praise for concord is found in
the "golden mouth" ofDio Chrysostom:
Concord has been proved (tfjc; b\xovo'\.ac, diroSeLxSeLoric;) to be beneficial to all
mankind (Dio Chrysostom, Nicom. 8); [Concord has been] lauded by all men always
in both speech and writing. Not only are the works ofpoets and philosophers alike
fiiU of its praises, but also all who have published their histories to provide a pattern
for practical application have shovm concord to be the greatest of human blessings
{Nicom. 10); Through which all greatest things are preserved is concord {Nicom. 11).
*
Many texts align stasis together with war and evil. For example, Solon, Frg. 4.19; Isocrates, Ep.
9.S.6; Paneg. 168; Xenophon, Mew. 1.2.63; Hell. 1.4.10; Josephus, J. fT. 4.397; 6.13.
^ Klaus Thraede, "Homonoia (Eintracht)," RAC 16:176-289 (with extended bibliography); John
Ferguson, Moral Values in the Ancient World (London: Methuen, 1958), 118-32; P. Jal, "Pax Civihs�
Concordia," Revue des Etudes Latines 39 (1961): 210-3 1. See also the bibliography in Mitchell, Paul and the
Rhetoric ofReconciliation, 60nl90.
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The aforementioned quotes demonstrate the Greco-Roman world's view of stasis as the
greatest evil and concord the greatest blessing. Thus, the endeavor to avoid stasis and to
promote concord is found always in the Greco-Roman world. Accordingly, these are the
great themes of the Greco-Roman literature.
Homer's Iliad is said to have been composed as an accusation against faction (Aelius
Aristides, Depace 58). The Archaic Greek poetry is said to have preserved the intense
ideological conflict between the "elitist" and the "middling."^ Empedocles' philosophy
argues that love {^iXm) and strife {v^Ikoq) are the basic cosmic forces that drive the
universe. Aristophanes' Knights has stasis as its major subject.^ Sophocles' Ajax, Oedipus
at Colonus, and Antigone has stasis as a major theme.'*^ Euripides' Orestes describes a
city dismembered through stasis. Aeschylus' Eumenides is a story of how internecine
strife ended with the establishment of the Athenian court. Thucydides depicts the
Peloponnesian War as a massive stasis. Plato's theory ofjustice (the major theme of The
Republic) is said to be incomprehensible apart from his analysis ofstasis.
^'^ A prominent
classic scholar once argued that "Greek and Roman political theory is above all else the
Leslie V. Kurke, "Archaic Greek Poetry," in The Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece (ed. H.
A. Shapiro; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 212-34.
' Lowell Edmimds, "The Aristophanic Cleon's 'Disturbance' ofAthens," The American Journal of
Philology 108 (1987): 233-63.
'� D. M. Juffras, "Friendship and Faction in Sophocles: Greek Political Thinking and the 'Ajax,'
'Antigone,' and 'Oedipus at Colonus'" (Ph.D. Thesis, University ofMichigan, 1988).
" J. Peter Euben, "Political Corruption in Euripides' Orestes," in Greek Tragedy and Political Theory
(ed. J. Peter Euben; Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1986), 222-51.
Suzanne Said, "Tragedy and Politics," in Democracy, Empire, and the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens
(ed. Deborah Boedeker and Kurt A. Raaflaub; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 275-95.
Jonathan J. Price, Thucydides and Internal War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
John R. Wallach, The Platonic PoliticalArt: A Study ofCritical Reason andDemocracy (University
Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 237n56.
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search for a remedy for the malaise ofstasis."^^ Josephus sees the fall of Jerusalem as the
result of stasis.^^ Appian's Roman History is noted for its description of the stasis that
took place in the late Roman Republic. In sum, stasis is a prominent theme in Greco-
Roman discourse and is discussed in various literary works ofpoetry, drama, historical
writings, philosophical writings, and so on.'^ Stasis is a prominent theme, for it determines
the rise and fall of a polis.
1.2 Stasis in the New Testament
Not only is stasis noted in the Greco-Roman literature as a powerful destructive force,
it is also a well-known evil in the NT.
(1) James, for example, speaks of the contrast between stasis ((XKaiaoTaoLa; James
3:16)'^ and peace (James 3:18).'^ These are the results of hearts nurtured by different sorts
of "wisdom." The wisdom that is "from above" (James 3:17) fosters certain characteristics
in the heart of a person. These characteristics include peaceable (elprivLKri), gentle
Malcolm Schofield, Saving the City: Philosopher-Kings and Other Classical Paradigms (Issues in
Ancient Philosophy; New York: Routledge, 1999), 1 .
Tessa Rajak, Josephus: The Historian andHis Society (2nd ed.; London: Duckworth, 2002), 91.
Historically, the Greek world has continuously been plagued by stasis: Alexander Fuks, Social
Conflict in Ancient Greece (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984); A. W. Lintott, Violence, Civil Strife, and Revolution in
the Classical City, 750-330 B.C. (London: Groom Helm, 1982).
Plato understands bmoiaaiQ as an enhanced version of stasis: "It is necessary in a State which is to
avoid that greatest ofplagues {\i^yiaio\} voatiiiaxoc;), which is better termed disruption {bianmaiv) than
dissension (amoLv)" (Plato, Laws 5.744d4).
Martin Dibelius refers to James 3:13-18 and 4:1-12 as "a group of sayings against contentiousness"
{James: A Commentary on the Epistle ofJames [Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976], 207). But these
passages are perhaps better viewed as "a group of sayings against stasis." Ralph P. Martin describes these
passages as about stasis. Accordingly, Martin writes, "One suggested setting of the troubles to which James
alludes could be that of congregational strife, leading to unruly behavior, disorderly worship, and a challenge
to recognized authority, as at Corinth (1 Cor 14:33; 2 Cor 12:20; IClem 3:1-4; 14:1�texts that have several
words or their equivalents in common with our passage�Cfi^og, epi^, dKaiaotaoLa, (^p6vi\iOQ)." (James
[WBC; Waco, Tex.: Word, 1988], 127). Martin missed one of the most relevant passages: Gal 5:20. See also
Pheme Perkins, "James 3:16-4:3," Int 36 (1982): 283-87.
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(67TL�LKr|g), and yielding (emeiQ^Q) capable ofproducing behaviors characterized by
goodness, impartiality, and the absence ofhypocrisy. The Scripture writer used great care
in selecting the aforementioned adjectives to describe the heart of wisdom not only for
alliteration, but also because these virtues help nourish harmony in a community. On the
contrary, the "wisdom" that is "earthly, unspiritual, and devilish" (James 3:15) fosters
hearts filled with "bitter jealousy (Cfi^oc) and self-ambition (epiGgia)" (James 3:16), vices
that lead to ''stasis (dKaxaoTaoia) and wickedness of every kind" (James 3:16). Envy and
self-ambition, as this thesis shall demonstrate, are vices commonly held responsible for the
uprising of stasis that can destroy communities (3.2.5).
James 3:13-18 reveals a link between wisdom/knowledge, hearts nurtured by wisdom,
and the communal life based on habits ofheart. A just community results when community
members make peace by accepting the divine wisdom in order to cultivate the virtues
orientating themselves toward others. Wisdom, virtue, and communal life are bound
together closely. True wisdom leads to peace, whereas false wisdom leads to stasis.
In chapter 4, James looks fiarther into the phenomenon of stasis.^^ He starts chapter 4
with a question when he vmtes, "Those wars (iroA-eiioL) and battles (iidxaL) among you
(h[iiv; pi), where do they come from?" (James 4:1). Wars and battles are concepts closely
related to the phenomena of stasis. They often appear in the same context. The first
question is immediately followed by another: "Do they not come from your passions (tqv
James B. Adamson's comment on the relationship between chapters 3 and 4 is apt. He writes,
"Having declared at the end of ch. 3 that true wisdom is peace, and false wisdom, strife, James naturally
begins ch. 4 with some remarks on the genesis of strife: it springs, he says, from our lusts" (The Epistle of
James [NICNT; Grand Rapids: Erdmans, 1976], 166).
^' n6A.e|io<; and lidxr) are frequently combined. In the present context, no distinction ofmeaning
between the two terms exists.
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fiSovcoy u|j,oov) that are at war within you?" (James 4:2). This question begins with the
particle ou expecting an affirmative answer. Yes, the wars and battles have roots in the
"passions." James further clarifies his ideas related to passions in James 4:2 when he writes,
"You desire and you do not have: so you murder. And you are jealous and cannot obtain:
so you do battle and wage war" (eiTL9u|i6Lt� Kal ouk exexe, (|)oy�U6Te Kal CnXoutg Kal ou
6iJvao9e eTTLxuxelv, |idxeo0e Kal iroA.eiielTe). This verse is composed of two parallel
sentences depicting the same social phenomenon. The second sentence reinforces the first
by the use of stronger vocabularies: "not having" is elevated to "not able to obtain;"
"murder" is elevated to "battle and war."^^ However, the message of the two sentences is
essentially the same: stasis originates in the desires for gain.
James tends to repeat himself James 1:14-15 forewarns that desire leads to death. In
like manner, James 3:14-16 foreshadows that jealousy leads to war. Both desire and
jealousy are passions for greater material gain. They are passions for the world and reveal
the wish to befriend the world (James 4:4). Not only are they desires for gain, they also are
desires for gain at the expense ofothers. As such, these characteristics are expressions of
envy.^"* These evils lead eventually to the destruction of the community. Because of these
evils, the community is divided into factions, killing, battling, and warring against each
The word ri6ovri normally means "pleasure" or "enjoyment," but here it functions as a synonym for
"passion." Cf Dibelius, Greeven, and Koester, James, 125n40.
Murder often is associated with jealousy (CtiIocj) and envy (4)e6vo(;), as is the case in Rom 1:29 and
Gal 5:21 (var.). Word plays on ^Qovoc, and (jjoveuu are found early on in Greek literature, e.g., Euripides Tro.
766ff.
Luke Timothy Johnson, "James 3.13-4.10 and the Topos HEPI OGONOY," NovT15 (1983): 327-47.
These are common themes in the Greco-Roman world. For example, Plato identifies desire as the
"sole cause ofwars and revolutions" (Plato, Phaed. 66c); Cicero sees cupiditates as the source of hatred,
quarrels, strife, sedition and wars (Cicero, Fm. 1.13.43-44). See Dibelius, Greeven, and Koester, James, 215.
Sophie Laws, The Epistle ofJames (BNTC; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1993), 168.
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other. In James' view, uncontrolled passions lead directly to the collapse of the
community.'^^
(2) Paul, like James, also has much to say about stasis. His vice lists serve as a good
example and reveal the importance ofstasis in his thought. Paul is a child of both Jewish
and Hellenistic culture. Like all Hellenists, he sees stasis as one of the most formidable
evils harming the communal life. Many of the vices enumerated in his vice lists relate to
internecine war. To understand Paul's vice list, the best place to start is the list in Gal 5:19-
20:
Anyone can see the kind ofbehavior that belongs to the lower nature: fornication,
impurity, and indecency; idolatry and sorcery; enmities, strife, jealousy, outbursts of
wrath, selfish ambitions, dissensions, factions, and envy;^^ drinking bouts, orgies,
and the like. I warn you, as I warned you before, that those who behave in such ways
will never inherit the kingdom ofGod.
In his commentary on Galatians, Ronald Fung writes, "the fifteen items as they stand may
be broadly classified into four groups."^^ The four categories are: (1) sexual sins
(fornication, impurity, and indecency); (2) religious deviations (idolatry and sorcery); (3)
disorders in personal relationships (enmities [^xQpcc], strife fepig], jealousy [CfjA-oc;],
outbursts ofwrath [6u|i6(;], selfish ambitions [kpiQda], dissensions [Sixooxaoia], factions
[aipeoLt;], and envy [(t)e6yo(;]); (4) sins of intemperance (drinking bouts, orgies). Similar
James Strange makes the same observation: "[James] blames strife among community members on
their failure (or refusal) to control their desire (4:1-2). Indeed, unfettered desire is the primary source of
destructive behavior in the community, according to James" (The Moral World ofJames: Setting the Epistle
in Its Greco-Roman and Judaic Environments [Studies in Biblical Literature; New York: Peter Lang, 2010],
23). James Ropes rightly claims James' link between desire, strife, and destruction as a commonplace of
Greco-Roman ethics: "This passage is made more intelligible by passages from Greek and Roman writers,
which show that not only the connection ofpleasure and desire, but that of desire, conflict, and war, was a
commonplace ofpopular moralizing in the Hellenistic age" (A Critical andExegetical Commentary on the
Epistle ofSt. James [ICC; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916], 257).
Some manuscripts have (^ovoi ("murders") following envy. Whether it was original or not, it shows
a close relationship between envy and murder as is the case in James 4:2. See note 22 above.
Ronald Y. K. Fung, The Epistle to the Galatians (NICNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1988),
253.
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groupings can be found, for example, in 1 Corinthians. The table below brings together
from other Pauline letters the vices Fung calls "disorders in personal relationships."
Rom 1:29^� unrighteousness ((x6i.KLa), wicl<edness (iroyripLa), covetousness (irleove^La), malice (KaKLoc), envy
((t)G6yog), murder (i^ovoc,), strife (epit;), deceit (66A.o<;), evil disposition (KaKoriGeia), whisperer (i|/LOupLotr|(;),
evil-speaker (KOLzakaXoc), God-hater (Qioaxhyr\c,), insulting (uPpLOtTji;), proud (mep-i\^avoc,), boaster (dlccCcoy),
inventor of evil (ect)eupetr|(; KaKcov), disobedient to parents (yov^vaiv a-neiQflc,), unintelligent (aawixoQ),
faithless (aawQ^xoc,), without natural affection (ttOTopyog) unmerciful (aveXer\\iwv)
2 Cor 12:20 strife (epiq), jealousy (Cf\Xoc,), wrath (Quiiog), selfish ambition (kpiQda), evil-speaking (KaTaA.aA,Ld),
whispering (i|;L6upi.op.6q), puffing up (^vaLujaiQ), insurrections (dKatKOTaoiai)
Eph 4:31 bitterness (irLKpCa), wrath (9u|i6(;), anger (opyri), clamour (Kpauyri), evil-speaking (P^ao4)r)|iLa),
malice (KaKta)
Colossians 3:5, 8 covetousness (TT^eove^ia), anger (opyri), wrath (eu^og), malice (KaKia), evil-speaking
(^hta^rpLa), filthy talking (aloxpo/loYia)
1 Timothy 6:4 envy {(|)96voq), strife (epii;), evil-speaking (pAxcocjjrmia), evil suspicion (uirovoLa mv^poc),
wrangling (5ia-iTtxpaTpi,pr|)
Although no two lists are the same, a form of family resemblance between these lists is
nonetheless apparent. First, "strife" C^ptc) tends to hold a prominent position in the lists
(Gal 5:20; 2 Cor 12:20; 1 Tim 6:4; cf Phil 1:15). It tends to appear at the beginning. One
must note also that "strife" is one of the most often mentioned vices in the Pauline corpus
(Rom 1:29; 13:13; 1 Cor 1:11; 3:3; 2 Cor 12:20; Gal 5:20; Phil 1:15; 1 Tim 6:4; Titus 3:9).
Second, "envy," either in the form of ^Qovoq or Cr\XoQ, often appears in close proximity to
"strife" (Rom 1:29; 2 Cor 12:20; Gal 5:20; 1 Tim 6:4; cf Rom 13:13; 1 Cor 3:3; Phil 1:15;
James 3:16). Third, "wrath" and "anger" appear fi-equently among the lists (2 Cor 12:20;
Gal 5:20; Eph 4:31; Col 3:8; cf Rom 2:8). Wrath is a form of senselessness.
Paul's list does not differ much fi-om the lists foimd in the Greco-Roman literature.
For example, in Sophocles, one finds the list of envy, stasis, strife, war, and murder
Three short lists are foimd in 1 Cor 5:10, 1 1, and 6:9-10. They have much in common. All three
contain vices from each of the four categories named by Fung. The order of these vices also is similar, except
for the vice of idolatry, which moves from the bottom (1 Cor 5:10) to the middle (1 Cor 5:1 1) and to the front
(1 Cor 6:9-10). This thesis does not intend to give a frill analysis ofPaul's vice list. Suffice to say that Paul
does have in mind different categories of vices.
^� Note that this list also comes after sexual sins and religious deviation as in Gal 5:19-20.
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(<^Q6voq, oxaoiQ, IpiQ, [idxai, (1)6vol) (Sophocles, Oed Col. 1234). In Pseudo-Demosthenes,
malediction, evil-speaking, envy, stasis, and dissension (dpd, ^Xao(^r\\iia, (^Qovoq, otdoLc;,
veiKoc) (Demosthenes, / Aristog. 52); In Xenophon, there is the sequence of "strife C^pig)
and anger (opyri) leading to hostility illoX^i\.Khv), covetousness (6 tou -rTA,�ov�Kt�LV epcog)
leading to enmity (6uop,6V6(;), and jealousy ((j)96vo(;) leading to hatred ([ilotitov)"
(Xenophon, Mem. 2.21). All these anti-social behaviors are related to discord.^'
(3) Texts drawn from the Gospels and from Revelation describing the end-time
events that are to take place before the parousia (see chart below) reveal also the evil of
stasis?^ These events are set in a particular order starting with war and sfrife followed by
famines, earthquakes, pestilence, and persecutions, and ending with cosmological events,
projecting unusual movements of the sun, moon, and stars, shaking the powers of heaven.^^
These texts bear similarity to one another with only a few variations. The variations come
into play in the middle portion of the lists. Both Matthew and Mark have famines,
earthquakes, and persecutions in the middle of their lists, whereas Luke replaces
persecution with pestilence. Revelation replaces earthquakes with pestilence (still,
earthquakes appear in the last section of the list).
^' James W. Thompson, Moral Formation According to Paul: The Context and Coherence ofPauline
Ethics (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 201 1), 99-101.
�'^ The chart is adapted from R. H. Charles, A Critical andExegetical Commentary on the Revelation
ofSt. John, 2 vols. (ICC; New York: Scribner, 1920), 1:158.
" Josephus: "the vengeance ofRome, famine and pestilence added to the horrors ofwar and, as a final
disaster, internecine strife" (J.W. 4.361).
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Matthew 24:6, 7, 9a, 29 Mark 13:7-9a, 24-25
1 ) wars 1 ) wars
2) strife 2) strife
3) famines 3) earthquakes
4) earthquakes 4) famines
5) persecutions 5) persecutions
6) EcHpses of the sun and moon; falling of
the stars; shaking of the powers ofheaven.
6) as in Matthew...
Luke21:9-12a, 25-26 Revelation 6:2-17, 7:1-3
1) wars 1) wars
2) strife 2) strife
3) earthquakes 3) famines
4) famines 4) pestilence (Death and Hades)^"*
5) pestilence 5) persecutions
6) Signs in the sun, moon, and stars; men
fainting for fear of the things coming on
the world; shaking of the powers of
heaven.
6) (6:12-7:3) Earthquakes, eclipse of the
sun, ensanguining of the moon, falling of
the stars, men calling on the rocks to fall
on them, shaking of the powers of heaven,
four destroying winds.
Revelation depicts these end time events graphically when it describes horse men with
different colored horses. The first horse man, a great conqueror, comes with a white horse.
The second horse man comes with a red horse. He is "permitted to take peace from the
earth (la^lv iV elpriyriv 4k xf\c, yf\Q), so that people would slaughter one another; and
was given a great sword (fidxaipa)" (Rev 6:3). Commentators agree that the phrase "slay
one another" (aXXr\Xovc, ocjjd^ouoLv) refers to civil strife.^^ G. K. Beale cites Matt 10:34-36
as a support.^^ In Matthew, Jesus says, "Do not think that I have come to bring peace on
earth (paMv elprivriy eirl xr[V yf\v) but to bring a sword (iidxatpa)." The same passage
continues with a depiction of strife within a household: "a man against his father, and a
daughter against her mother, and a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law; and a man's
The word "pestilence" (found in almost all modem translations) translates the Greek word Qclvclxoc,,
which literally means death. However, the word also can mean "a particular maimer of death." Here in this
context it refers to fatal illness and pestilence. See BDAG s.v., "QavaioQ."
G. K. Beale, The Book ofRevelation: A Commentary on the Greek Text (NIGTC; Grand Rapids,
Mich.: Eerdmans, 1999), 379; Charles, A Critical andExegetical Commentary on the Revelation ofSt. John,
164; J. Massyngberde Ford, Revelation (AB; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1975), 106.
Beale, The Book ofRevelation, 379.
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foes will be those ofhis own household" (Matt 10:35-36). The parallel between Rev 6:3
and Matt 10:34 shows that Rev 6:3 is about civil strife.
When the Gospels describe the second of the end-time events, the authors write,
"nation will rise (eyepGrioeTaL) against nation; and kingdom against kingdom" (Matt 24:7;
Mark 13:8; Luke 21:10). This passage would seem at first to be a depiction ofwar between
nations. However, if read in view of Isa 19:2, the subject becomes clear to be civil strife,
rather than war.^^ Thus, in both Revelation and in the Gospels, stasis is known as a great
evil listed alongside war, earthquakes, famines, and pestilence.
(4) Accused by his opponents of casting out demons through Beelzebul, Jesus
answers:
If a kingdom is divided against itself, that kingdom cannot stand. If a house is
divided against itself, that house will not be able to stand. If Satan has risen up
against himself and is divided, he cannot stand, but he is finished! (Mark 3:24-26;
Matt 12:25; Luke ll:17b-18a)
Apparently, in Jesus' understanding, no household and no kingdom can stand with stasis.
Stasis inevitably ruins a community. Leon Morris writes, "This is an elementary piece of
the wisdom of this world, and Jesus is suggesting that the Pharisees are naive if they think
that Satan is not well aware of it."^^ Stasis as an destructive evil force is widely
acknowledged by ancients.
(5) Finally, the death of Jesus also reveals the evil ofstasis. In both Mark and Luke,
Jesus, before his crucifixion, was placed beside a man named Barabbas, responsible for
" Isaiah 19:2 (LXX) reads: "And the Egyptians shall be stirred up (k-ney^pQ-qaovxai) against the
Egyptians: and a man shall fight against his brother, and a man against his neighbor, city against city, and
law against law." Both the gospels and Isaiah use the same verb eireyeLpcj in ind. fiit. pass. The verb is also
used in / Clem. 3:3 for internal strife: "So the worthless rose up (eTrnyepOTiaav) against the honored, those of
no reputation against such as were renowned, the foolish against the wise, the young against those advanced
in years."
Leon Morris, The Gospel According to Matthew (A Pillar Commentary; Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Eerdmans, 1992), 315.
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stasis and murder ((^ovoq) (Mark 15:7; Luke 23:19, 25). This alignment is not
misplacement. Jesus was crucified as "the king of the Jews." As such, Jesus' crime was the
same as that ofBarabbas, as both men had committed the crime of insurrection.^'^ When
Jesus was crucified, he was placed in between two A,TioTaL. This word was used by
Josephus to designate the Jewish revolutionaries.'*'^ In other words, Jesus died politically as
a man who had committed the crime of stasis. And since that stasis was one of the most
horrible crimes, Jesus therefore was fit to die the most gruesome death possible, namely,
the crucifixion.
Not only was the gruesomeness of the cross a fitting punishment for the horrifying
stasis, the lifting of the cross was also a fit for the haughtiness that motivates the work of
stasis. Joel Marcus asserts that Jesus' crucifixion as a parodic exaltation was not an
invention of the Gospel writers. Instead, it was a parody intended by the Roman authorities:
I would like to suggest that irony was exactly their intention: this strangely "exalting"
mode of execution was designed to mimic, parody, and puncture the pretensions of
insubordinate transgressors by displaying a deliberately horrible mirror of their self-
elevation. For it is revealing that the criminals so punished were often precisely
people who had, in the view of their judges, gotten "above" themselves�rebellious
slaves, for example, or slaves who had insulted their masters, or people of any class
who had not shown proper deference to the emperor, not to mention those who had
revolted against him or who had, through brigandage or piracy, demonstrated disdain
for imperial rule. Crucifixion was intended to unmask, in a deliberately grotesque
manner, the pretension and arrogance of those who had exalted themselves beyond
their station; the authorities were bent on demonstrating through the graphic tableau
of the cross what such self-promotion meant and whither it led. Crucifixion, then, is a
prime illustration ofMichel Foucault's thesis that the process of execution is a "penal
liturgy" designed to reveal the essence of the crime.'**
Barabbas is called a omamoxr\c. in Mark 15:7. The word is translated as seditiosis in the Vulgate.
''� Joel Marcus, Mark: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB; New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 2009), 1029. Marcus also notes that in John 18:40, Barabbas was described as a
Xr\ax-(\c,.
Joel Marcus, "Crucifixion as Parodic Exaltation," JBL 125 (2006): 78-79.
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Jesus was hanged high on the cross because he committed the crime of insurrection,
exalting himself up high as the king of the Jews. The highly-lifted cross was the Roman
response to the excessive haughtiness of the insurrectionist who brought stasis to the Pax
Romana.
1.3 Stasis and its Sociological Basis
Knowing that stasis and concord were some of the most important themes in the
Greco-Roman world, ifnot the most important theme, one might ask the question why?
Why were these themes so important? What were the social-political factors that gave
them prominence? Moshe Berent's article "Stasis, or the Greek Invention ofPolitics"
provides an answer to these questions."*'^ He argues that stasis was made a prominent theme
in Greek political discourse because the Greekpolis was a "stateless community."''^ By
"stateless community," he means that no agency within the Greek society had monopoly
over violence:
[The polis] is a relatively egalitarian unstratified community characterized by the
absence of coercive apparatuses, that is by the fact that the application of violence is
not monopolized by an agency or a ruling class, and the ability to use force is more-
or-less evenly distributed among an armed or potentially armed population. The fear
of stasis was directly related to the absence ofpublic means to restrain a seditious
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party.
Moshe Berent, "Stasis, or the Greek Invention ofPolitics," History ofPolitical Thought 19 (1998):
331-62.
Mogens H. Hansen argues otherwise. He argues that the polis always has a double meaning of first
being a place of settlement, i.e., a city; second, being a political community, i.e., a state. Thus, it is
"extremely precise" to translate polis as city-state (Polis: An Introduction to the Ancient Greek City-State
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006], 58). For fiirther information on the debate between Berent and
Hansen, see Moshe Berent, "Anthropology and the Classics: War, Violence, and the Stateless Polis," The
Classical Quarterly 50 (2000): 257-89; Moshe Berent, "hi Search of the Greek State: A Rejoinder to M.H.
Hansen," Polis 21 (2004): 107-46; Moshe Berent, "The Stateless Polis: A Reply to Critics," Social Evolution
& History 5 (2006): 141-63; Mogens H. Hansen, " Was the Polis a State or a Stateless Society?" in Even
More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis (ed. Thomas Heine Nielsen; Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2002), 17-47.
Berent, "Stasis, or the Greek Invention ofPolitics," 333.
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Max Weber famously defined the modem state as, "that human community which
(successfiiUy) lays claim to the monopoly oflegitimate physical violence within a certain
territory."'*^ The Greek poleis lacked such monopolization. It was stateless. In the Greek
polis, there was no police force, no standing army, and no courts separated fi-om the civil
society. In other words, there was no state apparatus above the civil society, overlooking it
and securing its well-fiinctioning. The civil society was the state-po/w itself Force (the
means to coercion) was equally distributed among the citizens. The citizens did not gather
at the agora to discuss how the central government should be organized, checked, and
balanced, so it may serve in their interests, for no such central government existed. The
government was within the society. The citizens gathered at the agora to discuss what they
as citizens of the polis should do. They were the arbitrators, the legislators, and the
executers.
The decentralized nature of the polis also is confirmed by the lack of taxation. There
was no centralized apparatus to collect tax (by means of force) and redistribute the goods.
Rather, the economic burden of the polis was upon the rich. They had the responsibility to
perform "liturgies" that would keep the public services in function ."'^ The polis was viewed
as a KOLVovia, within which the rich had the duty to share goods with others.
For the reasons mentioned above, stasis was regarded as the greatest evil in the
Greek world. According to this view, faction caused not only the breakdown of the civil
society, but also the complete ruin of the polis, politics, and everything related to
Max Weber, "The Profession and Vocation ofPoUtics (1919)," in Weber: Political Writings (ed.
Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 310-11.
Cf Isocrates, Areop. 25
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communal life. The polis was the congregation of its citizens. To divide the citizens into
two was to tear down the polis and bring it to destruction."*^
These statements apply also to the poleis of the later Hellenistic and Roman periods.
According to Mogens Hansen, during the Hellenistic period, "self-government (autonomia)
remained an ideal and an expressly state goal for apolis."^^ Ryan Balot notes that the polis
in the Hellenistic period remained largely a self-governing community:
Contrary to traditional modem views, however, the dominance of these kingdoms did
not spell the demise of the Greekpolis. Civic life in the Greek cities continued to be
vibrant and centrally important to Greek citizens. Epigraphic studies and
reevaluations of the literary sources, Polybius in particular, have shown that Greek
citizens continued to care deeply about their citizenship. They manned local militias,
stmggled to win political office, and educated the young in civic values. In foreign
policy, of course, the autonomy of the Greekpoleis was largely circumscribed. But
many Greek cities had long experienced the condition ofbeing subject to some sort
of outside control, whether that of Athens or Sparta or Persia. To many Greeks,
therefore, politics carried on largely as usual."*
The same is tme also of the poleis in the Roman period. Wilfried Nippel points out that
Rome had no central peacekeeping police force. When political turmoil arose, "Magistrates
had to face the citizenry in person: they could not avoid the risks ofphysical confrontation
with the addressees of their orders. Magistrates had to rely on the acceptance of their
authority and not (or not so much at least) on threatening or applying coercion."^� The
''^
However, interestingly, stasis is not outlawed in the Greekpolis. The reason for not outlaing stasis
lies also in the concept of "stateless community." In the absence of a centralized apparatus in control of
violence the only way to check a seditious party is by another one.
Hansen, Polis, 132. In this book Hansen identifies four features of the city-state cultures: "(1) a
degree of urbanization unexampled in major states before the Industrial Revolution, which began in the
second half of the eighteenth century; (2) an economy based on trade and centered on the city's market; (3) a
political decision-making process whereby laws and decrees were not always dictated by a monarch, but
were often passed by majority votes after a debate in an assembly, which mostly was a selection from among
the better-class citizens but sometimes included them all; (4) interaction between city-states, which resulted
in the rise of leagues of states and federal states" (ibid., 2).
Ryan K. Balot, GreekPolitical Thought (Ancient Cultures; Maiden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2006), 267.
Wilfiied Nippel, "Policing Rome," The Journal ofRoman Studies 74 (1984): 21.
27
lictors that accompany the magistrates were but symbolic representation of the magistrate's
claim to obedience.^'
Moreover, literary evidence shows the first centurypoleis in the Roman east as
governed by lively assemblies attended by local citizens.^^ Acts, for example, has
numerous such examples (cf Acts 19:23-41). Also, numerous other evidences can be
drawn from Dio Chrysostom, Josephus, and Plutarch."
In sum, the first century poleis in the Roman east, like its Greek predecessors, were
"stateless" lacking any sort of centralized political apparatus. In such poleis, the governing
force was largely in the hands of the local citizens themselves. Stasis, therefore, was
considered a major threat to the well-being of the polis.
In an important study on stasis, Kostas Kalimtzis extracts from Thucydides' account
of the stasis at Corcyra five central themes concerning stasis. These themes were later
theorized by philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle. These themes include:
(1) The classification of stasis as a deviant political process
(2) The observation that stasis is accompanied by transformations in values; the
tendency being for the replacement of common-interest with private-interest
values
(3) The dissolution of familial and political friendship ties, and replacement of these
bonds by "party associations" that exist outside of the constitutional framework
(4) The identification of honor and gain as the objectives of stasis, and terror and
fraud as the means
^'
Nippel, "Policing Rome," 23.
Anna Criscinda Miller, "Ekklesia: 1 Corinthians in the Context ofAncient Democratic Discourse"
(Ph. D. Thesis, Harvard University: Graduate School ofArts and Sciences, 2008), 45-123.
Cf. Plutarch's Political Advice and OldMen in PoliticalAffairs; Josephus' Mosaic sections in Ant.
2.217-4.331. He sets the ancient Israelites in the setting of a democratic ekklesia. Most ofDio Chrysostom's
speeches were delivered before an active and lively ekklesia. Giovanni Salmeri, "Dio, Rome, and the Civic
Life ofAsia Minor," in Dio Chrysostom: Politics, Letters, andPhilosophy (ed. Simon Swain; Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), 53-92.
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(5) The variabiUty and unpredictability of stasis and the prominence of unbounded
passions in the process.^"*
In other words, at the root ofstasis is the irrational and uncontrollable passion that seeks
for private-interest in honor and gain. This act of greed destroys the familial and friendship
ties that bind the polis together in unity. Once the ties are broken, the polis falls into stasis.
And stasis inevitably leads the polis to its destruction. In contrary to the sequence of vice,
faction, and destruction, Greco-Roman political discourse proclaims the remedy of virtue,
fi-iendship, and salvation. Their yearning for concord and salvation is revealed in two
memorable prayers:^^
I pray that stasis, greedy (d-rrA-riOTov) for evil, may never clamor in this city, and may
the dust not drink the black blood of its people and through passion cause ruinous
murder for vengeance (dvTi^ovohQ) to the destruction of the state. But may they
return joy for joy (xap^iaxa) in a spirit of common love (KOLi^ocfjiM StavoLa), and
may they hate with one mind (jiia (|)p6VL); for this is the cure ofmany an evil in the
world. (Aeschylus, Eum. 976-987)
Very wealthy Eirene, most beautiful of the blessed gods, I long for you, for you tarry.
I am afraid that old age may overcome me with toil before I behold your charming
youth, and your songs with their beautiful dances, and your crown loving revels.
Come to my city, mistress, but keep hateful (exQpccv) Stasis away from the house, and
mad (jiaLi'oiievay) Eris, who delights in the sharpened sword. (Euripides,
Kresphontes frg. 453)^^
In Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, Werner Jaeger, while commenting on 1
Clement, writes, "we remember that concord (homonoia) had always been the slogan of
peacemaking leaders and political educators, of poets, sophists, and statesmen in the
^'^ Kostas Kalimtzis, Aristotle on Political Enmity andDisease: An Inquiry into Stasis (Suny Series in
Ancient Greek Philosophy; Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 2000), 8-9.
Also, one reads from Aristophanes: "Let him be mute and stand aside from our sacred
dances...Whoever does not eliminate hatefiil stasis (otccolv kx^pkv), and is disagreeable to the citizens, but
kindles and fans civil strife, in his thirst for private advantage (KepScov iblwv einGuiicov)" (Aristophanes,
Frogs 354-360).
Aimette Harder, Euripides
'
Kresphontes andArchelaos: Introduction, Text, and Commentary
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985), 43, 102-10.
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classical age of the Greek polis. In his footnote to this passage he names Solon's elegy
Eunomia, Aeschylus' Eumenides, and sophist Antiphon's prose as forerunners of this
tradition.^^ Informed by Jaeger, this thesis will begin its exploration on stasis and concord
with the work of Solon.
" Werner Wilhelm Jaeger, Early Christianity and GreekPaideia (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1965), 13.
Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, 13n3.
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2 VIRTUE, FRIENDSHIP, AND CONCORD IN THE GRECO-ROMAN WORLD
This chapter will examine the works of nine different authors or schools of thought
including Solon, Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, Cynicism, Epicureanism, Stoicism, Josephus,
and Fourth Maccabees. The purpose of this chapter is to show that vice (especially the
desires for gain and honor) leads to faction and the destruction of the polis; whereas virtue
leads to friendship and concord. In cases where there is a complete text to deal with
(Solon's Eunomia, Thucydides' History, Plato's Republic, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
and Politics, Josephus' Jewish War, and Fourth Maccabees), this thesis intends to follow
the argumentative/narrative flow of the text as close as possible. In cases where literary
evidences are fragmented and scattered (Cynicism, Epicureanism, Stoicism), this thesis
will take a thematic approach.
2.1 Solon
The Greek Dark Age ended with the 8* century renaissance' and introduced the
Archaic Greek period which spans from 776 B.C. to 490 B.C.^ Things changed rapidly
during this period. Trade increased. Colonies were founded throughout the Mediterranean
and around the Black Sea. The Greek alphabet was invented. Cult centers were established
throughout the Greek territory. Literature began to flourish. Homer wrote his Iliad and
' For a general survey see Nancy H. Demand, A History ofAncient Greece (Overture Books; Boston,
Mass.: McGraw-Hill Companies, 1996), 94-117.
^ 776 B.C. is the traditional date of the first Olympic Games. 490 B.C. is the date for the battle of
Marathon, the beginning of the First Persian War.
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Odyssey, Hesiod wrote liis poems. Ionian sculptures were revived. Milesian thinkers broke
away from mythology and began to engage in philosophy. Poets such as Archilochus,
Alcaeus, and Sappho created lyric meters. However, most important of all these cultural
phenomena was the emergence of the polis?
The polies first were ruled by kings with advisory councils composed of nobles.
Kings made major decisions in dialogue with the demos (male citizenry arrayed for battle)
in the assembly {ekklesia). However, as the economy began to grow, the economic gap
between the rich and the poor began to expand. As a result, society became dangerously
unstable. Economic distress and social-political discontent soon began to engulfGreece,
thus leading to the expulsion of the nobles and the raise of tyrant rulers in various cities."*
Tyrants are unconstitutional rulers who take the advantage of the people's dissatisfaction
and seize power for their own advantage.^
In fear of tyranny, the nobles ofAthens summoned Solon and gave him absolute
authority for one year to reform Athens. Solon was made archon in year 594 B.C. and was
charged with the task to end the civil strife in Athens.^ To accomplish his task, he made
^ See the important study by Ian Morris, Burial andAncient Society: The Rise of the Greek City-State
(New Studies in Archaeology; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Morris writes, "In the eighth
century the Greeks developed a radically new concept of the state, which has no parallels in any other
complex society" (2). During this period "the idea of thepolis as a koinonia emerged quite suddenly, and
form that time on we can speak of the existence of thepolis" (3).
"
Acragas, Argos, Athens, Corinth, Epidaurus, Gela, Katane, Megara, Megara Hyblaea, Miletus,
Mytilene, Naxos, Samos, Sikyon, and Syracuse.
^ From year 650 B.C. to the end of the 6th century B.C. niraierous tyrants came to rule. This period is
often referred to as "the age of the tyrants." Still one of the best books on this subject is Antony Andrewes,
The Greek Tyrants (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1956).
^ Scholars debate the exact nature of the political strife confi-onting Athens. Some argue in support of
economic strife, a strife between the rich and the poor; others argue that the strife was regional; still others
argue that the strife was clan-based. G. R. Stanton, Athenian Politics, C 800 - 500 B.C.: A Sourcebook
(London: Routledge, 1990), 57nll.
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major revisions in almost all areas of the Athenian life/ In this section, this thesis will
examine Solon's "Eunomia," a poem he wrote during the reformation period. The purpose
of this study is to understand his view ofstasis and concord and how these concepts relate
to virtue and friendship.
2.1.1 Eunomia 4: 1-4
Solon's "Eunomia" (Poem 4)^ is one of his longest and most famous poems. The
poem beings with Solon's words about "our city":
Our city (fifiexepri ttoXk;) will never be destroyed (oMxai) by a dispensation {alaav)
from Zeus or the plans of the blessed immortal gods, for truly a great-hearted
guardian (4-itloko-itoc), daughter of a mighty father Pallas Athena holds her hand over
it. (Solon, Frg. 4.1-4).
The poem begins with the phrase "our city." This phrase shows that the city belongs to the
realm ofhumanity, exists under the control ofhuman hands, and is in their possession.
Furthermore, humans bear the responsibility to secure its existence. Its safety and
destruction no longer relies on the immortals. Solon and his contemporaries have drifted
"away from the world-view of epic poets and into the world of the philosophers."^ As such,
Solon perceives the polis as a self-regulating entity detached from "vertical despotisms
^ Ron Owens, Solon ofAthens: Poet, Philosopher, Soldier, Statesman (Brighton, England: Sussex
Academic Press, 2010), 97-143.
* Werner Jaeger coined the name "Eunomia" in his 1926 article, "Solon's Eunomia." Werner Jaeger,
Five Essays, trans. Adele Fiske (Montreal: Mario Casalini, 1966), 77-99. Expositions of this text include A.
W. H. Adkins, Poetic Craft in the Early Greek Elegists (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1985), 108-25;
Joseph A. Almeida, Justice as an Aspect ofthe Polis Idea in Solon 's Political Poems a Reading of the
Fragments in Light of the Researches ofNew ClassicalArchaeology (Mnemosyne; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2003),
esp. 207-36; F. Blaise, "Poetics and Politics: Tradition Re-Worked in Solon's Eunomia (Poem 4)," in Solon
ofAthens: New Historical andPhilological Approaches (ed. J. H. Blok and A. P. M. H. Lardinois; Leiden: E.
J. Brill, 2006); Elizabeth Irwin, Solon andEarly GreekPoetry: The Politics ofExhortation (Cambridge
Classical Studies; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Christoph Mulke, Solons Politische
Elegien Und lamben (Fr. 1 - 13 : 32 - 37 West): Einleitung, Text, Ubersetzung, Kommentar (Beitrage Sur
Altertumskunde 177; Miinchen: K. G. Saur, 2002).
' John Lewis, Solon the Thinker: Political Thought in Archaic Athens (London: Duckworth, 2006), 14.
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directed by willful, external forces."'^ This contrast between gods and men, according to
Werner Jaeger, is a major theme ofPoem 4.'' Although the guardian Athena holds her
hand over the city, she has no power to determine the events taking place under her hand.
Rather than a protection, Athena's hand symbolizes instead the separation between gods
and men. Her hand insulates the city from the dispensation of Zeus and the plans of the
gods.'^
2.1.2 Eunomia 4:5-10
The poem proceeds with the following words:
The citizens (doxoL) themselves by their foolishness (d(j)pa6LriOLy) are willing
(PouA-ovTat) to destroy ((j)9eLp6Lv) the great city, persuaded by material goods
(Xpr|(iaoLv). And unjust (ocSlkoc;) is the mind (vooc;) of the people 's leaders; they are
about to suffer many pains from great hubris (ijppioc;). For they do not understand
how to restrain their excess (Kopov).'^ Nor to order the present festivities of the
banquet in calmness (f]ouxLri). (emphasis mine; Solon, Frg. 4.5-10)
If gods are not to blame for the destruction of thepolis, then human beings are responsible
(cf Solon, Frg. 11.1-2). Solon directs his censure first towards the citizens (doioL), since
they in theirfoolishness chose (PouXopat) to destroy the city.'"* Rather than guided by
wisdom or reason, their choice was guided by foolishness. They were willing to sacrifice
the city for their own advantage and for the sake ofmaterial goods.
Lewis, Solon the Thinker, 16.
' '
Jaeger, Five Essays, 83-84. The same idea can be found in Frg. 1 1 : "If you have suffered ruin
through your own wickedness, ascribe no portion of this to the gods."
Elizabeth Irwin sees in these lines a decisive break with the imagery and themes ofmartial epic,
where "dispensation" remains a powerful force, and gods still play a important part in the destruction of
cities. This break is made "in order to make space for the dominant theme of the poem, civic turmoil and
injustice" {Solon andEarly Greek Poetry, 91-92).
Balot translates Kopoq as "greed" and correlates it with the later developed concept of irileoye^La.
Ryan K. Balot, Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001),
91-92.
Lewis, Solon the Thinker, 24-25.
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Solon then blames the leaders for their unjust minds, which led first to excess (Kopov),
and then to hubris (v^pioQ). In Solon's view, justice relates to moderation, namely,
contentedness with one's own share. Injustice, on the other hand, involves seeking goods
in excess, which inevitably leads to acts of hubris.*^ Thus, for Solon, the harmfiil acts of
the leaders have roots deep down in their unbalanced minds. In other words, the cause of
civil strife lies deep in unjust dispositions. When the leaders' minds are flawed, acts of
hubris emerge. As a result, leaders want to grasp power and wealth beyond their respective
lots. Accordingly, greed results in hubris and stasis.
Against greed and stasis, Solon advocates moderation and calmness as is evident in
another of his poem fragments:
And you, calm (fiouxdoayxeg) the obstinate heart within your breast, You who have
drawn many fortunate things in excess (kq Kopov), and on moderation (kv \ie-:pioioi)
set your great minds (voov); for we shall not be compliant, nor to you will there
things be of benefit. (Solon, Frg. 4c)
Solon wants the rich to moderate their minds and cease the excessive grasping ofmaterial
goods, lest they harm themselves, since others definitely will defy and react against their
excessive acts.'^ The word "calm" both here and in the Eunomia draws upon the image of
the sea, as in Frg. 12:
By the wind the sea is stirred (tapdooexaL), but if any wind
17
Disturbs it not, of all things it is the most just.
According to Lewis, hubris is "arrogance in action, including larceny and assault, directed against
the proper prerogatives of another person, the gods or the polis. It is not merely an attitude or disposition"
{Solon the Thinker, 27). Similarly, Paul Carledge claims, "Failure to control oneself would lead to
transgression of the communally defined limits of appropriate behavior. When accompanied by violence,
such transgression was both informally castigated and formally punished as hubris - the ultimate civic crime"
{Ancient Greek Political Thought in Practice [Key Themes in Ancient History; Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009], 16-17).
Owens, Solon ofAthens, 161. Moderation according to Owens is the key to this poem.
The sea imagery is found also xnFrgs. 6.3-4; 13.6, 11-12; 15.3.
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The sea represents the polis. Without the wind, the city is calm and just. The wind is not
part of the natural (just) condition of the sea, just as unbalanced minds seeking excess are
not a natural part of the well-formed city. This contrast between "disturbance" and
"calmness," according to Lowell Edmunds, is one of the fundamental antitheses of the
fifth-century Athenian political ideology.'^ However, this antithesis is confined not to the
fifth-century, but is found also in first-century literary works, as evidenced in Philo's
writing:
The opposite quality to rest is unnatural agitation (triv -rrapd ^iaw klvtiolv), the
cause of confiisions, and tumults, and stasis, and wars (tapaxcoy Kal Bopupcov
atdoecoy le Kal TToXeiicov), which the wicked pursue; while those who pay due honor
to excellence (ol KaloKaYaGLavKaXoc;) cultivate a tranquil, and quiet, and stable, and
peaceful life {r\p^iaxov 6e Kal fiouxdCovxa Kal oxaGepov �11 6� Kal elprivLKOv).
(?h\\o, Abr. 1.27; cf. Praem. 1. 151; Drunkenness 1.97)
Tumults, stasis, and war contrast with tranquility, quietness, stability, and peace. The verb
lapdooo) also is used often in NT to describe political turmoil and party strife (Acts 15:24;
16:20; 17:8, 13; Gal 1:7; 5:10).
2.1.3 Eunomia 4:1 1-29
In Poem 4 Solon continues to describe the acts of the unjust leaders. In greed, they
grasp that which does not belong to them but instead to the public as a whole. In doing so,
they violate justice, wound the city, and bring the city to a state of sickness:
They grow rich, persuaded by unjust deeds (dSiKoi; epYfiaoi). . .Sparing neither of the
sacred possessions nor any possession of the people; with rapaciousness they rob
(d(t)apiTaYfiL) fi-om one another. And fail to guard the sacred foundations of Justice
Edmxinds, "The Aristophanic Cleon's 'Disturbance' ofAthens." Edmunds claims that this antithesis
lost its popularity in the fourth-century and was replaced by the antithesis between stasis and 6|i6voLa (e.g.,
Isocrates, Callim. 44 [402/401 B.C.]). But it is perhaps an overstatement. For example, in a speech recorded
by Dionysius ofHalicamassus: "but you are continually stirred up by your demagogues and roused to fiiry
even as is the sea by winds that spring up one after another, and you do not permit the poUs to remain calm
and serene (ev Tiouxia Kal yaA-rivTi) for even the briefest space of time. The result, therefore, is that we prefer
war to peace" (Dionysius ofHalicamassus, Ant. rom. 32.4).
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(o�|ivd AiKr]Q 9�|i69Xa), who silently knows what is and what was, and, in time,
surely comes to exact retribution later, and now this inescapable wound (Hkoq)
comes to the entire polis, which falls swiftly in to an evil slavery: it awakens civil
strife {oxaoiv l\i^\)Xov) and sleeping war (T\6Xe[i6v euSovt'), and destroys the
beautiful youth ofmany; for {yap) fi-om its troubles the much-loved city swiftly worn
out fi-iendships {(\>iXo\)Q) in unjust factions {owoboic, toIq dSiKeouoLv).'^ These evils
turn on the people; and of the poor many are going into foreign lands, sold and bound
in shameful fetters. . .. Thus the public evil (6ri[i6oLoy KaKov) comes to the house of
each man (oiKaS' eKdcoTCJi), it jumps high over the court-yard fence, breaks down the
locked doors, and finds any man for certain even if he flees into the farthest comer of
his bedroom. (Solon, Frg. 4.1 1-29)
Robbing temples is one of the greatest sins in the ancient world (cf Rom 2:22; Dio
Chrysostom, 3 Regn. 52). The desire to overreach and gain more than one's lot is viewed
as an act of robbery (cf. Phil 2:6). Acts of robbery violate justice'^^ and provoke justice to
avenge. Justice avenges by raising stasis. Stasis wounds the polis and takes the fiiture
away from the polis. The loss of fiiture is vividly symbolized by the demise of the beautiftil
youth.
Solon proceeds to explain how this process takes place in Frg. 4.2 1 , beginning with
the particle yap. Solon speaks of the "much-loved city" (iToluripaTov aoxx)) harming itself
by dissolving finendship into factions. Strife, war, and slavery resuk from the eradication
of fi-iendship and the establishment of factions.
In a stasis, the citizens are the victims, since stasis is a form of self-destmction. The
harm is confined not only to the public sphere but extends to the private sphere as well. As
" The grammar of this sentence is difficult. The Greek reads: "k yap b\)a\ievewv Taxewc TToA.ur|paToy
aoTU TpuxexaL kv awoboic; tol; d6LK0U0Ly (jjCXouq." Translations usually break this sentence into two and
supply a verb for the second clause, for example: "from its ttoubles the much-loved city is swiftly worn out,
fiiendships desttoyed in unjust factions" Lewis, Solon the Thinker, 43. The verb "desttoyed" is a
supplementation. The problem comes with the verb tpuxexai, which is a indicative 3"* person singular
middle/passive verb. Its subject no doubt is doiu (city; neut. nom. sg.). The best way to ttanslate this sentence
is to take xpuxetat as an indirect middle, meaning something like: "the city worn out fiiendships [for its own
disadvantage]."
^� Scholars differ in their opinion regarding the meaning ofdike in Solon's poems. Lewis, Solon the
Thinker, 50-55.
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a form of sickness, stasis stands beyond the control of reason. Not even the friendship of
the blood tie is strong enough to withstand stasis. Like a powerful warrior, jumps
over fences, breaks doors, and finds man even at the farthest comers of the bedroom.
Nothing escapes from stasis. Stasis is all powerful. It defeats the polis down to its core.
2.1.4 Eunomia 4:30-39
In face of the greed that dissolves fi-iendship and destmcts the polis, Solon proposes
his solution:
These things my heart prompts me to teach (SiSd^aL) the Athenians:
how Lawlessness (6uavo|j,La) brings the worst evils to the city, and
Lawfulness (ewo\ilr\) manifests good order and everything perfect (dpxLa),
and often puts fetters on the unjust (dSiKOLg).
It smooths what is rough; quells excess (Kopov), dims hubris (uPpiv)
and shrivels the budding flowers ofmin.
It straightens crooked judgments, calms
haughty (m^prv^avd) deeds,^^ stops the deeds of sedition (6LxooTaoLr|(;),
and stops the anger of grievous strife (dpyaXkr\Q IpidoQ). It is by this
that all things to men are perfect (dpxia) and wise (Solon, Frg. 4.30-39).
Education represents the solution to stasis. The Athenians need to be taught that
Lawlessness brings destmction; Lawfulness makes all things perfect. Lawfiilness is
personified as a goddess preventing the polis from falling into strife. This goddess is the
subject of all the verbs found in the latter half of this passage (puts fetters, smooths, quells,
dims, shrivels, straightens, calms, and stops). Her work is recapitulated as putting fetters
on "unjust." "Unjusf is the adjective used earlier to describe unjust minds that seek excess
(Solon, Frg. 4.7), unjust deeds that violate Jusfice (Solon, Frg. 4.1 1), and unjust factions
that dissolve friendship (Solon, Frg. 4.22). This adjective applies to all evils involved in
the destmction of the polis. Thus, "putting fetters on unjust" means ceasing all evils
^' In Frg. 4b, haughtiness is associated with greed {(\)i)MypvpLa).
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leading to stasis. The statement serves as a summary statement. Later descriptions are
expositions on this statement. These descriptions involve first the quelling of excess and
the dimming of hubris. These are the "budding" flowers of ruin. They must be eradicated
before the flower blossoms.^^
The poem repeats again the importance ofjust minds and just acts. Crooked
judgments must be straightened; and haughty deeds must be calmed. The whole sequence
ends with the climax of ceasing sedation (6LxooTaoLa) and ceasing strife Cepig).
In sum, the source ofstasis, in Solon's view, lies in the unjust minds that seek for
excessive gain. Unjust minds lead to acts of hubris. Desires and acts of greed dissolve the
social ties uniting the polis. Stasis occurs when friendship and blood ties are deconstructed
and transformed into factions. To save the polis from stasis, citizens must learn to
moderate their minds and cease the acts of greed in order to secure the social ties of the
well-orderedpolis.
2.2 Thucydides
2.2.1 Pericles' First Speech (1.140-144)
Before the war broke out between Athens and Sparta, the Lacedaemonians sent their
final delegation to Athens with the following message: "The Lacedaemonians would like
there to be peace�and there will be peace, but only if you let the Greek have their
Solon expresses the same concem in Frg. 9:
From the clouds comes the might of snow and ofhail,
And thunder from the bright lightening comes.
By great men is a city desfroyed, and into monarchy's slavery,
The people through ignorance fall.
Once raised to great heights such men are not easy to resfrain
Thereafter; it is befitting now to heed all noble deeds (KaXa irccvta vodv).
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autonomy" (Thucydides, Hist. 1.139.3). Receiving this message, the Athenians were
summoned to the assembly to decide whether to accept the peace offering or to opt for war.
Thucydides has Pericles make his first speech in this assembly.^^ Pericles opted for
war. In his speech, Pericles tries to persuade the Athenians of their superiority to the
Lacedaemonians and of the Athenians' great chance ofwinning the war. Here Pericles
offers evidences ofAthenian superiority:
They [the Lacedaemonians] are not strong enough to maintain a war against a
military organization with is so different from theirs, seeing that they have no single
general assembly (pouXeuxripLco evl), and therefore cannot promptly put into effect
any emergency measure; and as they all have an equal vote and are of different races
(oi)x 6|i6(|)uA,OL) they each strive to advance their own interests (to k^' eauxov
�Kaoxo(; oTTeuST)). In such circumstances it usually happens that nothing is
accomplished. And indeed it could scarcely be otherwise, for what some of them (ol
(i,6v) want is the greatest possible vengeance upon a particular enemy, others (ol 6e)
the least possible damage to their ovm property. And when after many delays they do
meet, they give but a scant portion of their time to the consideration of any matter of
common concem (xqv kolvcov), but the larger portion to their own individual
interests (xd OLKeta). And each one (gKaoxoc) thinks no harm will come from his own
negligence, but that it is the business of somebody else to be provident on this behalf
(u-rrep eauxoO); and so through all separately (LSia) cherishing the same fancy,
universal min comes unperceived upon the whole body (x6 kolvov). (Thucydides,
Hist. 1.141.6-7)
Pericles points to the weaknesses of the Lacedaemonians. They lack a unified assembly.
Their assembly lacks harmony, since they are composed of different races, each tending to
their own agenda. To emphasize their discord, Pericles rhetorically sets up a |i�v ...Se
contrast:
What some of them (ol iiev) want is the greatest possible (|j,aA,Loxa)
vengeance upon a particular person,
others (ol 6e) the least possible (T^KLOxa) damage to their own property
Pericles made three speeches in Thucydides' History.
40
The contrast is made evident by the polarity between "greatest" and "least" and the
difference between harming others and protecting one's own. Pericles shows the
Lacedaemonians as in deep and serious discord.
In a flamboyant rhetorical style, Pericles sets up a contrast between common interest
and self-interest:
And when after delays (xpovLoi) they do meet, they give
but a scant portion (kv PpaxeX fiopLco) of their time to the consideration of
any matter of common concem (xcov kolvwv),
but the larger portion (xcp irXeovL) to their ovm individual interests (xd olKeXa)
This passage features, first a contrast between the "time delayed" before meeting and the
"scant amount of time" spend on common interest; and second, a contrast between the
"scant amount of time" on common interest and "the larger portion of time" on individual
interests. Through these different and disproportionate lengths of time, Pericles intends to
show the Lacedaemonians as people caring little for the common interest, but caring only
for self-interest. The citizen's disinterest in the common good, according to Pericles,
inevitably will bring min to the polis. The Athenians, on the contrary, are people who
strive together as apolis, since they know that the individual interest and the common
interest are closely bound to one another. Accordingly, Thucydides writes, "from the
greatest dangers that the greatest honors accme to a state as well as to an individual (Kal
TToXei Kal 16LQxri)" (Thucydides, //w/. 1.144.3). In the ideal po/w, common interest and
private interest are one.
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2.2.2 Pericles' Funeral Oration (2.35-46)
Athens was a powerful polis. The secret to the success of the city lies in Pericles'
famous fiineral oration (Thucydides, Hist. 2.35-46).^'' The speech occurred in the winter of
43 1 B.C., at the end of the first year of the Archidamian War. Athens was in a state of
irritation (dyepeGiCco) at this time (Thucydides, Hist. 2.21.3). Pericles was trying his best to
keep the polis quite (fiouxia; Thucydides, Hist. 2.22.1). The polis was at the brim of
stasis?^
Pericles' speech begins with a note on envy. Pericles feared that his eulogy for the
dead might ignite envy and disbelief instead of reverence for those persons with little
knowledge of battlefield events. Thus, he chooses to speak first not of the dead, but of
Athens and its training, political institutions, and manner of life (Thucydides, Hist. 2.36.4).
He praises Athens for its equality among citizens, freedom, restraint from lawlessness,
relaxation from toil, system ofwarfare training, and citizens' concem for public affairs.^^
He ends his praise with a tribute to the friendship among the Athenians:
Again in virtue (dpeiTiv) we stand in sharp contrast to most men; for it is not by
receiving kindness, but by conferring it, that we acquire our friends {^IXoviq). Now he
who confers the favor {x^P^^) is a firmer friend (pePaioTepoc;), in that he is disposed
John E. Ziolkowski, Thucydides and the Tradition ofFuneral Speeches at Athens (Monographs in
Classical Studies; New York: Amo Press, 1981). According to Ziolkowski, the fifth and fourth century
epitaphios logos has four distinct parts: prooemium, epainos, paramythia, and epilogue. Ziolkowski's
analysis has been applied to exegesis: James D. Hester, "The Invention of 1 Thessalonians: A Proposal," in
Rhetoric, Scripture, and Theology: Essays from the 1994 Pretoria Conference (ed. Stanley E. Porter and
Thomas H. Olbricht; Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), 251-79.
Avioding stasis, Pericles fiilfiUs the responsibility of the politician. Antonis Tsakmakis writes,
"Stasis is to be avoided at all costs.... Pericles, who, when faced with a disquieting split in the population
(2.21.3), did his best to restore the social cohesion and solidarity of the Athenians. The Funeral Oration
[2.34-2.46] is the corollary of this endeavour" ("Leaders, Crowds, and the Power of the Image: Political
Communication in Thucydides," in Brill's Companion to Thucydides [ed. Antonios Rengakos and Antonis
Tsakmakis; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2006], 173).
Citizens should participate in politics, as Thucydides writes, "We alone regard the man who takes
no part in public affairs, not as one who minds his own business (dtrpdYM'Ova), but as good for nothing
(dxpetoy)" (Thucydides, Hist. 2.40.2).
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by continued goodwill (euvoiac) toward the recipient, to keep the feeling of
obligation alive in him. (Thucydides, Hist. 2.40.4)
According to Pericles, friendship is a virtue. Moreover, he sees friendship as a relationship
intimately related to the practice of giving and receiving. The Athenians are superior to
others in that they are fonder of giving than receiving.
Having praised Athens for "her" superiority, Pericles proudly claims "our city as a
whole is the school ofHellas" (Thucydides, Hist. 2.41.1). It is for this great city, their city,
the noble men chose to suffer, fight, and die. Pericles bids the survivors to emulate those
who died and fix their gaze daily:
Upon the power ofAthens and become lovers of her (epaotdc; auTfjc;), and when the
vision of her greatness has inspired you, reflect that all this has been acquired by men
of courage who knew their duty and in the hour of conflict were moved by a high
sense ofhonor, who, if ever they failed in any enterprise, were resolved that at least
their country {xr\v xioXw xf\c, ocjjetepac) should not find herself deserted by their valor,
but freely sacrificed to her the fairest offering it was in their power to give.'^^ For they
gave their lives for the common weal (KOLvfi), and in so doing won for themselves the
praise which grows not old and the most distinguished of all sepulchers... their glory
survives in everlasting remembrance (aletp-vriOTOc;), celebrated on every occasion
which gives rise to word of eulogy or deed of emulation. For the whole world is the
sepulcher of famous men, and it is not the epitaph upon monuments set up in their
own land that alone commemorates them, but also in lands not their own there abides
in each breast an unwritten memorial of them, planted in the heart rather than graven
on stone. (Thucydides, Hist. 2.43.1-3)
The key to Athens' success lies in having its citizens become "lovers ofAthens"^^ and
make Athens their own. To die for Athens is to die for one's own. To become lovers of
Similarly, Demosthenes claims, "That the one who thinks he has been bom only to his parents waits
aroimd for death when it comes, all on its own, on the appointed day, whereas the one bom to his fatherland
will die willingly in order to avoid seeing his native land enslaved, and he will consider the violence and
dishonor which an enslaved polis must suffer to be more fearful than death" (Demosthenes, Cor. 205).
Paul W. Ludwig offers a lucid and acute analysis on Greek eros: "Much of classical thought,
explicitly and implicitly, based its notions of eros on purely formal resemblances among sexual desire, love,
and ambition as well as higher aspirations such as patriotism and cosmopolitanism. Common features in the
psychological responses to each of these passions led orators, poets, and philosophers to conclude that said
passions were differing manifestations of a single, underlying eros. They were then able to place the
apparently diverse passions on a continuum with one another, so that the logical progression, for example,
from sexual license to tyranny or from citizen lovers to loving the city, could seem unproblematic to them.
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Athens means that the common interest of the city is no longer external to the individual
self The good of the commonwealth becomes part of the individual's duty. Love combines
the selfwith the greater community and identifies self-interest with common good.^^ The
claim for self-interest is enlightened rather than eliminated. The desires for glory and honor
still exist, but these desires no longer are won through agon between neighbors and
citizens. The desires are instead channeled into a different arena, where cities vie against
one another. Rather than diminished, self-interest is enlarged and combined with the glory
ofAthens. Athens promises a glory wide spread in time and space. It promises monuments
wide spread beyond Athens, and everlasting remembrance in words and in deeds.
Pericles' speech removes Athens' destructive desire for gain that easily could have
brought the greatpolis to ruins, and instead channels this desire into the arena of
international politics.^^ The city of Athens is left behind as a realm where love dominates.
Eros therefore provided them with a bridge, missing in modem thought, between the private and pubHc
spheres" (Eros and Polis: Desire and Community in Greek Political Theory [Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002], 1-2).
One of the major tasks facing the Greek politicians is how not to let eros remain in private but to
politicize eros for the good of the polis. According to Ludwig, "three separable strands can be discerned in
Greek political discourse on eros: (1) political pederasty, (2) civic friendship or homonoia, and (3) the city as
an object of eros" (ibid., 19).
^' Gerald Mara rightly observes, "All of the three direct Periclean speeches presented by Thucydides
inspirationally urge a harmonization ofprivate well-being and the common good (1.144; 2.43; 2.60, 64)"
("Thucydides and Political Thought," in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Political Thought [ed.
Stephen G. Salkever; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009], 1 12).
^� Two events show Athens as a proponent of realpolitik in intemational politics: (1) The Corcyraeans
affair (445 B.C.). This event triggered the war between Athens and Sparta. The event started as a conflict
between the Corinthians and the Corcyraeans contending for the city ofEpidamnus. In order to ward off the
Corinthians, the Corcyraeans sought to make themselves an ally of the Athenians. As a result, they sent
envoys to Athens. The Corinthians followed. They too had envoys sent to Athens to prevent the formation of
the alliance. Both parties met at the assembly ofAthens. The Corcyraeans spoke first. Their appeal was
simple and direct. If Athenians were to accept them as their ally, they would gain good name for themselves,
much gratitude, and an enhanced naval power that would vex their foes. They remind the Athenians that
Corcyra is situated at a strategic place, and that they have a strong naval force compatible with both Athens
and Corinth. Therefore, Athens is faced with the opportunity of a lifetime to accept their offer and receive
great security and honor. Apparently, the strategy involves appealing to "safety," "honor," and "self-interest."
The Corinthians spoke after the Corcyraeans. Their speech utilizes a complete different set of terms.
They accuse the Corcyraeans ofwrong-doing (d6LK6u), harming their neighbors, using violence whenever
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Love prevails to the extent that the lover is willing to die for the beloved. Through love,
Athens becomes one's own.^' Rarely would an individual want to take advantage ofhis or
her own; instead, an individual would do his or her best to preserve and magnify his or her
they have power, overreaching whenever they can escape detection, and acting shamelessly whenever faced
with a chance for gain. Also, they accuse them of not offering due reverence and honor to their mother city�
Corinth. They, the Corinthians, on the other hand, have come with proper grounds of complaint (|ietd
irpooriKovTcov eyK^rindTwy) against the violent and overreaching Corcyra. They argue that Athens, according
to treaty, has no right (ouk 6LKaLcoq) to accept Corcyra as their ally. Finally, they appeal to duty. They remind
the Athenians that they received help from the Corinthians during the Persian War, and now is Athens'
chance to repay their debt. Their final request is for Athens to refrain from doing wrong to their equals and
from acts of overreaching. Instead, they call Athens to maintain fiiendship and pay back like with like.
Repeatedly, the Corinthians in their speech appeal to morals and virtues, encircling their speech around
concepts such as "justice," "goodness," "rightness," "duty," and "fiiendship." The Athenians opted for the
Corcyraeans. Their decision reveals their character. They were people in pursuit of self-interest.
(2) Athens' self-pursuing character is made even more palpable in a later event�^the Potidaea affair
(Thucydides, Hist. 1.54-66), where Athens contested with Corinth for the alliance of Potidaea. This event
took place not long after the Corcyraean affair. This event began with Athens sieging Potidaea. The
Athenians' actions made the Corinthians furious. Immediately after the siege, the Corinthians summoned the
Pelopormesian League to Lacedaemon, and complained to them about Athens' misdeeds. In that gathering,
many came forth to speak. Thucydides reports four of those speeches, including those by the Corinthians, the
Athenians, king Archidamus, and a certain man named Sthenelaidas (Thucydides, Hist. 67-88). At the
Athenians' chance to speak, they defended their imperial acts with the following words:
It was under the compulsion of circumstances that we were driven at first to advance our empire to its
present state, influenced chiefly by fear, then by honor also, and lastly by self-interest as well; and
after we had once incurred the hafred ofmost of our allies,. . .and when you were no longer friendly as
before. . .it no longer seemed safe to risk relaxing our hold. . ..And no man is to be blamed for making
the most ofhis advantages when it is a question of the gravest dangers, (emphasis mine; Thucydides,
Hist. 1.75.3-5)
By "compulsion of circumstances," the Athenians refer to the last stage of the Persian War. At that time, they
were forced by allies to take leadership. The Athenians acquired their empire not only out of necessity, but
also out of the drive of basic human dispositions, the need for safety, the love for honor, and the pursuit of
self-interest. As the empire grew, animosity grew alongside. Hatred and enmity grew and created a hostile
and dangerous environment, in which no one would chose to forgo resources that would contribute to safety.
The Athenians defended themselves with an appeal to circumstance and to human nature. They acted out of
necessity, need, and nature. They simply did what everyone else would do if placed in the same circumstance.
There is nothing remarkable or inconsistent with human nature in what we also have done, just
because we accepted an empire when it was offered us, and then, yielding to the sfrongest motives
�
honor, fear, and self-interest�declined to give it up. Nor, again are we the first who have entered
upon such course, but it has ever been an established rule that the weaker is kept down by the sfronger.
(emphasis mine; Thucydides, Hist. 1.76.2)
It has always been the rule that the strong should rule the weak, and the weak should obey the sfrong.
Sfrength gives legitimacy to rule. Sfrength is the fitiiess to rule. Justice, on the other hand, is a cunning word,
which "no one when opportunity offered of securing something by sfrength, ever yet put before force and
abstained from taking advantage (irleov exeLv)" (Thucydides, Hist. 1.76.2). No one when sfrength allows
stops at the sign ofjustice. Justice is for the weak, which lack power to overreach. "Right (SCKaia), as the
world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the sfrong do what they can and the weak
suffer what they must" (Thucydides, Hist. 5.89).
^' Ludwig, Eros andPolis, 322.
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possessions or belongings. The self-interest of the individual is transcended and becomes
identified with the community group as a whole. The glory ofAthens promotes the glory
of the individual. To praise the city, in Pericles' words, is to honor those persons who had
died for the city. The honor of the city is the honor of its individuals. The city and the
individual are one in love.
2.2.3 The Plague (2.47-54)
Pericles' funeral speech is followed by Thucydides' account of the great plague that
devastated Athens. These two events are intentionally juxtaposed with one another. The
funeral speech represents the height ofAthenian civilization, while the plague represents
its depths.''^
In the fimeral speech, Pericles speaks of the dead in accordance with a proper and
honorable burial; in the plague, many of those who died either were left unburied or buried
in shameful ways. In the funeral speech, the living are "restrained from lawlessness chiefly
through reverent fear" (Thucydides, Hist. 2.37.3); in the plague, the living become
"careless of all law sacred as well as profane" (Thucydides, Hist. 2.52.3). The citizens no
longer are restrained by the fear of gods or the law ofmen (Thucydides, Hist. 2.53.4). In
the fimeral speech, the survivors are inspired to honor by "the glory that survives in
everlasting remembrance" (Thucydides, Hist. 2.43.2); in the plague, the survivors are
shocked by the "sudden change of fortune" (Thucydides, Hist. 2.53.1) and "the transitory
of bodies and wealth" (Thucydides, Hist. 2.53.2). As a result, they "resolved to get out of
life the pleasures which could be had speedily and would satisfy their lusts" (Thucydides,
This intended juxtaposition is noted by virtually all Thucydidean scholars. June W. Allison,
"Pericles' Policy and the Plague," Historia: Zeitschriftfur Alte Geschichte 32 (1983): 14; W. Robert Connor,
Thucydides (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 63-64; Donald A. Nielsen, "Pericles and the
Plague: Civil Religion, Anomie, and Injustice in Thucydides," Sociology ofReligion 57 (1996): 397-407.
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Hist. 2.53.1). Pleasure replaces honor and expediency as the supreme good. In the funeral
speech, citizens are willing to sacrifice for the common good; in the plague, everyone
looks only to himself or herself
In the ideal polis, law restrains the desires of the citizens and their actions are
inspired to honor, with their eyes fixed upon the glory of the polis. In a ruinedpolis, people
no longer are restrained by the law. Desires run rampant. Everyone pursues only his or her
own pleasure.
2.2.4 Pericles' Last Speech (2.60-64)
Pericles died of the plague. Before his death, Thucydides records Pericles offering his
third and final speech addressed to a hostile audience. Struck by the plague and the war,
the Athenians underwent a change in resolution (Thucydides, Hist. 2.59.1) and were angry
at Pericles (Thucydides, Hist. 2.60.1). In his speech, Pericles asks them to preserve their
former resolutions and not to forfeit the safety of the commonwealth due to the hardship
they have suffered. He reminds them of the importance of the commonwealth:
For in my judgment a state confers a greater benefit upon its private citizens when as
a whole common wealth it is successfiil, than when it prospers as regards the
individual but fails as a community. For even though a man flourishes in his own
privates affairs, yet if his country goes to ruin he perishes with her all the same; but if
he is in evil fortune and his country in good fortune, he is far more likely to come
through safely. Since, then, the state may bear the misfortunes ofher private citizens
but the individual cannot bear hers, surely all men ought to defend her, and not to do
as you are now doing�^proposing to sacrifice the safety of the commonwealth
because you are dismayed by the hardships you suffer at home. (Thucydides, Hist.
2.60.2-4)
The fate of the individual is closely tied with the fate of thepolis. The individual rises and
falls together with the polis. Thus, the citizens should come together and work together for
the safety of the commonwealth. Pericles urges, "Put away your grief for private ills and
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devote yourselves to the safety of the commonwealth (lou kolvoG �zf\Q oQtripLat;)"
(Thucydides, //wr. 2.61.4).
In Thucydides' view, Pericles' death was Athens' greatest lost, for he was a true
leader one with the ability to restrain the multitude, leading them rather than being led by
them. In addition, he always offered Athens prudent advice aimed at the common good.
His successors did not live up to his legacy of leading Athens. His successors were instead:
led by private ambition {(^iXoxi\xlaQ) and private greed (Kep6r|) to adopt policies
which proved injurious both as to themselves and their allies; for these policies, so
long as they were successfiil, merely brought honor (xLfifi) or profit {di(^eX'm) to
individual citizens, but when they failed proved detrimental to the state in the
conduct of the war. (Thucydides, Hist. 2.65.7)
In Thucydides view, Pericles' successors were not real leaders. They were concerned only
for "their ovm." They exploited the polis to procure honor and wealth for themselves:
The successors ofPericles, being more on an equality (lool) with one another and yet
striving each to be first (tou -irpoTOt; yiyveoQai), were ready to surrender to the
people even the conduct of public affairs to suit their whims. (Thucydides, Hist.
2.65.10)
Instead of sacrificing the self for the polis, they were willing to sacrifice the polis for the
self No longer were they in love and at one with the polis. Instead, they strived against one
another for honor and gain. As a result, they fragmented the polis and led Athens into civil
discord (kv aXXr]Xoic, eiapdcxerioay). Eventually, Athens was brought to ruin because of
stasis and private quarrels (IbiaQ Siattjopag).^^
" In Thucydides' view, Athens did not collapse because of defeat, but because of stasis. Accordingly,
he writes, "After they had met with disaster in Sicily, where they lost not only their army but also the greater
part of their fleet, and by this time had come to be in a state of stasis at home, they nevertheless held out ten
years not only against the enemies they had before, but also against Sicilians. . .. [A]nd they did not finally
succumb until they had in their private quarrels fallen upon one another and been brought to ruin"
(Thucydides, Ms/. 2.65.12).
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2.2.5 The Stasis at Corcyra (3.69-85)
Thucydides viewed the Peloponnesian War as a massive stasis between the Greeks,
which ended with the climactic stasis in Athens. To show the essence and terror of stasis,
he gives a detail description of the stasis in Corcyra, out ofwhich he makes a model stasis.
Caught in between the war between Athens and Sparta, Corcyra was forced to choose
between the two.^'* Unfortunately, the opinion of the citizens was divided. The result was
stasis.^^ Thucydides introduces the stasis with the following words: "Such was the savage
progress of the stasis" (ovxuic, (op-T) r\ oxaoic; -irpouxcoprioe) (Thucydides, //w/'. 3.82.1). This
statement is paradoxical, since the concept of "progress" fits neither the noun "stasis" (a
"standing") nor the adjective "savage."^^ Stasis is an abnormal progress. As such, stasis
resembles a disease that "falls upon" (Thucydides, Hist. 3.82.2) cities and makes "progress"
among cities. It spreads until "the whole Hellenic world was convulsed (6KLvr|0ri)"
(Thucydides, Hist. 3.82.1).^^ The question remains as to whether a cure exists for this
disease.
According to Thucydides, stasis always will exist as long as human nature remains
the same. However, different types of stasis exist:
[It can be] severer or milder, and different in their manifestations, according as the
variations in circumstances present themselves in each case. For in peace and
prosperity both states and individuals have gentler feelings, because men are not then
forced to face conditions of dire necessity; but war, which robs men of the easy
Lowell Edmunds, "Thucydides' Ethics as Reflected in the Description of Stasis (3.82-83)," Harvard
Studies in Classical Philology 79 (1975): 73-92.
C. W. Macleod, "Thucydides on Faction (3.82.83)," Proceedings ofthe Cambridge Philological
Society 25 (1979): 52-68.
Connor, Thucydides, 103n61.
" This statement recalls the opening ofThucydides' History: "this [war] was the greatest disruption
(klvtiolq) for the Greeks, and for some portion of the barbarians, and, so to speak, among the largest portion
ofmankind" (Thucydides, Hist. 1 . 1 .2).
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supply of their daily wants, is a violent schoolmaster and creates in most people a
temper that matches their condition. (Thucydides, Hist. 3.82.3)
In other words, stasis is made severe in the times ofwar and mild in times of peace. In
Thucydides' view, the stasis in Corcyra is a severe type of stasis. It was savage. And it
seemed even more savage since it was the first to occur (Thucydides, Hist. 3.82.1).^^ Its
savageness is exemplified first by the transposition of values. What was viewed earlier as
virtue is now viewed as vice; what was viewed as vice is now viewed as virtue:
Reckless audacity came to be regarded as courageous (dvSpeia) loyalty to party,
prudent (ococjjpov) hesitation as specious cowardice, moderation as a cloak for
unmanly weakness, and to be clever in everything was to do naught in anything.
Frantic impulsiveness was accounted a true man's part, but caution in deliberation
{ao^aXda to �TTLPouXeuoao9aL) a specious pretext for shirking. The hot-headed man
was always trusted, his opponent suspected. He who succeeded in a plot was clever,
and he who had detected one was still shrewder; on the other hand, he who made it
his aim to have no need of such things was a disrupter ofparty and scared of his
opponents. (Thucydides, /fwf. 3.82.4-5)
What was regarded as shame is now regarded as honor; and what was honor is now
shame.^^ This transposition of value was foreshadowed earlier by the plague narrative. In
Thucydides" view, stasis is much like the plague (a disease).'*" It is abnormal and leads to
death. Moreover, stasis destroys not only the traditional values, but also the traditional ties
that unite and restrain the polis:
Furthermore, the tie of blood (^uYY^i^eg) was weaker than the tie ofparty (kaipLKou),
because the partisan was more ready to dare without demur; for such associations
(^uvo6ol) are not entered into for the public good ((0(j)eA.La) in conformity with the
prescribed laws (voiiwy), but for selfish aggrandizement (TrXeoi^e^ia) contrary to the
established laws (KaGeoTWTac). Their pledges (ttlot6L(;) to one another were confirmed
Price, Thucydides and Internal War, 12-13.
^' The reverse of language is also found in Isocrates, Areop. 19: "insolence as democracy, lawlessness
as Hberty, impudence of speech as equality, and Hcense to do what they pleased as happiness." Cf Plato,
Resp. 560-561; Phil 4:19.
Clifford Orwin, "Stasis and Plague: Thucydides on the Dissolution of Society," Journal ofPolitics
50(1988): 831-47.
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not so much be divine law (v6|icp) as by common transgression of the law
(Trapayo|ifioaL). (Thucydides, //w/. 3.82.6)
Thucydides compares the tie ofblood with the tie of party and finds the latter stronger than
the former. Earlier when describing the horrors ofstasis he notes, "there was no length to
which violence did not go; sons were killed by their father, and suppliants dragged from
the altar or slain upon it; while some were even walled up in the temple ofDionysus and
died there" (Thucydides, Hist. 3.81.5). These forms of death are abnormal. Fathers
normally do not kill their sons. The blood fie is chosen for comparison as one of the
strongest forms of social bound. Traditionally, the blood tie is viewed as one of the most
recalcitrant barriers to the political community (Thucydides, Hist. 2.35-46; Plato, Resp.
461e-465c). Even this strong tie fails to withstand the violence of stasis. As a replacement
of the blood tie, the parties and the associations are formed not for the public good but for
selfish aggrandizement {�uXgov^^'lo). This greed for honor and gain gives birth to faction
and stasis:
The cause of all these evils was the desire to rule (apxT)) which greed (irXeove^Lav)
and ambition ((t)LA,OTL|j,Lav) inspire, and also, springing from them, that ardour which
belongs to men who one have become engaged in factious rivalry ((j)LXovLK6Ly).
(Thucydides, //wr. 3.82.8)
In a stasis, everyone "strives in every way to get the better of each other" (Thucydides,
Hist. 3.82.8) and no one cares anymore for justice (SiKaioc) and the commonwealth (xr\
mXei ou|i4)opo(;).'*'
In sum, Athens fairs well when her citizens love her, fix their eyes upon her, and
become one with her. Such actions occur when common interest is identified with the self-
Cf. Phil 1:9-1 1, where Paul speaks of "the best" for the Christian community and the need to
cultivate justice.
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interest. In this ideal polis, citizens share friendship with one another and exhibit
willingness to die for the common good and common safety. Athens falls, when citizens
pursue only self-interest, seeking honor and gain for the self This act of greed inflicts the
polis with stasis. Citizens in a diseased polis divide into factions. Factions destroy all
previous social ties, including the blood tie. Stasis also inverts language, turning virtue into
vice, and vice versa.
2.3 Plato
Plato's Republic begins with a dialogue on justice. Participants of the dialogue
receive opportunity to express their own understandings ofjustice. Simonids defines
justice as "doing good to friends and evil to enemies" (Plato, Resp. 332d).'*^ Socrates
refiites this definition with the claim that justice never does harm, since harm is a form of
injustice. Thrasymachus enters the dialogue "like a wild beast," believing he has the most
excellent answer to the question of justice. He defines justice as "the advantage of the
stronger." His beastly appearance reflects his understanding ofjustice, since he appears
engulfed by the appetitive soul. Plato refiites Thrasymachus, noting that even rulers make
mistakes. Therefore, what they think advantageous may not be truly and objectively
advantageous."*^ Cleitophon, aware of the flaw in Thrasymachus definition, revises
Thrasymachus' definition and says that justice is what the superior supposed to be for his
Helping friends and harming enemies is one of the most prominent themes in ancient ethics (cf
Solon, Frg. 13.5-6). See below 4.4.6.
In Plato's view, "no art considers or enjoins the advantage of the sfronger but every art that of the
weaker which is ruled by it" (342c). This conclusion is again reaffirmed in 346e and 347a.
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advantage (Plato, Resp. 340b). Cleitophon reveals himself as a radical sophist. For him,
rulers never err and justice is nothing more than the will of the prince.'*'*
After each participant has offered their respective definition of jusfice, the dialogue
takes a radical turn. No longer are they concerned with the definition ofjustice; instead,
they pursue the question ofwhether justice is truly advantageous to its possessor.
Thrasymachus claims, "the most consummate form of injustice. . .makes the man who has
done the wrong most happy and those who are wronged and who would not themselves
willingly do wrong most miserable" (Plato, Resp. 344a). In other words, "injustice on a
sufficiently large scale is a stronger, freer, and more masterfiil thing than justice" (Plato,
Resp 344c).^^
2.3.1 The Necessity of Justice
Plato's reply to Thrasymachus involves three steps. First, Plato argues that justice is
virtue and wisdom, whereas injustice is vice and ignorance (Plato, Resp. 348c-351a).
Second, Plato shows that complete injustice cannot be stronger than justice, since complete
injustice is incapable of effective action (Plato, Resp. 351b-352c). Finally, Plato argues
that justice brings eudaimonia to its possessor (Books 2-5). This thesis will deal only with
Sophists are people who take advantage of the city: "Sophists' understanding of the natural is
oriented to individual tyranny or, at least, to pleasure, not to nature unblinkingly observed. The city, for them,
is conventional; what is natural is the individual good, for which political affairs are a means. Natural rule is
rule ofwhoever is strong, courageous, and clever enough to do what he wishes, which is to satisfy himself
endlessly, arrogantly, and at will. What is natural is tyranny, individual pleasure, gain, power, and excess,
and the courage and intelligence to achieve them. Because sophists do not think justice can be natural, they
do not try to elevate the city to what is naturally right. They on the whole live within the law, manipulating it
or teaching others how to do so. The city is to be used" (Mark Blitz, Plato 's Political Philosophy [Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010], 23).
Plato later rephrases this claim when he write, "life of the unjust man is better than that of the just"
(Plato, Resp. 347e); or again when he writes, "perfect and complete injustice is more profitable than justice
that is complete" (Plato, Resp. 348b).
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the second and third argument. To prove that justice is stronger than injustice (the second
argument), Plato writes the following passage:
[Plato:] "Do you [Thrasymachus] think that a city, an army, or bandits, or thieves, or
any other group that attempted any action in common (Koivfi), could accomplish
anything if they wronged on another (dSiKOLev dXXr\XoiQ)7" "Certainly not," said he.
"But if they didn't, wouldn't they be more likely to?" "Assuredly." "For factions
(oidoeLc;), Thrasymachus, are the outcome of injustice, and hatreds (iiLori) and
internecine conflicts {[idxoLQ kv dA.A.riA.0Lc;), but justice brings oneness ofmind and
friendship (b\i6voiav koi (^iXiav). Is it not so?" "So be it," he replied, "not to differ
from you." "That is good of you, my friend; but tell me this: if it is the business of
injustice to engender hatred wherever it is found, will it not, when it springs up either
among freemen or slaves, cause them to hate ([iiodlv) and be at strife (oxaoidC^iv)
with one another, and make them incapable of effective action in common (KOLvfi
irpdiTeLv)?" "By all means." "Suppose, then, it springs up between two, will they not
be at outs with (SLOLOovTai) and hate each other (p.LorioouoL) and be enemies (kxQpoi)
both to one another and to the just?" "They will," he said. "And then will you tell me
that if injustice arises in one it will lose its force and fiinction or will it none the less
keep it?" "Have it that it keeps it," he said. "And is it not apparent that its force is
such that wherever it is found in city, family, camp, or in anything else, itfirst
renders the thing incapable of co-operation with itself owing to faction (oxaoidC^iv)
and difference (6La(|)�p�o0ai), and secondly an enemy to itself and to its opposite in
every case, the just? Isn't that so?" "By all means." "Then in the individual too, I
presume, its presence will operate all these effects which it is its nature to produce. It
will in the first place make him incapable of accomplishing anything because of inner
faction (oiaoLdCovTa) and lack of one-mind (oux b\iovoowxa), and then an enemy
(kxQpbv) to himself and to the just. (Plato, Resp. 35 lc-352a)
This previous passage reveals many of the Greeks' understanding of the relationship
between justice (the prime virtue), stasis, enemy, and friendship. It reveals also the
isomorphic understanding of the relationship between the individual, the family, and the
Before entering into the details of the text, observing first how Plato presents this
dialogue is important. This dialogue features uncontested consensus between Socrates and
Thrasymachus. In addition, this text features a great amount of repetition. Socrates repeats
himself frequently and Thrasymachus again and again consents to what Socrates has to say.
This recurrent agreement between Socrates and Thrasymachus indicates the contents
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presented in this passage as important and crucial. Indeed many ofPlato's later arguments
are based upon this consensus.
Above all, this text speaks about the relationship between justice and the existence of
a community. From the beginning, the text states clearly that no community can exist if
members of that community act unjustly to one another. For any community to exist,
including even communities ofbandits and thieves, some form ofjustice must operate in
their midst. Without justice nothing can be achieved, since injustice causes hatred,
internecine conflict, and above all, stasis. On the other hand, justice begets harmony and
friendship. Evidently, Plato sees stasis as the opposite ofharmony and friendship.
In the second halfof the text, Plato establishes a clear path from injustice to faction,
from faction to community dysfimction, and finally, from dysfunction to war against the
self and the just.
in city, family, camp, or in anything else. in the individual too...
\\. first renders the thing incapable of co It will in the//rst place make him incapable of
operation with itself accomplishing anything
owing to faction (axaaidCeiv) and difference because of inner faction (axaaidCovxa) and lack
(6La(t)�p6o9aL), of one-mind (oux 6|iovoouvTa),
and secondly an enemy to itself (exGpov irai and then an enemy to himself (kxQpov Kal
eautco) and to its opposite in every case, the eaDTco) and to the just
just?
The same sequence applies to both the communities and the individuals. Stasis ceases not
only the proper fiinction of an entity, but also it ruins the entity through self-destruction.
Stasis is fearfiil, for it consumes itself
The second important fact revealed in this passage is the isomorphic relationship
between the different forms of social life. Plato applies the same concepts such as
55
just/injustice, ^tow/harmony, and friendship/enmity to different social organizations. Plato
also applies the same social mechanism to these different social organizations. For Plato,
the individual is like a polis, and the polis is like an individual. They possess similar
structured and fiinction. The whole ofPlato's Republic rests upon this fundamental
assumption of the individual as in an isomorphic relationship to the polis. In Plato's
understanding, the polis is none other than "the man writ large" (Plato, Resp. 368de). In
addition, for Plato, the best polis is one that "resembles an organism" (Plato, Resp. 462d).
The polis and the individual are analogous to one another. Plato evokes this principle to
denounce Thrasymachus and to show that justice brings eudaimonia to its possessor. His
strategy involves first showing that a happy city is a just city; therefore, a happy man also
must be a just man. Justice and happiness are one and the same.
2.3.2 The Po/w in Words
In order to show that a happy city is also a just city (the third argument), Plato begins
to construct his "city in words" in 369c. His task will not be accomplished until 427c.
Plato's city consists of three classes of people, namely the guardian, the auxiliary, and the
working class.
Plato spends most ofhis time dealing with the question ofhow to educate the
guardians (Plato, Resp. 374e-412b). Educating the guardians is a crucial task for Plato,
since the guardians are the repositories ofmilitary resources, political authority, and
cultural ethos. If they are to contend with one another, the polis no doubt will face severe
trouble. On the other hand, if they are to dwell together in peace with one another, the polis
undoubtedly will face great prosperity (cf Plato, Resp. 465b). The unity of the guardians is
the necessary and sufficient condition for the salvation of the polis. Thus, for Plato, the
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primary goal in constructing the justpolis requires keeping the guardians as "one" and
preventing stasis from rising in their midst.
According to Plato, the means to exclude stasis and achieve peace is education
('rTaL6eLa).The education of the guardians involves both music for the soul (Plato, Resp.
376e-403c/^ and gymnastics for the body (Plato, Resp. 403c-410a).
Music education involves the use of literature. For the educational purpose, Plato
supports the censoring of literary works. He expresses concerned, for example, that literary
works must reflect "patterns or norms of right speech about the gods" (Plato, Resp. 379a).
Gods must not be the source of evil. They must neither violate oaths nor be in strife and
contention with one another (Plato, Resp. 379e). They must be the source only of good
(Plato, Resp. 380c). Second, gods must not change shape, nor should they mislead human
beings by falsehoods in word or deed (Plato, Resp. 383a). Plato discusses his reasons for
such restrictions:
we must allow or not allow them [the guardians] to hear from childhood up, if they
are to honor the gods and their fathers and mothers, and not to hold their friendship
with one another (Tr\v dXXr\Xijiv (^iXiav) in light esteem. (Plato, Resp. 386a)
Gods must be like good citizens. They must not engage in civil strife. They must have a
steady character and must not deceive others in words and deed. The characteristics
required of the gods involve the stabilization of religion, family, and civic friendship.
Music education also involves the use of harmonic mode (dpiaoyta) and rhythm
(puGuiioc;). Both these manners of expression are influential, for they "find their way to the
inmost soul and take strongest hold upon it" (Plato, Resp. 40 Id). Thus, they must be
censored closely. In Plato's view, harmonic mode and rhythm must follow speech (Xoyoc).
Plato's music is equivalent to what we would call today fine arts.
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They must serve to develop the good disposition (euriGtLa) of the guardians. Attaining to
good reason (tq KaXcp loyw) they also must guide the guardians "to likeness (opoioxriTa),
to friendship ((^iXiav), and to harmony (E,\)\i^(jiviav)" (Plato, Resp. 401c).
The second component of Plato's education program is gymnastics. Surprisingly,
however, he did not speak at length regarding bodily physical training, since in Plato's
view the soul controls the body perfectly. If the soul is healthy, the body is healthy. As a
result, his writing on gymnastics instead takes on appearance of an attack medicine, which
takes care of the diseased bodies with no regard for the health of the soul.'*^ For Plato, the
real purpose of gymnastic is to train the soul. Gymnastic makes the soul hard, while Music
makes the soul soft:
"I have observed," he said, "The devotees ofunmitigated gymnastics turn out more
brutal than they should be and those ofmusic softer than is good for them." "And
surely," said I, "this savagery is a quality derived from the high-spirited element in
our nature, which, if rightly trained, becomes brave, but if overstrained, would
naturally become hard and harsh." "I think so," he said. "And again, is not the
gentleness a quality which the philosophic nature would yield? This if relaxed too far
would be softer than is desirable but if rightly trained gentle and orderly?" "That is
so." "But our requirement, we say, is that the guardians should possess both natures."
(Plato, Resp. 410d)
Like instruments tuned by relaxing and tightening the strings, so too are the souls tuned by
music and gymnastic. Here Plato speaks of the virtue ofmoderation, which preserves the
harmony of the polis:
The main source of civic strife is competition for scarce good things, and those who
can control their desires for these things are least likely to find it to their advantage to
be seditious and break the laws. . .the virtue ofmoderation�^understood as the control
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of spiritedness as well as desire�is used to re-establish that harmony.
Allan David Bloom, The Republic ofPlato (2nd ed.; New York: Basic Books, 1991), 361-63.
Bloom, The Republic ofPlato, 364-65.
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According to Plato, the ruler of the polis, "best blends gymnastics with music and applies
them most suitably to the soul" (Plato, Resp. 412a). Not only are these rulers the best of the
guardians, they also are "most inclined through the entire course of their lives to be zealous
to do what they think for the interest of the polis (tfi iroXeL fiyriocovTaL ^ufictjepeiv)" (Plato,
Resp. 412d). Rulers always will work for the best for the polis. They will watch "against
foemen without (xcov e^a)9ev iToA,e[j,La)v) and friends within (tqv kvxoc, (jjiliwy), so that the
latter shall not wish to work harm and the former shall not be able to work harm" (Plato,
Resp. 414b).
However, "fiiendship within" requires more than moderate rulers with zeal for the
polis, it requires also what Plato calls the "noble lie":
The earth as being their mother delivered them, and now as if their land were their
mother and their nurse they ought to take thought for her and defend her against any
attack and regard the other citizens as their brothers {ah^h^dv) and children {yT\y&j�iv)
of the self-same earth. (Plato, Resp. 414a)
This lie, according to Plato, makes citizens "more inclined to care for the state and for one
another" (Plato, Resp. 41 5d). Plato urges the polis to fiinction as a fictive family in which
citizens regard one another as brothers and sisters.
For the guardians, the noble lie is insufficient. They must live in reality as a family in
which "the possession ofwives, marriage, and the procreation of children must as far as
possible be arranged according to the proverb that fiiends have all things in common"
(Plato, Resp. 424a). The guardians must not possess private property (Plato, Resp. 416d).
They must learn to live together in unity (Koivfi Ctji^; Plato, Resp. 416e) in order to "save
themselves and save their city (ocoCoLev XV[V tto/Ilv)" (Plato, Resp. 417a).
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2.3.2 Concord as the Greatest Good
The goal ofPlato's policy toward the guardians is to promote the greatest good for
the polis in order to avoid the greatest evil (Plato, Resp. 462a). But what are the greatest
good and the greatest evil?
Do we know of any greater evil for a state than the thing that distracts it and makes it
many instead of one (i^Lac;), or a greater good than that which binds it together and
makes it one (laiay)? (Plato, Resp. 462ab)
The greatest evil is the fracturing of the polis; the greatest good is the unity of the polis.
According to Plato, nothing ties the polis together with more strength than the polis
functioning as "community of pleasure and pain" (f) fiSovfic t� Kal Xutttic KOLVQVia; Plato,
Resp. 462b). Emotions are important. Unity must run deep dovm into the very core of the
human existence. The words and deeds of appearance can lie; but the inner emotions are
difficult to fabricate. Unity in emotion is the strongest unity possible.
Plato considers his policy toward the guardians as a means toward this greatest good,
for when all things are shared in common with no "mine" and "not mine," then any good
or ill happening to one person will be shared among all others. Thus, sharing all things in
common forces the community to become one in their perceptions. In turn, this sharing
forces the community to become one in their emotional reaction to their perceptions:
[The guardians] will have one and the same thing in common which they will name
mine, and by virtue of this communion they will have their pleasure and pains in
common....this unity is the greatest blessing for a state. (Plato, Resp. 464ab)
Plato believes the implementation of his policies will allow guardians to dwell together in
great peace free from all dissensions. As a result, the guardians will need not fear that "the
rest of the city will ever start faction against them or with one another" (Plato, Resp. 465b).
60
In the end, the polis will experience "salvation" (oQiripLav) (Plato, Resp. 465d) and the
highest possible levels of happiness {d)ha.i\iov^oxcar\v) (Plato, Resp. 466a).
In sum, Plato's ideal polis is governed by guardians trained in virtue. The guardians
share mutual friendship, common possessions, and common wives and children. They also
share pleasure and pain in common. Because of virtue and friendship, the guardians are
saved from stasis. Their salvation in turn saves the polis from stasis. In a "just"po/w, each
class minds their own business."*^ As such, the guardians are wise (wisdom), the auxiliaries
are brave (courage), and the inferior are ruled by the superior (temperance). Just as the soul
rules over the body, so the guardians rule over the inferior. If the guardians are well
educated (devoid of stasis) and the polis is just (everyone doing his own task), then the
polis will be well-governed and will be saved from the greatest evil of stasis.
2.4 Aristotle
2.4.1 The General Framework
In Aristotle's understanding, ethics and politics are interrelated. Politics aims to
produce good citizens and enable them to attain the good life, namely, the life of
happiness.^" For Aristotle, the sphere ofpolitics is conceived in ethical terms. The aim of
politics is human goodness. Politics is ethical:^*
Plato's definition ofjustice: "to do one's own business and not to be a busybody is justice" (Plato,
Resp. 433a).
^" Price notes a correspondance between the three ends of thepolis and the three kinds of friendship:
"living (a goal ofutility), living together (a source ofpleasure), and living well (the goal of goodness)" (Love
and Friendship in Plato andAristotle, 194).
^' Malcolm Schofield, "Aristotle's Political Ethics," in The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle 's
Nicomachean Ethics (ed. Richard Kraut; Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 305.
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We stated that the chief good is the goal ofpolitics; and it devotes most of its concem
and effort to making the citizens be of a certain kind, viz. good and capable of fine
deeds. (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1.9.8)
The tme polifician is thought to have put most of his efforts into study of virtue. For
he wants to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws. (Aristotle, Eth.
�/c. 1.13.2)
[The] state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only. . . [I]t is
plain that a city worthy the name must have virtue as its aim (Aristofie, Pol. 3.5.10-
11)
A state. . .a community of families and aggregations of families in wellbeing, for the
sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life. . . A state is the union of families and villages
in a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and honourable life
(Aristotle, Po/. 3.5.13-14).
The state is one form of community of similar people, and its object is the best life
that is possible. ... [T]he greatest good is happiness, and this is some perfect activity
or employment of virtue, Happiness is the highest good, being a realization and
perfect practice of virtue (Aristotle, Pol. 7.7.2).
Politics aims to produce virtuous, noble citizens, capable of fine deeds. For Aristotle, a
virtuous life is a good life. Thus, the polis exists for the good and happy life.
Aristotle defends his view in greater detail toward the end of the Nicomachean Ethics
(NE). He acknowledges ethical theory as insufficient for the development of virtue. Right
laws must be enforced in addition to education:
It is difficult to obtain a right education in virtue from youth up without being
brought up under right laws; for to live temperately and hardily is not pleasant to
most men, especially when young; hence the nurture and exercises of the young
should be regulated by law, since temperance and hardiness will not be painfiil when
they have become habitual (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 10.9.8).
In other words, the lives ofmen^^ must be regulated by "a certain intelligence, and by a
right system, invested with adequate sanctions" (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 10.9.1 1). Beyond
ethics, the science of legislation is needed. Since laws are the product ofpolitics, ethics
" Aristotle has a different idea on the moral development ofman and woman. Thus, I use the word
"men."
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therefore needs help from politics. Both education and law (ethics and politics) are needed
for the upbringing of the virtuous human being.
2.4.2 Virtue
In the very beginning ofNE, Aristotle describes politics as "the most authoritative of
the sciences." As such, politics aims to bring forth the good {kyaJdoq). The question ofwhat
constitutes good remains to be asked. The good, according to Aristotle, must be an end-in-
itself (to T�A.og) and must be self-sufficient (aurapKeia) (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1.7.8). An
option is an end-in-itselfwhen it is chosen for its own sake and not as a means to an end
(Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1.7.5). An option is self-sufficient when it alone renders life desirable
and lacking in nothing {Eth. nic. X.l.l). According to Aristotle, eudaimonia (6u6aL|iovLa)
satisfies both these criteria. Thus, eudaimonia is "the end at which all actions aim," i.e.,
"the Good."
However, according to Aristotle, claiming eudaimonia as the Good is a truism
(Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1.7.9), a consideration with which everyone would readily agree. What
needs to be clarified is the concept of eudaimonia. Aristotle defines eudaimonia in terms of
the human fiinction (to epyoy tou dy6pGJTT0u), since the goodness of a thing resides in its
fiincfion (Aristotle, nic. 1.7.10).^^
Aristotle defines the fiinction of a man as "the active exercise of the soul in
conformity with rational principle" (vj/uxfic; evepyeia KaTd Xoyov) (Aristotle, Eth. nic.
1.7.14). In other words, human activity is distinctively characterized by rationality.
Since eudaimonia and the good are one and the same, human beings achieve
eudaimonia by becoming good. Becoming a good human being requires performing the
" For example, a "good" sculptor is a sculptor who performs his function well.
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human function well and rightly. Given that the function of the human being is the "active
exercise the soul in conformity with rational principle," the good of a human being will
then be to perform that exercise in excellence.^"* Thus, the eudaimonia of a man is defined
as the "active exercise of his soul in conformity with virtue" (^|/uxfl(; evepyeia YLveiai Kai'
dpexriv) (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1.7.15; cf 1.13). Virtue, for Aristotle, simply means
"excellence." In short, the eudaimonia of a man consists in his exercising his function in
excellence. Eudaimonia, therefore, requires not only a disposition geared toward virtue, but
also a manifestation of virtue in action (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1.8.9).
Aristotle believes that the eudaimonia life is also the best, and the noblest, and the
most pleasant life (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1.8.10-14). As such, the eudaimonia life satisfies all
common expectations of a good life.
For Aristotle, there are two kinds of virtue, namely intellectual virtue and moral
virtue. Intellectual virtue is produced and increased by instruction; whereas moral virtue is
the product of habit (Aristofie, Eth. nic. 2.1.1). No one is bom with innate moral virtues.
Nature gives human beings only the capacity to receive moral virtue. Habit brings the
capacity to receive moral virtue to maturity (teA,eL6a)) (Aristofie, Eth. nic. 2.1.3).
Moral habits are developed by the practice of virtuous acts. To that end, Aristotle
writes, "we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by
doing brave acts" (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 2.1.5). Or, more generally, "our moral dispositions
are formed as a result of the corresponding activities" (Aristofie, Eth. nic. 2.1.7). Practice is
the only way to achieve virtue. Nonetheless, not all activities will help formulate moral
Deborah Achtenberg, "The Role of the Ergon Argument in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics," in
Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy IV: Aristotle 's Ethics (ed. John Peter Anton and Anthony Preus; Albany,
N.Y.: State University ofNew York Press, 1991), 59-72, esp. 67.
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dispositions. Certain requirements must be met in order for practices to become
constructive. An act possesses virtue and contributes to moral disposition only if the agent
performing the act is in a certain state ofmind:
First he must act with knowledge; secondly he must deliberately choose the act, and
choose it for its own sake; and thirdly the act must spring from a fixed and permanent
disposition of character. (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 2.4.3)
A courageous act committed accidentally or unconsciously does not qualify as a virtuous
act. Virtuous acts are the products of knowledge, deliberative choice, and fixed disposition.
The question remains as to what exactly are those acts that one is to choose deliberately
and by practicing those acts one develops a robust moral character. In other words, what
are the virtues? What is courage? What is temperance? What is justice? Virtue, according
to Aristotle, involves the act of observing "the mean" between excess and deficiency.
Moral virtue, according to Aristotle, is the habit of deliberatively choosing "the mean"
(to |i�Oov):
Virtue is a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice ofactions and
emotions (e^ig -rrpoaLpeiLKri), consisting essentially in the observance of the mean
relative to us, this being determined by principle, that is, as the prudent man
((t)p6vLO[iO(;) would determine it. (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 2.6.15)
He exemplifies his concept of "the mean" through a series of eleven moral virtues
(Aristofie, Eth. nic. 2.7).^^ Aristofie develops these virtues in detail in Eth. nic. 3.6-4.9.^^ In
Book 5, Aristofie deals with one single virtue, namely, the virtue of jusfice. In Book 6,
Aristotle deals with various intellectual virtues, including knowledge, craftsmanship,
practical wisdom {^povvpvC), insight, and wisdom. According to Aristotle, the
" Michael Pakaluk, Aristotle 's Nicomachean Ethics: An Introduction (Cambridge Introductions to
Key Philosophical Texts; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 113-16.
Courage (3.6-9), temperance (3.10-12), liberality (4.1), magnificence (4.2) megalopsychia (4.3-4),
good temper (4.5), fHendliness (4.6), truthfiihiess (4.7), wit (4.8). Cf. Howard J. Curzer, Aristotle and the
Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 19-220.
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development ofmoral virtue requires ^p6vr]oiQ. For Aristotle, <^p6vf]oiQ is excellence in
deliberation. OpovrjOLc; is the intellectual faculty that determines the right principle. Virtue
is the habit of choosing the right principle. Choice is a voluntary action preceded by
deliberation. Choice adds desire upon the object determined by deliberation.
Virtue = Disposition determined by right principle (6.8.4)
Disposition of choosing the mean (meaiKis determined by principle; 2.6.15)
Principle is determined by (jjpovriOLc; (6.13.4)
(jjpovriOLc; is right principle in matters of conduct (6.13.5)
Choice is a voluntary action preceded by deliberation
(3.2.17)
The object of choice is something within our power
which after deliberation we desire (3.3.19)
Choice is a deliberative desire (3.3.19; 6.2.2)
Deliberative excellence
constitutes (^p6vr]oic, (6.9.7)
In Book 7, Aristotle deals with the issue ofmoral weakness. Aristotle argues that
moral weakness is not caused by the errors in knowledge but by the influence of desire
(etTLGuiiLa) and passion (�ndBoQ) (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 7.3.9-10).
2.4.3 Friendship
Aristotle devotes Books 8 and 9 of the Nicomachean Ethics to friendship. The
lengthy amount of space spend on friendship speaks of its importance in Aristotle's
thought.^^ Aristotle openly proclaims its importance in the opening lines ofBook 8:
" Robert Sokolowski writes "In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics friendship plays a much more central
role in the discussion of the moral virtues. Several virtues. ..are freated in books III and IV, and justice is
discussed in book V, but fiiendship is freated in two books, books VIII and IX, toward the end of the work. I
think that friendship, and specifically noble friendship is the culmination ofmoral virtue; the ability to be a
friend in the highest and best way is the moral perfection ofhuman nature, according to Aristotle. Justice is
not the highest virtue after all; friendship is. Friendship is beyond justice" ("The Christian Difference in
Personal Relationships," in On Wings ofFaith andReason: The Christian Difference in Culture and Science
[ed. Craig Steven Titus; Arlington, Va.: Institute for the Psychological Sciences Press, 2008], 77).
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Friendship is a virtue, or involves virtue; and also it is one of the most indispensable
requirements of life. For no one would choose to live without friends, but possessing
all other good things. (Aristotle, Eth. �zc.8.1.1)
Friendship is indispensable for the good life. To become a ftiUy developed human being (a
virtuous being) an individual needs friendship. Not only is friendship indispensable for the
good life, friendship also is indispensable for life, itself Aristotle claims that without
friendship no one would choose to live. Living requires living in friendship. Aristotle
understands friendship as the basic building block of the human life.
According to Aristotle, friendship requires certain acts:
(1) feel goodwill for each other (euvoeXv aXk^XoiQ), that is, wish each other's good,
and (2) be aware of each other's goodwill, and (3) the cause of their goodwill must
be one of the lovable qualities [i.e., the good, the pleasant, and the useful] mentioned
above. {AnsXotXe Eth. nic. 8.2.1)
For Aristotle, goodwill is a friendly feeling toward another human being. Friendship
requires goodwill, but goodwill is not the same as friendship. For goodwill occurs not only
in friendship, but also between strangers {Eth. nic. 9.5.1). For example, an individual may
express goodwill toward a fallen athlete seen on television. Furthermore, in addition to
goodwill, friendship requires affection {^\.Xr\oic^ {Eth. nic. 9.5.1-2). Affection involves
intense desire and willingness to provide active assistance to others. Thus, goodwill is not
the same as friendship. Goodwill is but the beginning of friendship, just as pleasure of the
eye is the beginning of love. Goodwill itself cannot produce friendship; but friendship
cannot do without goodwill.^^
Thus, the definition in Eth. nic. 8.2.1 [quoted above] is "schematic" in the sense that it "leaves most
of the important work of classification undone, since it indicates few uniformities in the definienda; thus
resemblances and differences, and underlying principles ofunity, need to be discovered by inspection of the
separate species" (Pakaluk, Nicomachean Ethics. Books VIII and IX, 61-62). Pakaluk is arguing against John
M. Cooper, "Aristotle on the Forms ofFriendship," Review ofMetaphysics 30 (1977), 619-48.
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Three kinds of friendship exist, namely friendship of utility, friendship of pleasure,
and friendship of virtue. Only the last, says Aristotle, properly counts as friendship, while
the others are called friendship only in an analogical sense (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.4.4). In
the friendship of virtue (or perfect fiiendship), friends love each other for the friend's sake.
In the friendship ofutility and the friendship of pleasure, friends love each other not for the
friend's sake but for the sake ofbenefit and pleasure. Perfect friendship lasts long, since
virtue is a permanent quality. Friendships ofutility and fiiendships ofpleasure end easily,
since benefit and pleasure are temporal and non-essential qualities (Aristotle, Eth. nic.
8.3.1-7). Friendship of virtue is rare, just as men of virtue are rare. In addition, this type of
friendship is rare because true friendship requires time and intimacy (Aristotle, Eth. nic.
8.3.8). Friendship as a virtue, like all other virtues, requires active and constant practice.
Friendship is exercised by "seeking other's society" (ouCfiv) (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.5.3; cf.
8.6.1).
2.4.4 The Causes of Stasis
Friendship, according to Aristotle, preserves the polis. It prevents the polis from
falling into stasis. Stasis is one of the major themes in Book 5 ofAristotle's Politics.^^
According to Aristotle, stasis has three different causes:
Since we are examining from where stasis and constitutional transformations arise,
we must undertake to explain their universal origins and causes. There are
approximately three in number, and we must start by distinguishing each type
separately. We must comprehend (1) the psychological inclination (ttcSc; 'exovteg) to
engage in stasis, (2) the ends (tlvcov 6V6K�v) for which it is waged, and third (3) the
beginnings (dpxal) that set into motion the political disturbances and staseis between
citizens. (Aristotle, Po/. 5.2.1)
Stasis is dealt within the broader context of "constitutional transformations" (^leTaPoXal tcov
�iToA.LteLa)v; Pol. 5.1.1). The content of this section on stasis is heavily indebted to Kalimtzis, Aristotle on
Political Enmity andDisease, 103-34, 49-78.
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Jowett calls these three causes the material, final, and efficient causes of stasis?'^
According to Aristotle, the material cause of stasis is the inclination induced by the
perception of injustice:
Those that desire equality enter on stasis if they thinlc that they have too little
although they are the equals of those who have more, while those that desire
inequality or superiority do so if they suppose that although they are unequal they
have not got more but an equal amount or less. (Aristotle, Pol. 5.2.1)
The perception of injustice creates an inclination among the citizens "to engage in actions
that fall outside the existing context ofpolitical justice" and "a permanent subjective
condition of disloyalty and rebellion toward the principles of their constitutions."^' Stasis
feeds upon this material and grows out of this inclination. There are two final causes for
stasis:
The objects about which it is waged are gain (KepSoc;) and honor (TL(ir|), and their
opposites, for men carry on stasis in states in order to avoid dishonor (diLiiLay) and
loss (Cripiav), either on their own behalf or on behalfof their friends. (Aristotle, Pol.
5.2.2)
Persons engaging in stasis seek honor and gain in order to compensate their losses, since
they perceive themselves as victims ofunjust treatment. The efficient cause of stasis
includes seven major causes and four adjunct causes:
The causes (altLaL) and the origins (dpxal) of the disturbances (KLvrjoecoey) because
ofwhich they acquire this psychological inclination in the manner described, and for
the objecfives mentioned [i.e., honor and gain]�are approximately seven in number,
though there could be more. Of the seven, two are the same as those previously
mentioned, though not in the same manner. That is, citizens are stirred up against
each other because of gain and honor, not so that they may gain these for themselves,
as was previously stated, but because they see others getting the larger share of
*� According to Aristotle, all things come with four causes: the material cause ("that out ofwhich"),
the formal cause ("the form"), the efficient cause ("the primary source of the change or rest"), and the final
cause ("the end, that for the sake ofwhich a thing is done"). A statue, for example, may have bronze as its
material cause; a specific shape as its formal cause; an artisan as its efficient cause; and a purpose (e.g. sell
for money) as its final cause. These issues are discussed in Aristotle, Phys. 2.3, An. Post. 2.1 1, and Metaph.
A.3 and A.2.
^' �jd\\mizi^, Aristotle on Political Enmity andDisease, 116-17.
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them�some justly, others unjustly. They are also stirred up by hubris (lippiv), fear
((j)6poy), superiority (mepoxw), disdain (KaTa(t)p6vr|0Lv), and increase outside of
proportion (aij^rjoLV Tr]v irapd to avdkoyov). Other modes of cause could be
electioneering (kpiQdav), inattention (oA-LycopLav), small changes (liLKpoTriia), and
heterogeneity of the populace (dvopoLOTtixa). (Aristotle, Pol. 5.2.3)
Chronologically, the efficient cause comes before both the material cause and the final
cause. The efficient causes are the "small matters" that "carried on about great matters"
(Aristotle, Pol. 5.3.1). In other words, the "small matters" give rise to ideas among the
citizens of unjust treatment. These ideas in turn implant in the citizens the inclination to
engage in stasis and seek compensations in gain and honor.
2.4.5 Friendship and Concord
The cure for stasis, according to Aristotle, is friendship.^^ The chief aim of the
lawgivers is to promote friendship and banish stasis:
Friendship appears to be the bond of the state; and lawgivers seem to set more store
by it than they do by jusfice (SiKaLOOuyriv), for to promote concord (b\i6voia), which
seems akin to fiiendship ((^iXia), is their chief aim, while stasis, which is enmity, is
what they are most anxious to banish. And ifmen are fiiends, there is no need of
justice between them; whereas merely to be just is not enough�a feeling of
friendship also is necessary. Indeed the highest form of jusfice seems to have an
element of friendly feeling in it. (Aristofie, Eth. nic. 8.1.4)
Elsewhere, Aristofie claims, "friendship is the greatest of blessings for the state, since it is
the best safeguard against revolufion (axaoid(^oi�v) and the unity (\iiav) of the state. . .but
appears to be and is said by him [Socrates] to be the effect of fiiendship" (Aristofie, PoL
2.1.16).
Kalimtzis notes that for Aristotle, "The problem ofstasis was not a problem of conflict resolution
and consensus-building between warring factions or one of adjusting distributions between the haves and the
have-nots. All of these factors, although they have their place, are subordinate to the erosion ofpolitical
friendship, what the Greeks call homonoia, literally 'together-mindedness'
" {Aristotle on Political Enmity
and Disease, xiv-xv).
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According to Aristotle, concord denotes not friendship, butfriendship between
citizens (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 9.6.2). As such, citizens in agreement with one another
comprise concord. Concord does not denote merely an agreement of opinion, since this
agreement is possible even among strangers, nor is concord an agreement in reasoned
judgments on any subject whatsoever. Agreement in astronomy, for example, does not
count as concord. Concord refers specifically to that moment "when the citizens agree
(6|iOYva)Hoyc5oL) as to their interests (irepl xcov av\i^^p6v�^^^yv), adopt (irpoaLpcoyTaL) the
same policy, and carry their common resolves (KOLvfj So^avta) into execution (TrpdiTQCL)"
(Aristotle, FrA. nic. 9.6.1).
Concord, therefore, can exist only between good men, for only good men are willing
to come together to deliberate, to determine, and to execute the common good:
Concord. . .exists between good men (xoXg eiTLeLKeoLy), since these are of one mind
(6|j,ovoouol) both with themselves and with one another, as they always stand more or
less on the same ground; for good men's wishes are steadfast, and do not ebb and
flow like the tide, and they wish for just and expedient ends (id SiKaia Kal xd
ou|i(j)epoyxa), which they strive to attain in common (Koivfi). (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 9.6.3)
On the other hand, base men (ol ^a\)Xoi) care only for themselves and "try to get more
(-rrXeove^Lac) than their share of advantages, and take less than their share of labors and
public burdens" (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 9.6.4).
According to Aristotle, different forms of government show different forms of
friendship between the ruler and the ruled. In a monarchy, the relationship between the
ruler and the ruled is like the friendship between father and child. In an aristocracy, the
relationship is like the friendship between husband and wife. In a timocracy, the
relationship is like friendship between brothers. In a tyranny, the relationship is like the
friendship between master and slave, which is not a true fi"iendship. As for democracy.
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Aristotle notes, "there is most room for them [friendship] in democracies, where the
citizens being equal have many things in common" (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.1 1.8). In other
words, democracy can be argued as the best form of government, since it provides the
greatest room for friendship, the greatest virtue beyond justice. In a democracy, when all
citizens come together in friendship and unity, they become a collective body with great
physical, moral, and mental strength:
It is possible that the many, though not individually good men, yet when they come
together may be better, not individually but collectively, than those who are so, just
as public dinners to which many contribute are better than those supplied at one
man's cost; for where there are many, each individual, it may be argued, has some
portion of virtue and wisdom, and when they have come together, just as the
multitude becomes a single man with many feet and many hands and many senses, so
also it becomes one personality as regards the moral and intellectual faculties.
(Aristotle, Po/. 3.6.4-5)
The polis with the greatest amount of friendship is the greatestpolis of all. Such greatness
is possible only when citizens are equal to one another and virtuous in concem with the
public good.
In sum, Aristotle begins his ethical-political treatise with the concept of the Good,
from which he derives the concept ofeudaimonia. He then defines eudaimonia in terms of
human nature. Virtue, according to Aristofie, is "the active exercise of the soul's faculties
in conformity with rational principle" (li/uxfjc; evepyeta Kctxh Xoyov). Friendship is a virtue.
Three types of friendship exist, namely friendship based on utility, friendship based on
pleasure, and friendship based on virtue. Only the latter counts as tme fiiendship.
Friendship, according to Aristotle, saves the polis from stasis. The more friendship, the
better the polis.
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2.5 Cynicism
Cynics, liice Aristotle, are eudaimonists. Antisthenes claims that virtue ensures
happiness (euSai^iovLa) (DL 6.1 1). Diogenes says, "instead of useless toils men should
choose those that are according to nature (Kaid ^volv), w^hereby they might have lived
happily (Cf|v �u6aL|i6ya)c;)" (DL 6.71; cf Ps. Diogenes, Ep. 30).^^
Closely related to the concept ofeuSaipovia, again, is the concept of nature (DL 6.38,
71). However, Diogenes does not identify nature as the function ofman. Rather, he
identifies it as the simple life (6 euieXfi ptoc) (DL 6.21, 37). He believes that "gods have
given to men the means of living easily" (DL 6.44; cf DL 6.78 tCwac ol|iov eA.a(j)poTaTay];
6.104 [Xix(2)Q PloCv]). Life according to nature is simple and easy life. He calls this life the
self-sufficient life (DL 6.1 1, 78).
This easy and self-sufficient life involves two requirements: "on the physical plane,
contentment with the bare necessities of life [2.5.1]; and on the spiritual level, complete
detachment from the world and worldly affairs [2.5.2]."^"* This understanding of self-
sufficiency is different from Aristotle's understanding. First, Aristotle thinks that external
goods are required for the fiourishing life; second, Aristotle closely associates the
flourishing life with the life of the polis. Diogenes denies both claims. He proclaims
instead the ideal of the cosmopolis composed of citizens who lead a simple and self-
sufficient life (2.5.3).
Emperor Julian also notes, "Now the end and aim (okotoc Kal xkXoQ) of the Cynic philosophy, as
indeed of every philosophy, is happiness, but happiness that consists in living according to nature (Kaxa
^voiv) and not according to the opinions of the multitude." (193d). To live happily is to live well: "Why do
you live, if you do not care to live well {KaXQc, Cr\v)T (DL 6.65). It is an evil (kokov) to live ill (to KaKCj; Cnv)
(DL6.55).
*"*
Audrey N. M. Rich, "The Cynic Conception ofAytapkeia," Mnemosyne 9 (1956): 23.
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2.5.1 Self-sufficiency
According to Diogenes, the flourishing and self-sufficient life needs only basic
necessifies. Living self-sufficiently allows for adaptation to all circumstances (DL 6.22).
The aim ofphilosophy, according to Diogenes, is to help people be prepared for every
fortune (iraoav x\)xy]v irapeoKeudoGaL; DL 6.63).^^ Diogenes is said to have learned this
through watching a mouse:
Through watching a mouse running about. . .not looking for a place to lie down in,
not afraid of the dark, not seeking any of the things which are considered to be
dainties, he [Diogenes] discovered the means of adapting himself to circumstances
{Tf\Q irepLOxdoecoc;). (DL 6.22; cf 6.37)
Living a self-sufficient life, Diogenes keeps minimal possessions.^^ He eats simply (DL
6.57), avoids desserts (DL 6.55, 56), tends to eat only raw meat (DL 6.34, 73, 76), drinks
only water (DL 6.31, 104), and sleeps in open spaces. In many ways his life resembles that
of a dog (DL 6.33, 40, 45, 46, 55, 61, 77, 78, 79). Accustomed to minimal desires,
Diogenes and his followers learn to guard themselves against the whirlwinds of fortune.
However, the happy and self-sufficient life is sustained not only passively by having
minimal needs, but also actively by vigorous training and toil: "nothing in life. . .has any
chance of succeeding without strenuous practice (aoKr\oiv)" (DL 6.71). Training involves
both the mind and the body (DL 6.70). The individual must prepare bodily for all harsh
physical condifions. Thus, Diogenes rolls over hot sand in summer (DL 6.23). During the
winter, he embraces statues covered with snow and walks barefoot on snow (DL 6.23, 34).
Teles the Cynic devotes an entire treatise to the topic of self-sufficiency. Li the treaty's opening line,
Teles claims, "Just as a good actor must perform properly whatever role the poet assigns him, so too must a
good man perform whatever Dame Fortune (i] tuxt)) assigns" (Edward N. O'Neil, Teles: The Cynic Teacher
[Texts and Translations; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1977], 7-19).
William D. Desmond notes, "from Diogenes to the time ofJulian, the Cynic was easily recognizable
by his staff, traveling bag, beard, single thin cloak and nothing else except his dirt" {Cynics [Ancient
Philosophies; Berkeley: University ofCahfomia Press, 2008], 79).
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The individual also must be mentally prepared for all harsh conditions. First, he or
she must have the ability to control desires (DL 6.66). As such, the individual must be
trained in order to "derive more pleasure from despising pleasure than from the pleasures
themselves" (DL 6.71). Second, he or she must not be afraid of discomfort (dXy-qdwv) (DL
6.55). The individual must learn courage, the hue of virtue (DL 6.54). Diogenes often
compares his training with athletic training, like a runner striving toward a goal (DL 6.34).
Nonetheless, Diogenes considers his training the only true training, fri his view, athletes
are stupid and their toil is unprofitable and ineffective (DL 49, 70). They defeat only slaves,
whereas he defeats men (DL 6.33, 43; Dio Chrysostom, Isthm. 12). The true and usefiil
labor is to live according to nature and to possess the ability to overcome everything {i\av
eKVLKfioaL) (DL 6.71).
Living according to nature, therefore, does not constitute an unconstrained, carnal,
and beastly life. Accordingly, such a way of living does not suggest primitivism. Rather,
this controlled kind of life requires fraining and habituation in order to reach the goal of
self-sufficiency and invincibility. Living according to nature leads to a life of liberty
(eXeuGepia) (DL 7.71), being from all external disturbances. This life requires reason to
discern truth, happiness, and the means to attain that goal of happiness.^^ Without reason,
people in madness will choose (alpeco) misery (KaKoSaiiiovdco; in contrast to euSaLiiovia;
DL 6.71).
Diogenes aligns reason with courage and nature in opposition to passion, fortune, and
convention (DL 6.38). With the use of "right reason" (6p9oc; koyoQ), he justifies even the
practice of cannibalism:
" Luis E. Navia, Diogenes the Cynic: The War against the fForW (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books,
2005), 144-45.
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He saw no impropriety ... .in touching human flesh. . . . [AJccording to right reason as
he puts it, all elements are contained in all things and pervade everything: since not
only is meat a constituent of bread, but bread of vegetables; and all other bodies also,
by means of certain invisible passages and particles find their way in and unite with
all substances in the form of vapour. (DL 6.73)
Thus, living according to nature is not an unrefiecfive intuifive way of living; rather it
requires training and often a counterintuitive way ofperceiving. Cynics call themselves the
wise. They live according to nature and reason. Others, in their view, live in madness. Mad
men are not true human beings.
Diogenes is famously known to have "lit a lamp in broad daylight and said, as he
went about, 'I am looking for a man'" (DL 6.41). More than once he reported that he finds
no men but only scoundrels (DL 6.32) and crowds (DL 6.40, 60). Men are mad for "very
valuable things. . .were bartered for things of no value, and vice versa." He lists various
examples:
He would wonder that the grammarians should investigate the ills ofOdysseus, while
they were ignorant of their own. Or that the musicians should tune the strings of the
lyre, while leaving the dispositions of their own soul discordant; that the
mathematicians should gaze at the sun and overlook matters close at hand; that the
orators should make a fiiss about justice in their speeches, but never practice it; or
that the avaricious should cry out against money, while themselves envying the very
rich. He was moved to anger that men should sacrifice to the gods to ensure health
and in the midst of the sacrifice should feast to the dettiment of health. He was
astonished that when slaves saw their masters were gluttons, they did not steal some
of the viands. (DL 6.27-28)
2.5.2 Defacing the Currency
Life according to nature stands in contrast with life according to customs (v6\ioq; DL
6.38, 71).^^ Diogenes' attack on custom is made memorable through the phrase "defacing
the currency" (DL 6.20-21, 56, 70-71). Currency stands for civic convenfions. The metals
The contrast between law/convention and nature is a recurrent theme in Greco-Roman philosophy.
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from which currencies are made stand for nature. To deface the currency is to get rid of
conventions and to return to nature.
Diogenes wants to deface many conventions. First, he rejects family, commerce, and
politics:
He would praise those who were about to marry and refrained, those who intending
to go a voyage never set sail, those who thinking to engage in politics do no such
thing, those also who purposing to rear a family do not do so, and those who make
ready to live with potentates, yet never come near them after all. (DL 6.29)
Also, he reftises to work and prefers instead to beg (DL 6.45, 48, 56, 62, 66). He questions
the value of religion (DL 6.39, 42, 59, 60), the need for death rites (DL 6.32, 52, 79), and
the importance ofpaideia (DL 6.39). He despises both trainings in music (DL 6.47, 48)
and athletics (DL 6.49, 61). He thinks that music, geometry, astronomy, and other such
studies should be discarded as useless and unnecessary (DL 6.73).
Moreover, Diogenes not only rejects institutions and conventions; he also ridicules
those persons who practice these customs. He mocks political leaders (Alexander [DL 6.27,
60, 63, 68], Perdiccas [DL 6.44]), famous orators (Demosthenes [DL 6.34], Lysias [DL
6.42], Anaximenes [DL 6.57]), and distinguished philosophers (Plato [DL 6.24, 25, 26, 40,
67]).
Diogenes challenges also the proprieties of the Athenian life. He performs all kinds
of natural ftinctions�eating (DL 6.58, 61), urinating (DL 6.46), defecating (Dio
Chrysostom, Virt. (Or. 8) 36; Julian, Or. 6.202c), masturbating (Dio Chrysostom, Tyr. 16-
20), and fornicating (DL 6.22)� shamelessly in public in the manner of a dog.
Diogenes' challenge to the polis is all encompassing. Whatever is cherished as civil,
he questions it and shows its absurdity. Aristotle may have had him in mind when he
commented, "a man who is incapable of entering into partnership, or who is so self-
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sufficing tliat he has no need to do so, is no part of a polis, so that he must be either a lower
animal or a god" (Aristotle, Pol 1 . 1 .12).^^ Animals and gods are precisely what Diogenes
claims for himself While he acts like a dog^� and is treated as a dog, he at the same time
claims to be close to the gods:
The gods, who are man's benefactors, provide a paradigm for Cynic self-sufficiency;
the Cynic himself is godlike (DL 6.51, 104), friend of the gods, (DL 6.37, 72), their
messenger, their agent (DL 6.120), and in being dYocGot; 6aL|ia)v ('tutelary god,"
"guardian angel"; DL 7.74), he is himselfvirtually divine.^'
This combination of dog and god is well-expressed by a poem written by Cercidas, who
writes, "Diogenes, a true bom son ofZeus, a hound ofheaven" (DL 6.77).
For Aristotle, the polis is natural (Aristotle, Pol. 1.1.8) and human beings are by
nature political animals, and the polis is meant for the good of human beings. Diogenes
disagrees. He inverts Aristotle's thesis and claims that the polis is against nature and that
the virtuous life can be found only through rejection of the conventional polis.
2.5.3 The Cosmopolis
Diogenes, however, did not avoid speaking ofpolitics. Some ofDiogenes' teachings
on politics can be traced back to Antisthenes, his teacher. Antisthenes often employs
military language to describe virtue and its effect. Pmdence, for example, is called the
"most sure stronghold (xeLXog oLO^aXkoTOLTOv) which never cmmbles away nor is betrayed"
(DL 6.13). He encourages people to constmct "walls of defense" with "impregnable
reasoning" (DL 6.13). Nonetheless, virtue is more than a defensive wall. Virtue is also a
Rich claims, "Possibly Aristotle has the Cynics actually in mind when he says this, for of course, the
gods and the animals are, in the eyes of the Cynic, the very types of those which he aspires" ("The Cynic
Conception ofAytapkeia," 28).
� He also claims himself as a dog (DL 6.45, 46, 60).
^' John Moles, "Cynic Cosmopolitanism," in The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its
Legacy (ed. R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Caze; Berkeley: University ofCalifomia Press,
1996), 113.
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weapon enabling a handful of good men to fight against all the bad (DL 6.12). Wise men
know whom to love and who is worthy of love (DL 6.1 1, 12). Thus, only men ofworth are
friends (DL 6.12). Wise men will make alliance with one another based on virtue. When
"brothers are like-minded (oiiovoouvtcov dbeX<^(ov), no fortress is so strong as their
common life (ouiiPLOJOLv)" (DL 6.6). For Antisthenes, the strongestpolis is one based on
friendship of virtue.
Antisthenes' philosophy operates within the traditionalpolis; but the same is not true
ofDiogenes. He rejects the polis. He is a man "without a city, without a house, without a
fatherland, a beggar, a wanderer with a single day's bread" (DL 6.38). However, Diogenes
does not discard the concept ofpolis completely. Instead, he transforms it and develops a
radically new idea, namely the cosmopolis?^ When asked ofhis origin, Diogenes answers,
"I am a citizen of the world (KooiiOTToA-LiTig)" (DL 6.63; cf DL 6. 98; Dio Chrysostom, 4
Regn. 13; Epictetus, Diatr. 3.22.47; Lucian, Vit. Auct. 8). Diogenes' cosmopolis is
composed of fellow wise men (DL 6.93). In this polis, wise men share all things in
common, including wives and sons (DL 6.72). According to Diogenes, this universal polis
is the only true noXixda. Crates, Diogenes' pupil, describes this cosmopolis in a poem:
There is a city Pera (Hripri) in the midst ofwine-dark sea (o'lvottl) of vapor (TU(t)(p),
Fair and rich (KOiXx\ Kal iTLeLpa), though filthy, owning nothing,
Into which sails neither foolish parasite
Nor glutton, slave of sensual appetite.
But thyme it bears, garlic, and figs and loaves,
For which things' sake men fight not each with other,
Nor stand to arms for money (irepl Keppaxog) or for fame (irepl hoiry^.
(DL 6.85; cf Demetrius, Eloc. 259)'^
In an important study on Cynic cosmopolitanism, Moles argues that Cynic cosmopolitanism is not
purely negative. His argument consists of five proofs. Moles, "Cynic Cosmopolitanism," 109-10.
Crates mimics Homer, who writes, "There is a Cretan land in the midst of the wine-dark sea, Fair
and fiixitfiil, with sea all about. In it are many people, Coimtless in number, and nine hundred cities" (Homer,
Od. 19.172^).
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Crates' ideal polis is called Pera, which means "wallet," the leather pouch that Cynics
carry each day. The polis represents the Cynic way of life.^"* This polis is said to be situated
"in the midst of wine-dark vapor." Vapor stands for "the lack ofmental clarity that
prevents people from attaining the only goal of their existence�happiness."^^ It stands
also for all the conventions and customs that are built upon the folly mind. Pera is apolis
amongst the folly but not of the folly. This polis is devoid of vices both of the intellect and
of the body. Finally, this polis is composed ofwise citizens.
This polis is characterized as fair and rich, but paradoxically possesses nothing, since
all things are shared in common. The citizens of this polis live on simple foods such as
thyme, garlic, figs, and bread. Living wisely and simply, the polis is able to maintain its
peace. The result is a polis without stasis, for no one in this polis takes up arms against
another for money (irepl Kepiiaiog) or for fame (nepl So^ric). This characteristic reveals two
facts about Crates' understanding of the polis. First, the best polis is without stasis. Second,
stasis is often caused by contentions for money and for fame. Like Thucydides and
Aristotle, Crates also finds money and fame as the source of stasis. Thus, in the ideal
Cynic polis neither money nor fame is present:
Ignominy {ciboimv) and poverty (neyiav) he declared to be his country (naTpCSa),
which Fortune could never take captive. He was, he said, a fellow-citizen (uoA-Lirit;)
ofDiogenes, who defied all the plots of envy ((j)96y(o). (DL 6.93)
Moles, "Cynic Cosmopolitanism," 111.
Navia, Diogenes the Cynic: The War against the World, 178.
Plutarch reports a saying from Crates: "So Crates, thinking that luxury and exfravagance were as
much to blame as anj^ing for the growth of civil discords {xkc, oiaoeLt;) and the rule of despots in states,
humorously advised: 'Do not, by always making our fare more ample than lentils,/ Throw us all into discord
(oTOOLv)'" (Plutarch, Tu. San. 125f).
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This ideal polis is composed of virtuous citizens. No one envies another person for money
or for fame.^^
In sum, the Cynics inherit from Aristotle (or along with Aristotle) a set of common
vocabularies and a basic philosophical framework centered on the concepts of eudaimonia
and nature. Defining nature as natural life, the Cynics reject the traditional polis and
expand their horizon to include both animals and gods as members of their cosmopolis. In
this cosmopolis. Cynics are fellow-citizens of one another. As virtuous citizens, all Cynics
live self-sufficiently in ignominy and in poverty. Devoid of fame and wealth, this Cynic
polis exists without envy or fighting against each other for honor and gain. Instead, citizens
are friends to one another and all things are shared in common.
2.6 Epicureanism
Epicurus, the founder ofEpicureanism, like other Greco-Roman philosophers, is in
search of the happy life (DL 10.122). But unlike others, Epicurus defines happiness in
terms of pleasure:
We call pleasure the alpha and omega of a blessed life (liaKapLcog ^x\v). Pleasure is
our first and kindred good. It is the starting-point of every choice (alpeoecog) and of
every aversion ((j)UYfi�;), and to it we come back, inasmuch as we make feeling the
rule by which to judge of every good thing. (DL 10.128-9; cf Cicero, Fin. 1.29;
Diogenes ofOinoanda, Frg. 32)^^
"
Note also: "The love ofmoney ((tjilapYupiav) he [Diogenes] declared to be mother city of all evils"
(DL 6.50); "He would ridicule good birth and fame and all such distinctions, calling them showy omaments
ofvice" (DL 6.72); "Wealth and fame and high birth they [the Cynics] despise" (DL 6.104).
Geert Roskam compares this view with that ofAristotle: "Epicurus neither opted for an active life of
politics nor for the theoretical life of contemplation, but for a third kind of life, that is, a life devoted to
pleasure, which, in Aristotle's view, is only a life for cattle {Eth. nic. 1.5.1-3)" {Live Unnoticed: On the
Vicissitudes ofan Epicurean Doctrine [Philosophia Antiqua; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2007], 14).
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Ethics is knowledge what to choose and what to avoid in order to achieve the good life.
According to Epicurus, the criterion for choice and aversion according to Epicurus is
pleasure.^^ Pleasure is good; pain is evil. However, not all pleasures are choice worthy, nor
are all pains to be avoided, since some pleasures can bring the consequence of great pain,
and some pains can bring the consequence of great pleasure (DL 10.129; PD 8).^� Thus,
prudence (<^p6vr\oic,) is needed to judge (Kpivelv) that which is truly pleasurable and what
is truly painfiil (DL 10.132). Prudence therefore is an absolute necessity for good life:
[T]he beginning and the greatest good is prudence (cjjpovriaLc;). Wherefore prudence is
a more precious thing even than philosophy; from it spring all the other virtues, for it
teaches that we cannot lead a life of pleasure which is not also a life ofprudence,
honor, and justice; nor lead a life of prudence, honor, and justice, which is not also a
hfe of pleasure. (DL 10.132; PD 4)
Prudence guides a person to the life of pleasure. But what is pleasure? Epicurus claims that
the most valuable pleasures are freedom from pain (d-rrovLa) and peace ofmind (diapa^ia)
(DL 10.131, cf 10.128, 136). Of these two freedoms, the latter is more important than the
former, since the body encounters the present alone, whereas the mind encompasses the
past, the present, and the fixture. Thus, pain of the mind is more severe than pain of the
body, and pleasure of the mind is more desirable then pleasure of the body (DL 10.137).
Epicureans can even claim, "on the rack the wise man is happy" (DL 10.1 18; cf DL
10.131, SV 47, Cicero, Fm. 1.62-3; Tusc. 2.17; 5.27).
To achieve the happy life, the Epicureans offer the recipe called tetrapharmakos (the
fourfold remedy), which states, "God presents no fears, death no cause for alarm; it is easy
Epicums justifies his claim by appealing to "nature" when he says, "[A]s proof that pleasure is the
end he adduces the fact that living things, so soon as they are bom, are well content with pleasure and are at
enmity with pain, by the prompting ofnature and apart from reason" (DL 10.137).
^� For example, a costly diet would seem at first sight more pleasurable than a simple diet, but if they
are to be evaluated pmdently, the simple diet would be preferred instead, for "it supplies all that is needfixl
for health, and enables a man to meet the necessary requirements of life without shrinking, and it places us in
a better condition when we approach at intervals a costly fare and renders us fearless of fortune" (DL 10.131).
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to procure what is good; it is also easy to endure what is evil" (Philodemus, Hercul. 1005,
4.9-14; cf.DL 10.123-4).
(1) God presents no fears. Epicurus thinks that God is not involved in human affairs
(PD 1). Thus, one needs not to fear the gods.
(2) Death is no cause for alarm. Epicums thinks that death has nothing to do with
human beings (oi)6ev -rrpo; riiiag), since the soul disperses upon death, and leaves human
beings without feelings (PD 2). A correct understanding of god and death, according to the
Epicums, helps bring peace to the mind.
(3) Procuring good is easy. Epicums thinks that one needs to reflect on the nature of
desire, and leam to control one's inner attitude by practical wisdom. According to Epicums,
there are natural desires and empty desires. Pmdent people seek only natural desires (DL
10.129-32; PD 29). Natural desires are easy to satisfy. Epicums states, "nature's wealth at
once has its bounds and is easy to procure; but the wealth of vain fancies (Keycov So^cov)
recedes to an infinite distance" (PD 15). To secure the health ofbody and tranquility of
mind, the Epicureans lived a self-sufficient life characterized by simple and inexpensive
diet(DL 10.11, 130; PD 10).
(4) Finally, enduring evil is easy.
Since pleasure alone constitutes the good, virtue becomes a means to an end
(Diogenes ofOinoanda, Frg. 32). However, treating virtue as a means does not diminish
its importance, for it remains as an indispensable means to pleasure. Accordingly, Epicums
states, "the virtues have grown into one with a pleasant life, and a pleasant life is
inseparable from them" (DL 10.132; PD 5).^'
Phillip Mitsis, Epicurus
'
Ethical Theory: The Pleasures ofInvulnerability (Cornell Studies in
Classical Philology; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 62.
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In the realm ofpolitical discourse, the Epicureans highly value the good of "security"
(cLOi^aXda). Security means first and above all "security against fellow-men" (PD 6, 7, 13,
14), that is, not to be physically or psychologically harmed by others. Security is simply
another way of expressing the ultimate concem of freedom from pain (dirovLa) and peace
ofmind (dxapa^La). According to the Epicureans, the best way to achieve security is to live
an unnoticed life (Xd06 pioSoag; Plutarch, Lar.v/v. 1 1 28a- 1 129b; /iJv. Col. 1126e-1127c;
Flavius Philostratus, Vit. Apol. 8.28.12) and to shun politics (ou -noXii^voeoQai; PD 14; DL
10.1 19; VS 58).^^ They do so, because they find in politics a false understanding of the
procuring of security:
Some have wanted to become famous and respected, thinking that this way they
would achieve security from men. If, then, the life of such persons is secure, they
attain nature's good. But if it is not secure, they do not possess what, in line with
what is natural, they desired in the first place. (PD 7; cf Lucretius, DRN 5.1 1 17-35)
The soul neither rids itself of confusion (lapaxTli^) nor gains a joy (/apdy) worthy of
the name through the possession of supreme wealth (ttA-oOto; undpxwv 6 \xeyioxoQ),
nor by the honor (xLiafi) and admiration (TTepLpXevlfLg) bestowed by crowds, nor
through any of the other things sought by unlimited desire. (VS 81)
In Aristotle's understanding, the language of security (and of self-sufficiency) is applied
first and above all to the polis. However, in the Epicurean thought, security primarily
applies to the individual. Images of the polis are often projected or applied to the life of the
individual. Death, for example, is visualized as an enemy invading the city, "but as far as
death is concemed, we men all live in a city without walls" (VS 31). The misfortunes of
life are also envisioned as enemies attacking the city. Accordingly, "I have anticipated thee.
Fortune, and entrenched myself against all thy secret attacks. And we will not give
ourselves up as captives to thee or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for us to
Roskam, Live Unnoticed: On the Vicissitudes ofan Epicurean Doctrine.
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go. . .. we will leave life crying aloud in a glorious triumph-song that we have lived well"
(VS 47). Moreover, terms such as "quietness" (fiouxia) and "without disturbance" (lirj
TapdixeoeaL or dcxapa^ta) traditionally used to describe the well-being of the polis are used
to describe the well-being of the individual.
This transition from thepolis to the individual might suggest to modem interpreters
that the Epicureans have abandoned politics and systematically have transferred political
language into moral language. However, these conclusions should not be hastily drawn, for
while the Epicureans in principle rejected ordinary politics, they did not reject the concept
of the communal life.^^ They instead adopted a counter-cultural politics rooted in their
need for friendship and justice.^"*
2.6.1 Friendship
Away from daily politics. Epicureans find security and companionship in the
community of fiiendship.^^ As such, the Epicureans place high value upon fiiendship, and
their writings often lavish praises upon the value of friendship:
Of all the things wisdom prepares for the blessedness of life as a whole much the
greatest is the possession of fiiendship. (PD 27)
Friendship dances through the world bidding us all to awaken to the recognition of
happiness. (VS 52)
The noble man is chiefiy concemed with wisdom and fiiendship; of these, the former
is good for a lifetime, and the latter is good for all time. (VS 78)
Evidences show that under certain circumstances Epicureans were encouraged to engage with
pohtics: (1) when being harassed as "free riders" (Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1 127a); (2) when the war is at brink,
there is a need to stand up for security (PD 14; cf Plutarch, Adv. Col 1 124d); (3) when property laws are
under negotiation, there is a need to step out and protect one's property. See Malcolm Schofield, "Epicurean
and Stoic Political Thought," in The Cambridge History ofGreek andRoman Political Thought (ed. C. J.
Rowe and Malcolm Schofield; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 441nl3. Cf Brown, "Politics
and Soceity," 180.
^ Brown, "Politics and Soceity," 180.
Tim O'Keefe, Epicureanism (Ancient Philosophies; Berkeley: University ofCalifomia Press, 2010),
147-54. Mitsis, Epicurus' Ethical Theory: The Pleasures ofInvulnerability, 98-128.
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According to tlie Epicureans, friendship is the best way to secure happiness (PD 27; VS
52), since it provides confidence that help will be near when help is needed (VS 34).
Friendship strengthens the mind, gives peace to the mind, and supplies ultimate pleasure to
the individual (Cicero, Fin. 1 .66-67).
Friends are expected to identify fully with one another (PD 40). They are expected to
come together as "a community that is fox one another" (t) Trpoc dA,A,r|A,ouc; KOLvcovta) (PD
36, 37, 38). Friends are expected to share pleasures and pains with one another (DL 10.120;
SV 56-57), aid one another (VS 39; DL 10.120), suffer for one another (Plutarch, Col.
1 1 1 lb), and die for one another if necessary (DL 10.120).
Friends must be tested before they become friends (VS 28). Once friendship is
established, friends must remain faithful (VS 56-57). Epicureans never should give up a
friend (DL 10.120). Epicureans treasure most the faithfulness of a fi-iend, for "without
confidence there is no friendship" (el 6' diTLOXQy ou6� (j)LA.(oy) (DL 10.1 1). As such, their
aim is to "live with each other most enjoyably in the most steadfast trust (to pepaLOxaxov
�TTLOT(0|ia)" (PD 40).
In a community of friendship, vices that lead to injurious acts must be avoided. These
vices include hatred (liloo;), envy {^Qovoq), and contempt (KaTa(j)p6yTiOLc;) (DL 10.1 17).
The community instead should be of "one mind" (SV 61 [6[xov�0)]; DL 10.135 [xov o|iOLoy
oeautco]).
Scholars have debated whether Epicureans value friendship "for the sake of friends"
or "for the sake of self-pleasure."^^ The answer to this question depends on the
Annas, The Morality ofHappiness, 236-44; Eric Brown, "Epicurus on the Value ofFriendship
(Sententia Vaticana 23)," CP 97 (2002): 68-80; Matthew Evans, "Can Epicureans Be Friends?" Ancient
Philosophy 24 (2004): 407-24; Mitsis, Epicurus
' Ethical Theory: The Pleasures ofInvulnerability, 98-128;
Tim O'Keefe, "Is Epicurean Friendship Altruistic?" Apeiron 34 (2001): 269-305.
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interpretation of certain passages. For example, the Vatican Sayings contain a debated
passage which states, "Every friendship is an excellence (dpexri) in itself, even though it
begins in mutual advantage" (VS 23). The word dpetri has been emended by some as
alpexri meaning "choiceworthy."^^ Settling this debate rests beyond the scope of this thesis.
Regardless, fiiendship is more than "mutual advantage" and is highly valued either as a
virtue or as choice worthy in itself
2.6.2 Justice
Epicureans value both friendship and justice. According to the Epicureans, societies
and laws were developed for the sake of security.^^
Those who have established laws and ordinances and instituted monarchies and other
governments in towns and cities, have placed human life in great security and repose
(ao^dXeiav Kal fiou/Lav) and delivered it from many troubles; and if anyone should
go about to take this away, we should lead the life of savage beasts, and should be
everyone ready to eat up one another as we meet. (Plutarch, Adv. Col. 30)
Epicurus has a dark view ofhuman nature and thinks that without security, men would
devour one another (PD 6, 7, 13, 14, 40). According to Epicurus, justice, the contract for
mutual non-aggression, is one of the ways people find security among fellow-men:
Natural justice is a token of advantage (ou|iPoA,oy xou (j)U|i(t)6povTO�;), to prevent one
man from harming or being harmed by another. (PD 31)
The justness of a law depends on whether it concurs with the notion ofjustice, i.e., whether
it serves to advance or not the mutual intercourse of a community:
[W]hen judged by their [conventional laws] consequences, were seen not to
correspond with the notion of justice, such laws were not really just; but wherever the
laws have ceased to be expedient (awei^epe) in consequence of a change in
circumstances, in that case the laws were for the time being just when they were
expedient for the mutual intercourse of the citizens (ouv�())6pev dc, Tr\v upoQ
" This has been accepted by the majority of scholars but rejected by Brown, "Epicurus on the Value
ofFriendship (Sententia Vaticana 23)."
Schofield, "Epicurean and Stoic Political Thought," 438-40.
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dXXr\Xovc, KOLvcovLav), and subsequently ceased to be just when they ceased to be
expedient (ouvecjjepev). (PD 38)
Clearly, justice and injustice are understood in terms of advantage. Neither justice nor
injustice exists in and of itself Injustice is not evil per se. Injustice is evil because of its
consequences. It causes fear, loss of assurance, and suspicion that harms peace ofmind
(PD 17, 34, 35; cf VS 6; Lucretius, Z)i?A^ 5.1 151-60; Cicero, Fin. 1.50-1). Likewise, there
is no absolute justice; instead, justice entails only "an agreement made in reciprocal
intercourse in whatever localities now and again from time to time, providing against the
infliction or suffering of harm" (PD 33). The basic Epicurean doctrine�seek pleasure,
avoid harm�governs still the social and political philosophy of the Epicureans.
In search of security, friendship, and justice, the Epicureans retreated from the
conventional polis and chose to live in communities with fellow-Epicureans:
Moreover, it is well-know that Epicurus had his Garden setup outside ofAthens,
almost as if it were a counter-polis set against the traditional polis. The Garden had
no restriction to membership. Thus, already in the early Epicureanism there is "a
potential for cosmopolitanism."^^
The later Epicureans did in fact develop a radical vision of cosmopolitanism, especially in
the teachings and practices ofDiogenes ofOinoanda:^"
Then in truth the life of the gods will cross over to men. For all things will be frill of
justice and mutual friendship {biKaioo\)vr\c, Kal ^LXccXXr\X'iaQ), and there will be no
need for walls or laws or any other thing that we fabricate because of one another.
But about the necessities of agriculture. . . such things will, as necessary, cut into the
Brown, "Politics and Soceity," 191. Paul Zanker notes, "In Athens the disciples of Epicurus were so
closely identified with a life outside tiie community of thepolis that they were often referred to simply as
'those from the Garden' (Sextus Empiricus, Math. 9.64)" {The Mask ofSocrates: The Image of the
Intellectual in Antiquity [Sather Classical Lectures; Berkeley, Calif: University ofCalifomia Press, 1995],
114).
^� Diskin Clay, "The Philosophical Inscription ofDiogenes ofOenoanda. New Discoveries 1969-
1983," in ANRW{ed. Wolfgang Haase; Berlin: de Gmyter, 1990), 2446-559, 3231-2; Martin Ferguson
Smith, The Philosophical Inscription ofDiogenes ofOinoanda (Wien: Verlag der Osterreichischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1996); Martin Ferguson Smith, Supplement to Diogenes ofOinoanda the
Epicurean Inscription (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 2003).
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continuous pursuit ofpliilosopliy. For farming provides tiie tilings that nature needs.
(LS 22S; Diogenes ofOinoanda, Frg. 56)
. . . so-called foreigners really are not, for in relation to each section of the earth, each
has its own fatherland, but in relation to the whole circumference of this world, the
entire earth is the single fatherland of all and the world is one home. (Diogenes of
Oinoanda, Frg. 30)
In sum, the Epicureans value pleasure. For this reason, they also value security (i.e.,
not being harmed by others). Conventional politics resembles the wrong way of securing
safety via wealth and fame. To obtain true security, the Epicureans retreated from the
convention polis to communities based on friendship. In a friendship community there is
neither envy nor contempt. All are of one mind, concemed with what is expedient for the
fellowship that exists for one another (owk^epev elc; tt]v i\pbQ dXXr]Xo\)Q KOLvwvLav).
2.7 Stoicism
2.7.1 Zeno' s Republic
Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, wrote a treatise called the Republic. Only fragments of
the treatise are extant today. One of the longest fragments of this treatise is found in
Diogenes Laertius' Live ofEminent Philosophers 7.32-33:
They say first (1), that at the beginning of the Republic he [Zeno] proves general
education useless; second (2), that he says that all who are not good men are personal
and public enemies, slaves, estranged from each others, parents from children,
brothers from brothers, kin from kin, when�in the Republic, once again�^he makes
the good alone citizens and friends and kin and free. . .; (3) that he lays dovm the
doctrine, likewise in the Republic, that women should be held in common, and (4)
that neither temples nor law-courts nor gymnasia should be built in cities; (5) that on
coinage he writes as follows, that "it must not be thought that coinage should be
introduced either for purposes of exchange or for travelling abroad." And he requires
(6) that no part of the body should be hidden away. That the Republic is the work of
Zeno Chrysippus also says, in his On Republic. And (7) he has discussed erofic
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topics at tlie beginning of the work entitled The Art ofLove but also writes much the
same in Conversations?^
Due to the scarcity of evidence and the fragmentary nature of extant evidences, scholars
hold radical different opinions concerning the nature ofZeno's proposed Republic. J.
Sellars, for example, argues that Zeno's Republic promotes an individual cosmopolitan
ethic resembling Cynic cosmopolitanism.^^ H. C. Baldry argues that Zeno's Republic
depicts an ideal community that serves as a remedy for the conventional polis. In other
words, Zeno is working in the tradition of Plato's Republic. K. M. Vogt argues that
Zeno's Republic is not describing an ideal city as does Plato, but is discussing a real city.^"*
In this real city "only the sages are citizens of the cosmos; but all human beings are each
other's fellow-inhabitants of the cosmos, or citizens in a lesser sense."^^ In other words, he
sees continuity between Zeno and the late stoics such as Cicero and Seneca whose doctrine
affirms the universal brotherhood of all humankind.
Malcolm Schofield recently defended Baldry's thesis.^^ Schofield argues that Zeno,
like Plato, attempts to show how apolis can be reformed or reconstructed to achieve safety
in the sense of secured from stasis?'' Schofield argues that Zeno attempts to achieve this
goal through friendship and concord:
Malcolm Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1999), 3-4.
John Sellars, "Stoic Cosmopolitanism and Zeno's Republic," History ofPolitical Thought 28 (2007):
1-29.
H. C. Baldry, "Zeno's Ideal State," The Journal ofHellenic Studies 79 (1959): 3-15.
Katja Maria Vogt, Law, Reason, and the Cosmic City: Political Philosophy in the Early Stoa (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 65.
Vogt, Law, Reason, and the Cosmic City: Political Philosophy in the Early Stoa, 1 1 .
The same thesis is defended also by Daniel S. Richter, Cosmopolis: Imagining Community in Late
Classical Athens and the Early Roman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 201 1). Richter claims, "I
would agree with Malcolm Schofield's suggestion that Zeno's political philosophy can best be understood
when we accept the idea that he envisaged a human community based in the classicalpolis" (63).
Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City, 55-56.
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The objective is conceived not in ternis of the ethics of the individual, but constitutes
a specifically political ideal: the same political ideal, in fact, as Plato has in view in
the Republic and elsewhere�fiiendship and concord, understood in the ordinary
senses of those words. Where Zeno differs from Plato is principally in the role he
assigns to erotic love in cementing the city together in concord.^^
Zeno, like Plato, wants to promote friendship and concord and avoid stasis. However, they
differ in their choice ofmethod. Plato achieves the aim through strict communism, while
Zeno achieves the same result through erotic love:
Pontianus said that Zeno ofCitium took love to be a god who brings about fiiendship
and freedom, and again concord, but nothing else. That is why in the Republic he
said that Love is a god, there is a helper in furthering the safety of the city.
(Athenaeus ofNaucratis, Deipn. 561c)
The erotic love that Zeno proposes, according to Schofield, is the Sparta practice of
political pederasty. Zeno's love is not a passion, but "an attempt to make friends on
account of an appearance ofbeauty" (Stobaeus, 2.66.1 1-13). Appearance in Greek
understanding refiects character. The wise person is attracted to the youth for the youth's
natural endowment for virtue. They love them and help them mamre to virtue. The goal of
love is fiiendship. Thus, according to Zeno, "love is an attempt to make friends, on account
of beauty being apparent: its object is not sexual intercourse, but friendship" (DL 7.130).
Friendship brings to the polis harmony and concord to the polis (Stobaeus, 2.106.12-17;
2.108.15-18).'��
Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City, 25-26.
For political pederasty, see Paul Cartledge, "The Politics of Spartan Pederasty," in Spartan
Reflections (Berkeley: University ofCalifomia Press, 2001), 91-105; Ludwig, Eros andPolis, 28-39.
Text can be found in Arthur John Pomeroy, ed. Arius Didymus: Epitome ofStoic Ethics (Texts and
Translations; Atlanta, Ga.: Society ofBiblical Literatiire, 1999), 85-89.
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2.7.2 Epictetus
Later Stoics developed a more distinct voice of their own.'�' This thesis will focus on
Epictetus, the most important Stoic thinker of the first century A.D. According to Epictetus,
human beings are creatures who pursue self-interest:
Cannot a man think that something is profitable to him, and yet not choose it? He
cannot. (Epictetus, Diatr. 1.28.7); Such is the nature of the animal man; everything
that he does is for himself (Epictetus, Diatr. 1.19.12); It is a general rule that every
living thing is to noting so devoted as to its own interest. (Epictetus, Diatr. 2.22.15)
The pursuit of self-interest leads often to discord:
It is my nature to look out for my own interest. If it is my interest to have a farm, it is
my interest to take it away fi-om my neighbor; if it is my interest to have a cloak, it is
my interest also to steal it from a bath. This is the source ofwars, stasis, tyrannies,
plots, (emphasis mine; Epictetus, Diatr. 1.22.14; cf 2.24.21-29)
The cure to this discord prompted by self-interest, according to Epictetus, is reason.'"^
Reason distinguishes a human being from a beast. Accordingly, Epictetus writes,
"Consider what those things are from which you are separated by virtue of the faculty of
reason. You are separated from wild beasts. . .you possess the faculty ofunderstanding the
divine administration" (Epictetus, Diatr. 2.10.3). Reason provides the human beings with
the ability to understand "the divine administration" and "the governance of god"
(Epictetus, Diatr. 4.7.6-7). This understanding involves the knowledge of human beings
being a part of the whole and being a part ofGod. Epictetus claims, "all things are united
The history of Stoicism is generally divided into three phases: the Early, the Middle, and the Later
(Roman) Stoicism. See David Sedley, "The School, from Zeno to Arius Didymus," in The Cambridge
Companion to the Stoics (ed. Brad friwood; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7-32.
'"^
According to the Stoics, Nature rules that all animals should follow the direction of their impulse
(6pii,r|). However, as human beings mature, impulse is supervened and shaped by reason (DL 7.86). Therefore,
Nattire rules that human beings should follow reason:
Nature's rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect
leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly
becomes the natural life. (DL 7.86)
Like Aristotle, the Stoics hold that human beings are rational beings. However, they emphasize that human
reason is but a part of the universal reason.
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in one; . . ..our souls are so bound up with god and joined together with Him, as being parts
and portions ofHis being" (Epictetus, Diatr. 1.14.1-5). In the stoic understanding, human
beings are intertwined with god, as evidenced by Epictetus' teaching, "You are a fragment
ofGod; you have within you a part ofHim" (Epictetus, Diatr. 2.8.1 1; cf 1.12.26; 2.5.13).
In the stoic teaching, the theological doctrine ofparticipating in god also is expressed
through political terms:
Anyone who has attentively studied the administration of the universe (tfj SioLKrioeL
tot) Kooiiou) and has learned that "the greatest and most authoritative and most
comprehensive of all governments is this one, which is composed ofmen and God,
and that from Him have descended the seeds ofbeing, not merely to my father or to
my grandfather, but to all things that are begotten and that grow upon earth, and
chiefly to rational beings, seeing that by nature it is theirs alone to have communion
(KOLycovety) in the society ofGod, being intertwined with him through the reason�
why should not such a man call himself a citizen of the universe? Why should he not
call himself a son ofGod? (emphasis mine; Epictetus, Diatr. 1.9.4-6)
To have communion in the society ofGod and to be intertwined with God is the same as
being a citizen of the universe. Just as God is one and human beings are part ofGod,
Epictetus claims that the "universe is a single city" (Epictetus, Diatr. 3.24.10-1 1) and that
human beings "are a citizen of the world, and a part of it" (Epictetus, Diatr. 2.10.3). In this
universal city, human beings are friends with one another (Epictetus, Diatr. 2.15.10).
Epictetus also conflates the imagery of the polis with the imagery of the household when
he claims, "this universe is but a single state (pia 7T6XLc)...all things are full of friends
(4)LA.o)y), first gods, and then also men, who by nature have been made of one household of
with one another" (Epictetus, Diatr. 3.24.10-1 1). In this po/w/household there is only one
'"^ G. R. Stanton notes, "The basis for such a claim [T am a citizen of the universe'] is the thesis of the
kinship ofGod and men {auyykveia loO 9eo0 Kal dvGpcjircoy)" ("The Cosmopolitan Ideas ofEpictetus and
Marcus Aurelius," Phronesis 13 [1968]: 185). In the same article, Stanton observes, "Epictetus consistently
mentions cosmopolitan ideas in order to evoke practical precepts and he links these ideas not with a structure
of philosophical thought but with a framework ofmoral instruction" (187).
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Lord who is in charge of all. God is the Lord. He arranges all things and maintains the
good-ordering of the /jo/w/household:
In a well ordered house no one comes along and says to himself: "I ought to be
manager of this house"; or if he does, the lord of the mansion when he turns around
and sees the fellow giving orders in a high and mighty fashion, drags him out and
gives him a dressing down. So it goes also in this great city, the world; for here also
there is a Lord of the Mansion who assigns each and every thing its place. (Epictetus,
Diatr. 3.22.3-4)
Through reason, human beings leam that they are under "the divine administration." Their
duty is submit themselves to the "divine administration," follow the law of life, and do
what nature demands (Epictetus, Diatr. 1 .26. 1 ; cf 3.7.25).'�'* The stoic word for duty is id
KaGrjKoyia (Epictetus, Ench. 30; cf Rom 1:28).'�^ As part of the whole, human beings
possess the primary duty to serve the needs of the whole. To this end, "God has made all
things in the universe, and the whole universe itself. . .and the parts of it to serve the needs
of the whole (irpoc; x?^'^^"^ '^'^^ oXcov)" (Epictetus, D/a^r. 4.7.6).
As a human being put in place by God as part of the universe and as a citizen of the
cosmopolis, the individual must obey the ordinance ofGod and fulfill his or her duty.
Epictetus urges, "I ought to maintain my relations, both natural and acquired, as a religious
man, as a son, a brother, a father, a citizen" (Epictetus, Diatr. 3.2.4).'�^
Stoic thought holds god, law, reason, and nature as one and the same: "[T]he end may be defined as
life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that
of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things (6
VQ\io<^ 6 kowoq), that is to say, the right reason (6 opQoi; XoyoQ) which pervades all things, and is identical
with this Zeus, lord and ruler ofall that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and
the smooth current of life (triv toO �i)6aL|ioyo(; dpetTiv Kal eupoiav pCou), when all actions promote the
harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will ofhim who orders the universe" (emphasis
mine; DL 7.88).
"Befitting acts are all those which reason prevails with us to do; and this is the case with honoring
one's parents, brothers and country, and intercourse with fiiends" (DL 7.108). The concept is translated by
Cicero as officium ("duty"). Cicero's De Ojficiis was the most read book in the middle ages.
106 ujj^g duties of citizenship, marriage, begetting children, reverence to God, care ofparents, in a
word, desire, avoidance, choice, refiisal, the proper performance of each one of these acts, and that is, in
accordance with our nature" (Epictetus, Diatr. 3.7.25; Cf 4.4.16-17).
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The citizen must serve its polis just as the foot must serve the body. Without X\\tpolis,
no citizens exist, just as no foot exists without the body. Individuals always must act in
view of the whole:
What then is the profession of a citizen? To treat nothing as a matter ofprivate profit
(16 ta oup,(|)6poy), not to plan about anything as though he were a detached unit, but to
act like the foot or the hand, which, if they had the faculty of reason and understood
the constitution of nature (xfi (i)U0LKfi) would never exercise choice and desire in any
other way but by reference to the whole. . .the whole is more sovereign than the part,
and the state more sovereign than the citizen. (Epictetus, Diatr. 2.10.4)
The whole is sovereign and has priority over the part. The wise person who understands
the divine governance through reason, knows that he or she is part of the whole and knows
that it is his or her duty to equate "one's own" with the "common interest." Truly, "he can
attain nothing ofhis own proper goods unless he contributes something to the common
interesf (Epictetus, Diatr. 1.19.13-14). The individual must follow God's leadership and
consider the common interest as his or her own interest:
I will assert of the foot as such that it is natural for it to be clean, but if you take it as
a foot, and not as a thing detached, it will be appropriate for it to step into mud and
trample on thorns and sometimes to be cut off for the sake of the whole body (uirep
xou oXo\>); otherwise it will no longer be a foot. . .If you regard yourself as a thing
detached, it is natural (Kaxd ^miv) for you to live to old age, to be rich, to enjoy
health. But if you regard yourself as a man and as a part of some whole (^l�pog oXou
xLvoq), on account of that whole it is fitting (Ka9r|K6L) for you now to be sick.
(Epictetus, Diatr. 2.5.24-25)
Persons must accept whatever is allotted to them. If the whole wants a person to live well
then the person should live well; if the whole wants a person to sacrifice, then he or she
should sacrifice, trust the guidance of god, and fulfill his or her assigned duty. The duty
assigned by god will always be for the good of the whole. The individual must gain the
perspective and know whatever god asks of an individual, it will always be for the good of
the whole. Since one is part of the whole, good for the whole also will be good for the part.
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The individual must leam to see through reason the picture of the whole and to align his or
her self-interest with the common interest. Such action will save the city:
It is a general mle�^be not deceived�^that every living thing is to nothing so devoted
as to its own interest (tq l6lq ouiicj^epoviL). . . . For its nature is to love nothing so
much as its own interest; this to it is father and brother and kinsmen and country and
God ... For this reason, if a man puts together in one scale his interest and
righteousness and what is honorable and country and parents and friends, they are all
safe (otpCetai); but if he puts his interest in one scale, and in the other friends and
country and kinsmen and justice itself, all these latter are lost because they are
outweighed by his interest. (Epictetus, Diatr. 2.22.15-18)
Reason lifts the perspective to that of god's perspective and aligns self-interest with that of
the whole.'�^ With enlightened self-interest, "wars, seditions, tyrannies, plots" no longer
will exist; instead, "love in the household, concord in the State, peace among the nations"
will exist (Epictetus, Diatr. 4.5.35).
In sum, Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, espouses erotic love as a means toward
friendship, which will in tum bring concord and safety to the polis and keep the polis from
falling into stasis. Epictetus, the most famous Stoic in the Roman period, claims that
stasies are caused by the pursuit of unenlightened self-interest. Avoiding stasis requires
developing a universal perspective, and leaming to view the self as a citizen of the
cosmopolis. As friends of the same cosmopolis and as members of the same household, the
"Govern us as rational beings by pointing out to us what is profitable, and we will follow you;
point out what is unprofitable, and we will tum away from it" (Epictetus, Diatr. 3. 7.33). Marcelo D. Boeri
calls this the idea of cosmological ethics. He writes, "This idea also assumes that our practical life has
something to do with universal nature as long as universal nature can have a normative character that works
as a criterion for moral action, and that human reason, in being an mstance of imiversal reason and thereby
akin to it, is able to know universal reason and to consider events from a universal reason viewpoint' ("Does
Cosmic Nature Matter? Some Remarks on the Cosmological Aspects of Stoic Ethics," in God and Cosmos in
Stoicism [ed. Ricardo Salles; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009], 173). Similarly, John Sellars notes
that: "'living according to Nature' is cuhivating a new perspective on the world that tries to see things from
thepoint ofview ofNature as a whole rather than merely from one's own limited perspective" (Stoicism
[Ancient Philosophies; Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 2006], 126).
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individual must fulfill his or her duty and view common interest as his or her own interest.
With this perspective gained through reason, discord can be avoided.
2.8 Josephus
Josephus begins his book The Jewish War with a preamble speaking of his motives,
aims, approaches, and methods. He calls the Jewish War "the greatest conflict between
cities or nations" (Josephus, J.W. 1.1) and "the upheaval. . .of the greatest magnitude"
(Josephus, J. W. 1 .4).'�^ In his assessment the Jewish war ended in favor of the Romans not
because of the superiority of the Romans, but because of the stasis that took place in
Jerusalem. Jerusalem was ruined by civil strife. It was the "tyrannical Jewish leaders
who drew the might of the unwilling Roman army to the holy sanctuary" (Josephus, J. W.
1.10). The reluctant Romans acted unwillingly. Titus, the Roman general, "pitied the
people who were left to the mercy of the rebellious parties and delayed the capture of the
city time and again; for by prolonging the siege he gave the guilty a chance to repent"
(ibid.). Jerusalem did not fall because of the Romans. It fell because of5tow."�
Stasis is a major theme in Josephus' writings.'" Louis Feldman claims, "The
avoidance of sedifion (oxdoiQ) is a major theme running through all of the aristocrat
'"^
Josephus is mimicking Thucydides, who thinks that the Peloponnesian War was "great and
noteworthy above all the wars that had gone before. . ..For this was the greatest movement that had ever
stirred the Hellenes, extending also to some of the Barbarians, one might say even to a very large part of
mankind" (Thucydides, Hist. 1.1.1 -2).
In Thucydides view, Athens fell also because of stasis (2.2.4).
' Later toward the end ofhis book on the Jewish War, Josephus puts these words into the mouth of
Titus: "God indeed has been our ally in this war; it was God who brought down the Jews from their
sfrongholds; for what could human hands or engines accomplish against such towers?" (Josephus, J. W.
6.410-411).
' ' ' The word stasis appears 76 times in Jewish Antiquities and 71 times in Jewish War. In the
Antiquities, many OT narratives are re-narrated as events of stasis, for example, the Tower ofBabel (Josephus,
Ant. 1 .1 17) and the rebellion ofKorah (Josephus, Ant. 4.12-13).
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Josephus' works.""^ Tessa Rajak thinks that the centrality of stasis is the result of
Josephus imitating Thucydides: "Josephus is absorbed by politics and it was natural that
Thucydides should be a model, influencing not only the language and the narrative, but,
most relevant here, the Jewish historian's general conceptions of the attributes of
leadership and of the destructive power of civil dissension (stasis)."^^^Mark Brighton
thinks the centrality of stasis is simply a reflection of the general practice ofhistoriography:
"Josephus organizes his work around stock themes in Greco-Roman historiography,
prominent among which is 5toz5.""'*Nonetheless, the literary tradition may indeed reflect
the social-political realities.
2.8.1 Before the War
According to Josephus, the stasis in Jerusalem originated in certain individuals and in
their personal dispositions. Josephus often characterizes these people as envious, foolish,
and mad (cf Josephus, J. W. 2.346; 4.261). In contrary to these ill characters, Josephus
represents himself as a prudent and capable general."^
Early in the war, Josephus was appointed general in charge of Galilee. Upon his
arrival at Galilee, he first sought to "gain the goodwill (euvoiac;) of the inhabitants"
(Josephus, J. W. 2.569). Also, he shared his power with the local great men, eager to "make
' Louis H. Feldman, Judean Antiquities 1-4: Translation and Commentary (Flavius Josephus:
Translation and Commentary; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000), 340n74.
' Tessa Rajak, "Josephus," in The Cambridge History ofGreek andRoman Political Thought (ed. C.
J. Rowe and Malcolm Schofield; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 585.
Mark Andrew Brighton, The Sicarii in Josephus 's Judean War RhetoricalAnalysis andHistorical
Observations (Early Judaism and Its Literature; Atlanta: Society ofBiblical Literature, 2009), 24.
Shaye J. D. Cohen, Josephus in Galilee andRome: His Vita andDevelopment as a Historian
(Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1979), 69-73, 91-100.
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them his fast friends" (Josephus, J. W. 2.570)."^ Josephus depicts himself as a pmdent man
establishing friendship and goodwill in Galilee, settling the intemal disputes in order to
make provision for the safety (do(t)dA.6La) against the extemal threats of Rome.
Josephus depicts his opponent, John ofGischala, with striking contrast to the
historian's eager desire to cultivate friendship:
[A] treacherous person. . .whose name was John. His character was that of a very
cunning and very knavish person, beyond the ordinary rate of the other men of
eminence there; and for wicked practices he had not his equal anywhere. Poor he was
at first, and for a long time his wants were a hindrance to him in his wicked designs.
He was a ready liar, and yet very sharp in gaining credit for his fictions: he thought it
a point of virtue to delude people (dpeifiv fiyouiieyoc zv^v a.-nQar\v), and would delude
even such as were the dearest to him (xcjy ^vXidxijiv). He was a hypocritical
pretender to humanity, but where he had hopes of gain, he spared not the shedding of
blood (6l' �A.TTL6a KepSouc; (tjovLKwiaxog): his desires were ever carried to great things,
and he encouraged his hopes from those mean wicked tricks which he was the author
of He had a peculiar knack at thieving {Xrpxy\:,); but in some time he got certain
companions in his impudent practices: at first they were but few, but as he proceeded
on in his evil course, they became still more and more numerous. (Josephus, J. W.
2.585-587)
Josephus obviously hates John, as evidenced by this long, continuous rant against him.
John is freacherous, cunning, knavish, and wicked. He turns fiction into credit and virtue
into deception. He deludes even finends. He has a "desire for gain" and engages in acts of
"thieving." Such character traits are the traits of persons who cause stasis.
Moreover, Josephus pictures John as a man filled with envy. Out of envy, John plots
against Josephus (Josephus, J. W. 2.614) and tries to cormpt the citizens ofTiberius to
revolt against Josephus (Josephus, J. W. 2.617). This act of envy caused great fear in
Josephus, for "he was afraid lest a civil war (TToA,�|iou 6p(j)uA.Lou) should be raised by the
envy of a few men, and bring the city to min" (Josephus, J. W. 2.620). To prevent the total
Whiston's translation. The Greek word used here is oLk6l6co, which means "to make one's own"
(LSJ).
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outbreak of the civil war, Josephus restrains the fury of his men and wants them to subdue
their enemies not by slaughter, but by prudent conduct (Josephus, J. W. 2.623).
John's plot to kill Josephus did not succeed. Failing to kill Josephus, John sends
messengers to Jerusalem to accuse Josephus ofhaving too much power. The Jerusalem
leaders, out of envy supported John with money so he could build an army to fight against
Josephus. Again, envy plays a major role in the discord among the Jews. Contrary to the
"envious" opponents, Josephus presents himself as a man who treasures "goodwill"
(euvoia; Josephus, J. W. 2.569, 623, 628, 646).
This comparison between Josephus and his opponents, between goodwill and envy, is
not an inadvertent description on Josephus' part. Louis Feldman notes, "One of the motifs
running through all of Josephus's works is the power of jealousy (which he often couples
with hatred) and its consequences.""^ Josephus is aware fiilly of the great evils of envy.
Accordingly, he claims, "nothing is stronger than envy and calumny, and that nothing does
more certainly divide the goodwill {eovomv) and natural affections ((j)U0LKTiy oLKeLox'nTa)
ofmen than those passions" (Josephus, Ant. 13.310). Assigning the evils of envy to John,
Josephus blames him of destroying the goodwill and friendship that bind the Jewish people
together against Rome. Envy is the logic of discord, and envy fi-actured the Jewish people
and abandoned them to the hands of the Romans.
The close relationship between envy and stasis is also exemplified by Josephus'
descripfion of the Event ofKorah (Josephus, Ant. 4.1 1-56). Like the Jerusalem War, the
Event of Korah is depicted as a stasis. Josephus writes, "a stasis for which we know of no
Louis H. Feldman, Josephus 's Interpretation of the Bible (Hellenistic Culture and Society;
Berkeley: University ofCalifomia Press, 1998), 198. See also Louis H. Feldman, Judaism andHellenism
Reconsidered (JSJSup; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2006), 475-79.
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parallel whether among the Greeks or barbarians, broke out among them; this stasis
brought them all into peril of destruction (dTToA.�oGaL Kivdw^voavxac.) from which they
were saved CeoQoe) by Moses" (Josephus, Ant. 4.12)."^ This event was caused by the
envious Korah, who thought that "he had a greater right to enjoy all this glory himself, as
being richer than Moses without being his inferior in birth" (Josephus, Ant. 4.14). Seeking
for glory, Korah accuses Moses of seeking glory for himselfby appointing his brother
Aaron as the priest. Josephus comments, "Korah wished to appear that he was concemed
for the public welfare (toij kolvoO TrpovoeXoGaL); in reality, he was but scheming to have
the honor (ttiv TLjiTiy) transferred by the people to himself (el; kavxbv)" (Josephus, Ant.
4.20). In other words, driven by envy, Korah was ready to lead the community into stasis
and sacrifice the public welfare in order to gain honor for himself
So it was the folly of the few individuals that led the Jews to the state of stasis and
eventually led to their defeat."^ Josephus expresses this opinion through Agrippa's speech
delivered to the Jewish people at the opening of the Jewish War (Josephus, J. W. 2.346-
Feldman claims that Josephus' description intends to parallel Thucydides' description of the stasis
in Corcyra. Feldman, Judean Antiquities 1-4, 334n23.
Many scholars note Josephus' apologetic motivation. Cohen, for example, notes, "It is well known
that BJ apologizes to the Romans for the Jews. Not all Jews revolted, only small bands ofmadfanatics.
These were in no way representative of the Jewish people or bearers of Jewish tradition. Those of them who
finally maintained the revoh in Jerusalem and made it necessary for Titus (regretfiilly) to destroy the city,
were a gang formed mainly of refugees who entered Jerusalem from the countryside and Galilee, established
a tyranny, and forced the defenseless populace to fight against the Romans. Their motive was the selfish
satisfaction oftheir lustforpower, their deeds were execrable and beyond condemnation" (emphsis mine;
Josephus in Galilee andRome, 97).
Steve Mason holds a similar opinion. He writes, "[Josephus'] essential thesis {War 1.9-12) is that the
revolt was caused by only afew troublemakers among the Jews�power-hungry tyrants and marauders who
drove the people to rebel against their will. The vast majority of Jews, he contends, have always been peace-
loving, devoted to the Roman virtues of order and harmony. Those who fomented revolt were aberrations
from true Judaism. They introduced innovations in the ancesfral customs and polluted God's temple by their
actions. So in desfroying Jerusalem and its temple the Romans were acting as God's agents, bringing divine
punishment for the oufrageous actions of a few rebels" (emphasis mine; Josephus and the New Testament
[2nd ed.; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2003], 159).
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401). His speech is a deliberative speech on concord, seeking to persuade the Jews not to
act against their own advantage revolting against Rome:
Had I perceived that you were all zealously disposed to go to war {voX�\xdv) with the
Romans, and that the purer and more sincere part of the people did not propose to
live in peace (elprivriy), I had not come out to you, nor been so bold as to give you
counsel (oupPouXeueiv eGdpprioa); for all discourses that tend to persuade men to do
what they ought to do (xou id bkovxa midlv) are superfluous, when the hearers are
agreed (opovoLa) to do the contrary. But because some are earnest to go to war
because they are young, and without experience of the miseries it brings; and because
some are for it, out of an unreasonable {ctXoywxoQ) expectation of regaining their
liberty, and yet others are led on by greed (irA-eoye^La) and the prospect of enriching
themselves at the expense of the weak in the event of a general explosion. So in the
hope ofbringing these misguided persons to reason (oQctjpovLoGevTec;) and changing
their attitude, and to prevent the folly of a few to be visited on good citizens, I
deemed it my duty to call you all together and tell you what I think is in your best
interest (o\)\x(^kpeiv). Ifmy remarks are not to someone's liking (liT) td irpog r\bovi]v
dKouT)), pray let him not create a disturbance (9opuPr|ori). For those who have
irremediably (dvriK�OT(oc;) made up their mind to rebel (ttiv dirooiaoLy) will be free to
feel the same after my exhortations (irapaLveoLv); but my words will be lost even on
those who are anxious to hear my views, unless you all give me a quiet hearing
(fiouxia). (Josephus, J. W. 2.345-347)
The preceding material is the exordium ofAgrippa's speech.'^' In this passage Agrippa
calls those who are eager for war young, inexperienced, unreasonable, and led by greed.
These few misguided persons act with folly. Agrippa wants to bring them back to reason
so they may do what is best for the polis.
This is the first of War's seven major deHberative speeches (Josephus, J. W. 3.362-82; 4.163-92
[Ananus], 238-69 [Jesus the chiefpriest]; 5.362-419 [Josephus]; 6.99-110 [Josephus]; 7.341-88 [Eleazar]).
Steve Mason asserts, "All of Josephus' major speeches....are his literary creations" {Judean War 2:
Translation and Commentary [Flavius Josephus: Translation and Commentary; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2008],
265).
This exordium adopts many of the standard topoi of the deliberative speech. First Agrippa declares
his theme�the choice between war and peace. He then tries to soften the minds ofhis audience and prepare
them for his upcoming speech. He accomplishes this preparation by applying words with positive
connotation (e.g., "pure" and "sincere") to people who are open-mind. Also, he establishes himself as a
person who practices "frank speech." He wants his audience to know he intends his presence for their good
and for their advantage. Agrippa speaks without fear, although he faces of the danger of commotion. This
exordium is remarkably similar to Demosthenes, Exord. 44.
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Agrippa's speecli was successful at first and helped delay the menace of the war.
Nonetheless, the insurgents soon gained an upper hand and expelled Agrippa from
Jerusalem (Josephus, J. W. 2.405-7). After the cessation of the sacrifice for Rome, the war
began (Josephus, J. W. 2.409). The Romans quickly won battles in Galilee and in the
Transjordan areas (Josephus, J. W. 3.1-4.120).'^^ As a result, the insurgents were forced to
retreat to Jerusalem (Josephus, J. PT. 4. 121).
Looking back at the war that took place in regions outside of Jerusalem, Josephus
offers several observations:
Every town was moved (eKLvetio) with turmoil and civil war (tapaxri Kal nok^iOQ
6[i(j)uA.Log), and the moment they had a respite from the Romans they turned against
each other (elg dA.A,r|A,ou(;). Contention (kpiQ) raged fiercely between the advocates of
war and the lovers of peace. First of all in the homes this party rivalry {^\.X6v^vkov)
disrupted unity among those who had long been bosom friends {xdv oiiovoouvTcov
irdylaL); then people that were the dearest to one another (ol ^ikxcLxoi A.aol) severed
all former ties, and attaching themselves to men who shared their respective views,
lined up on opposite sides. Stasis reigned everywhere; the revolutionary and militant
party with the boldness of youth silenced the old and prudent (yripaLCOv Kal
oa)(j)p6va)v). The various cliques began by plundering (dp-rraYdc;) their neighbors. Then
they banded themselves into companies and extended their depredations (Xvpxdoiv)
all over the countryside, so much so that in lawlessness and brutality the Romans
were no worse than the victims' own countrymen. In fact, to be captured by the
Romans seemed to the unfortunate victims far more preferable. (Josephus, J. W.
4.131-134)
The preceding description offers a picture of total chaos. The passage begins with the verb
KLveo), Thucydides' favorite word for stasis. Thucydides beings his History by describing
the Peloponnesian War as "the greatest movement (KLvr]oiQ) that had ever stirred the
Hellenes" (Thucydides, Hist. 1.1.2) Moreover, he depicts the stasis at Corcyra, his model
stasis, as "the first that occurred; for afterwards practically the whole Hellenic world was
convulsed (eKivrieri)" (Thucydides, Hist. 3.82.1). Again, Josephus is mimicking
This passage includes the descriptions of staseis at Tiberias (J. W. 3.448-457) and Tarichaea {J. W.
3.492-502).
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Thucydides. In Josephus' view, the Jewish War, rather than a Roman invasion, resembled
more the massive stasis of the Peloponnesian War, where turmoil and civil war (tapaxTi
Kal TToXeiioc; k\i^\)X\.0Q) occurred in each and every town.'^^
Stasis, according to Josephus, breaks first the bond of "like-mindedness" (6|i6yooc) in
homes, then the bonds of "friendship" {^iXoc) among the citizens. In place of these bonds
are the factions "lined up on opposite sides." Josephus characterizes stasis as a rash act
lacking prudence. The symptoms ofstasis are the acts of overreaching, robbing (dp-rraYri),
and thieving {kvpxdoi).
2.8.2 Stasis in Jerusalem
Jerusalem was soon to fall into the same terror ofstasis }^'^ Nonetheless, one man had
the ability to prevent stasis and save the city from its destruction�Ananus. Josephus
describes Ananus as "a man of the soundest judgment who might possibly have saved the
city" (Josephus, J. W. 4.151). Josephus also pictures him as a man who "always put his
private interest second to the public welfare" and one who had "the maintenance of peace
'^^
Again, tapdooco/Tapaxii is a standard term for stasis (cf 2.1).
The Zealots sowed the seed of stasis in Jerusalem when they entered into the city. Accordingly, "hi
the end, the brigand chiefs, having their fill ofpillaging the country, joined forces and formed a single pack
ofvillainy. They all crept into Jerusalem�a city without military commanders, and one to which, according
to hereditary custom, anyone of Jewish blood was admitted without scrutiny; a city, moreover, where at that
moment everyone thought that those who were irrupting came out ofgoodwill (eiivota) as allies. Yet it was
just this circumstance which, irrespectively of stasis, ultimately ruined the city; for supplies which might
have been adequate for the combatants were squandered upon a useless and idle mob, who in addition to war
brought on themselves stasis and starvation" (Josephus, J. W. 3.135-137).
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as his supreme aim" (Josephus, J. W. 4.320). In Josephus' understanding, Ananus was the
Jewish Pericles. '^^
Ananus tried the save the great city though his speech (Josephus, J. W. 4.163-192),
but ultimately he failed. The Zealots found help from the Idumaeans and brought them into
the city. The Idumaeans slaughtered many people. As a result: "the whole outer courts of
the Temple were deluged with blood, and when dawn arrived it found eight thousand five
hundred people dead" (Josephus, J. W. 4.3 13).'^^ Ananus was among those who died in the
hands of the Idumaeans. Josephus comments on Ananus' death:
I should not be wrong if I were to say that the fall of the metropolis began with
Ananus' death, and that the overthrow of the walls and the destruction of the Jewish
state dated from the day when the Jews beheld their high priest and the champion of
their cause assassinated in the heart of Jerusalem. (Josephus, J. W. 4.3 18)
Ananus' death symbolizes the fall of Jerusalem, for he represents the best of the Jewish
way of life:
Ananus was a man revered at every hand and a very just man (SiKaLOTaTog).
Although so distinguished by birth, position, and the honors (xtfJ-fic;) he had attained,
he had been a lover of equality (to LooTLiiov), even with regard to the lowest of the
people (Kal irpoq xoug xaTTeLvoxdiouc;). Utterly devoted to liberty and inspired by a
passion for democracy, he always put his private interest (xqv LSlqv luoixeXajv)
second to the public welfare (x6 Koiyfl a\)\i^kpov). The maintenance of peace was his
supreme aim. (Josephus, J. W. 4.319)
Ananus is praised by Josephus as a just man, since he did not take advantage of others,
although he held distinct honor having both the ascribed honor of noble birth and the
acquired honor of acclaimed status. Rather than taking advantage of others, he claimed
equality even with persons of the lowest status. Instead of seeking his own interests, he
This connection between the two is noted by Seth Schwartz, Josephus and Judaean Politics
(Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), 224.
The polluting of the temple was, according to Josephus, one of the reasons why Jerusalem fell:
"there was a certain ancient oracle of those men, that the city should then be taken, and the sanctuary burnt,
by right ofwar, when a stasis should invade the Jews, and their own hand should pollute the temple ofGod"
(Josephus, y. ff. 4.388).
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sought the interest of the general public. In addition, he knew that peace was the greatest
good for own people. In Josephus' view, Ananus was the spokesman for virtue. His death
resembles the defeat of virtue. Josephus writes, "virtue itselfwept for these men, I believe,
lamenting her total defeat at the hands of vice" (Josephus, J. W. 4.325). The fall of virtue
leads to the fall of the polis.
Seeing that Jerusalem had fallen into dissension, the Roman generals advised
Vespasian to attack the polis. He refiised, thinking that it is best to wait, since the Jews
"were perishing by their own hands and suffering the greatest evil, civil strife,. . . .[And]
they were risking their lives through civil war and dissension, and suffering daily greater
miseries than they would themselves [the Romans] inflict on them if they attacked and
defeated them" (Josephus, J. W. 4.375). Vespasian thought it be best that "the Jews be left
to prolong their own destruction" (Josephus, J. W. 4.376).
Vespasian's tactics proved correct. The stasis in Jerusalem worsened rather than
improving. By the time Titus was ready to siege Jerusalem, "the civil strife in Jerusalem
had reached a fresh climax and became a three-cornered fight, as one of the parties had
turned its arms against itself�a discord which, as among criminals, might be called good
and the work of jusfice. . .It would not be far wrong to describe this as a faction within a
faction, like a raving beast driven by lack of other food at last to devour its own fiesh"
(Josephus, J. PT. 5.1-4).
2.8.3 Mary's CarmibaHsm
Literarily, the Jews were devouring their own flesh. To demonstrate the devastating
power of stasis, Josephus includes in his narrative the story ofMary's cannibalism
(Josephus, J. W. 6.199-219). This story is placed "at the climax of Josephus' account of the
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Roman siege of Jerusalem in 70 CE, and it serves dramatically as the catalyst for the
destruction of the Jewish Temple."'^''
According to Josephus, Mary was a refuge who fled from Peraea to Jerusalem. She
had already been plundered (StripTTaoav) by the tyrants before she even entered into
Jerusalem. Then, in the city she was plundered (dpTrdCw) by spearmen day by day. The
plundering raised great indignation in Mary, so she began to abuse and curse those
rapacious villains (6 apira^). Three times in a short passage Josephus mentions the word
root dpirat Plunder, the act of gaining for oneself at the expense of others, is a sure sign of
stasis.
Plundering brought to Mary the hunger of the body and the wrath of the mind.
Josephus writes, "while hunger ravaged her bowels and marrow, rage consumed her still
further, she finally yielded to the promptings of fury {ppyr\v) and necessity (dvaYKTic) and
defied nature itself" (Josephus, J. W. 6.204).'^^ As a result, she snatched up (dpirdCco; lit.
"Plundered") her baby and spoke to the child:
Poor baby, why should I keep you alive amidst war, famine, and civil strife (oxccoeL)?
We will only face slavery with the Romans, even ifwe survive until they arrive, but
famine will forestall slavery, and the rebels (ol oxaoLaoTal) are more cruel than
either. Come, be my food and an avenging omen for the partisans, and to the world
the only tale (i-iDGoc) as yet untold of Jewish misery. (Josephus, J. W. 6.205-207)'^^
Plundering led eventually to the complete breakdown of the social order. The mother
"plundered" her own son. Not even the strongest social tie between the mother and the son
Honora Howell Chapman, "Josephus and the Cannibalism ofMary (BJ 6.199-219)," mA
Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography (ed. John Marincola; Maiden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2007),
419-26.
Chapman claims that the emphasis on Mary's emotional state relates Mary to the mythological
Medea.
Stasis as worse than war is rehearsed more than once by Josephus, who writes, "While the
government was storm-tossed by the three greatest calamities�^war, tyranny, and party strife�^the citizens
felt that war was relatively the mildest" (Josephus, J. W. 4.397).
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could withstand the blows of stasis. Mary's cannibalism represents the self-devouring
Jewish civil war. Everyone who heard of this story "shuddered as if the crime where his
own" (Josephus, J. W. 6.212).'^�
Contrary to the Jerusalem devastated by stasis, Josephus depicts a unified and
idealized Jerusalem in his work Against Apion. In this idealized Jerusalem, the law is
engraved in the souls of its citizens, which results in "admirable harmony {p\i6vo\.av).
Unity ((iiay) and identity (ttiv auTriv) of religious belief, perfect uniformity (|iri6ev
(xA,A.r|A.o)v hm^kp^w) in habits and customs, produce a very beautiful concord (oufxctjcovLav)
in human character" (Josephus, C. Ap. 2.179). This ideal polis is a harmonizedpolis. In
this polis, the citizens think and act the same (cf Phil 2:1-5). In this polis, there exists only
"one temple for one God; for like is always attracted to like {^ikov yap del Travil to
0|j,0L0v). This temple ought to be common to all men (kolvoq dudvTQy), because he is the
common God of all men" (Josephus, C. Ap. 2.193). In this passage, Josephus adopts two
most famous Greek proverbs concerning fi-iendship: (1) like befriends like;'^' (2) fiiends
share all things in common. Citizens are fiiends attracted to the same temple, and all
citizens share the temple in common. In this temple adored by friendship, prayers are made
first and above all "for the salvation of the community (u-rrep Tfjc; Koivfjc eiixeoGaL
o(OTripLa(;)...for we are bom for fellowship (KOLvcovLa) and he who sets its claims above his
private interest (16 lou) is specially acceptable to God" (Josephus, C. Ap. 2.196).'"
Chapman suggests, "the baby embodies all the suffering of the Jews in this war by suffering murder,
dismemberment, and consumption at the hands ofhis own mother" ("Josephus and the Cannibalism ofMary
(BJ 6. 199-2 19)," 423).
See below 4.5.7n205.
'^^ See below 4.2.1.
Rajak notes, "The sole rulership ofGod is embodied in the first commandment (CA II. 190). This in
tum generates a governing principle, that of unity. The unity of the godhead is pictured as replicated in the
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In sum, in Joseplius view, the Jewish War was caused by a few envious and greedy
men who desires gain and honor and engages in acts of robbery and thieving. They
disrupted the friendship and harmony among the Jews and caused stasis, which led
eventually to the destruction of the great city. In contrast to these men who pursuit self-
interest, Josephus presents himself and Ananus as men ofwisdom who cherishes goodwill,
friendship and equality. As such, these two men are concemed with the public welfare and
the safety of the polis. Josephus' ideal polis is composed of citizens who place public
interest above private interest and are bound together in fiiendship. The ideal polis is a
harmonious KOLvcovLa.
2.9 Fourth Maccabees
The author of 4 Maccabees begins his book with a clear announcement of his subject.
The author wants to explore "whether devout reason (euoeprig A-oyLoiiog) is sovereign over
the emotions (xwv -traGcov)" (4 Mace 1:1). Also, he intends to praise the highest virtue {xy\c,
(ieyLOTTig dpexfic;) of ^pov^aic, (4 Mace 1 :2).'^'* These two purposes are actually one and the
same, since ''^povvfsyQ is supreme. . . [and] by means of it reason mles over the emotions" (4
Mace 1:19). In other words, through 4)p6vr|OL(;, reason mles over emotions. The supremacy
of (t)p6vriOL(; and the thesis of "reason mles over the emotions" are two aspects of the same
concept.
structure of the world and in human institutions, the one and only temple {CA II 193). ...Also deriving from
this principle are homonoia, social unity, and sumphonia, unanimity ofopinion {CA II 179-180), which can
be understood as guarantees against civil dissensions" ("Josephus," 588).
'^'^ This word comes with the particle 6ti which conveys a sense of certitude, translated either as
"indeed" or "of course." This particle shows that ^p6vx\avQ as the supreme virtue is a widely accepted fact
even among the Jews. The word ^p6vr\a\.q and its cognates appears throughout the book: ({jpoveu appears in 4
Mace 6:17; 4)p6vTi0L(; in 4 Mace 1:2, 18f; (jjpovLiio; in 4 Mace 7:17; Kata4)pov6u in 4 Mace 4:9, 26; 5:10; 6:21;
13:9;iT6pL(t)pov6coin4Macc6:9;7:16; 14:1; i)iT6p<j)poyea) in 4 Mace 13:1; 14:11; 16:2. As with Aristotle,
(t)p6vrioL<; is closely related to right reason.
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Having stated iiis tliesis, the author of 4 Maccabees outlines his book (4 Mace 1:7-
12).'^^ He begins with a philosophical exposition of his thesis (4 Mace 1:12), which takes
place in 4 Mace 1:13-3:18. Next, he demonstrates the truth ofhis thesis through various
exemplifying characters "who died for the sake of virtue, Eleazar and the seven brothers
and their mother" (4 Mace 1:8). This verse serves as an outline for 4 Mace 3:19-17:6.'^^
Fourth Maccabees concludes with aperoratio in 4 Mace 17:7-18:24 celebrating the
martyrs' victory over the tyrant due their steadfast endurance (4 Mace 1 : 11).'^^
2.9.1 Devout Reason is Sovereign over Emotions (1:13-3:18)
In the first section of 4 Maccabees (4 Mace 1:13-3:18), the author clarifies his thesis
statement ("devout reason is sovereign over the emotions"). This statement is repeated
numerous times in the first section and reappears sporadically throughout the whole book
(4 Mace 6:31-35; 13:1-5; 16:1-4).'^^
The author deals first with the phrase "devout reason." In 4 Maccabees, the word
reason is not a general term, but a specific, devout form of reason. The adjective devout is
repeatedly used as a modifier for reason (4 Mace 1:1; 6:31; 7:4,16; 8:1; 13:1; 15:23; 16:1,
4; 17:22; 18:2; cf 5:31, 38; 7:1; 11:21). But what exactly is this "reason" described as
"devout"?
'^^ For more on the structure and form of the book, see David Arthur DeSilva, 4 Maccabees (Guides to
Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 25-28. DeSilva argues that 4
Maccabees is a mixture of different forms: "it combined elements of the diatribe (a philosophical
demonstration) and the commemorative address (an encomium) into what now fimctioned as a protreptic
discourse (a work that promotes a certain way of life). In all of these aspects, 4 Maccabees fiinctions
primarily as what ancient rhetoricians would have called epideictic rhetoric" (46).
'^^ Fourth Macabees 5:1-7:23 narrates the martyrdom ofEleazar; 4 Mace 8:1-14:10, the martyrdom of
the seven brothers; and 4 Mace 14:1 1-17:6, the martyrdom of the mother.
The word endurance (uiroiioni) is repeated throughout chapter 17 (4 Mace 17:7, 10, 12, 17, 23).
� David C. Aune, "Mastery of the Passions: Philo, 4 Maccabees and the Earliest Christianity," in
Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a Christian Response within the Greco-Roman World (ed. Wendy E.
Helleman; Lanham: University Press ofAmerica, 1994), 125-58.
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Now reason is tlie mind (voug) that with sound logic (opGou loyou) prefers (-iTpoTLp,coy)
the life ofwisdom. Wisdom (oo^ia), next, is the knowledge (yvQCLg) of divine and
human matters and the causes of these. This, in tum, is education from the law (fi tou
v6|j,ou -naibda), by which we leam divine matters reverently and human affairs to our
advantage (oupcjjepovTQc;). (4 Mace 1:15-17)
The person with devout reason always deliberates with sound logic and chooses the life
informed and determined by wisdom. Devout reason has a role similar to Aristotle's idea
ofmoral virtue. '^^ As such, moral virtue refers to the habit of choosing those options
determined by right principle (Aristotle, Nic. Eth. 6.8.4). To deliberate with sound
principles is to engage in the act of t^pov^oiQ. (^p6vr\oic, is an indispensable means to virtue
(cf 4 Mace 1:30). Moreover, like Aristotle, the author of 4 Maccabees understands
wisdom as a specific type of knowledge, namely knowledge about divine and human
matters.'''^ However, unlike Aristotle, he thinks knowledge can be known only through
"education from the law." For the author of 4 Maccabees, tme reason is that which through
^p6vr\0LQ (choose with sound reason) subjects itself to the law ofGod (wisdom) (4 Mace
2:21-23), and live in accordance with the law (tco y6|ico iro/lLTeuopeyof;) (4 Mace 2:8).''*'
Next, the author clarifies the notion of "emotion." The author claims pleasure and
pain as the two types of emotion.
''^^ Pleasure can be further divided into pleasures of the
soul and pleasures of the body. The pleasures of the soul include boastfulness (dXaCoveia),
love ofmoney ((jjiXapyupia), thirst for honor (<^iXodo^ia), rivalry ((j)L/lov�LKLa), and malice
{^aoKavia) (4 Mace 1:26). The pleasures of the body include indiscriminate eating
'^^ David Arthur DeSilva, 4 Maccabees: Introduction and Commentary on the Greek Text in Codex
Sinaiticus (Septuagint Commentary Series; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2006), 85.
DeSilva writes, "the author's definition of 'wisdom' is taken directly from the 'Greco-Roman
dictionary ofphilosophy' appearing substantially the same in Cicero, Aetius, Seneca, and Philo" (Ibid.).
nolLt6uo|iaL appears four times: 4 Mace 2:8, 23; 4:23; 5:16; -noXixdoi appears three times 4 Mace
3:20; 8:7; 17:9.
'""^ A fraditional topic in Greco-Roman philosophy, see Aristotle, Eth. nic. 2.3.
Ill
(TrayTO(j)aYLa), gluttony (Xai|iapYLa), and solitary gormandizing (|ioyo4)(XYL(x) (4 Mace 1:27).
The pleasures of the soul are recapitulated again later in 4 Mace 2:15 with some variation
as lust for power ((^ikipxiac,), vainglory (KeyoSo^iac;), boasting (dXaCoyetaq), arrogance
(lieyaAxjcuxLag), and malice (paoKayCocc;). The author labels these vices as "violenf and
"malicious" emotions. These passions often relate to stasis. In other words, the vices
quelled by devout reason are those that lead to stasis. As such, once these vices are quelled,
the nation will regain its peace and withstand the extemal enemies.
2.9.2 Eleazar and the Seven Brothers and Their Mother (3:19-17:6)
In order to interact effectively with the biographical narrative, it is necessary to take
note of the framing device encapsulating the entire narrative. This framing occurs in 4
Mace 3:19-21 and 18:4:
But now indeed the time summons us to the narrative demonstration of the self-
controlled reason. For when our forebears were experiencing deep peace (PaGeXay
elpr\vt]v) on account of the good ordering (euvoiiCav) provided by the Law, and
getting along well, with the result that even Seleucus Nicanor, the king of Asia, both
apportioned money to them for the religious service and recognized their
commonwealth (-noliidav); then it was that certain people (hv^q), introducing
innovations against (yecoxepLoayxec) the general concord (xriy Koiyriy ofioyoLay), and
caused many and various disasters. (4 Mace 3:19-21)
On account of them the nation was restored to peace (elpriyeuoey) and, having
renewed good order (�W0|iLay) over the homeland, they ravaged the enemv forces.
(4 Mace 18:4)
Both passages speak of peace, good ordering, and Israel's relationship with foreign powers.
The narrative begins with "deep peace," "good ordering," and the good relationship
between the Jews and Seleucus Nicanor. The narrative ends with the restoration and
renewal of "peace" and "good ordering" and the defeat of foreign enemies. Framing the
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biographical narratives with these concepts, the author reminds his readers that the
philosophical thesis of "devout reason is sovereign over the emotions" is not irrelevant
speculative practice disconnected with politics and communal life. Rather, the thesis and
its exemplifying narratives are meant to be read and interpreted in the context of the
political struggle between Jews and Gentiles The exposition of virtue is about not only
morality, but also politics. The figures in the narrative are not individual heroes and
heroines. They are, on the contrary, representations of the Jewish people?'^
In 4 Mace 3:21 (see previous block quote), the pronoun xiveg ("certain ones") refers
to persons who are responsible for introducing innovations against the general concord.
Simon is one of those people (4 Mace 4:1). The opening phrase that introduces Simon
makes the connection explicit: "Now there was a certain Simon" (SLjicov yap tiq). The
author notes Simon as a political opponent (dvTLTroA,LT�u6|i�yo(;) of Onias the high priest.
He tried to harm Onias by "all manner of slander" but failed. As a result, he fled to the
Seleucids and betrayed his country, reporting to the Seleucid king about the treasuries in
the temple. Immediately the king had Apollonius sent to seize the money, but failed
because ofGod's intervention. The author portrays these men as lovers of honor and lovers
ofmoney. Their emotions are not governed by devout reason, so their acts lead to the harm
of Israel.
'''^ Jan Willem van Henten, The Maccabean Martyrs as Saviours of the Jewish People: A Study of2
and 4 Maccabees (JSJSup; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 243-69; Hans-JosefKlauck, "Brotherly Love in
Plutarch and in 4 Maccabees," in Greeks, Romans, and Christians: Essays in Honor ofAbraham J. Malherbe
(ed. David L. Balch, Everett Ferguson, and Wayne A. Meeks; MinneapoHs: Fortress, 1990), 155.
This connection has been noted by many commentators. Henten, for example, writes that: "The
martyrs represent the most obvious demographic categories of the Jewish population: men and women,
young and old. The seven sons and the mother can be taken symbolically as a reference to the entire Jewish
people or the faithful part of it" {The Maccabean Martyrs, 212).
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However, the descriptions of 4 Mace 3:21 describes even more accurately the man
mentioned later in 4 Mace 4:16�Jason, the brother ofOnias. He bribed Antiochus
Epiphanes and was appointed high priest and ruler of the nation. He took this opportunity
and "changed the nation's way of life and altered its form of government in complete
violation of the law" (�^e6Lf|Tr|0�v to iQvoc, Kal 6^�TroA,LT6UO�V eirl iraoay Trapavo|iLay; 4
Mace 4:19). His radical acts are said to have angered the "divine justice"''*^ causing
Antiochus himself to make war against the Jews (4 Mace 4:20).''*^ War ascended because
of the violation of the law (cf 4 Mace 3 :20). The real cause of destruction lied not in the
hands of foreigners but in those "certain people" who transgressed the law and broke the
peace and good order.
The war ended with the plunder of Jerusalem and a decree issued forbidding Jews to
observe the law (4 Mace 4:23). Because of this decree, Jews were forced to eat defiling
foods and renounce Judaism (4 Mace 4:26). As a result observant Jews, such as Eleazar
and the seven brothers and their mother were tortured for their refiasal to cooperate.
The narratives of Eleazar and of the seven brothers have a similar structure. Each
begins with a conversation between Antiochus and the martyr(s) followed by an account of
torture, and each ends with a panegyric:
Antiochus' Conversation with the Priest Eleazar (5:1-38)
Eleazar's Steadfastness under Torture (6:1-35)
Panegyric on Eleazar (7:1-23)
Antiochus' Conversation with the Seven Brothers (8:1-9:9)
The Torture of the Seven Brothers (9:10-12:19)
Justice is a philosophical way of speaking of God (4 Mace 4:13; 8:14, 22; 9:9, 15, 24, 32; 1 1:3;
12:12; 18:22).
According to Martin Hengel, king Aniochus' oppressive policy was the result of inner Jewish
conflict {Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in Their Encounter in Palestine During the Early Hellenistic
Period [2 vols.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974], 287).
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Panegyric on the Seven Brothers (13:1-14:10)'''^
Antiochus' conversations with the martyrs talce the form of the deliberative speech. He
gives advice (ou^pouXeuG); 4 Mace 5:6; 8:5; cf 8:29) to the martyrs, exhorting (mpaKald;
4 Mace 5:12; 6:1; cf 8:17; 10:1) them to yield to his will to save themselves (4 Mace 5:6;
cf 10:1, 13) and to have peace (4 Mace 8:26) and safety (4 Mace 9:4). He chastises the
martyrs for senselessness (dvorixoc; 4 Mace 5:9, 10), madness (\iaivo\iai; 4 Mace 8:5; cf
10:13), holding vain opinion (KevoSo^eco; 4 Mace 5:10), being taken away by foolish
philosophy and futile reasoning (4 Mace 5:11), ignoring what is truly beneficial (ou|i4)gpa);
4 Mace 5:11), and casting harm upon themselves.
Responding to Antiochus, both Eleazar and the seven brothers speak in the first
person plural ("we"). They speak as representatives of the Jewish people. The author of 4
Maccabees often described their interaction with the king as a form of competition or
warfare.'''^ For example, in the panegyric to Eleazar's martyrdom, the author depicts him
first as a skilled captain who steers the ship of religion over the sea of emotions (4 Mace
7:1-3; cf 13:6-7). This image of ship-sailing picks up the "ship of the state" imagery
popular in Greco-Roman political discourse (e.g., Plato, Resp. 488a-489d). This imagery
effectively relates Eleazar's personal victory with the victory of the Jewish people. The
Jewish people win their immortal victory by adhering to God's divine law in the same
manner as Eleazar.
The ship as a metaphor for the city (or nation) is confirmed by the second imagery
the author uses to eulogize Eleazar, namely the imagery of the besieged city:
David J. Elliott, "4 Maccabees," in The OxfordBible Commentary (ed. John Barton and John
Muddiman; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 790.
Henten argues that these imageries are chosen for their representative flmction. Henten, The
Maccabean Martyrs, 235-38.
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No city besieged with many ingenious war machines has ever held out as did that
most holy man. Although his sacred life was consumed by tortures and racks, he
conquered the besiegers with the shield of his devout reason. (4 Mace 7:4-5)
Again the victory belongs to Eleazar. However, his victory lies not only in his ability to
withstand the attack, but also in his ability to conquer the besiegers, not through actual
physical force, but through his steadfastness in God's law. The author juxtaposes active
attack (conquer) with passive refiisal (shield). This juxtaposition is one of the majors
themes of this book repeated many times throughout the letter (4 Mace 1:11; 8:2, 15; 9:30;
11:24; 16:14; 17:2, 20; 18:4).
The narrative of the seven brothers occurs after the death ofEleazar (4 Mace 8:1-
14:10). The author introduces the brothers as a group working together "like a chorus" (4
Mace 8:4; cf 13:8; 14:8 [xopeuw]; 18:23). The chorus is a metaphor for concord and
harmony. The seven brothers represent Israel at their best in harmony and in unity with one
another.
Meeting the seven brothers, the king in his violent rage (o(l)66pa irgpLiraBa);; 4 Mace
8:2)*''^ advises them not to display the same madness (iiavflyaL xr\v amr]v) exhibited by the
old man Eleazar. Rather, the brothers should to yield to the king and enjoy his friendship
{(^iXla) and benefaction.
The author then enters into a hypothetical dialogue, surmising what the seven
brothers "might have thought" if they were to act cowardly and inmanly (4 Mace 8:16-
26).'^� They could have in their fear asked themselves the following questions: "should we
not fear the instruments of torture and consider the threats of torments and give up these
The king repeatedly was enraged by the martyrs (4 Mace 8:2; 8:9; 9:10; cf. 10:5). Unlike the Jews
whose devout reason controls their emotions, the king lacks self-control and his emotions run wild.
Stephen D. Moore and Janice Capel Anderson, "Taking It Like a Man: Masculinity in 4
Maccabees," JBL 111 (1998): 249-71.
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vainglory (K6vo6o^Lav) and this arrogance (aXjal^ovdav) that threatens to destroy us?.. ..Why
does such contentiousness (cjjUoyeLKLa) excite us...when we can live in peace (dxapa^Lag)
ifwe obey the king?" Their choice in other words is between friendship that leads to peace,
and vainglory, arrogance, and contentiousness that leads to death.
However, from the authors' point view, this hypothetic self-questioning represents
the wrong way ofperceiving reality. Adhering to the Law is not an act of vainglory,
arrogance, or contentiousness. Rather, adhering to the Law is an act of virtue. Thus, the
brothers "with one voice together as from one mind" (6 id [iiolq ^(jivf\Q ofioO dSoirep d-rro xf\Q
autfi; ilfuxfit;) reject the offer of "friendship" and asked instead for death. They asked,
"Why do you delay, O tyrant? For we are ready to die rather than transgress our ancestral
commandments" (4 Mace 9:1). Then the king tortured and killed the brothers one by one
(4 Mace 9:10-12:19).'^'
In 4 Mace 13: 1, the author begins his panegyric to the seven brothers. He lauds them
for coming together as a "holy chorus" and encouraging one another to die for the sake of
the law. Again and again the author emphasizes on unity. He composed a long paragraph
specifically to praise their unity and explain how that unity came to formation:
^'^^ You are not ignorant of the affection of brotherhood (xd xf\<; d6�X(t)6Tr|TO(; (^iXxpa),
which the divine and all-wise Providence has bequeathed through the fathers to their
descendants and which was implanted in the mother's womb. ^ There each of the
brothers dwelt the equal Cloov) length of time and was shaped during the same (tco
ai)xcp) period of time; and growing from the same (xou auxou) blood and through the
same life, they were brought to the light of day. ^^'^ When they were bom after an
equal Cloqv) time of gestation, they drank milk from the same (xqv auxwv) fountains.
For such embraces brotherly-loving {(^iXdd^X^oi) souls are nourished (owxpk^ovTai);
The brothers died from the eldest to the youngest. Stanley K. Stowers notes, "For ancient readers,
each is yet more amazing, as the boys are successively younger. The assumption is that, the younger the child,
the less his reason" ("4 Maccabees," in The HarperCollins Bible Commentary [ed. James Luther Mays and
Joseph Blenkinsopp; San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2000], 852-53). The youth of the sixth and seventh
brothers is emphasized (4 Mace 11:13-14; 12:1-2). This sequence is intentionally arranged to elicit /7a//!05.
The climax to the sequence is the death of the mother ("the mind even of a woman;" 4 Mace 14: 1 1).
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^ ^ and they grow stronger from this common nurture (owTpo(^iaQ) and daily
companionship (owr]QdaQ), and from both general education and our discipline in
the law of God. ^^^^ Therefore, when sympathy (ou^TraeoOc) and brotherly affection
((^iXadeX(\>iac,) had been so established, the brothers were the more sympathetic
(oupTTaGeoTepov) to one another (iTpot; aXlr]lo\)Q). ^^"^^ Since they had been educated by
the same (xcp auxcp) law and frained in the same (xdg auxdt;) virtues and brought up
(ouvxpacfjevxec;) in right living, they loved one another all the more. ^^^^ A common
zeal (opoCriXLa) for nobility expanded their goodwill and harmony (ewoiav Kal
ofxoyoiay) toward one another (irpoc dXXr]Xo\)Q), ^^^^ because, with the aid of their
religion, they rendered their brotherly love ((t)LA.a6�A.(t)Lay) more fervent. ^^^^ But
although nature and companionship (ouvriGeiag) and virtuous habits had augmented
(ouyau^ovxo)!^) the affection of brotherhood (xd xf|c; dSeXcjjoxTixoc ^LXxpa), those who
were left endured for the sake of religion, while watching their brothers being
maltreated and tortured to death. ^'^'^^ Furthermore, they encouraged them to face the
torture, so that they not only despised their agonies, but also mastered the emotions
ofbrotherly love ((^iXoLd^X^iao). (4 Mace 13:19-14:1)
The unity and harmony of the seven brothers is emphasized by (1) the frequent use of the
ouv-prefix (4 Mace 13:21; 22 [x2]; 23 [x2]; 24; 26; 27 [*2]); (2) the frequent use ofauxog
as an identical adjective (4 Mace 13:20 [x3]; 21; 24 [x2]); (3) the use of the reciprocal
pronoun aXXr\X()iv (4 Mace 13:23, 25); (4) the use ofwords with the root (\)iX- (4 Mace
13:19, 21, 23, 26, 27; 14:1; cf 13:24 [dYa-rrdo)]); (5) the use of the 6|io-prefix (4 Mace
13:25). Their unity is developed by nature, education, companionship, and above all by
virtue (4 Mace 13:27). There is a clear chronological progression from common nurture to
common education and finally to the climax of the common zeal for nobility
(KaA-OKdyaGia).'^^ These commonalities are the basis of their friendship (f] irpog 6iXXr\Xo\)c,
eiJvoLa)'" and their concord (6p,6voLa) (4 Mace 13:25). This harmonious virtue-friendship
gave the brothers the ability to conquer the tyrant. The death of the seven brothers is
'^^ KaXoKdyaGLa as moral excellence is discussed in Aristotle, Eth. eud. 8.3: "we have previously
spoken about teach virtue in particular; and as we have distinguished their meaning separately, we must also
describe in detail the virtue constituted from them, to which we now give the name ofnobility
(KaloKdyaGLav)." Cf Isocrates, Demon. 51 [the conclusion to the whole speech]; Demosthenes, Cor. 118
[Demosthenes is crowned by the people ofAthens for his virtue and nobleness].
EijvoLa is the core element in Aristotle's definition of fiiendship.
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presented as a "sacred and harmonious concord" for the sake of religion, as evidenced
when the author writes, "O most holy seven, brothers in harmony! For just as the seven
days of creation move in choral dance around religion, so these youths, forming a chorus,
encircled the sevenfold fear of tortures and dissolved it" (4 Mace 14:7). Just as creation
expels the evil of chaos, the virtuous concord of the seven brothers dissolves the evils of
the tyrant.
2.9.3 Victory over the Tyrant (17:7-18:24)
Having recounted the death of the martyrs, the author of 4 Maccabees closes his book
with an account of the effect of the martyrdoms (4 Mace 17:7-24), a direct appeal to his
readers (4 Mace 18:1-5), and a final emotional appeal (4 Mace 18:6-19).
In this final section, the author lauds the martyrs for their virtue (4 Mace 17:12, 23)
and endurance (4 Mace 17:6, 10, 12, 17, 23). They endured the tortures "even to death" (4
Mace 17:10). Their death was a "ransom for sin" and an "atoning sacrifice" for Israel.
Because of their death, the land was purified (4 Mace 17:21-22), the enemies were unable
to rule over the nation (4 Mace 17:20), the nation was vindicated (4 Mace 17:10), and the
nation gained peace (4 Mace 18:4). Their virtue not only saved the nation but also
conquered the enemies (4 Mace 18:4; cf 17:24) and punished the tyrant (4 Mace 17:21;
18:5).
In sum, Israel lost its peace and good order because certain individuals rejected the
law capable of restraining the emotions. Forfeiting the law, these individuals were unable
to constrain the pleasures of the soul such as love ofmoney ((^ihx.py\)pia) and thirst for
honor ((t)LXo6o^La). These pleasures led them to the betrayal of their nafion. The acfions of
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the martyrs serve as a foil to the actions of these men. Accordingly, the martyrs adhere to
the law and restrained their emotions. Because of their virtue, they were able to come
together in unity and friendship, and were willing to endure torture even to death. Their
harmonious and sacrificing friendship eventually defeated the tyrant and brought peace
back to Israel. The salvation of Israel depended on law abiding virtue and the harmonious
chorus build upon that virtue.
2.10 Conclusion
The study of this chapter confirms the statements made earlier at the end ofChapter
1. There it is claimed that stasis is a deviant process, where citizens replace common
interest with self-interest in pursuit honor and gain. The pursuit of self-interest inevitably
dissolves friendship into faction. Citizens, as a result, become enemies toward one another
and devouring one another, leading to the fall of the polis. The polis is saved only if
citizens are willing to forfeit their desires for personal honor and gain, pursue instead the
common interest, and maintain the common bound of friendship. In other words, thepolis
is saved through virtue and friendship.
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3 PHILIPPIANS AS DELIBERATIVE RHETORIC ON CONCORD
Stasis as an important tlieme in Greco-Roman literature has been noted in Chapter 1.
In Chapter 2, this thesis explores how various authors respond to the dangers of stasis. To
many of these authors, envy, greed, and faction are the essential components of stasis. In
contrast to stasis stands concord. And concord is sustained by virtue and friendship. This
chapter will describe Philippians as a letter written by Paul to end the discord in the church
ofPhilippi. As such, this chapter will begin with a general introduction to Philippians (3.1).
The introduction will end with the question: what is Paul's purpose ofwriting Philippians?
This question will be answered in section 3.2. Section 3.2 will assert Philippains as a
deliberative letter on concord. In other words, Paul's major purpose in writing Philippians
was to promote concord in the church ofPhilippi. The argument takes two steps: (1)
Philippians is a deliberative rhetoric (3.2.1-4); (2) Philippians is a deliberative rhetoric on
concord (3.2.5). Finally, this chapter will end with a structural analysis ofPhilippians
(3.2.6). The proposed structure will serve as a guide to the reading ofPhilippinas in
Chapter 4.
3.1 Introduction to Philippians
3.1.1 Composition
There is virtually no dispute that Paul is the author ofPhilippians. However, whether
Philippians is a composite letter is disputed. Advocates of the composite theory claim that
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Philippians is a composite of two or three different letters.' There are, however, good
evidences for the integrity ofPhilippians.'^ Robert Jewett,^ for example, argues that the
letter is bind together in unity by several recurrent themes, such as suffering, joy, correct
mental attitude, and the kenosis motif Also, similar terminologies are scattered throughout
the letter. Finally, Jewett argues that the epistolary thanksgiving and the succeeding
sections of the letter are connected seamlessly to one another. This latter argument,
according to Jewett, is the most powerful evidence for the unity of the letter. David
Garland,"* on the other hand, refutes the composite theories by revealing their fallacy "of
constructing an abstract 'regular Pauline letter structure' and using it to make judgments
about integrity;"^ Whereas in reality there is always in Paul's letters as much irregularity as
regularity. This thesis will work from the assumption that Philippians is a unified literary
work.
3.1.2 Place and Date ofComposition
The place and date of the writing will not be argued in this thesis, for it has little
bearing to the overall thesis. The popular candidates for the place of composition include
' David E. Garland, "The Composition and Unity ofPhilippians: Some Neglected Literary Factors,"
TVovr 27 (1985): 141n3, 55.
^
Many scholars have argued for the unity of the letter, including: L. Gregory Bloomquist, The
Function ofSuffering in Philippians (JSNTSup; Sheffield, Eng.: JSOT Press, 1993), 97-1 18; William J.
Dalton, "The Integrity ofPhilippians," Bib 60 (1979): 97-102; Garland, "The Composition and Unity of
Philippians," 141-73; R. Jewett, "The Epistolary Thanksgiving and the Integrity ofPhilippians," A^ovJ 12
(1970): 40-53; T. Evan Pollard, "Integrity ofPhilippians," NTS 13 (1966): 56-66; Jeffrey T. Reed, A
Discourse Analysis ofPhilippians: Method and Rhetoric in the Debate over Literary Integrity (JSNTSup;
Sheffield, Eng.: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997).
^
Jewett, "The Epistolary Thanksgiving and the Integrity ofPhilippians," 40-53.
'*
Garland, "The Composition and Unity ofPhilippians," 141-73.
' Garland, "The Composition and Unity ofPhilippians," 150.
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Rome,^ Caesarea/ and Ephesus.^ Discussions about tlie place and date of the composition
tend to be speculative.^ And little consensus exists among the scholars.
3.1.3 The Purpose ofPhilippians
What is Paul's purpose ofwriting Philippians? This question gives rise to many
different answers. The chart below provides a sample of the answers given by scholars
who wrote major commentaries on Philippians in the past 20 years.'
To
express
gratitude
To inform
about his
situation
To warn
against
false
teaciiing
To plea for
unity
To stand
firm
against
opposition
To
recommend
Epaphroditus
Others
Peter T. O'Brien (1991) ? * * * *
Richard R. Melicl<
(1991)"
* * *
Gordon Fee (1995)" *
Frank Thielman (1995)" * * * *
* Most English-speaking commentators today opt for Rome. Markus N. A. Bockmuehl, The Epistle to
the Philippians (Black's New Testament Commentary; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1998), 25-32; Fee,
Paul 's Letter to the Philippians, 34-37; Moma D. Hooker, "Philippians," in The New Interpreter 's Bible
(Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon, 2000), 473-75; Richard R. Melick, Philippians, Colossians, Philemon (NAC;
Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman, 1991), 34-39; Peter Thomas O'Brien, The Epistle to the Philippians: A
Commentary on the Greek Text (NIGTC; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1991), 25; Moises Silva,
Philippians (2nd ed.; BECNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2005); Ben Witherington, Paul's
Letter to the Philippians: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 201 1), 9-1 1.
' Gerald F. Hawthorne, Philippians (WBC; Waco, Tex.: Word Books, 1983), xli-xliv.
* Charles B. Cousar, Philippians and Philemon: A Commentary (NTL; Louisville, Ky.: Westminster
John Knox, 2009), 9-11; Hansen, The Letter to the Philippians, 24; Gerald F. Hawthorne and Ralph P. Martin,
Philippians (Rev. ed.; WBC; Waco, Texas: Word Books, 2004), 1; Frank S. Thielman, "Ephesus and the
Literary Setting ofPhilippians," in New Testament Greek and Exegesis: Essays in Honor ofGerald F.
Hawthorne (ed. Amy M. Donaldson and Timothy B. Sailors; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2003), 205-24.
^
Hansen, The Letter to the Philippians, 25.
'� For similar svmimery of earlier commentaries, see Hugh Blake Harwell, "Classical Rhetoric and
Paul's Purpose in Philippians" (Ph.D. Thesis, The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1993), 15-35. He
lists six purposes: to exhort to joy, to express gratitude, to inform about his and Epaphroditus' situation; to
commend Epaphroditus; to warn about outsiders; to exhort to unity.
" MeMck, Philippians, Colossians, Philemon, 29-30.
Fee, Paul 's Letter to the Philippians, 39.
Frank S. Thielman, Philippians (The NFV Application Commentary Series; Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Zondervan, 1995), 18-22.
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Markus Bockmuehl
(1998)''
* * * * *
Moma Hooker (2000)'^ * * *
Martin & Hawthorne
(2004)"
* * * * * *
Moises Silva (2005)" * * *
Stephen E. Fowl (2005)'* * *
John Reumann (2008)'� * * * *
Charles B. Cousar
(2009)^�
* * * *
G. Walter Hansen
(2009)^'
* * * * * 22
Todd Still (2011)" * * * * *
Ben Witherington
(2011)''
* *
The chart above shows that scholars widely acknowledge numerous reasons for Paul's
writing ofPhilippians. But are these purposes of equal importance? Are they in any way
related to one another? Is there an overarching theme that binds these multiple purposes
Bockmuehl, The Epistle to the Philippians, 32-33. Bockmuehl denies that "intemal disunity" is a
serious problem in Philippi (19). Along with Witherington, he argues that Philippians is "more of a progress-
oriented than a problem-solving letter" (33).
Hooker, "Philippians," 475.
Hawthorne and Martin, Philippians, Iv-lvii. Paul writes also to express his deep affection and to
exhort them to rejoice in all circumstance.
Silva, Philippians, 2-4.
Fowl, Philippians, 10-12. Fowl thinks that "Paul's purposes is to help form in the Philippians (and
us) the dispositions, habits, and skills needed to understand themselves and their world in Christ." He denies
that "intemal divisions" is a problem in Philippi (11).
John Reumann, Philippians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB; New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 3.
'"
Cousar, Philippians andPhilemon, 1 7-20.
''
Hansen, The Letter to the Philippians, 19-30.
Paul also attempts to deal with the problem of suffering.
Todd D. Still, Philippians & Philemon (The Smyth & Helwys Bible Commentary; Macon, Ga.:
Smyth & Helwys, 2011), 13-14.
Witherington, Paul's Letter to the Philippians, 25-26.
Unity, however, is not Paul's primary goal: "Paul stresses unity not for damage control but because
unity is necessary if the Philippians are to continue to make progress in living lives worthy of their calling, if
they, like Paul, are to press on to the goal of full maturity or perfection, if they are to fully imitate the self-
sacrificial behavior ofChrist, who is the main positive example held up for them" (Witherington, Paul's
Letter to the Philippians, 26).
124
together in one? Or is Paul writing in an ad hoc manner composing a letter that has no
central theme, but has only sections of texts that are loosely related to one another?
To answer these questions one must first specify the genre of the text. Reading is
always genre-based.'^^ Richard Burridge argues that the concept of genre is not purely
prescriptive, nor is it purely descriptive; rather, genre stands in the middle between these
two extremes as "a system of expectations" guiding the reader in his or her encounter with
the text.^^ Words follow a system of expectations called morphology; sentences follow a
system of expectations called syntax; texts follow a system of expectations called genre.
Genre is the grammar of texts and is both prescriptive and descriptive.
If the genre of a text can be identified, then the conventions of that genre will become
a heuristic guide for the readers, allowing them a better understanding of the text. This
thesis will argue in the following material that Philippians belongs to the genre of the
deliberative rhetoric (3.2.1-3.2.4). Moreover, this thesis will argue that Philippians is a
deliberative rhetoric on concord (3.2.5). Deliberative speeches have certain structures.
These structural conventions will help guide the readers to the text (3.2.6). They will help
identify the major thesis ofPhilippians and provide answers to the questions raised earlier
concerning the purpose or purposes ofPhilippians, the relationship of these purposes to
each other, and the importance of these purposes in relation to each other.
E. D. Hirsch writes, "Ali understanding of verbal meaning is necessarily genre-bound" (Validity in
Interpretation [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967], 76). For a helpftil survey on modem generic
theories see: Mary Gerhart, "Generic Studies: Their Renewed Importance in Religious and Literary
Interpretation," JAAR 45 (1977): 309-25. On the use of "genre" in NT studies, see: Klaus Berger, Formen
Und Gattungen Im Neuen Testament (UTB; Tubingen: Francke, 2005); Brook W. R. Pearson and Stanley E.
Porter, "The Genres of the New Testament," in Handbook to Exegesis ofthe New Testament (ed. Stanley E.
Porter; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 131-65.
Richard A. Burridge, What Are the Gospels?: A Comparison with Graeco-Roman Biography (2nd
ed.; The Biblical Resource Series; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2004), 33-34.
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However, as helpful as the concept of genre can be, imposing an abstract genric
model upon the existing texts should be avoided. Existing texts often involve a mixture of
different genres, and even within a single genre variations in structure always exist. Thus,
one must avoid the danger of cutting the feet to fit the shoes. This thesis will reflect on
some of the particularities ofPhilippians in 3.2.6.
3.2 Philippians as a Deliberative Discourse on Concord
Hans Betz's commentary on Galatians, published in 1979,^^ introduced rhetorical
criticism to the field ofPauline studies.^^ Since then the question whether rhetorical
criticism is an appropriate and fruitful method for the study ofPaul's letters has been
constantly debated.^" Dennis Stamps,^' Stanley Porter,^^ Philip Kern," Jeffrey Reed,^"* Carl
Hans Dieter Betz, Galatians: A Commentary on Paul 's Letter to the Churches ofGalatia
(Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979); Hans Dieter Betz, "The Literary Composition and Function of
Paul's Letter to the Galatians," in The Galatians Debate: Contemporary Issues in Rhetorical andHistorical
Interpretation (ed. Mark D. Nanos; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2002), 3-28.
A better expression instead might state, "brought back rhetorical criticism." C. Joachim Classen
writes, "It was practiced in antiquity and it was not totally neglected in the Middle Ages; it was frequently
employed with great skill during the Renaissance, and it has never been forgotten ever since in some quarters,
while others preferred to ignore it" ("St. Paul's Epistles and Ancient Greek and Roman Rhetoric," in
Galatians Debate: Contemporary Issues in Rhetorical andHistorical Interpretation [ed. Mark D. Nanos;
Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2002], 270-78). He especially highlights the contribution ofPhilipp
Melanchthon.
Troy W. Martin frames this question as a debate between rhetorical arrangement and epistolary
conventions, involving five issues: (1) whether Paul's letters were speeches; (2) whether Paul's letters
conformed to the prescriptions of the ancient rhetorical theorists; (3) whether the ancients themselves would
condone epistolary rhetorical arrangement; (4) whether the rhetorical arrangement ofPaul's letters has been
usefiil; and (5) whether Paul was a rhetorician. Troy W. Martin, "Invention and Arrangement in Recent
Pauline Rhetorical Studies: A Survy of the Practicies and Problems," in Paul and Rhetoric (ed. J. Paul
Sampley and Peter Lampe; New York: T&T Clark, 2010), 51-62.
^' Dermis L. Stamps, "Rhetorical Criticism of the New Testament: Ancient and Modem Evaluations of
Argumentation," in Approaches to New Testament Study (ed. Stanley E. Porter and David Tombs; Sheffield:
Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), 129-69.
Stanley E. Porter, "Paul as Epistolographer and Rhetorician?" in The Rhetorical Interpretation of
Scripture: Essays from the 1996Malibu Corference (ed. Stanley E. Porter and Dennis L. Stamps; Sheffield:
Sheffield Academic, 1999), 222-48; Stanley E. Porter, "The Theoretical Justification for Application of
Rhetorical Categories to Pauline Epistolary Literature," in Rhetoric and the New Testament: Essays from the
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Classen, and R. Dean Anderson for different reasons express doubts about, ifnot
objection against, rhetorical criticism. It is not the purpose of this thesis to provide a fresh
assessment of the applicability of rhetorical criticism or to provide a comprehensive
evaluation of the arguments against rhetorical criticism. However, one must acknowledge
that many of the criticisms launched against rhetorical criticism are not well-grounded, for
they focus too narrowly on the comparison between Paul's letters and the rhetorical
handbooks, neglecting the actual speeches of the Greco-Roman period.^^ As a result, the
comparison becomes theoretical and abstract. A comparison between Paul's letters and the
actual speeches will show that Paul's letter writing does reflect the rhetorical conventions
of his day.
This thesis compares Philippians both to the rhetorical handbooks and the extant
speeches. The purpose of the comparison is to demonstrate that Philippians is a
deliberative rhetoric on concord. According to Margaret Mitchell, deliberative rhetoric has
four essential characteristics, including:
(1) a focus on fiiture time as the subject of deliberation; (2) employment of a
determined set of appeals or ends, the most distinctive ofwhich is the advantageous;
1992 Heidelberg Conference (ed. Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993),
100-22.
Philip H. Kem, Rhetoric and Galatians: Assessing an Approach to Paul 's Epistle (Society for New
Testament Studies; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
Jeffrey T. Reed, "The Epistle," in Handbook ofClassicalRhetoric in the Hellenistic Period, 330
B.C.-A.D. 400 (ed. Stanley E. Porter; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 167-92; Jeffrey T. Reed, "Using Ancient
Rhetorical Categories to Interpret Paul's Letters: A Question ofGenre," in Rhetoric and the New Testament:
Essays from the 1992 Heidelberg Conference (ed. Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht; Sheffield:
Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), 292-324. In the latter article. Reed uses Philippians as a test case to argue
against rhetorical criticism.
Classen, "St. Paul's Epistles and Ancient Greek and Roman Rhetoric," 95-1 13.
R. Dean Anderson, Ancient Rhetorical Theory andPaul (Revised ed.; Contributions to Biblical
Exegesis and Theology; Leuven, Belgiimi: Peelers, 1999).
Stamps, for example, in his argument against rhetorical criticism, never makes any substaintial
interaction with acient speeches. Stamps, "Rhetorical Criticism of the New Testament: Ancient and Modem
Evaluations ofArgumentation," 129-69.
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(3) proof by example; and (4) appropriate subjects for deliberation, ofwhich
factionalism and concord are especially common.''^
This thesis will argue in the following material that Philippians exhibits all four of these
characteristics (3.2.1; 3.2.3-5). In addition, this thesis will argue that Philippians, like other
deliberative discourses, involves the acts of advice-giving, deliberation, and choice (3.2.2).
Reflecting these characteristics, Philippians will be identified as a deliberative rhetoric on
concord.
3.2.1 The Future Time Reference
According to Aristotle, three kinds of rhetoric correspond with three kinds of
audiences.^^ The audience must be either "a mere spectator or a judge (Kpixriv), and a judge
either of things past or of things to come (-rrepl tgjv (ie/lXovtcov)" (Aristotle, Rhet. 1.3.2).
The deliberative speech is for audiences who judge of things to come.''^
In a deliberative speech recorded by Thucydides, the orator Diodotus says explicitly
that citizens are gathered to deliberate "about the fiiture rather than the present"
(Thucydides, Hist. 3.44.3). Isocrates'*' in the exordium of his speech On Concord, bids his
audience to examine and compare arguments with an unbiased hearing in order that they
may wisely "deliberate about the future" (Isocrates, De pace 1 1.4; Big. 19.3; Ep. 5.4). He
Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric ofReconciliation, 23.
Aristotle, Rhet. 1358b4; 1359al-2; 1392a5; Quintilian, Inst. 3.4.7; 3.8.6; Cicero, Part. or. 3.10;
20.69.
Quintilian: "we deliberate about the future" {Inst. 3.4.7); "deliberative debates the future" {Inst.
3.8.6). The use of examples is appropriate for deliberative rhetoric for "the future often seems to reflect the
pasf (/�5/. 3.8.66).
R. C. Jebb divides Isocrates' writings into four categories: (1) Scholastic Writings; (2) Political
Writings; (3) Forensic Speeches; (4) Letters and Fragments. Under the second category he lists two writings
on the relations ofGreece with Persia: Panegyrius (Or. 4) and Philippus (Or. 5); and four writings on the
intemal affairs ofGreece: Plataicus (Or. 14), On the Peace (Or. 8), Archidamus (Or. 6), and Areopagiticus
(Or. 7). R. C. Jebb, The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus, Vol 2 (London: Macmillan, 1893), 78-80.
This classification is followed by George Norlin, "Introduction," in Isocrates {Loeb Classical Library;
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1928).
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expects his speech to help "avert fiiture (tcov [i^XXovxijiv) perils from us and deliver us
from our present ills" (Isocrates, Areop. 16). Lysias exhorts his audience that they ought to
take the events of the past as example in "deliberating on the future course of things"
(Lysias, Dem. Apo. 23.3). Similarly, Andocides asks his audience to "use the past as a
guide to the future" (Andocides, De pace 2). Demosthenes differentiates forensic and
deliberative rhetoric based on the fact that forensic rhetoric is about the past, whereas
deliberative rhetoric is about the present and the future (Demosthenes, Exord. 10).
Polybius in various occasions limits deliberation to the fiiture (Polybius, Hist. 2.4.5;
11.6.6). Dionysius of Halicamassus, like Demosthenes, differentiates forensic and
deliberative rhetoric based on time (Dionysius ofHalicamassus, De Iso. 16.68). Dio
Chrysostom in his deliberative speech describes his responsibility as an orator to provide
advice usefiil to the city in the future to come (Dio Chrysostom, Nicom. 2; cf. 2 Tars. 25,
26).
Paul's deliberative speeches also bear a future orientation. First Corinthians, for
example, is framed by future-oriented statements (1 Cor 1:10; 15:58)."*^ Ephesians also is
framed by future-oriented statements (Eph 4:1-3; 6:10-17). So too is Philemon (Phlm 10;
17 and 20b). Philippians is also framed by fliture-oriented statements (Phil 1:27-30; 4:2).
3.2.2 To Advise, to Deliberate, and to Choose
The purpose of the deliberative rhetoric is for the orator to provide advice for his
audience (ouiiPouXeuco), have them deliberate (PouA,�UOl)) and consider (oKOTreto) his advice,
and have them choose (alpew) that which is to their advantage.'*^
Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric ofReconciliation, 24-25.
This fact is highlighted by Harvey Yunis: "In a strict sense, a rhetor spoke to the audience as an
adviser. Since the demos held the power of decision, that is all a rhetor could do, no matter how he tried to
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The advice given can be either hortatory or dissuasive (TTpoxpeTTcov r\ d-iroTpeTTcoy).
The term most commonly used for the act of advice-giving is ou^pouXeuo) (Demosthenes,
Depace 3; 38.1, 2, 3, 4;'*'* Aristides, Depace 7, 68; Josephus, J. W. 2.345; 5:419; 6:107;
Dio Chrysostom, 2 Tars 1, 4; Nicom. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; / Clem. 51.A, 5; 58.2 [ou|iPouXr|]). In
John 18:14, for example, Caiaphas stands as "one who gives advice to the Jews" (6
ouiiPouXeuoag tolc 'Iou6aLOL(;). His deliberative speech appeals to the advantage of the
people (au|i4)ep�L. . .utrep xou Xaov). Some authors prefer to use words other than
ouiipouA,�U(o, such as: irapaLygQ ("to advice;" Dio Chrysostom, 2 Tars. 6; Ign. Magn. 6:1;
Ign. Smyrn. 4:1) or TiapaKaleco ("to exhort;" Aristides, De pace 23; Ign. Eph. 3.2).
After the orators deliver their advice, the audience then must deliberate the issue and
evaluate the advice. The most common words for deliberation are pouA.6ua) (Demosthenes,
Exord. 1.2; 6.2; 10.1; Z)e pace 2; 2 Philip. 28;), OKOireo) ("to consider"; Demosthenes,
Exord. 1.1; 3.1; 10.1), and SoKipdCo) ("to judge"; Demosthenes, Exord. 5.3).
The final step in the deliberafive process calls the audience "to choose" the advice
they consider best. Different words are used for this final act of choice, such as: alpew ("to
choose;" Demosthenes, / Olynth. 1, 25; Exord. 3.1; 7.1; 8.3; 29.3; 56.2; Ep.l.A; Isocrates,
Areop. 19), eXeoGe ("to select;" Andocides, De pace [Of these you chose whichever you
prefer (xouTcov o xi av pouilrjoGe eA.�oGe)]; Demosthenes, / Olynth. 20; Exord. 56.1), Kptva)
present himself. When the demos voted and thereby decided policy, they were choosing what seemed to them
the best advice out of the possibilities advocated by the several rhetores who addressed them that day. Amid
the urgent, competitive atmosphere in which rhetores operated, the Athenians maintained a clear
understanding that rhetores delivered advice: 'adviser' (symboulos) and 'advise' {symbouleueiri) were terms
used by Athenians to describe the rhetor and his activity" {TamingDemocracy: Models ofPolitical Rhetoric
in Classical Athens [Rhetoric & Society; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996], 12).
Seventeen ofDemosthenes 61 existing speeches are deliberative speeches (assembly speeches). For
a general introduction to Demosthenes deliberative speeches, see R. D. Milns, "The Public Speeches of
Demosthenes," in Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator (ed. Ian Worthington; New York: Routledge, 2000),
205-23. This article deals with three major issues: (1) the dating and sequence of the genuine speeches (2) the
publication and circulation of the speeches; (3) the style and artistry of the speeches.
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("to judge"; Aristotle, Eth. nic. 3.3.19; Pol. 3.1.4; cf. Isocrates, Areop. 19), and pouA.o|iaL
("to prefer")."*^
Paul's favorite word for his deliberative appeal is TTapaKailew. The verb appears twice
in Philemon (Phlm 9, 10). Paul uses it in contrast to eTTLxdoao) ("to command;" Phlm 8).
He refuses to command Philemon; instead, he intends to persuade him on the basis of
love."*^ The verb irapaKaA-eo) appears also in First Corinthians, in the propositio, where
Paul urges the brothers and sisters in the name of Lord Jesus Christ to be united (1 Cor
1:10). Similarly, the word appears in the propositio ofEphesians, where Paul appeals to
the Ephesians to maintain the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace (Eph 4:1-6). The verb
is used also in Philippians (Phil A:2).^'' Moreover, in the same letter Paul speaks of the
process of deliberation (6oKL[j,dCco; Phil 1:10) and of choice (alpeo); Phil 1:22). Both these
concepts will be discussed later in this thesis (4.4.2 and 4.5.2).
3.2.3 The Appeal to Advantage
The end (xeloc) of the deliberative speaker is the expedience (to ox)\i^kpov)^^ or harm
(to pXapepoy): "He who exhorts recommends a course of action as better and he who
Citizens have the power to determine their own fUture: "each one ofyou yourselves is a general"
(Demosthenes, Pr. 50.3). Similarly, Aeschines claims that "by law and by his vote the private citizen rules
like a king in a democratically govemed polis" (Aeschines, Ctes. 233; cf Demosthenes, 4 Philip. 40^1).
Frank Forrester Chruch asserts that Philemon is deliberative. Frank Forrester Church, "Rhetorical
Structure and Design in Paul's Letter to Philemon," HTR 71 (1978): 17-33. Church divides the letter into
three sections: the exordium (Phlm 4-7); theprobatio (Phlm 8-16); and theperoratio (Phlm 17-22). See also
Ronald Hock, "A Support for His Old Age: Paul's Plea on BehalfofOnesimus," in The Social World ofthe
First Christians: Essays in Honor ofWayne A. Meeks (ed. L. Michael White and O. Larry Yarbrough;
Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 67-81; Clarice Martin, "The Rhetorical Function ofCommercial Language in
Paul's Letter to Philemon (Verse 18)," in Persuasive Artistry: Studies in New Testament Rhetoric in Honor of
George A. Kennedy (ed. Duane F. Watson; Sheffield: JSOT, 1991), 321-37.
Rhetorically, the term appears not in the propositio (Phil 1 :27-30), but in the repetitio (Phil 3:17-
4:3). However, these two sections closely are related to one another. Thepropositio provides the thesis
statement supported by later arguments; the repetitio ends and summarizes those arguments, hiteracting with
the same material, the repetitio basically restates the propositio.
The words "expedient" and "advantageous" will be used as synonyms in this thesis.
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dissuades advises against it as worse" (Aristotle, Rhet. 1.3.5). But what exactly are the
things expedient that would appeal to a person so that they might willingly choose the
course of action advised by the orator? The answer to this question would lead, as Aristotle
does in his book on rhetoric, to the exploration of human psychology. All human beings,
according to Aristotle, aim at happiness and its component parts. Anything contributing to
these aims could be described as expedient.
Happiness as well-being combined with virtue, or independence of life (auxapKCLa
Cwf)!;), or the life that is most agreeable (riSLoxog) combined with security {do^aXdac^),
or abundance of possessions and slaves, combined with power to protect and make
use of them; for nearly all men admit that one or more of these things constitutes
happiness. If, then, such is the nature of happiness, its componentparts must
necessarily be: noble birth, numerous friends, good friends, wealth, good children,
numerous children, a good old age; fiirther, bodily excellences, such as health, beauty,
strength, stature, fitness for athletic contests, a good reputation, honor, good luck,
virtue. (Aristotle, Rhet. 1.5.3-4 [Freese, LCL])
Aristotle includes in his list both intemal and extemal goods. Goods are "whatever is
desirable for its ovm sake, or for the sake ofwhich we choose something else" (Aristotle,
Rhet. 1.5.18).'*^ Whatever would help procure these goods, happiness and its component
parts, would be regarded as expedient. These aims (goods) are given as statements of fact.
Human beings do not deliberate about these ends. Human beings deliberate only about the
means to the ends. The orator's task, while he exhorts his audience, is to show that his
advice is expedient, that is, it correlates to and contributes to the acquisition of goods.^�
'' Irwin argues that in Rhetoric, Aristotle is not expressing his own view ofhappiness, but the
"common views ofhappiness" for the purpose of teaching rhetoric. Nevertheless, his own view ofhappiness
is not far from the common view. See T. H. Irwin, "The Ethics in the Rhetoric and in the Ethics," 155-158.
^� Similar lists of goods can be found in other rhetorical handbooks. The author ofRhetoric to
Alexander argues that "one delivering an exhortation must prove that the courses to which he exhorts are just,
lawfiil, expedient, honorable, pleasant, and easily practicable" (Aristotle, [Rhet. Alex.] 1421b20). The author
then in the same text gives detail definition for each concept (Aristotle, [Rhet. Alex.] 1421b35-1422a22). Cf
Cicero, /�v. 2.4.12; 2.51.155-58.176; Quintilian, /m/. 3.8.1-6.
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For the reasons Hsted above, orators appeal to "advantage" in their deliberative
speeches to induce their audience to accept their advice. Demosthenes, for example,
knows well that the audience is gathered to seek for "advantage" (to oupcj)�pov)
(Demosthenes, / Olynth. 1). Therefore, orators must show their respective audiences that
their advice is advantageous: "if anyone has something practical or expedient to say now is
the time to declare it" (Demosthenes, Exord. 11.1). The word "expedient" is found
throughout his Exordia (Demosthenes, Exord. 3; 6.2; 8; 9.2; 13; 18; 19; 20.1, 3; 22.1; 23.1,
2; 25.2, 3; 28.1, 2; 31.2; 32.3; 32.4; 33.3; 34.3; 36.2; 40.1, 3; 44.2; 45.1; 47.1; 50.1; 52;
53.1; 56.1, 3; De pace 12; 3 Philip. 4). Sometimes he makes it clear that his speech is for
the advantage of the city (oup(t)epeLv xfj -rTolei; Demosthenes, Exord. 5.1; 7.2; 50.3; 51.1).
Isocrates in his deliberative speeches repeatedly appeals to the advantage of his
recipients (Isocrates, Paweg. 182; Phil. 8, 17; Archid.4; Areop. 84; De pace 5, 10, 11, 16, 62,
66; cf. Panath. 2, 12, 14 [more honorable and more important or more advantageous to us
all]).
Dio Chrysostom, in all of his speeches on concord, without exception, appeals to the
"advantage" of his audience. For example, in his speech To the Nicomedians, he says: "I
have both the desire and the ability to give advice on the interest of the commonwealth
(uepl To5v KOLvf) oupcjjepovTcov)" (Dio Chrysostom, Meow. 1; cf. 2 Tars. 6, 7, 16, 19, 22,
28, 35, 40; Nicom. 9, 49; Nicaeen. 5; Cone. Apam. 16, 19, 25, 27). Aristides also appeals
to the advantage in his deliberative speeches. For example, in his speech On Concord, he
intends to foster a common friendship between two parties so they may have thoughts
"expedient to all of you in common" (KOLvfi TraoLv \)v\iiv ou|i(j)6p6L; Aristides, Peri, homon.
8;cf 32, 46, 65; Rhod 5, 14).
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However, not all authors choose to use the phrase to ov\i^epov for their appeal to
advantage. Other words can be used as well, such as: w^kXi[ioc,?^ xpr|OLiJ,ov,^^ and
XvoixeXr\c,?^ At times, the authors adopted a different but related concept; namely, the
concept of "the best."^"* This concept can be expressed through many different words:^^
(l)Ta KpctTLOxa: Thucydides, //w?. 1.36.1; 1.85.2; Demosthenes, �'xorJ. 29.3;
Aeschines, Ep. 1 1.6; Polybius, Hist. 18.7.6 [friends who would give you the best
advice (touc; toc KpocTLOTd ool ov\x^o\)XivoovxaQ)]; Dionysius Halicamassus, Hist.
3.4.2; 3.7.3; 3.22.2 [deliberate for what was best and most advantageous (toc
KpccTLOTtt Kal oup(f)opci)TaTa) for both cities]; cf. Isocrates, ^JMc. 33.2
(2) TOC peA-Tiota: Thucydides, /f/^r. 3.43.1; Isocrates, .4reop. 51; Panath. 143; Ep. 4.6;
Demosthenes, 2 Philip. 5; Chers. I; Rhod. lib. I; Exord 5.3; 6.2; 8.1, 2, 3; 9.1; 20.8;
34.7; Ep.l.A.S; Dio Chrysostom, 2 Tars. 29.
(3)xa apLOta: Thucydides, //wr. 1.43.4; 2.22.1; 4.74.3; Isocrates, ^J. Nic. 2 [advise
not the most pleasant things, but the which is best (toc dpLOTa) ]; Dio Chrysostom, 2
Tars. 26; Nest. 3. Aristides, Depace 38 [faction permits neither the speaking nor the
doing ofwhat is best].
(4) xa 6La(j)6povTa: Thucydides, Hist. 1.70.1; 2.43.6; 6.92.5 [you are deliberating
about interests that are of the greatest importance (irepl [ieyiox(ov x(ov 6La4)ep6vTQy)];
^'
Isocrates, Archid. 5; Dio Chrysostom, Cone. Apam. 19, 22.
Thucydides, Hist. 3.44.4; 3.56.3; 6.34.9 [most useful, coupled with safest]; Isocrates, Ad. Nic. 42.3;
50.5; 53.4 [Isocrates presents himself as useful]; Ep. 2.17.1; Demosthenes, Symm. 1.1; Exord. 1.1 [xprp\.\i.oc,
ifi iroA-et]; 11.1 [used together with oun(t)epov]; Dio Chrysostom, Nicom. 2 [the orator himselfbecome useful
to the city]; 2 Tars. 5; Aristides, Depace 11.
" Dio Chrysostom, Nicom. 5, 8, 9, 48; 2 Tars. 45.
^'^ The close relationship between "choosing the best" and the deliberative rhetoric has been neglected
even by thesis that bears title such as Marie-Noel Keller, "Choosing What Is Best: Paul, Roman Society, and
Philippians" (Ph.D. Thesis, Lutheran School ofTheology at Chicago, 1995). Keller emphasizes in her thesis
that Paul uses language familiar to the Philippians: "citizenship language (Phil 1 :27-2: 1 8; 3 :20) with rhetoric
that reflects unity in a Roman colony (Phil 2:1-5; 4:2); military language (Phil 1:27-28; 4:1) which connotes
suffering and steadfastness; and ruler cuh language which declares the standard under which one stands (Phil
2:6-1 1 ; 3:20)" (ibid., 154). Unfortunately, she overlooked the importance of ethical and fiiendship language
in Philippians.
Many of these words are listed in LSJ as the superlative of kya^oc,: "apiotoe, PIXtlotoi;, KpatLOTog,
luLOTOQ (IcjoToc), Epice pelxaioc;, KapTLOToq, ^kpxaiQQ, (jjepLoxog." See also Kei Eun Chang, "Paul's Use of
Part-Whole Argument of to Sympheron in 1 Corinthians" (Ph.D. Thesis, Boston University, 2009). The
concept of "the best" carries heavy moral coimotation. Socrates in face ofhis trial says: "Whenever a man
takes a position he thinks is best {x\yx\aa.\i^voQ ^Xxiazov) or is put there by his commander, there he must
remain not taking into account death or any other thing more than shame" (Plato, Apol 28d). Deserting what
one considers to be "the best," even under the threat of death, is a shameful disgrace.
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Isocrates, Hel. enc. 12 [to speak on subjects recognized as good, or noble, or of
superior moral worth (tqv bm^^povxbiv efr dpgifi)]; Soph. 6; Dionysius of
Halicamassus, yln?. rom. 11.15.1; cf Plato, Leg. 964a.
At times orators would appeal to goods other than expediency. Aristotle, for example,
mentions the goods of just, lawfiil, honorable, pleasant, and easily practicable (Aristotle,
[Rhet. Alex.] 1421b20-1422a20). Quintilian groups goods in two categories: Honor
(including rightness, justice, piety, equity, and clemency) and expediency (including ease,
importance, pleasantness, and safety) (Quintilian, Inst. 3.8.26-27). Demosthenes often
appeals both to justice and expedience (Demosthenes, Exord. 1 8, 20, 22, 40; cf De pace
10). Dio Chrysostom also in one of his speeches appeals to goodness, justice, and
expedience (Dio Chrysostom, [Cor.] 23).
Whether justice and expedience coincide was hotly debatable in the Greco-Roman
world. Thucydides and figures such as Thrasymachus (in Plato's Republic) and Callicles
(in Plato's Gorgias) apparently think that these two attributes are not the same. Aristotle,
on the contrary, claims that "the expedient is good" (xo ou[i(j)epoy dyocQov; Aristotle, Rhet.
1.6.1). Epictetus makes a similar claim: "the good is advantageous" (to dyaBov ou|i(j)epoy
eoil; Epictetus, Diatr. 1.22.1). Cicero wrote a whole book�On Duties�^to defend the
thesis that expedience and justice are one and the same.
Paul in 1 Corinthians repeatedly appeals to the advantage of the Corinthians. Words
such as "advantage," "gain," and "reward" is found throughout the letter (1 Cor 3:8, 14;
6:12; 7:35; 9:17-22; 10:23; 10:33; 12:7; 13:3; 14:6; 15:32).^^ In PhUemon he appeals to
Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric ofReconciliation, 33-39. Mitchell argues that Paul redefines the
meaning of oi)|i4)ep�LV within the course ofhis progressive argument (ibid., 35).
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the "good" (Phlm 6, 14), the "useful" (guxpriotov; Phlm 1 1)," and the "benefit" (Philm
20).^^ In Galatians, Paul appeals above all to "benefit": "if you let yourselves be
circumcised Christ will be of no benefit to you" (Gal 5:2). And not only will there be no
benefit (ou6ev (jd(\)eXr\oei), the Galatians will instead become debtors (64)�LA,eTrig) to the
entire law (Gal 5:3). The author of 1 Clement claims that his advice is "good and
exceedingly usefiil" (KaA,r| Kal mepdyav 6^kXi\ioQ; 1 Clem. 56:2). Toward the end ofhis
letter, he summarizes the purpose of his writing: "we have written enough to you, brothers,
about the things pertaining to our religious observance which are most profitable (tcSv
(0(l)�A.L|iG)tdTa)y) for a virtuous life (kvdpexov piov)" (7 Clem. 62:1).
In Philippians, Paul not only appeals to "the besf (Phil 1:10a), but also to justice
(Phil 1:11; 3:9). Moreover, he appeals to the distinct Christian goal of holiness (Phil 1:10b).
Besides, the appeal to salvation is found frequent in the letter (Phil 1:28; 2:12; 3:20; cf
3:2). And more than once Paul reflects on the question ofwhat truly counts as "gain" (Phil
1:21; 3:7, 8). These appeals characterize Philippians as a work of deliberative rhetoric.
3.2.4 The Use ofExamples
According to Aristotle, all branches of rhetoric need proof Two different kinds of
proof exist, namely example (-rrapdSeLYpa) and enthymeme (kvQ\)\ir\\ia) (Aristotle, Rhet.
1.2.8). Example resembles induction; enthymeme resembles deduction (Aristotle, Rhet.
1.2.8; 1.2.13; 2.20.1). Examples are of two kinds: things that have happened before and
things that are invented (Aristotle, Rhet. 2.20.2; cf 1.2.13). Aristotle cautions that "while
" It is perhaps a play on Onesimus' name; or perhaps a play on the title Christ. See David E. Garland,
Colossians and Philemon (The NIV Application Commentary; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1998), 329-
30.
Paul is pushing language to its limit: "yes! Brother! I, of you, benefit, in the Lord" (val d6el(t)6, eyu
OOVJ 6vaL\jir]v kv KupLco). The word benefit is no doubt a play on Onesimus' name. Paul identifies Onesimus as
Philemon's benefit in the Lord.
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the lessons conveyed by fables are easier to provide, those derived from facts are more
usefiil for deliberative oratory, because as a rule the future resembles the past" (Aristotle,
Rhet. 2.20.8). Aristotle also is aware that different proofs suits different rhetoric. He thinks
that examples suit the deliberative rhetoric best.^^ In Rhetoric to Alexander, examples are
defined as "actions that have occurred previously and are similar to, or the opposite of,
those which we are now discussing" (Aristotle, [Rhet. Alex.] 1429a21).^� Their function is
to enhance the credibility of one's thesis.
Following the convention of deliberative rhetoric, Paul in 1 Corinthians employs
numerous examples: Paul appeals to the ancestors (1 Cor 10:1-13), to soldiers, planters and
shepherds (1 Cor 9:7), to the body of Christ (1 Cor 12), to the personification of love (1
Cor 13), to the heavenly bodies (1 Cor 15), and also to himself (1 Cor 4:16, 11:1). In
Ephesians, Paul repeatedly makes use of Jesus (Eph 4:32; 5:2, 23, 25, 29) and God (Eph
4:24; 5:1) as exemplars for imitation. The imagery of the body is also used an exemplar for
concord (Eph 1:22; 4:4, 15-16; 5:29-30). In Galatians, various characters are used as
examples, including Paul himself (Gal 1:11-2:14), Abraham (Gal 3:6-9), the disciplinarian
(Gal 3:23-25), the guardians and trustees (Gal 4:1-5), Hagar and Sarah (Gal 4:21-31). In
Philemon, Paul repeatedly speaks of his imprisonment (Phlm 1, 9, 10, 13, 23), making
himself an example for Philemon to follow.
In Philippians, Paul also uses numerous examples. There is the example of Paul
himself (Phil 1:12-26; 3:1-16), Jesus and God (Phil 2:5-11), Paul and Timothy (Phil 2:19-
24), Paul and Epaphroditus (Phil 2:25-30). Also there is the negative example ofpeople
Enthymemes suit the forensic rhetoric best. AmpHfications suit the epideictic rhetoric best.
*� Scholars who focus on the rhetorical analysis on Philippians have not fully appreciated this fact.
This thesis will show that the examples in Philippians all have a direct bearing on the calling for unity
between the two women in Phil 4:2.
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who boast in the flesh (Phil 3:1-6) and people who are enemies of the cross (Phil 3:18-19).
The whole letter is composed of examples. This feature characterizes Philippians as a work
of deliberative rhetoric.
3.2.5 The Language ofUnity and Stasis
Concord is an important topic in the Greco-Roman rhetorical tradition.^' Many of the
Greco-Roman orators are known to have written or delivered speeches on concord.^^ For
them, it is an honor and duty to speak on behalfof the polis and to promote concord and
friendship among the citizens in order to sustain the safety and the happiness of the polis.
Aristides proudly claims, "concord toward one another and war against the barbarians are
noble and proper topics for discussion" (Aristides, De pace 2). In this statement, he echoes
his great predecessor, the great orator Isocrates (Isocrates, Paneg. 3-4).
The rhetorical handbooks also recognize the importance of rhetoric as a means to
provide safety for the city. Aristotle lists five important subjects for the deliberative
rhetoric: "ways and means, war and peace, the defense of the country, imports and exports,
legislation" (Aristotle, Rhet. 1.4.7). Under "legislation," Aristotle includes all issues
related to the safety (do^dX^ia) or the salvation (ocoTripia) of the city (Aristotle, Rhet.
1.4.12). Orators dealing with these issues must know how to answer questions such as:
"how many forms of government there are; what is expedient for each; and the natural
causes of its downfall." Aristotle deals with these questions in detail in Politics books four
and five. Stasis is one of the dominate themes in book five. As a result, in their efforts to
Abraham J. Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, 147.
Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric ofReconciliation, 60-62.
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preserve the polis, orators must know how to prevent stasis, or, in positive terms, how to
promote concord.
Likewise, Rhetoric to Alexander claims that "deliberations and speeches in council
and in parliament must necessarily deal with either religious ritual, or legislation, or the
form of the constitution, or alliances and treaties with other states, or war, or peace, or
finance" (Aristofie, [Rhet. Alex.] 1423a24-25). Legislafion has to do with promoting laws
that:
will be equal for the citizens, consistent with the other laws, and advantageous for the
polis (ou(i(l)6poyTa tfj tt6A.6l), best of all as promoting concord (6|i6voLav), or failing
that, as contributing to the noble qualities of the citizens (xy\v idv -rroA-Licoy
KoloKayaQ'mv) or to the public revenues or to the good repute of the common wealth
or the power of the state or something else of the kind. (Aristotle, [Rhet. Alex.]
1423bl6-23)
Concord and noble citizens are some of best things that one could offer to the polis.
Similarly, the two principal considerations in making a deliberative case are identified by
Rhetorica AdHerrenium as security (tutam) and honor (honestam) {Rhet. Her. 3.2.3).
In sum, the promotion of concord is widely acknowledged in both theory and practice
as a noble and important theme, ifnot the most noble and the most important theme, for
the deliberative speech. Concord is advantageous to the city. It saves the city and provides
safety to the city. In the following, this thesis will argue that Philippians is a deliberative
speech on concord. This assertion will be proved by showing that Philippians shares a
common language with other political discourses also seeking to avoid stasis and promote
concord.^'' The language of factionalism and reconciliation abounds in Philippians. This
This thesis assumes that 1 Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, and Philemon all seek to promote
concord within the Christian community. See Introduction.
Ignatius. William R. Schoedel rightly notes, "The theme ofunity may well represent the central
concem of the letters of Ignatius" {Ignatius ofAntioch: A Commentary on the Letters ofIgnatius ofAntioch
[Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985], 21).
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language consists of concepts and terms such as: (1) oneness and sameness; (2) (j)96voc;; (3)
Ipic,; (4) euSoKia; (5) epiGeia; (6) KevoboE,la; (7) yoyy\)o\x6Q and 6iaXoyio[i6c,.
3.2.5.1 Oneness and Sameness
Urging for unity, Paul wants the Philippians to live worthy of the gospel of Christ so
they may "stand firm in one spirit, striving together with one soul for the faith of the
gospel" (Phil 1 :27). The dative phrase "with one soul" is moved to a forward position in
juxtaposition to "one spirit," highlighting the importance ofunity in one. The importance
ofbeing in one is noted again in Phil 2:2 in the phrase "thinking the one thing" (to
^povowx^o), concatenated with three other phrases emphasizing unity: "think the same
Similarly, Clayton N. Jefford writes, "Even the most casual of readers will immediately notice that an
axial concem within the Apostolic Fathers is the drive for unity.... The desire for unity is certainly evident
throughout the larger corpus of the Apostolic Fathers, yet it is nowhere more overt than in the writings of
Ignatius" ("Ignatius and the Apostolic Fathers," in The Routledge Companion to Early Christian Thought [ed.
D. Jeffrey Bingham; New York: Routledge, 2010], 109).
Many scholars have argued for Ignatius' writings as deliberative discourse on concord, including
Allen Brent, A Political History ofEarly Christianity (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 195-208; Allen Brent,
Ignatius ofAntioch and the Second Sophistic: A Study ofan Early Christian Transformation ofPagan
Culture (Studien Und Texte Zu Antike Und Christentum; Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 23 1-3 1 1 ; John-
Paul Lotz, Ignatius and Concord: The Background and Use ofthe Language ofConcord in the Letters of
Ignatius ofAntioch (Patristic Studies; New York: Peter Lang, 2007); Harry O. Maier, "The Politics and
Rhetoric ofDiscord and Concord in Paul and Ignatius," in Trajectories through the New Testament and the
Apostolic Fathers (ed. Andrew F. Gregory and C. M. Tuckett; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 307-
24.
1 Clement. 1 Clement as a deliberative rhetoric on concord was first argued by Jaeger. Jaeger's claim
was followed by many: Odd Magne Bakke, "Concord and Peace ": A Rhetorical Analysis of the First Letter
ofClement with an Emphasis on the Language ofUnity and Sedition (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen
Zum Neuen Testament 2 Reihe; Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 2001); Barbara Ellen Bowe, A Church in Crisis:
Ecclesiology and Paraenesis in Clement ofRome (Hdr; Mirmeapolis: Fortress, 1988); Cilliers Breytenbach,
"Civic Concord and Cosmic Harmony: Sources ofMetaphoric Mapping in 1 Clement 20:3," in Grace,
Reconciliation, Concord: The Death ofChrist in Graeco-Roman Metaphors (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2010), 297-
311; David G. Horrell, The Social Ethos of the Corinthian Correspondence: Interests and Ideologyfrom 1
Corinthians to 1 Clement (Studies of the New Testament and Its World; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996),
238-80; W. C. van Unnik, "Studies on the So-Called First Epistle ofClement: The Literary Genre," in
Encounters with Hellenism: Studies on the First Letter ofClement (ed. Cilliers Breytenbach and L. L.
Welbom; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2004), 115-81.
Dio Chrysostom. C. P. Jones, The Roman WorldofDio Chrysostom (Loeb Classical Monographs;
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), 83-94; A. R. R. Sheppard, "Homonoia in the Greek
Cities of the Roman Em^ixt," Ancient Society 15-17 (1984-1986): 241-52.
Aristides. Lotz, Ignatius and Concord, 79-87 ["Aelius Aristides and the Discord of the Cities"].
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thing" (to auTO (^povf\xe), "having the same love" (tt^v a\)xr\v dYairriv exovTe;) and "of one
soul" (ou[i\|ji)xoL). Philippians 3:12-16 again emphasizes the importance of "one and the
same" when Paul claims that there is only "one thing" (ev; again emphatic), and whoever is
perfect should think of this "one thing" (referring back to Phil 2:2). Paul's final exhortation
in Phil 3:12-16 is for the Philippians to keep in step with "the same" (tco ahxQ oxoixdv)
stance of striving to know Christ.^"* "The same" appears for the last time in Phil 4:2, where
Paul exhorts Euodia and Syntyche to be of the same mind.
Unity cannot be achieved without community members sharing in common activities.
Communities are formed either through common pleasure, common projects, or common
character. Whichever that may be, communities cannot do without "one" and "the same."
For this reason, Paul repeatedly refers to "oneness" and "sameness" in Philippians. This
same strategy is found also in other Pauline letters.
When Paul appeals for concord, he often resorts to "oneness" as the shared
foundation for peace and unity. For example, in the propositio ofEphesians, he writes,
"there is one body and one Spirit, just as you were called to the one hope of your calling,
one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all" (Eph 4:6). The word "one" is
mentioned seven times in this one single sentence. The image of the "one body" in
particular plays an important role in Ephesians. "The mystery" is revealed as God tearing
down the dividing wall, allowing Gentiles to become part of Israel by uniting in Christ and
forming a new political body, namely, the body of Christ (Eph 1:23; 2:14-17; 3:6; 4:11-16).
In 1 Corinthians, the propositio is placed immediately after the thanksgiving,
declaring unity as the major theme of the letter. The phrase "the same" is repeated three
^* Bockmuehl, The Epistle to the Philippians, 228. Bockmuehl rightly notes that "by stressing this task
as a joint and common endeavor of 'keeping in step,' Paul hints at the theme ofunity."
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times in one verse: "Now I exliort you, brethren ...that you all speak the same (to ccuto
Uyr\zi TTavTeg) and that there be no divisions among you, but that you be made complete in
the same mind and in the same judgment (kv tco auTco vol kkl kv xr\ auTfj yv6\ir[)" (1 Cor
1:10). "The same" reappears again in chapter 12, where Paul in verse four lays the
foundation for church unity upon the Trinitarian formula: "the same Spirit," "the same
Lord," and "the same God" (1 Cor 12:4). Later in the same chapter, Paul demonstrates that
though the spiritual gifts differ, they are all derived from one and the same spirit, for the
common good {a\)[i^kpov):
To one is given through the Spirit the utterance ofwisdom,
To another the utterance of knowledge according to the same Spirit,
To another faith by the same Spirit,
To another gifts ofhealing by the one Spirit,
To another the working ofmiracles.
To another prophecy,
To another the discernment of spirits,
To another various kinds of tongues,
To another the interpretations of tongues,
All these are activated by one and the same Spirit. (1 Cor 12:8-1 1)
In the second half of chapter 12, Paul introduces to his argument the metaphor of the body.
The church members are like members of a body, each with a different function, in need of
one another to form a well-ftmctioning body. At the core ofPaul's metaphor is the
emphasis on the "oneness" of the body:
For just as the body is one (kv) and has many members, and all the members of the
body, though many are one body (kv o(^\ia), so it is with Christ. For in the one Spirit
(kvi TTveuiaaTi.) we were all baptized into one body (kv ocopa). . .and we were all made
to drink of one Spirit (kv weupa). (1 Cor 12:12-14)
Christ-followers as members of one single body must maintain unity and avoid dissention
(1 Cor 12:25a). They must leam to show "the same" (to auTo) care toward one another,
with no partiality (1 Cor 12:25b). With his emphasis on "one" and "the same," Paul intends
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to correct the misbehaviors of the Corinthian community, where members of the
community thinlc too highly of themselves and refuse to identify with persons of lower
status.
Their attitude is reflected in the way they conduct the Lord's Supper. Showing no
care for the lowly, or in Paul's words, humiliating those who have none, the members of
the well-to-do eat the Lord's Supper without waiting for those who had to arrive later in
time (1 Cor 1 1 : 17-34).^^ To rectify their behavior, Paul reminds them the meaning of the
Lord's Supper. To eat the bread and drink the cup is to enter into a fellowship and to
become one body with one another (1 Cor 10:16-18). Again Paul emphasizes the
importance of "oneness."
The same strategy is found also in the Greco-Roman authors. Plato, for example,
resorts to "oneness" when he urges for unity when he writes, "Do we know of any greater
evil for a state than the thing that distracts it and makes it many instead of one (\iiaQ), or a
greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one (ptav)"? (Plato, Resp.
462a). Demosthenes notes the importance to "keep the polis together, that all may be of
one mind ([iiay yvui\ir\v), and may not gratify the enemy" (Demosthenes, Fals. leg. 298).
For Dinarchus, having one mind requires agreement upon the interests of the state (tqv
KOLvfi ou|i(t)6p6yTwy) (Din 1.99). Dio Chrysostom's speech on concord contains a passage
that looks very much like a compendium of different ways of expressing unity:
Even as I myself rejoice at the present moment to find you wearing one costume (ev
oxfp.ci), speaking one language (filav ^(jdvr]v), and desiring the same things (tauxd
PouA-oueyou;). Indeed what spectacle is more enchanting than a city with a singleness
of thought (6|iO(|)poyot)or|(;), and what sound is more awe-inspiring than its
harmonious voice. What city is wiser in council than that which takes council
Gerd Theissen, The Social Setting ofPauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth (Philadelphia: Fortress,
1982), 145-74.
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together (ific a^ia pouAeuo^xevrig)? What city acts more smoothly than that which acts
together (tfig d\ia ^paxTouorit;)? What city is less liable to failure than that which
favors the same policies (xf\c, lauxd pouXeuoiaevrig)? To whom are blessings sweeter
than to those who are of one heart and mind (tqv oiiovoouvtcov)? To whom are
afflictions lighter than to those who bear them together (kolvti), like a heavy load? To
whom do difficulties occur more rarely than to those who defend each other
(dXXr\XoviQ)7 What city is dearer to its people, more honored by the stranger, more
useful to its friends, more formidable to its foes? (Dio Chrysostom, Nicaeen. 3-4)
Chrysostom uses constructs such as "one" (do), "the same" (6 ahxoQ), "likeness" (6|io-),
"together" (apa), "common" (adv. KOLvrl), and "one another" (aXXr]Xix)v) to express the
unity of the political community. At the end ofhis speech, he prays to the Greek gods�
Aphrodite (fosterer of friendship), Harmony, and Nemesis. He prays that the gods will
implant in the city "a passionate love (epcj-ra), a singleness of purpose (\iiav yv6\ir\v), the
same wish and thought (xauxa pouXeoBai Kal (\>povdv); and. . . that they may cast out strife
(oxaoty) and contentiousness (epiba) and jealousy ((j)LA,oyLKLav)" (Dio Chrysostom,
Nicaeen. 8). Once again, this speech emphasizes "one" and "the same."
Later Christian writers, imitating Paul, frequently resort to the language of oneness in
their appeal for concord. Ignatius, for example, in his letter to the Magnesians echoes
Paul's oneness language:
[Gjathering together (eul x6 auxo), let there be one prayer (\xia irpooeuxr)), one
petition (\iia Serioig), one mind (dc, vovq), one hope (iiia eXirlg), with love and
blameless joy, which is Jesus Christ. . .Let all of you run together as to one temple of
God (eva vabv ouvxp^xexe GeoO), as to one altar (eirl ev GuoiaoxripLov), to one Jesus
Christ (�ttI eva 'Irjoouv Xpioxov), who came forth from one Father (kvoQ iraxpoc;) and
remained with the One and returned to the One (dq kva bvxa Kal x^piioavxa). (Ign.
Magn. 7.1-2)
This passage contains a total ofnine "ones" and one "the same." The same emphasis is
found in his letter to the Philadelphians:
Take care, therefore, to participate in one Eucharist (pta guxapLoxta), for there is one
flesh (pia aapQ of our Lord Jesus Christ, and one cup (ev -rroxripLov) that leads to
unity (kv(x)oiv) through his blood; there is one altar (kv Guo laoxripLov), just as there is
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one bishop (dc, e-rrLOKOTTOc;), together (d[ia) with the council of presbyters and the
deacons, my fellow servants (ouv6ouA.ol(;), in order that whatever you do, you do in
accordance with God. (Ign. Philad. 4)
These appeals to "one" and "the same" found in the canonical writings, the Greco-Roman
writings, and the early Christian vmtings show their application as strategic for the unity of
the political community. Often in political speeches, these appeals are found clustering at
the propositio (or near the propositio) or near the end of the discourse. Paul's letter to the
Philippians follows the same convention. The appeal for "one" and "the same" is found
above all in Phil 1 :27 (the propositio) and in Phil 2:2 (right after the propositio), and
toward the end of the discourse in Phil 3:13, 15; 4:2.
3.2.5.2 0d6u(K (Phil 1:15)
Ancient authors often blame envy as the cause ofpolitical strife and stasis?^
Thucydides, for example, blames envy for the stasis in Corcyra, for without envy
"revenge would not have been set above religion, and gain above justice" (Thucydides,
Hist. 3.84.1).^^
Isocrates, in his letter to Philip, warns him not to take the Hellenic cities by force,
for such action would gain him not goodwill (dvom), but envy, hostility, and opprobrium
(Isocrates, Ep. 2.21). Apparently, envy is undesirable and best avoided. Envy is evil, for it
will "wage war (TroA,�pouoL) not on depravity, but on prosperity," and will "hate (pioouoLv)
not only the best men but the noblest pursuits," and will "destroy (dTroA.A.uouoLv) those
whom they have cause to envy" (Isocrates, Antid. 142). Envy is destructive and can easily
bring communities to ruin. Knowing the destructive force of envy, Isocrates ftill heartily
Bakke, Concord and Peace, 93-96.
Chapter 3 section 84 has been rejected by most scholars as inauthentic, but still it provides evidence
that in antiquity envy closely relates to stasis.
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praises Agamemnon, for he was able to hold an army full ofpride and passion and envy
and ambition together for ten years (Isocrates, Panath. 82). For the same reasons, Isocrates
praises the old Athenian constitution with great enthusiasm, for it was cable ofproducing
citizens without envy:
Not only...of the same mind ((oiiovoow) regarding public affairs (tdiv kolvojv), but in
their private life as well they showed that degree of consideration for each other
which is due from men who are right-minded (eu (j)povouvTac;) and partners in a
common fatherland (TraTptSot; KOLvcovoOviac;). The less well-to-do among the citizens
were so far from envying {^Bovdv) those of greater means.... Those who possessed
wealth, on the other hand, did not look down upon (uTrepeoSpcov) those in humbler
circumstances. (Isocrates, ^reop. 31-32 [LCL, Norlin])
Poor persons show no envy toward the rich; and rich persons show no despise toward the
poor. For Isocrates, such community without envy and dispise is the ideal community that
is right-minded and unanimously concemed with the common good. Both Plato and
Aristotle echo Isocrates' account of the good politeia.
Plato claims that the community with no communion with either poverty or wealth is
the best, for such communities will have "no place for the growth of insolence and
injustice (oijie uPpig oijx' dSiKLa), ofjealousies and envies (CriXoi le Kal (t)96voL)" (Plato,
Leg. 679b). This comment is made in discussion ofpoliteia, stasis, and war (Plato, Leg.
678a-679d).
Aristotle names the best constitution (dpLOiri i^oXvxda) as the one administered by
the middle class, since the middle class is least inclined either to shun office or covet office,
both ofwhich are injurious to the polis. A polis without the middle class leaves citizens
either very rich or very poor:
The result is a state consisting of slaves and masters, not of free men, and of one
class envious ((t)9oyowT(ov) and another contemptuous (KaTacjipoyouvxcov) of their
fellows. This condition of affairs is very far removed from friendliness {^\.kmQ), and
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from political partnership (KOLVcoviag TroA,LtLKf|(;)�for friendliness is an element of
partnership. (Aristotle, Pol. 4.9.6 [LCL, Rackham])
Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle, all seek to avoid the radical division between the rich and
the poor, in order to prevent the uprising of the vices of envy and contempt among the
citizens, vices that would destroy the harmony and the friendship crucial for the safety of
the political community. Aristotle elaborates on envy and contempt as causes ofpolitical
turmoil in Book 5 ofPolitics (Aristotle, Pol. 5.2.6; 5.3.7).
In his Rhetoric, Aristotle defines envy as the "disturbing pain and directed against
good fortune, but not that of one who does not deserve it, but of one who is our equal and
like (tou loou Kal opoiou)" (Aristotle, Rhet. 2.8.3; cf 2.\0.l;Nic. Eth. 2.7.15). He claims
that persons who desire glory and honor are especially prone to envy (Aristotle, Rhet.
2.10.4).
Demosthenes binds envy together with faithless and ungratefiilness as the three
worst reproaches against Athens (Demosthenes, Lept. 10).^^ He sees envy as the worst, by
far:
Every reproach, I might almost say, should be avoided, but this above all, men of
Athens. Why? Because in every way envy is the mark of a vicious nature, and the
man who is subject to it has no claim whatever to consideration. Moreover there is no
reproach more alien to our city than the appearance of envy, averse as she [our city]
is from all that is disgraceful. (Demosthenes, Lept. 140; cf Ep. 3.28)
Envy is politically dangerous, for it stands against justice and advantage (Demosthenes, /
Aristog. 75.7), and is closely associated with stasis (Demosthenes, / Aristog. 52).
Therefore, envy must be excluded by all means from the polis.
Dio Chrysostom notes that concord can be achieved only by "getting rid of the vices
of envy, greed, and contentiousness, the sfriving in each case to promote one's ovm (kuxov)
Both faith and grace are important concepts related to friendship.
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welfare at the expense of both one's native land and the commonweal (ttiv -iraTpiSa Kal to
KOLvfi o\)\x^epov)" (Chrysostom, 2 Tars. \9)?^ Only then can the polis achieve a strong
unity (oup-TTvea); common-breath; cf Phil 1:27) and be united in common (lauxd
irpoeXeoGaL; LCL: "to unite upon common policy"). If these vices prevail, the polis will be
in a constant state of instability (kvioi^aXelQ).
In another speech, Chrysostom urges the citizens ofNicomedians to eliminate "envy
and rivalry and stasis which is their outcome" (Chrysostom, Nicom. 43), and introduce
instead "sharing in things which are good, unity ofmind, rejoicing of both peoples in the
same things (KOLVCoviav dyaQCSv, opocjjpoouvriv, eirl tolc; autoXc; dpcjjOTepcoy xapdy)^�"
(ibid.; ct AdNicaeen. S;Invid. 39).
Envy often is named as the cause for stasis in the writings of Josephus (J. W. 1.67;
4.566).^' Josephus once expressed his fear when he wrote, "civil war (iroleiiou �[i(j)i)A,Lou)
should be raised by the envy {^Qovov) of a few men, and bring the city to ruin" {J. W.
2.620). In response to this danger, he urged his party to seek safety {aa^aX^m). In Mark
15:10, Pilate sees envy at work in the strife between Jesus and the chief priests.^^ In Paul's
view, envy was the cause to the turmoil in Galatia (Gal 3:1; 5:21, 26).^^ The author of
The vice of envy is mentioned earlier in the speech in 2 Tars. 10, 13. Envy, says Chrysostom,
should be overcome by justice and the greatness of the city.
� Each of these elements finds its correlation in Philippians. The sharing of goods in related to the
fellowship of the gospel; the unity ofmind is related to the plea "to think the same;" rejoicing is related to the
repeated claim to "joy."
Louis H. Feldman, Studies in Josephus
' Rewritten Bible (JSJSup; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1998), 209-13
[The Disastrous Effects ofEnvy].
A. C. Hagedom and J. H. Neyrey, "Tt Was out ofEnvy That They Handed Jesus over' (Mark 15.10):
The Anatomy ofEnvy and the Gospel ofMark," JSNT 69 (1998): 15-56.
" John H. Elliott, "Paul, Galatians, and the Evil Eye," in The Social World of the New Testament:
Insights and Models (ed. Jerome H. Neyrey and Eric Clark Stewart; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson Publishers,
2008), 221-34.
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First Clement repeatedly pairs envy with jealousy as the vices that give rise to the discord
in the church of Corinth (7 Clem. 3:2; 4:7, 13; 5:2).
In sum, envy is a vice that stands in contrast to goodwill and friendship (see the
discussion on euSoKia below). Moreover, since friendship is the basis ofpolitical concord,
envy is thus a disruptive force that demolishes the harmony of the polis and brings it to the
state ofstasis?^
3.2.S.S^Epic (Phil 1:15)
The word kpic,?^ according to Margaret Mitchell, "is common in Greek literature to
refer to political strife and its causes."^^ She claims this statement to be a well-documented
fact "recognized by the exegetical tradition and needs no further proof Indeed, the
evidences abound.
In Homer, epig is personified as a goddess and as the sister ofmurderous Ares. The
Trojan War is the result of her hurling dovm "bitterness equally between both sides as she
walked through the onslaught making men's pain heavier" (Homer, II. 4.445). Hesiod
personifies IpiQ as a blameworthy goddess, for she is the one "who builds up evil war and
slaughter" (Hesiod, Op. 1 1). In Theogony, Eris belongs to the family ofNight:
Deadly Night bore Nemesis (Nepeoiv) to affiict mortal men, and after her. Deceit
( ATTdtriv) and Friendship (OiloxriTa) and hatefiil Age and hard-hearted Strife ('Epig).
But abhorred Strife bore painfiil Toil and Forgetfiilness and Famine and tearful
Sorrows, Fightings, also Battles (Mdxac), Murders (Oovouc;), Manslaughters
( AvSpoKxaoiac;), Quarrels (NeiKgd), Lying Words, Disputes (Aoyoug
' k\i<\>ilXoy'm(^),
Lawlessness and Ruin, all of one nature, and Oath who most troubles men upon earth
when anyone willftiUy swears a false oath. (Hesiod, Theog. 223-230)
Bakke, Concord and Peace, 95.
Bakke, Concord and Peace, 91-3.
Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric ofReconciliation, 8 1 .
Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric ofReconciliation, 8 1 .
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This mythological statement offers a roundabout way of saying that these words belong in
the same semantic domain. In other words, all these words are related to the complex
social phenomena of concord and discord. "Epic; is responsible for the many evils of the
social life.
"Epic;, in Solon's "Eunomia," is the climax of a series of social evils: injustice,
roughness, insolence, violence, ruin, crooked judgments, haughty deeds, and sedition
(Solon, Frg. 4.32-38). As such, the term refers to the conflict between the noble and the
demos. Thucydides uses epic; to describe fierce debates between citizens grouped in
factions. This term appears at crucial turning points, for example, when Sparta invades
Athens for the first time (Thucydides, Hist. 2.21.3),^^ and when Athens invades Syracus
(Thucydides, //w?. 6.35.1).
Dionysius of Halicamassus uses epic, to describe the conflict between Romulus and
Remus when he writes, "Thereupon greater strife C^pi-c) arose between them than before, as
each, while secretly striving for the advantage (to -uXkov ex^Lv), was ostensibly willing to
accept equality" (Dionysius ofHalicamassus, Hist. 1.87.1). This strife leads later to quarrel
((jjiXoueiKLag), war (pdxri), and the slaying ofmany people ((^ovoq ttoA,u<;) (ibid.). In another
place, Dionysius calls 'epig the most baneful of all human maladies. Here he is referring to
the conflict between the senates. The cure for this conflict is to have one mind
(oiioyvcopoyetv) in concem with the public safety (irepl kolvtiq ocoxripLaf;) (Dionysius of
Halicamassus, Hist. 6.66).
Appian describes Sulla's first march on Rome:
The city is brought to the brim of stasis: "They gathered in knots (^uataoeL;) and engaged in strife
some urging that they should go out, others opposing this course."
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Thus the seditions (otdoe lc;) proceeded from strife and contention (kpiboQ Kal
(l)LA,ovLKLa(;) to murder (^ovovq), and from murder to open war {�uoXk\iovc), and now
the first army of her own citizens had invaded Rome as a hostile country. (Appian,
Bell. civ. 1.7.60)
Here IpiQ is here grouped with contention, murder, and war, the exact same concepts
found in the works of Hesiod and Dionysius to describe the phenomenon ofpolitical
confiict. This grouping of terms shows the existence of a system of discourse related to
political conflict that has remained constant throughout history from Hesiod down to the
Roman Empire. This same system of discourse also is at work in the orations ofDio
Chrysostom and Aristides. Both orators see a close relationship between IpiQ and stasis
(Dio Chrysostom, Dei cogn. 72; Avar. 10; 2 Tars. 44; Borysth. 22; Nicaeen. 8; Apam. 9; In
cont. 6; Hom. 2; Invid. 39; Aristides, De pace 1 1-12, 73).
In I Clem. 3:2 the word IpiQ is bound closely to stasis. The author writes, "Hence
flowed emulation and envy, sfrife and sedition, persecution and disorder, war and captivity"
(4k toutou Cf\XoQ Kal (^Qovoq Kal Ipic, Kal omoiQ SloyM-oc Kal dKaxaoTaoLa �n6Xe\xoQ Kal
aLxiiaXwoia).^^ These terms are arranged in a specific order and show how stasis develops
over time. The sequence begins with the individual and with his or her discontents. Then
the sequence leads to dispute and enmity toward one another. Finally, the sequence ends
with war and the captivity that ensues. The same idea also is found in / Clem. 6:4: "Envy
and strife {Cr\XoQ Kal epiq) have overthrown great cities and rooted up mighty nations."
Envy leads to sfrife, and strife leads to the downfall of the city. For the author of 1 Clement,
the destination toward which strife and envy leads is none other than death (7 Clem. 3:4;
The close relationship between Ipic, and discord in 1 Clement is noted by Bakke. In 1 Clement, Ipiq
is often used in conjunction "with oxaoLi; in 3:2, 14:2, 54:2; with Cf\koc, in [3:2], 5:5, 6:4, and 9:1; and with
6i.^ooTaoLa, oxiop,a, and mXi\xoQ in 46:5." Bakke, Concord and Peace, 85.
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3.2.5.4 EdSoKia (Phil 1:15)
The word euSoKia rarely occurs in classical literature, nor is it found in the works of
Philo, Josephus, and the Apostolic Fathers.^*^ Paul uses this word to refer to both the
goodwill ofGod (Eph 1:5, 9) and the goodwill of human beings (Rom 10:1; Phil 1:15; 2:13;
2Thess 1:11^').
Philippians 1:15 (cf 2:13) places euSoKia in contrast to envy and strife. This suggests
ei)6oKL(x as a variant for the Greek word eijvouQ/eijyoLa, since Greek literature often uses
eijyoLa in contrast with envy. For example, Plato notes that criticism against the law should
be accepted not peevishly (tq (t)66vco) but in a friendly spirit (euvoia). Isocrates advises
Philip that he should capture the goodwill of cities rather than their walls, "for
achievements like the latter not only engender envy {^Qovov), but men attribute the credit
form them your armies; yet ifyou are able to win friendship and goodwill (euvoiag), all
will praise the wisdom shown by you" (Isocrates, Ep. 2.21). Dionysius of Halicamassus
reports an incident in early Roman history, where neighboring cities invited (or lured)
Romans to live with them, "some from the best ofmotives, because of good will (euvoiav)
and compassion for their [Romans'] misfortune, but the greater part through envy (^Bovov)
of their former prosperity" (Dionysius ofHalicamassus, Ant. rom. 7.18.3). Plutarch writes,
"we consider goodwill (eijvoLav) to be contrary to both [envy and hatred], as it is the wish
for one's neighbour's prosperity; and hatred and envy to be the same, since their aim is the
contrary to that of friendship" (Plutarch, Inv. od. 536f; cf Adul amic. 54c [among tme
friends there is neither emulation nor envy]); Philo wams against envy for it brings ill-will
The same is true for the verb 6i)6oKeco, which appears 57 times in the OT and 21 times in the NT, but
never in the works of Philo and Josephus and only once in the Apostolic Fathers (7 Clem. 18:16).
Abraham J. Malherbe, The Letters to the Thessalonians: A New Translation with Introduction and
Commentary (AB; New York: Doubleday, 2000), 410.
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(6uovoLa) and hatred (|iL06w) in contrast to goodwill and love (oTeyco) (Philo, los. 1.5).
Josephus thinks that Abimelech's goodwill toward Isaac was hindered by envy (Josephus,
A.J. 1.259). Envy, according to Josephus, destroys goodwill. Josephus, commenting on
Antigonus' death, writes, "nothing is stronger than envy (4)66you) and calumny, and that
nothing does more certainly divide the goodwill (eijyoLav) and natural affections ofmen
than those passions" (Josephus, Ant. 13.3 10; cf J. W. 1 .77).
Moreover, Greco-Roman literature often uses eijvoia in a manner similar to Paul's
use of ei)6oKia, placing it in conjunction with God ("God's goodwill;" Euripides, Suppl.
157; Isocrates, Archid. 59; Demosthnes, 2 Olynth. 1, 22; Dionysius ofHalicamassus,
rom. 2.18.1; 3.28.9; 5.10.4; 6.17.4; Josephus, Ant. 1.269; 2.169; 4.106, 190; 5.95; Dio
Chrysostom, Cone. Apm. 12).
As a result, Paul likely uses euSoKia as a synonym for ewoia. The significance of this
word usage to the text ofPhilippians requires fiarther exploration. In the Greco-Roman
literature, the concept ofewoia is closely related to the concept of fiiendship.^^ For
example, Aristotle thinks that ewoia is the core element that constitutes friendship. He
defines friendship in terms ofeijvoLa:
To be fiiends therefore, men must (1) feel goodwill (euvoetv) for each other, that is,
wish each other's good, and (2) be aware of each other's goodwill, and (3) the cause
of their goodwill must be one of the lovable qualities mentioned above [i.e., the good,
the pleasant, and the usefiil]. (Aristofie, Eth. nic. 8.2.1)
Similar definifions are found centuries later in Plutarch's and Cicero's writings. Plutarch
defines friendship as "goodwill and graciousness combined with virtue (ewoia Kal idpiQ
|i6x'(xp6Tf|(;)" (Plutarch, ^w/c. mult. 93f). Cicero defines fiiendship as: "nothing other than
agreement in all things, human and divine, together with goodwill and affection" (Cicero,
This definition is later appropriated by Augustine, Acad. 3.6.13; Ep. 258.1.
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Amic. 6.20). So closely related are these two concepts that many authors employ them as
hendiadys (Isocrates, Pa�ar/z. 54.3; Xenophon, Anab. 2.6.13; Cyr. 3.1.28; Demosthenes,
Ep. 3.37; Polybius Hist. 7.9.4; Philo, Plant. 90; Somn. 2.108; los. 1.74; Spec. 1.52;
Plutarch, Cohib. ira 453c; Num. 6.3; Cor. 38.5; Crass. 12.5; Praec. ger. reipubl.S06f; Pel.
4.2; Me. 2.1; Fra?. amor. 480a, 481c; Per 29.1;v4m/c. mult. 93f; Dio Chrysostom, Gra/. 2;
//om. 12; /)e/ cogw. 12; Alex. 64; 2 Tara. 25; Tyr. 59).
Thus, �i)6oKLa, like eiJVOLa, stands in contrast to envy and represents friendship, the
force that units the polis. It belongs to the language of concord.
3.2.5.5 'Epideia (Phil 1:17; Phil 2:3)
The word epiGeia occurs even more rare than dhoKm?^ BDAG rightly notes that the
word is "found before NT times only in Aristotle." Aristotle mentions epiGeia as a cause for
political revolution:
[T]he cause and origins of the disturbances. . .happen to be seven in number. . ..the
motives of gain and honor (TLpTit'; cf. Phil 2:3)... insolence, fear, excessive
predominance, contempt (KaTa(j)p6vr|0Lv; cf Phil 2:3), disproportionate growth of
power; and also other modes [beyond the seven] of cause are epiGeLa, carelessness,
pettiness, dissimilarity. (Aristotle, Po/. 5.2.3)
Aristotle later would describe epiGeCa as an act of "election intrigue" or "canvass"
(Aristotle, Pol. 5.2.9).^^ C. Spicq suggests that the word was derived fi-om eritheuomai
("work for hire") and that it originally meant "paid work." From there derives the negative
meaning of dispute, intrigue, and personal ambition.^^ He further suggests that
Like friendship, goodwill sustains thepolis: "But if you should take the bond ofgoodwill out of the
universe no house or city could stand, nor would even the tillage of the fields abide" (Cicero, Amic. 23).
^ The word is not found in the LXX, Philo, and Josephus. It appears only once in the Apostolic
Fathers (Ign. Phil 8.2).
Cf Philo, To Gains 68: "The only stable government is one in which there is no strife and intrigue
{k^iXbv^iKOQ Kttl dvepLGeuToc;)."
C. Spicq, "epeeCCu, epiCu, epLGeia, epic;," TDNT 2:70.
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"connotations of intrigue, disputation, and chicanery appear in all the NT texts."^^ H.
Giesen, on the other hand, argues that kpvQda means "self-interest" or "selfish."^^ Louw-
Nida suggests that the word represents "a feeling of resentflilness based upon jealousy and
implying rivalry."^^ They translate it as selfish ambition, rivalry, and resentfulness.
The word appears seven times in the NT (Rom 2:8; 2 Cor 12:20; Gal 5:20; Phil 1:17;
2:3; Jas 3:14, 16). Twice it appears in vice lists (2 Cor 12:20; Gal 5:20). James pairs the
word twice with the vice of jealousy (CfiA,o;). Jealousy implies a comparison with others.
This character ofmeasuring oneself against the other is also implied in Phil 1:17 and Phil
2:3. In Phil 1:15-17, epiGeia is set in parallel with ^Qovoq and epiQ, and in contrast to
euSoKia and dYaTrri. These terms are all relational. In Phil 2:3, epiBeLa is paired with
K6yo6o^La (see below) and stands in contrast to humility, which is further specified as
"regarding others as better than yourselves." This contrast implies that epiGeia and
KeyoSo^Ltt involve the spirit of exaltation, namely, to regard oneself as better than others. In
other words, both kpiQda and Kei^oSo^ia are relational terms. This indicates that self-
interest or selfishness does not capture fully the meaning of the word {contra Giesen), for
selfishness does not necessarily imply comparison. Also, Paul's use of the term epiGeia
lacks clear indication that the term involves acts of intrigue or chicanery {contra Spicq).
Thus, the term most plausibly means rivalry or self-ambition. Louw-Nida finely articulates
the intricate meaning of these terms:
The meaning of "rivalry" may be expressed as "wanting to be better than someone
else" or "wanting to make people think they are better." The meaning of "selfish
" C. Spicq, "epeeiCco, epiCu, kpiQda, epic," TDNT2:70.
H. Giesen, "epL<;," EDNT2:52-53
L&N 88.167
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ambition" may be rendered as "what they do is just to make themselves look bigger"
or "what they do is just for themselves."^�
The key to this word is the spirit of comparison or the desire to be better or bigger than the
other.
3.2.5.6 Keuodo^ia (Phil 2:3)
In 4 Mace 2:15, K6vo6o^La is placed in a vice list together with lust for power
(4)LA.apxLa), pretension (dA-aCoveta), boasting (peyalauxta), and envy (PaoKavLa). In 4 Mace
8:19, Keyo6o^La is combined with pretension (dXaCoveia). In Galatians, KevoSo^oc; is
placed in parallel to the act ofprovoking and the act of envy (Gal 5:26). In 1 Clement,
K6Vo5o^La appears in a vice list, placed after the vice ofpretension (dXaCoveCa) (7 Clem.
35:5; cf Herm. Mand. 8.1.5). In Ignatius' letter to the Philadelphians, KevoSo^Ca stands in
contrast to the love ofGod. Bishops seek their ministry either for KevoSo^ia or for the love
ofGod (Ign. Phld. 1:1). In Did. 3:5, KevoSo^og is connected with "lust for money"
((j)LA.dpYupo(;) as acts that would lead to robbery (KA.OTTr|). In Philo, the word Kev'oSo^ia
appears thrice {Mut. 1 :96; los, 1 :36; Legat. 1 : 1 14). In Legal 1 : 1 14, it is combined with
"contentiousness" ((t)L/loi^6LKLav).^^ In the Tablets of Cebes, KevoSo^ia appears along with
the vices of intemperance (dKpaoia), pretension (dXaCoveia), and lust for money
((j)LA.apYupLa).
" In contrast to the rare occurrence ofKeyofio^ia, the phrase Kcvog b6E,a appears frequently in Philo.
The phrase often carries a connotation of "arrogance," ofplacing oneself above others. For example, Somn.
2:16: "There is also visible the seed of vain opinion (to Tfi? Kevfic So^t]?), on which he mounts as on a chariot
by reason ofhis levity, being puffed up, and elated, and raising himself to a height to the destruction of
equality." Somn. 2:78: "all who are companions of vain opinion (Qmadxai xf\Q Keyfig b6E,r\c,) place themselves
above all things, above all cities, and laws, and national customs, and above all the circumstances which
affect each individual of them." Somn. 2:115: "But we say, that the lover of indiscriminate study, and
unreasonable contention, and vain opinion (Kevfjg 66^Tig), being always puffed up by folly, wishes to assert a
precedence, not only over men, but also above the nature of all existing things."
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Frequently, Kevo6o^La appears in context with dlaCovda, and with different kinds of
lust, such as lust for money, lust for power, and lust for contention. These connections
suggest that KevoboUa, like kpiQda, involves the desire to exalt oneself over against others.
This exaltation leads to lust, when an individual thinks that as prominent as he or she is, he
or she deserves more power, more gain, and more honor.
Many ancient authors recognize the desire for honor and gain as the cause ofpolitical
discord. Thucydides, for example, notes that the evils of stasis are caused by "the desire to
rule which greed (irA-eove^Lav) and ambition ((j)LA,oxLp,Lay) inspire" (Thucydides, Hist.
3.82.8). Aristotle notes that "gain (KepSot;) and honor (xL[if|v) stir men up against each other"
(Aristotle, Po/. 5.2.3).
3.2.5. 7 royyvojfiOf and AiaAoyLc^oc (Phil 2:14)
The word yoYY^oiioc; and its cognate rarely appear in the Greco-Roman literature.
Nontheless, they appear frequently in the OT and in the OT Apocrypha.^^ In Exod 15-17,
the Israelites repeatedly complain against Moses because of their lack of drink (Exod 15:24;
17:3) and lack ofmeat and bread (Exod 16:3). In Num 14, the Israelites complain against
Moses and Aaron because of the strong enemies they face, enimies far beyond their ability.
In Num 16-17 (LXX), the Israelites complain against Moses and Aaron when they say,
"you [Moses and Aaron] have killed the people of the Lord [referring to Korah, and all his
company]" (Num 16:41). In all these cases the complaints are directed toward Moses and
Aaron, the leaders of congregation. The Israelites complain because they feel deserving of
roYYWoc: Exod 16:7-9, 12; Num 17:20,25; Wis 1:10, 11; Sir 46:7; Pss. Sol. 5:13; 16:11; Isa 58:9;
John 7:12; Acts 6:1; Phil 2:14; 1 Pet 4:9; yoyY'JC": Exod 17:3; Num 1 1:1; 14:27, 29; 17:6, 20; Jda. 1:14; Judg
1:14; Jdt 5:22; Ps 58:16; 105:25; Sir 10:25; Isa 29:24; 30:12; Lam 3:39; Matt 20:1 1; Luke 5:30; John 6:41,
43, 61; 7:32; 1 Cor 10:10; 6LaY0YYuC<J: Exod 15:24; 16:2, 7, 8; Num 14:2, 36; 16:11; Deut 1:27; Josh 9:18;
Sir 31:24; Luke 15:2; 19:7.
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better drink and better food. Also, they complain because they do not think they deserve to
die. Complaints arise when discrepancies occur between reality and expectation. People
who complain have in mind their desired reality. Often, as with the Israelites, people think
they deserve more and ought to have more than they presently own. Accordingly, people
often direct complaints to those persons whom the complainer sees as responsible for the
situation. Usually, these responsible persons possess higher authority. People who
complain want those persons in power to do what they ought to do in order to meet their
expectations.
Complaining reveals a discrepancy between the one who complains and the one
complained against. Complaint reveals that the two parties are not of the "same mind." As
such, complaint is a language of discord.
The word 6LaA.OYLOM.6c; can have various meanings. It can mean "to ponder" (Mark
2:6), "to discuss" (Mark 8:16), "to doubt" (Luke 24:38), or "to dispute" (Luke 9:46, 1 Tim
2:8). Here in Philippians, Paul does not elaborate on his meaning for 6LaAoYLap6(;. This
lack of elaboration makes determining the precise meaning of the owrd difficult. The only
clue to its meaning is its placement with yoYY^opog. As a result, "dispute" is the most likely
meaning for 6LaA,oYLop6(;.^^ Again, people are in dispute because they are not of the "same
mind." ALaAoYioiiog suggests a language of discord.
To conclude, Philippians contains numerous concepts expressing either the discord or
the concord within a community. "Oneness," "sameness," and "goodwill" are the language
of unity. "Envy," "stt-ife," "self-ambifion," and "vainglory" are the language of sedifion.
The use of these concepts suggests Philippians' concem with the unity and disunity of the
Fee, Paul's Letter to the Philippians, 244; Hawthorne and Martin, Philippians, 144; O'Brien, The
Epistle to the Philippians, 292; Silva, Philippians, 131.
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Christian community. Thus, good evidence qualifies Philippians as a deliberative rhetoric
on concord.
3.2.6 The Airangement
Having identified Philippians as a deliberative rhetoric on concord, the next step
involves reading and analyzing Philippians according to the conventions of that genre.
Greco-Roman rhetorical speeches conventionally are divided into four or more different
94
sections.
According to Aristotle, speeches are made up of two major parts: the statement of
the subject (-rrpoGeoLg) and the proof of the subject (irLOXLt;) (Aristotle, Rhet. 3.13.1). In
addition to these two parts an exordium (TTpooLpiov) and an epilogue (ctlXoyoc;) may be
added (Aristotle, Rhet. 3.3.4). Further divisions are, in Aristotle's view, absurd and
unnecessary.
Later rhetoricians disagree with Aristotle and dissect speeches to more than four parts.
Quintilian argues for a five part division: prooemium, narratio, probatio, refutatio, and
peroratio (Quinfilian, Inst. 3.9.5). The author ofRhetorica ad Herennium argues for six:
exordium, narratio, divisio, confirmatio, confutatio, and conclusio {Rhet. Her. 1.3.4; cf
3.9.16-18). Cicero in De invention also argues for a six part division: exordium, narratio,
partitio, confirmatio, reprehensio, and conclusio (Cicero, Inv. 1.14.19). Although speeches
are dissected in different ways, two elements�^the exordium and the peroratio�^remain
On Arrangement in ancient rhetoric see Heinrich Lausberg, Handbook ofLiterary Rhetoric: A
Foundation for Literary Study (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1998), ��255-1091 ; Wilhelm Wuellner, "Arrangement," in
Handbook ofClassical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330 B.C.-A.D. 400 (ed. Stanley E. Porter; Leiden:
E.J. Brill, 1997), 51-86.
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constant throughout. Other categories simply are refinements ofAristofie's conception of
the statement of the subject (-npoGeoLt;) and the proofof the subject (ttlotl;).
In the following, this thesis will examine how scholars have read Philippians as a
deliberative rhetoric.^^ This section will show considerable consensus among scholars on
how Philippians is arranged as a deliberative rhetoric. Certainly, disagreements among
scholars exist. However, the disagreements are ofminor importance, and some have only
to do with terminology. At the end of this section, this thesis will provide its own structural
reading ofPhilippians.
Duane Watson (1988) performed the first fiill-scale rhetorical analysis on
Philippians.^^ According to Watson, in this letter Paul deals with the problem of "the
appearance of a rival gospel in Philippi, a situation which also besets him in his place of
imprisonment."^^ The letter is categorized as deliberative. Philippians 1 :3-26 is the
exordium used (1) to obtain attention, receptivity, and goodwill from his audience; (2) to
indicate the topics and propositions to be developed in the rhetoric; and (3) to elicit pathos.
The narratio (Phil 1 :27-30) contains the major exhortation and introduces the major topoi
of the letter (life-citizenship, humility, and suffering). The probatio (Phil 2:1-3:21) is
divided into three sections, consisting of numerous examples and uses a variety of
amplificatory techniques.
Richard A. Lanham, A Handlist ofRhetorical Terms (2nd ed.; Berkeley: University ofCalifomia
Press, 1991), 172.
For bibliography on the rhetorical studies on Philippians see Duane F. Watson, The Rhetoric ofthe
New Testament: A Bibliographic Survey (Tools for Biblical Study Series; Blandford: Deo, 2006), 163-66.
Duane F. Watson, "A Rhetorical Analysis ofPhilippians and Its Implications for the Unity
Question," A^ovr 30 (1988): 57-88. Before Watson, George Kennedy offers a short comment on Philippians
claiming that "Philippians is largely epideictic." George A. Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation through
Rhetorical Criticism (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1984), 77.
Watson, "A Rhetorical Analysis ofPhilippians," 58.
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Five years after Watson's article, three Ph.D. theses were published in the same year,
each providing its own rhetorical analysis on Philippians. L. Gregory Bloomquist
(1993)^^ agrees with Watson that Philippians is deliberative. However, his division of
Philippians differs widely from Watson. He limits the exordium to Phil 1 :3-l 1.
Furthermore, he labels Phil 1:12-14 as the narratio and Phil l:15-18a as the partitio. His
analysis is skewed. The descriptive nature of Phil 1:12-14 and Phil l:15-18a lacks the
quality of exhortation central to the genre of the deliberative rhetoric. These two passages
focus on Paul (xd Kax' epe), his situation, and his response to his situation. Undeniably,
these passages contain implicit appeals, presenting Paul as a moral exemplar for imitation.
However, these appeals, precisely because of their implicitness and indirectness, do not fit
the labels of narratio or the partitio, both which supposedly contain clear and explicit
statements that are to be proved in the argumentatio.
Moreover, Phil 1:15-1 8a hardly qualifies as a partitio, which is supposed to be a list
ofpoints to be treated. Nowhere in Philippians does Paul try to prove that "some proclaim
Christ from envy and rivalry. . .out of selfish ambition, not sincerely but intending to
increase my suffering in my imprisonment," or to prove that "others [proclaim] from good
will...out of love, knowing that I have been put here for the defense of the gospel." Plainly,
these passages do not contain the theses that Paul intends to prove in his letter.
Timothy Geoffrion (1993) relies heavily on Watson in his rhetorical analysis of
Philippians. His division of the text is identical to that ofWatson's. He subdivides the
exordium (Phil 1:3-26) into two sections. The first section (Phil 1:3-1 1) introduces the
" Bloomquist, The Function ofSuffering in Philippians, 1 19-20.
As he acknowledges in Timothy C. Geoffrion, The Rhetorical Purpose and the Political and
Military Character ofPhilippians: A Call to Stand Firm (Lewiston: Mellen Biblical Press, 1993), 160n3.
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major topics of the letter and highlights the purposeful relationship of the Christian
KOLVcovia. The contents are anticipatory to the propositio statement. The second section
(Phil 1 : 12-26) of the exordium serves primarily to establish Paul's ethos and to present him
as a model for the Philippians. The propositio (Phil 1:27-30) introduces the forthcoming
topics, namely the manner in which the community ofbelievers should act and think
amidst opposition and suffering. The probatio (Phil 2:1-3:21) develops the topics of the
propositio with the use of enthymemes and examples.
Hugh Harwell's analysis ofPhilippians (1993) also follows Watson closely.'"^
Nonetheless, unlike Watson he identifies the exigency not as the rivlary gospel but as
disunity in the church.'�^ He rightly describes the function of the exordium (Phil 1:3-26) as
both to prepare the listener for the rest of the speech and to introduce the subject at hand.'�^
He also correctly claims the function of Paul's autobiographical prologue (Phil 1:12-26) as
"more to increase goodwill (as well as pathos and attentiveness) than to communicate what
issues are to be discussed later in the speech.'''^"^ According to Harwell, the narratio (Phil
1:27-30) "defines the scope of the argument for the audience, introducing the major point(s)
at issue."'�^
David A. Black (1995)'�^ confirms Philippians as deliberative. However, his division
differs from those of the previous authors, although some similarities still exist. Philippians
1:27-30, for example, is still identified as the propositio. Nonetheless, he incorporates it as
Harwell, "Classical Rhetoric and Paul's Purpose in Philippians", 104.
'"^
Harwell, "Classical Rhetoric and Paul's Purpose in Philippians", 60.
Harwell, "Classical Rhetoric and Paul's Purpose in Philippians", 107.
Harwell, "Classical Rhetoric and Paul's Purpose in Philippians", 111.
Harwell, "Classical Rhetoric and Paul's Purpose in Philippians", 1 12.
David A. Black, "The Discourse Structure ofPhilippians: A Study in Textlinquistics," NovT31
(1995): 16-49.
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part of the argumentatio. One of the most problematic parts of his analysis is his
segregation of Phil 1:12-26 from the exordium. He labels this segregated passage as the
narratio. This analysis is unfortunate because Phil 1 : 12-26 does not perform the ftmction
of the narratio. The primary purpose of the narratio is to state the facts to be proved in
the argumentatio. Philippians 1:12-26 does not serve this purpose, and Black agrees, for
he claims the fiinction ofPhil 1:12-26 as to establish "Paul's fiBog or credibility with his
readers by demonstrating what kind of an apostle he is proving to be in prison."'
Labeling Phil 3:1-21 as the refutation also is unfortunate decision, a decision that Black
gives no justification. Moreover, it is truly unconvenfional to call Phil 4:10-20 a
narratio Overall, Black seems to lack rigor when he applies rhetorical categories to the
text.
Ben Witherington (201 1), like others above, categorizes Philippians as deliberative
and identifies Phil 1 :27-30 as the propositio (only Bloomquist disagrees). Against others,
but in agreement with Black, he identifies Phil 1:12-26 as the narratio. This identification
is problematic, for again the purpose of the narratio is to state the facts to be proved.
Philippians 1 : 12-26 does not fiilfill this fiinction. The text does not provide relevant
Narratio is most suitable for forensic speech. According to the study ofFredrick J. Long, the
forensic speech has at least three formal features: "First, the narratio may be demarcated not infrequently
with some form of irpdooco/irpdYlia ('I act/do'; 'deed'), 6iTiYeo|iaL/6LTiYriOL(; ('I narrate'; 'narrative'), or
YLvo|iaL ('I happen').... Second, yap typically demarcates the begiiming of the narratio.... Third, the
narrative typically follows the prooemium, can vary considerably in length, and is often confirmed with
testimony of persons or written documents" {Ancient Rhetoric andPaul's Apology: The Compositional Unity
of2 Corinthians [SNTSMS 131; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004], 83-84). The purpose of the
narratio is to show how the events in dispute really ought to be understood. The narratio, therefore, involves
descriptions ofperson(s), their action(s), place, time, manner of action, and the reason for these {Ancient
Rhetoric and Paul's Apology, 152). Paul in Philippians, however, is not defending himself against another.
Thus, it is inappropriate to categorize Phil 1 : 12-26 as the narratio.
Lausberg, Handbook ofLiterary Rhetoric, �289; Quintihan, Inst. 4.2.31; Cicero, Inv. 1.27.
Black, "The Discourse Structure ofPhilippians," 48.
' '� Black admits and writes, "A deliberative discourse does not normally contain a narratio at the end"
("The Discourse Structure ofPhilippians," 47n50).
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historical background for the propositio. Another ofWitherington 's innovation is his
extension ofprobatio to Phil 4:3. Also, he separates Phil 4:10-20 from the peroratio as an
independent subunit.
Watson (1988)
Epistolary Prescript (1:1-2)
Exordium (1:3-26)
Narratio (1:27-301
L. Gregory Bloomquist (1993)
Epistolary Prescript (1:1-2)
Exordium (1:3-11)
Narratio (1:12-14)
Partitio (l:15-18a)
Argumentatio (l:18b-4:7)
Peroratio (4:8-20)
Epistolary Postscript (4:21-23)
Timothy Geoffrion (1993)
Epistolary Prescript (1:1-2)
Exordium (1:3-26)
Narratio (Prooositio and Ratio)
Probatio (2:1-3:21)
Digressio (2:19-30)
Peroratio (4:1-20)
A. Repetitio (4:1-9)
B. Adfectus (4:10-20)
Epistolary Postscript (4:21-23)
(1:27-30)
Probatio (2:1-3:21)
Peroratio (4:1-23)
Hugh Blake Harwell (1993)
Epistolary Prescript (1:1-2)
Exordium (1:3-26)
Narratio (1:27-30)
Probatio (2:1-3:21)
Peroratio (4:1-20)
A. Repetitio (4:1-9)
B. Adfectus (4:10-20)
Epistolary Postscript (4:21-23)
David A. Black (1995)
Epistolary Prescript (1:1-2)
Exordium (1:3-11)
Narratio (1:12-26)
Argumentatio (1:27-3:21)
A. Propositio (1:27-30)
B. Probatio (2:1-30)
C. Refutatio (3:1-21)
Peroratio (4:1-9)
Narratio (4:10-20)
Epistolary Postscript (4:21-23)
Ben Witherington (2011)
Epistolary Prescript (1:1-2)
Epistolary Thanksgiving and
Exordium (1:3-11)
Epistolary Body introduced
and Narratio (1:12-26)
Prooositio (1:27-30)
Probatio (2:1-4:3)
Peroratio (4:4-9)
Concluding arguments (4:10-
20)
Epistolary Greetings and
Closing (4:21-23)
The overview above reveals a remarkable consistency in the scholars' understanding
of the structure and purpose ofPhilippians. All scholars take Philippians as deliberative.
Furthermore, except for Bloomquist, whose analysis is in many ways idiosyncratic and
defective, all of the scholars identify Phil 1:27-30 as the propositio of the letter. Most
scholars identify Phil 4:1 as the beginning of the peroratio. Between the propositio and
peroratio is the probatio, which most scholars identify as Phil 2:1-3:21.'''
' ' ' Watson finds a digression within the probatio. Black subdivides this section into two: theprobatio
and the refutatio. He subsumes both together with the propositio under the rubric ofargumentatio. However,
the conception remains basically the same. Witherington extends theprobatio from Phil 4:1 to Phil 4:3.
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Consistent understanding of the genre and structure ofPhilippians leads to consistent
understanding of the major purpose ofthis letter (stated in the propositio), namely to
recover the unity of the Church. Nonetheless, there are nuances to this statement. The
nuance has to do with how much opposition plays into the theme ofunity. Is unity a means
to conquer opposition? Or do the two themes stand on equal footing? Or is salvation from
opposition an incentive or a motive to promote unity? These questions will be answered
later in this thesis (4.10.2).
Remarkable consistency also exists in scholars' respective understandings of the
ftinction ofPhil 1:3-26. Although scholars dispute whether Phil 1:3-26 should be treated as
a single unit (the exordium) or as two units (the exordium and the narratio; Black and
Witherington), they nonetheless agree on its use and fiinction. Ancient rhetorical
handbooks claim that the exordium serves three different fiinctions: benevolum (well-
disposed), docilem (ready to leam), and attentum (attenfive).''^ Most of the previously
Aristotle defines the exordium as "the beginning of the speech which paves the way for what
follows" (Aristotle, Rhet. 3.14.1). Its primary fimction is (1) "to make clear what is the end or purpose of the
speech" (Aristotle, Rhet.3>.\A.6). In places where the subject is clear or unimportant, the exordium can be
excluded. The exordium can serve other remedial flmctions as well. It can help (2) remove prejudices against
the speaker, incite the prejudices against the opponent, make the hearer well disposed (or indignate); (3) to
engage the hearer's attention (or the opposite) (Aristotle, Rhet.2>.\A.l). These functions are necessary only
when the hearer is poor in judgment and unprepared for the oration. For Aristotle, under normal
circumstances, the exordium which he calls an ornament and an aid to memory is unnecessary and can be
easily disposed.
Later rhetoricians assign a more positive role to the exordium. Rhetoric to Alexander, for example,
defines the exordium as: "A preparation of the hearers and a summary explanation of the business to persons
who are not acquainted with it, in order (1) to inform them what the speech is about and to enable them to
follow the line of argument, and (2) to exhort them to attend, and (3) to make them well-disposed towards us"
(Aristotle, [Rhet. Alex.] 1436a34). The author is particularly interested in the third function of the exordium
and the implementation of this function. It all depends on what kind of audience is present at the assembly. If
the audience is friendly, then the exordium should be kept short with a slight tone of irony. If the audience is
neutt-al, neither hostile nor friendly, then the exordium should flatter the audience, complimenting, for
example, their ability to evaluate speech. If the audience is hostile, which may happen either because of the
prejudice toward the speaker or the prejudice toward the subject, remedy must be sought to eliminate that
hostility.
The author ofRhetorica AdHerennium capttores the function of the exordium well in three succinct
words: benevolum (well-disposed), docilem (ready to leam), and attentum (attentive) {Rhet. Her.l.4.6, 7).
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mentioned scliolars agree witli the ancient rhetoricians and acknowledge that Phil 1:3-26
serves to establish Paul's ethos and introduce the major themes of the letter.
Rhetorical criticism highlights thepersuasive nature of the text}^^ It insists that the
text functions together as a whole. It insists also that the letter has a central thesis with
which the whole letter integrates. The central thesis of a deliberative rhetoric is found in its
propositio. The text that comes before the propositio serves a preparatory function. The
text that comes after the propositio serves a supporting ftinction. Rhetorical criticism helps
clarify the intemal stmcture of the text by highlighting certain texts as central and others as
peripheral, serving a supportive ftmction.
However, rhetorical criticism does have deficiencies. For example, treating Phil 1:3-
26 as the exordium does not do justice to the clear division between Phil 1:3-11 and Phil
1:12-26.'*'* However, neither does treating them as distinct passages serve them flill justice,
for both attend the same preparatory fiinction supporting the main thesis. It is therefore
best to combine both the rhetorical arrangement and epistolary conventions and subdivide
the exordium into two subunits: the thanksgiving and Paul's autobiography.
These words later became standard terminologies of all subsequent Latin rhetorical handbooks (Cicero, Inv.
1.20; Quintilian, Inst. 4.1.5). Although these terms are alien to both Aristotle and the author ofRhetoric of
Alexander, the conceptions behind them (i.e., the functions that are assigned to the exordium) are similar.
Remarkably, rhetoricians throughout the centuries maintained an almost exact imderstanding of how the
exordium should function. For such high degree of standardization to develop, referring not only to the way
that the exordium is conceptualized, but also the way that it is taught (i.e., through standardized terms), there
must be in reality some form of social practice highly formalized in order to sustain this consistency
throughout the centuries.
David S. Cunningham claims, "Christian theology is best understood as persuasive argument. ...
Theologians are always seeking to persuade others...of a particular understanding of the Christian faith"
(emphasis his; Faithful Persuasion: In Aid ofa Rhetoric ofChristian Theology [Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1991], 5). He names Paul as one of Christian theology's earhest practitioners.
Terence Y. Mullins, "Disclosure: A Literary Form in the New Testament," NovTl (1964), 44-50; J.
H. Roberts, "Pauline Transitions to the Letter Body," in L'apotre Paul: Personnalite, Style et Conception Du
Ministere (ed. Albert Vanhoye; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1986), 93-99; Jack T. Sanders, "Transition
from Opening Epistolary Thanksgiving to Body in the Letters of the Pauline Corpus," JBL 81 (1962), 348-62.
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Another deficiency of rhetorical criticism concerns many scholars' treatment ofPhil
2:1-1 1 as a component among many that constitutes the probatio. Such consideration fails
to do justice to the passage's dominating and paradigmatic importance. This scheme
overlooks the passage's status ofbeing the "generative image" (Meeks) and the "master
story" (Gorman) that conditions all other moral exemplars found in the letter. In other
words, the intemal stmctural relationship between the various passages in the probatio is
not reflected in the rhetorical categories. The rhetorical arrangement shows that all
exemplars serve to support the propositio but fails to elucidate the intemal relationship of
these various exemplars. This deficiency finds no easy remedy. One only can constantly
keep in mind that the Christ-hymn serves a generative fiinction, and that other exemplars
must be read in view of the Christ-hymn.
Having noted the strengths and constrains of rhetorical criticism, a new stmctural
arrangement ofPhilippians is proposed as follows:
Epistolary Prescript (1 : 1-2)
Exordium (1:3-26)
A. Thanksgiving (Phil 1:3-11)
B. Paul's autobiography (Phil 1:12-26)
Propositio (1:27-30)
Probatio (2:1-3:16)
Peroratio (3:17^:9)
A. Repetitio (3:17-4:3)
B. Adfectus (4:4-9)
Concluding Arguments (4:10-20)
Epistolary Closing (4:21-23)
In agreement with the majority of scholars, the opening and closing are assigned with
epistolary categories. The letter opens with an epistolary prescript (Phil 1:1-2) and ends
with an epistolary closing (Phil 4:21-23). The propositio of the Philippians is found in Phil
1 :27-30. Before the propositio is the exordium, subdivided into two: the thanksgiving and
Paul's autobiography. After the propositio, comes the probatio (Phil 3:17-4:9). The
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probatio then leads to the peroratio (Phil 3:17-4:9). Here this thesis differs from the
scholarly consensus. Most scholars see Phil 4:1 as the beginning of the peroratio
(Witherington at Phil 4:4). But this demarcation fails to do justice to the summarizing
fiinction of Phil 3:17-21, where many of the critical terms and concepts found in the
propositio and the generative-model (i.e., the Christ-hymn) are repeated."^ How this
passage functions as a summary statement can be summarized as follows:
(1) The call to imitation and to live according to the example "you have in us" (Phil
3:17) recapitulates all the exemplars narrated previously. All these examples ultimately
point back to the Christ-hymn and to the initial call in the propositio: live your life in a
manner worthy of the gospel ofChrist. The verb -rrepLTTaTeco in Phil 3:17, 18 echoes the verb
TToA-LxeuopaL in Phil 1:27, since Paul often uses -irepL-rTaxeQ in conjunction with d^icog (Eph
4:1; Col 1:10; 1 Thess 2:12); (2) The contrast between "destruction" and the coming of the
"Savior" in Phil 3:19-20 echoes the opposition between "destruction" and "salvation" in
Phil 1:28; (3) The phrase "enemies of the cross of Christ" in Phil 3:18 recalls the
"opponents" who stand against people who live worthy of the gospel of Christ in Phil 1 :28;
(4) The concept of iToA,LX�upa in Phil 3:20 resonates with the verb iroXixeueoGe in Phil 1:27.
Note that the word iroA-LxeueoGe is one of the key concepts in the propositio, ifnot the most
important concept of the propositio Philippians 3:20 is the only place where the ttoA,l-
word reappears. These two words together frame the letter; (5) God's act "to transform"
Neal Flanagan, "Note on Philippians 3:20-21," CBQ 18 (1956), 8-9; Garland, "The Composition
and Unity ofPhilippians," 158.
Grammatically, all words in Phil 1:27-30 hinge upon this one single verb uoA-LTeueoee. Moreover,
many concepts in Phil 1 :27-30 relate semantically to the imagery of thepolis, especially to matters related to
the fortification and the defense of the polis. For example, there are concepts such as "standing firm,"
"striving side by side," "enemies," "intimidation," "struggle," and "salvation." Taken together, they conjure
the image ofprotecting the polis against invasion.
168
(pexaoxrifiaTLCa)) and to make "conform" (ou|ipop4)0(;) echoes the language of the Christ-
hymn where concepts such as \iop(^r\ and oxf|pa are found; (6) The transformation from
humility to glory in Phil 3:21 models Christ's humility and his glory in Phil 2:6-1 1; (7)
The noun evepyeia in Phil 3:21 encapsulates all previous words that are related to "work"
(Phil 1:6, 22; 2:12, 13, 25, 30; 3:2). God's "good work" (Phil 1:6) is completed through the
final transformative act done according to the same "outworking" (evepyeLa) that brought
all things in subject to Christ (Phil 3:21); (8) "Belly" symbolizes self-love and the desire
for gain (Phil 3:19)."^ The desire for gain and honor is mentioned repeatedly in
Philippians (Phil 1:17; 2:3; cf 1:21; 3:7, 8). These desires cause strife and disunity in the
community ofbelievers; (9) The "mind" can be either earthly-oriented for heavenly-
oriented. The earthly-oriented minds serve only the self; the heavenly oriented-mind looks
upon Christ and imitates Christ. How to think is a lesson taught repeatedly in Philippians.
These evidences show that Phil 3:17-21 well summarizes the major teachings of the
letter. Thus, it takes up the fiinction of the peroratio, namely to "give a summary statement
of the proofs" (Aristotle, Rhet. 3.19.4). For this reason, Phil 3:17-21 should be regarded as
part of the peroratio together with Phil 4:1-3. Reasons why Phil 4:4-9 is treated as the
adfectus will be discussed later in 4.11.
To conclude. Chapter 3 demonstrates Philippians as a deliberative rhetoric work
(3.2.1-4). Second, it shows that Philippians is a deliberative rhetoric on concord (3.2.5).
Third, it identifies some of the strengths and weaknesses of past studies on the rhetorical
Karl Olav Sandnes argues that "belly" is a metaphor for selfishness. He writes, "[I]n Phil 3:18-19
belly-worship is best explained in terms of a figurative extension ofgluttony; i.e. self-love. This
interpretation nicely fits the widely acknowledged emphasis on fiiendship {(^iXia) in this epistle. Christ's
self-renouncing example is depicted by Paul in terms commonly associated with fnendship. The egoistic
orientation Paul is warning against is fiiendship towards oneselfonly" (Belly and Body in the Pauline
Epistles [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 145-53; here 151).
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analysis ofPhilippians. This chapter ends with its own structural analysis ofPhilippians
(3.2.6).
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4 VIRTUE, FRIENDSHIP, AND CONCORD IN PHILIPPIANS
In Chapter 1, this thesis shows the Greco-Roman world's view of stasis as the
greatest evil and concord the greatest good. Chapter 2 concludes that intellectuals
throughout the Greco-Roman world sought to promote concord through virtue and
friendship. In Chapter 3, this thesis asserts Paul's letter to the Philippians as a deliberative
discourse on concord. Based on these conclusions, this chapter will explore the manner in
which Paul's letter to the Philippians as a deliberative discourse on concord promotes
concord through the fostering of virtuous friendship.
This chapter will show how the themes of (1) virtue, (2) friendship, and (3) the
concord and salvation of the Christian polis binds Philippians together as a whole.
(1) The theme of virtue is found in the mention ofmoral knowledge and moral
perception (Phil 1:9; 4.2.3) ^ the virtue ofjustice (Phil 1:11; 4.2.5) ^ moral choice (Phil
1:22; 4.3.3) ^ moral progress (Phil 1:25; 4.3.4) ^ practical wisdom (Phil 2:2; 4.5.2) ^
moral will and moral praxis (Phil 2:13; 4.6.1) ^ moral habituation (Phil 3:12-16; 4.9.1).
Virtue stands in contrast to the vices of envy, strife, and self-ambition (Phil 1:15-17;
3.2.5.2-4) ^ self-ambition and vain-glory (Phil 2:3; 3.2.5.4-5) ^ greed (Phil 2:6; 4.5.6) ^
contention for honor (Phil 3:17-4:3; 4.8.3).
(2) The theme of friendship is found in the mention of KOLvcovLa (Phil 1:5, 7; 4.2.1) ->
joy (passim.; 4.2.6) ^ goodwill (Phil 1:15; 3.2.5, 4.6.2) one spirit, one soul, ouv-prefix,
binary between friend and enemy (Phil 1:27-30; 4.4.3-4.4.6) ^ like-mindedness (Phil 2:2;
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4.5.1) -> virtuous friendship (Phil 2:5; 4.5.3) -> friendship as equality (Phil 2:6; 4.5.7) ->
exemplary friendships (Phil 2:19-30; 4.7) -> fiiendship and self-sufficiency (Phil 4:10-14;
4.12.1) -> fiiendship and gift (Phil 4:15-20; 4.12.2).
(3) The theme ofpolis and of concord and peace is found in the menfion of peace
(Phil 1 :2; 4.1.3) church as the holy temple-city (Phil 1:10; 4.2.4) live as a cifizen
(Phil 1:27; 4.4.1-4.4.2) friendship and concord (Phil 1:27-30; 4.4.7) ^ safety (Phil 3:1;
4.8.1) ^ peace ofGod (Phil 4:7, 9; 4.11.2).
4.1 Philippians 1:1-2
Paul begins his letter with the standard letter opening formulae: superscription (Phil
1:1), adscription (Phil 1:1) and salutation (Phil 1:2). Comparing this letter opening with
other Pauline letter openings, one immediately identifies two important differences. One
difference concerns the use of the title "slave" for both Paul and Timothy (4.4.1), and the
other difference is the mention of "overseers and deacons" (4.4.2). Both these
particularities foreshadow the major themes of this letter.
4.1.1 Slave
Paul usually refers to himself as an aposfie in the openings of his letters. Once he
calls himself a prisoner (Phlm 1 ). Three times he refers to himself as a slave (Rom 1:1;
Phil 1:1; Titus 1:1). Nonetheless, only in Philippians does he refer to himselfsolely as a
slave. In both Romans and Titus, he adds "aposfie" to the fifie "slave." The appellation of
"slave" in Philippians is peculiar.'
' Fee writes, "For the (basically Gentile) readers of this letter, this word [60OA.01;] would have only
meant 'slave' [not 'servant']" {Paul's Letter to the Philippians, 62).
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Paul must have chosen this title intentionally, because the concept of slavery is
closely related to one of the major themes ofPhilippians, namely, the virtue ofhumility?
The word "slave" (6oijA.og) appears later in Phil 2:7 and in Phil 2:22 (in verbal form). In the
Christ Hymn, the "form of slave" {\iop^\\ 6ouA.ou) is placed in contrast to the "form ofGod"
(pop4)Ti eeou) highlighting the polarizing distance through which Christ traversed.
Descending from the status of God to the status of the slave, Christ becomes the supreme
exemplar of the virtue ofhumility, which Paul is eager to instill within the minds of his
recipients (Phil 2:3). In Phil 2:22, Paul groups himself with Timothy as men who serve in
the gospel. They serve with the virtue ofhumility, seeking other's interest rather than their
own. They serve the gospel not only by spreading the gospel, but also by enslaving
themselves to the gospel in conformity to Christ. They serve the gospel by becoming living
examples of the gospel. The phrase "serve in/enslaved to the gospel" (eSouXeuoev etc to
d)CLyykX\,ov) bears frill witness to the propositio ofPhilippians, that the gospel is both the
message proclaimed (serve the gospel) and the message toward which Christians submit
their own lives (enslaved to the gospel).
^ The lowly image of the slave is reinforced by Paul's frequent reference to his bondage (Phil 1 :7, 13,
14, 17). hi Philippians, the slavery image is associated also with the concept of xaireLVog (Phil 2:3, 8; 3:21;
4:12). Both these concepts have negative connotations in Greco-Roman culture. Generally, slaves are treated
as sub-humans in the Greco-Roman world. Orlando Patterson argues that slavery was "the permanent, violent
domination ofnatally alienated and generally dishonored persons" {Slavery and Social Death: A
Comparative Study [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982], 13). Ta-rreLVog, for its part, is often
equated with disdained concepts such as "weak," "insignificant," "base," "servile" (Witherington, Paul 's
Letter to the Philippians, 129). However, Paul associates both concepts (slave and xaireLVOQ) with Christ, the
person whom Christians imitate for virtue. In Pauline ethics, the concepts of slave and laireLvoq stand at the
core ofChristian virtue. Bruno Blumenfeld rightly observes, "Begirming with Paul, the adjective tapeinos
(servile) as used in the NT consistently describes a positive quality. With Christianity the meanings ofwords,
their chains of signification, often change. Christianity speaks a new language with old words and builds its
vocabulary from skandalon to skandalon.... Christian language develops at the expense of the Greek's
perplexity. Language itself is thus crucified and resurrected" {The Political Paul, 300).
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4. 1 .2 Overseers and Deacons
The second anomaly to Paul's standard opening is the mention of "overseers and
deacons" (eTTLOKoiroL Kal SiaKovoL) The title eirLOKoiroc appears nowhere else in Paul's
writings except in the later pastoral writings.^ Interestingly, Paul never mentions these
titles when he speaks of the "spiritual gifts" given to the Christ-followers (Rom 12:3-8; 1
Cor 12:1-31; Eph 4:4-16). The word "overseer" is used in the Greco-Roman world for all
kinds of different people and different offices. For example, ship captains are called
"overseers" in charge of goods (Homer, Od. 8, 163), as are people in charge ofmarried
young couples (Plato, Leg. 784a, 795d), market dealings (Plato, Leg. 849a), households
(Aeschylus, Eum. 740), temples, and building projects (Plutarch, Pericl. 13)."* The title is
also used for people whose responsibility is to oversee the polis. Plato, for example, notes
that "Our constitution (-rroXLieLa) will have its perfect and definitive organization only
when such a guardian (eiTLOKOTTfi)....oversees (e-moxripQy) it" (Plato, Resp. 506b; cf Solon,
Frg 4.3).
The title SiaKOvo;, on the contrary, appears frequently in Pauline letters.^ The word
most commonly means "servant" (Matt 20:26; 22:13; 23:1 1; Mark 9:35; 10:43; John 2:5;
2:9; 12:26; Rom 13:4). Paul more than once calls himself a servant (1 Cor 3:5; 2 Cor 3:6;
6:4; 1 1 :23; Eph 3 :7; Col 1 :23, 25). Servants belong to masters. Servants of the NT either
belonged to the church (Rom 16:1), to Christ (2 Cor 1 1:23; Col 1:7; 1 Tim 4:6; cf Eph
6:21; Col 4:7), or to God (Rom 13:4; 2 Cor 6:4). More than once servants are identified as
^ 'ETTLOKOTTeco (Hcb 12:15; 1 Pet 5:2), CTLOKoirri (Luke 19:44; Acts 1:20; 1 Tim 3:1; 1 Pet 2:12),
eiTLOKOTOg (Acts 20:28; Phil 1:1; 1 Tim 3:2; Titus 1:7; 1 Pet 2:25).
" H. W. Beyer, "eirLOKOirri," TDNT 2.606-22; L. Coenen, "Bishop, Presbyter, Elder,"NIDNTTl.m-
92; J. Rohde, "eiTLOKOTrri," EDNT 2.35-36.
^Rom 13:4; 15:8; 16:1; 1 Cor 3:5; 2 Cor 3:6; 6:4; 1 1:15, 23; Gal 2:17; Eph 3:7; 6:21; Phil 1:1; Col 1:7,
23, 25; 4:7; 1 Tim 3:8, 12; 4:6.
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people who serve for the good of others (Rom 13:4; 15:8; Col 1:7, 25; cf 1 Cor 3:5). The
word may have been used as a title in 1 Tim 3:8, 12. Nonetheless, even this usage
emphasizes the act of serving others (SiaKoyeo); 1 Tim 3:10, 13). The office of 6LdKoyo(; in
post-Pauline Christian communities likely retained this fiinctional aspect of serving others
as the Gospels have emphasized. Thus, whether Slockovoc is a title in Philippians, the
emphasis on serving should not be overlooked.^
The question remains as to why Paul mentions these two groups of people.^ There are
three common answers to this question:^ (1) Paul wants to thank them for their support of
organizing the gifts; (2) Paul wants to give them respect because of their prominence in the
Church; (3) Paul wants to capture their attention since he wrote the letter to persuade them
to live in harmony. Methodologically, it seems most prudent to connect this particularity
with the major theme of this letter, i.e., to connect these two groups of people with the
theme that bears the greatest explanatory power. In this case, option three would be the
most prudent choice. Good reasons exist for making this connection. First, both e-RLOKOTToc;
and SuxKovoc; are people who serve the community. Their ftmction is to preserve the good
and the well-ftmctioning of the community. The eTTLOKO-rrog takes more of a top-down
approach. Their task is to "oversee" and to "look after" the community. The StdKovoc; takes
more of a bottom-up approach. Their task is to "serve" as a servant, not for their own good
but for the good of the community. In both cases the good of the community is in view.
Paul is reminding these two groups of people of their task to preserve the community
^ Hawthome and Martin rightly concludes that: "service orministering to others. . .is at the heart of the
word SLaKovoi;" {Philippians, 10).
^ Contra Hawthome who argues that overseers and deacons refer to the same group ofpeople.
Hawthome, Philippians, 9-10.
* Bockmuehl, The Epistle to the Philippians, 55; Hooker, "Philippians," 481; O'Brien, The Epistle to
the Philippians, 49.
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rather than to ruin it. Second, a tendency exists in Philippians to have people grouped up in
pairs: Christ and God (Phil 2:6); Paul and Timothy (Phil 2:19-24); Paul and Epaphroditus
(Phil 2:25-30), and finally, Euodia and Syntyche (Phil 4:2). In each case, Paul either
emphasizes their fiiendship or pleas for their unity. Thus, this pair in Phil 1 : 1 also may be
related to the theme of fiiendship and unity.
4.1.3 Peace
Anomalies aside, some concepts in the letter opening, while they appear as mere
conventions ofPaul, do nonetheless anticipate major themes to be explored later in the
letter. Among these concepts is that of "peace." Peace is always combined with grace in
the Paul's salutafion (Rom 1:7; 1 Cor 1:3; 2 Cor 1:2; Gal 1:3; Phil 1:2; Eph 1:2; 2 Thess
1:2; Phlm 3). Grace is a modified form of the common Greek greeting (xalpeiv)? Peace is
the standard form of Jewish greeting.
'� Paul's formula combines both the eastern and the
western form of salutation. These above statements are true and valid observations noted
by many commentators." However, deriving a strict dichotomy between the Jewish
understanding of peace and the Greco-Roman understanding of peace and to assign Paul's
use of "peace" exclusively to the former is erroneous.'^
Commentators on Paul often suggest a narrow meaning for the Greco-Roman idea of
"peace," thinking that it refers solely to the absence ofwar and stasis; whereas, the Jewish
understanding of "peace" has a more comprehensive meaning, suggesting not only the
' Some letters use the optative (xatpoic;) or the imperative (xKLpe)- Francis Xavier J. Exler, The Form
of the Ancient Greek Letter ofthe Epistolary Papyri (3rd C. B.C.-3rd C. A.D.): A Study in Greek Epistology
(Chicago: Ares, 1976), 23-36, 67.
Hawthome and Martin, Philippians, 12.
' '
Fee, Paul 's Letter to the Philippians, 70.
O'Brien, for example, claims that: "eLpr|vr| ('peace') suggests an OT background .... The word
stands firmly within the OT tradition" (The Epistle to the Philippians, 51).
176
absence of discord, but also the blessings of "abundance," "wholeness," and "well-being"
(cf Lev 26:3-13). Although there is some truth in this dichotomy, an absolute distinction
must be avoided.'^ Peace in the Greco-Roman world also closely relates to the concept of
"abundance," as is evident, for example, in the now lost sculpture made by Kephisodotos,
which depicts mother Eirene standing, cradling in her left arm baby Ploutos.'"* Today 13
Roman marble copies of this statue are in extant.'^ These statues demonstrate the close
relationship between peace and abundance.
Not only is the dichotomy between Jewish and Greco-Roman understanding ofpeace
problematic, assigning Paul's view of peace exclusively to the Jewish tradition also is
problematic, for Paul, like his Greco-Roman contemporaries, ties peace closely with the
extermination ofwar and strife. In Rom 5, peace relates to the reconciliation between
enemies. In Rom 8:6, the life and peace of the spirit must be read in the context of the war
and death mentioned in Rom 7. In Rom 14, peace is placed in opposite to the disputes
about food. In 1 Cor 7:15, peace is the opposite of discord in marriage. In 1 Cor 14:33,
peace stands in direct contrast to dissensions {dKOLxaoxaoia). In 2 Cor 13:11, peace is
Edward Keazirian argues that peace is a muhi-faceted concept broader than simply the antithesis of
war: "[Peace is] not only as the antithesis ofwar, but as prosperity, security, and a sense ofwell-being in
relationships with the gods, with nature, with one's irmer self, with those in one's own social, economic, and
political sphere (insiders), and with all those beyond it (outsiders)" ("Peace and Peacemaking in Paul against
the Backdrop ofGreco-Roman Conceptions ofPeace" [D.Theol. Thesis, Boston University School of
Theology, 2009], 24). While the thesis does contribute to the understanding ofPaul's use of peace, it
nonetheless has severe shortcomings. Peace in Pauline literature stands primarily in contrast to strife and
stasis, not war.
The visual presentation ofEirene is thoroughly surveyed by Amy Claire Smith, Polis and
Personification in Classical Athenian Art (Monumenta Graeca Et Romana; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 201 1), 77-81,
109-18. Smith notes that "there is natural cotmection between Eirene (Peace) and Opora (Harvest,
Autumn). . .[For] Eirene was earlier known as one of the Horai (Seasons), presumably the autumn season in
which everyone was freed from military duties and devoted their attentions to reaping the ripened crops"
(ibid., 77). Sayings that relate peace to wealth also abound in Greco-Roman literature (e.g., Hesiod, Opera et
dies 212; Pindar, Ol 13.6; Aristophanes, Pax 519; Euripides, Suppl 484).
See the catalogue listed in Smith, Polis andPersonification in Classical Athenian Art, 146-47. One
of the best preserved statues is found today in Munich:
http://en.wikipedia.org/v>'iki/File:Eirenc Ploutos GIvptothek Munich 219 n2.ipg
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mentioned together with "same mind." In Gal 5:22, peace appears in a virtue list placed in
contrast to a vice list with numerous vices related to stasis. In Eph 2: 14-17, peace is the
antithesis of enmity. In Eph 4:3, peace is unity. The same is true also for Col 3:15. In sum,
Paul uses peace predominately as a synonym for concord.
Greco-Roman literature often combines peace and concord as hendiadys. This
combination has been well-documented by W. C. van Unnik.'^ He cites evidences from
Dio Chrysostom, Cone. Apam. 26; Rec. mag. 6; Nicaeen. 2; Plutarch, Garr. 17 (511c);
Alex. fort. 1.9 (330e); Superst. 4 (166e); 0th. 15.6; Lucian, Herm. 22; Dio Cassius, Hist.
Rom. 44.24.3, 25.3-4; Tacitus, Hist. 3.80.4; Cicero, Fat. 2; Sallust, Hist. 1.77.13; Diodorus
Siculus, Hist. 16.7.2; Dionysius ofHalicamassus, Ant. rom. 7.60.2.'^ These texts prove that:
When 1 Clement, therefore, characterizes itself as an gvieu^Lg... .irepl elpi^vriQ Kal
opovolac; [1 Clem. 63:2] , this is not a casual description. No, for ancient readers a
light must have dawned, if they had not understood earlier, when Clement used this
widely current formula by which the well-being and happiness of a community was
designated. He writes a letter on account of the troubles in Corinth, where the well-
being of the ekklesia is threatened by divisions.'^
Furthermore, Greco-Roman literature frequently combines peace with friendship as
hendiadys (Plato, Leg. 62Sh; Symp 195c; Polybius, //w^. 1.16.5; 3.24.9; 4.52.6; 21.16.9;
Dionysius ofHalicamassus, rom. 3.41.5; 3.66.2; 5.34.4; 5.45.2; 6.95.1; 8.68.3; 9.19.1;
Josephus, yl.y. 8.400; 12.394; 18.375; Plutarch, Comp. Lyc. Num. 4.6; Pyrrh. 21.6; Mulier.
virt. 254a; Quaest. rom. 267c; Cor. 33.5; 35.8; Pel 29.12; Flam. 5.S;Arat. 14.2; Gen. Socr.
Unnik, "Studies on the So-Called First Epistle ofClement: The Literary Genre," 146-51. See also
Bakke, Concord and Peace, 72-84; E. A. Russell, "Godly Concord: En Homonoia (1 Clement 9.4)," IBS 1 1
(1989).
" Dio Chrysostom, 1 Regn. 6; Nicom. 14; 1 Fort. 2; Dio Cassius, Hist. 53.5; 54.35; Diodorus Siculus,
Hist. 16.60.3; Dionysius ofHalicamassus, Ant. rom. 7.60.2; Josephus, Ant. 4.50; Plutarch, Caes. 12.2; 23.6;
Frat. amor. 484b.
Unnik, "Smdies on the So-Called First Epistle ofClement: The Literary Genre," 145. dpr\v^Q Kal
onovola; is used as a hendiadys in 1 Clem 20. 1 0, 1 1 ; 60.4; 6 1 . 1 ; 63 .2; 65 . 1 . See also Horrell, The Social
Ethos of the Corinthian Correspondence: Interests and Ideologyfrom 1 Corinthians to 1 Clement, 252-53.
178
584a; Dio Chrysostom, 3 Regn. 96; Troj. 143; Avar. 10; Nicom. 22; Nicaeen. 2; cf.
Xenophon, Hell. 3.2.9; Diodorus Siculus, Bib. His. 19.77.7). Plato remarks that intemal
concord should be secured by the "establishment of friendship and peace by terms of
conciliation" (Plato, Leg. 628b). The highest good (x6 dpLOTov) for the polis is "peace with
one another and friendly feeling (elprivT) Trpoc; dXXr]Xo\)(; d\ia Kal (j)LA.o(j)poauvTi)" (Plato,
Leg. 628c). Dio Chrysostom makes the similar remark that it is fitting forpolies founded
by gods to "maintain peace and concord and friendship toward one another."'^
To conclude, the word peace anticipates the major theme ofPhilippians, namely, the
need to terminate intemal strife and the need to create concord through the development of
friendship.
4.2 Philippians 1:3-11
Many scholars have claimed that Paul's epistolary thanksgiving serves to introduce
the major themes of his letters. In terms of rhetorical analysis, the exordium fulfills the
function of docilem (ready to leam). The purpose is to provide the listeners with an
adequate frame of reference so they might easily follow the forthcoming arguments.
Philippians is no exception. The thanksgiving section serves to infroduce many of the
major themes in Philippians.^^ The focus in this section will be on the themes of (1)
KOLvcovLa; (2) Ipyov; (3) knowledge and perception; (4) temple; (5) justice; and (6) joy.
" Dio Chrysostom goes on to say that citizens should show "sobriety, virtue, orderly government,
honor for the good citizens and dishonor for the base" (Nicaeen. 2). The well-being of the polis is based on
peace and friendship, which is in tum based on the virtue of the citizens.
Cousar, Philippians and Philemon, 28; Geoffrion, The Rhetorical Purpose and the Political and
Military Character ofPhilippians, 1 64-65 ; Witherington, Paul 's Letter to the Philippians, 53 .
Joy: 1:4, 18, 25; 2:2, 17-18, 28, 29; 3:1; 4:1, 4, 10.
Sharing/participations (Koivcovia and its cognates): 1:5, 7; 2:1; 3:10; 4:14, 15.
Gospel: 1 :5, 7, 12, 16, 27; 2:22; 4:3, 15.
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4.2.1 KoLVcovta^^
Following the letter opening is Paul's thanksgiving (Phil 1:3-1 1), in which Paul gives
thanks to God for the Philippians, for their "fellowship in the Gospel" (KOLvuvia dQ xb
6uaYYeA.L0v) (Phil 1:5).^^ The word root kolvco- is mentioned again later in Phil 1:7 where
Paul speaks of the Philippians as partakers with him in grace (ouYKOLvcovout; pou xf\Q
xdpLTo;). The ouv-prefix highlights the bonding, togetherness, and unity of the Christian
community. In both passages (Phil 1 :5, 7), Paul speaks of the Philippians' participation in
his ministry. Paul is referring most likely to their financial aid (cf Phil 4:10-20).
The word KOLvcovia is distinctively Pauline, used 13 fimes by Paul out of the 19
occurrences in the nt.^^ Cognates related to KOLvcovLa also abound in Paul's letters.^'*
Philippians contains 6 words related to Koii^wvLa scattered evenly throughout the letter
(Phil 1:5, 7; 2:1; 3:10; 4:14, 15).
Thinking/Mind: 1:7; 2:2, 5; 3:15, 19; 4:2, 8, 10.
Being convinced: 1:6, 14, 25; 2:24; 3:3.
Imprisonment: 1:7, 12-14, 19-26, 30; 4:14.
Compassion/Love: 1:8, 9, 16; 2:1-2, 12; 4:1
Being in Christ: 1:1, 13, 26; 2:1, 5; 3:14; 4:7, 19,21.
Gain in Christ: 1:21; 3:7, 8.
All: 1:4, 7, 8, 25; 2:17, 26; 4:21
Philippians' gift: 1:3, 5; 2:26; 4:10-20
Future eschatological references: 1:6, 10; 2:16; 3:11-12, 20-21
^' For bibliography on the study ofKOLVcovLa see Peterman, Paul s Giftfrom Philippi, 41 . Cf Friedrich
Hauek, "kolvo?, koivwvoq, kolvcovIco, KOLvuvia, ktX," TDNT 3:7S9-i09; J. Schattenmann, "Fellowship, Have,
Share, Participate: Koivuvia," NIDNTT 1 :639-44.
Bockmuehl rightly translated it as "partnership in the gospel." "In" is used in the sense of "a vested
interest in." Bockmuehl, The Epistle to the Philippians, 60.
Acts 2:42; Rom 15:26; 1 Cor 1:9; 10:16; 2 Cor 6:14; 8:4; 9:13; 13:13; Gal 2:9; Phil 1:5; 2:1; 3:10;
Phlm 1:6; Heb 13:16; 1 John 1:3, 6, 7.
KoLvcoygco (Rom 12:13; 15:27; Gal 6:6; Phil 4:15; 1 Tim 5:22; cf Heb 2:14; 1 Pet 4:13; 2 John 1:11);
KOLycoyLKOQ (1 Tim 6:18); KOLvcovog (1 Cor 10:18, 20; 2 Cor 1:7; 8:23; Phlm 1:17; cf Matt 23:30; Luke 5:10;
Heb 10:33; 1 Pet5:l;2Pet 1:4); ouYKOLvcoyoq (Rom 11:17; 1 Cor 9:23; Eph 5:1 1; Phil 1:7; 4:14; cf Rev 1:9;
18:4).
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Three times the word KOLvoovia appears in the thanlcsgiving section ofPaul's letters
(1 Cor 1 :9; Phil 1 :5; Phlm 1 :6). A comparison of these three appearances and their
immediate context reveals its significance in Paul's thought.
1 Cor 1:8-9
He (bg) will aso
strengthen you to the
end (PePaicooeL upag
ewe; xkXovc], blameless
on the day of our Lord
Jesus Christ (kv xr\
rp.kpa TOU KoupCou
f)(ia)y 'Itioou xplotoO).
God is faithful; by him
you were called into the
fellowship (elc;
KoivcovLav) of his Son,
Jesus Christ our Lord.
Phil 1:3-7
I thank my God every time I remember
you, constantly praying with joy in
everyone of my prayers for all of you,
because of your fellowship in the gospel
(KOiVQVia upcSy eic, to euayY^KLOv) from
the first day until now. I am confident of
this, that the one who began a good
work (epyov dyaQbv) among you will
bring it to completion {4ttlt�/160�l) by the
day of Jesus Christ (axpi rp.kpoLQ xplotou
'Irjoou). It is right for me to think this way
about all of you, because you hold me in
your heart, for all of you share
(ouyKOLVCJVoug) in God's grace with me,
both in my imprisonment and in the
defense and confirmation of the gospel.
Phlm 1:6
I pray that the
fellowship (f)
KOLvcovLtt) of your faith
may become effective
(evepYTig) when you
preceive (eiTLYvwoeL) all
the good that we may
do unto Christ (eiq
XpioTov).
Three conclusions can be drawn from this comparison: (1) All Christ-followers participate
in the KOLVQVLa. In 1 Cor 1 :9, Paul affirms that the Corinthians already have been called
(6KA,r|9r|T�; aorist passive) into the KOLVcovia. In Philippians, the KOLvcovia came into
existence on "the first day," presumably the day that the Philippians received the gospel. In
Phlm 6, Paul prays that the fellowship may become effective, assuming that it is already in
existence though not in the state ofbeing effective. The words Paul uses�"call" and "from
the first day"�suggest that the event of entering into the KOLvcovLa takes place once a
person claims Jesus Christ as his or her Lord. The KoivwyCa coincides with the experience
of conversion. To become a Christ-follower is to enter into the Christ-KOLvcovLa. Just as the
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Greco-Roman citizens are defined by tlieirpolis?^ so too are Clirist-fi)llowers defined by
their participafion in the Christ-KOLvcovLa. Since "having the spirit ofChrist" is also one of
the defining characteristics of the Christian existence (Rom 8:9),^^ Paul can at times define
the KOLVQVLtt as the KOLVcovia of the Spirit (Phil 2:1; 2 Cor 13:14).
(2) The KOLvcovLa will be made complete on the day ofChrist Jesus. Both passages
from 1 Corinthians and Philippians explicitly mention the day ofChrist's second coming.
Both also refer to the concept ofxkXoc,. Philemon mentions a rather cryptic phrase "unto
Christ" (elg xpiotov). N. T. Wright argues that "Christ" fiinctions as shorthand for "the fiiU
and mature life of those in Christ," as in Eph 4:12-13.^^ If true, then "unto Christ" also
may have an eschatological overtone, for Paul teaches in Philippians that the full
conformation to Christ will be fiilfilled only on the day of the Lord Jesus Christ (Phil 3:21).
Thus, the phrase "unto Christ" conveys both the sense of "being mature as Christ" and
"looking forward onto Christ."^^
Clearly, for Paul, the KOLvcovia has both a starting point and an end point. Between
the two is a process of development under the guidance of God's hand. The Christ-
KOLVQVia has neither achieved the state ofperfection, nor has it been caught in the state of
Arjan Zuiderhoek writes, "The oldpolis ideal, which defined the city essentially as a community of
people, of citizens, had remained central to Greek civic ideology during the Roman imperial period. This is
evident, for instance, from the way cities always described themselves, or were referred to, as a commimity
ofpeople - the Athenians, the Pergamenes, the Prusans - instead of a place" {The Politics ofMunificence in
the Roman Empire: Citizens, Elites, and Benefactors in Asia Minor [Greek Culture in the Roman World;
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009], 71).
Commenting on Rom 8:9, James D. G. Dunn writes, "hi this verse, in fact, Paul provides the nearest
thing to a definition of a Christian (someone who is 'ofChrist'). And the definition is in terms of the Spirit"
{The Theology ofPaul the Apostle [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1998], 423).
N. T. Wright, The Epistles ofPaul to the Colossians and to Philemon: An Introduction and
Commentary (TNTC; Downers Grove, 111: InterVarsity, 1986), 183.
Douglas J. Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon (The Pillar New Testament
Commentary; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2008), 394.
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stagnation perpetually struggling against sin and weakness.^^ Rather, the Christ-KOLVcoyLa
is always on its way toward perfection. God is at work in the Christ community, nurturing
it so that it may grow and become mature. Paul describes God's work with different verbs:
God will strengthen the fellowship; God will bring it into completion; God will make it
effective. These verbs suggest different degrees ofmaturity for the Christ-KOLvojvLa. The
KOLVcovLa can be more or less strengthened, more or less complete, and more or less
effective.^*^
(3) The KOLVcovLtt exists in relation to Christ.^' In all three passages the concept of
KOLVCovLtt is modified by some genitive construction. In 1 Cor 1:9, KoivwyCa is modified
by the genitive phrase tou uIoij auTou 'Irioou Xpioxou tou Kupiou fipwy. In Phlm 6, it is
modified by the genitive phrase: Tfig ttlot6(oq oou. In Phil 1:5, it is modified both by the
genitive pronoun upcov and the prepositional phrase eiQ to euayye/lLOi'. All three cases
either feature an implicit or explicit reference to Christ Jesus. In 1 Cor 1 :9 the reference is
explicit. In Phlm 6, the modifying phrase "your faith" is mentioned in the previous verse as
James Durai for example argues that Rom 7 indicates "an ongoing state� 'with my mind I go on
serving the law ofGod, and with my flesh [I go on serving] the law of sin'" {The Theology ofPaul the
Apostle, 473-77, here 474).
Victor Furnish once claimed the idea of a progressive moral achievement is incompatible with
Paul's teaching. Furnish, Theology andEthics in Paul, 239-41. However, this claim is problematic. J. Paul
Sampley rightly argues that "Paul assumes that believers make progress, by the working of the Holy Spirit
and by the mutual care among believers, toward maturity, toward salvation which will fiilly and finally occur
at the day ofChrist.... Images ofprogress, growth, and movement prevail as Paul delineates the life
appropriate to such grand design" ("Reasoning from the Horizons ofPaul's Thought World: A Comparison
ofGalatians and Philippians," in Theology andEthics in Paul andHis Interpreters [Nashville: Abingdon,
1 996], 1 1 6). See also J. Paul Sampley, Walking between the Times: Paul 's Moral Reasoning (Minneapolis:
Forfress, 1991).
^'
George Panikulam, in his study of KOLvcjvLa, writes, "Pauline kolvcovlk is first and foremost
Christocentric" {Koinonia in the New Testament: A Dynamic Expression ofChristian Life [Rome: Pontificio
Instituto Biblico, 1979], 108, cf 105).
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faith "toward Jesus Christ."^^ In Phil 1:5, KOLvwvLa is modified by the gospel, which has
Christ at its content (Rom 1:2-4; Phil 1:27).
In sum, in all three passages, Paul reminds his recipients that they are part of the
fellowship related to and characterized by Jesus Christ and that the fellowship is in an up
building process striving toward perfection. Interestingly, all three letters are deliberative
letters on concord. The strife and conflict within the Christ-KOLvcovia reminds the KOLvcoyCa
of its imperfection. Though the churches are imperfect, they are nonetheless a KOLVcovia.
The KOLVcovia awaits to be fully realized. It is still in the process ofbeing perfected.^^
These three passages show the concept of KOLVcovia playing a crucial role in Paul's
urge for unity. Nonetheless, the exact nature and function ofKoiycovia in Philippians needs
further exploration. This thesis will explore the use of KoivcovLa in the Greco-Roman world
and how this usage relates to the major themes ofPhilippians: (1) fiiendship; (2) the polis;
and (3) the idea of the public good.^'*
Paul may have intended a chiastic structure: oou ttiv dYairriv... [oou] xriv itlotlv... ex^L? trpcx; tov
Kupiov 'Irjoouv... el? iravTaq xohc, kyioMQ (Phlm 5). Faith is faith toward the Lord Jesus.
Panikulam, after examining all KOLVcjvia occurrences in Paul, makes the exact same conclusion
when he writes, "Paul presents Kotvcovta as an 'already' - 'not yet' reality, ft is a present reality because it
has significance and foundation in the life of the community in this life. It is an eschatological reality,
because a final accomplishment ofKOLvcovia is possible only at the Parousia. Hence almost always Paul hints
to a growth in KoivcjVLa" {Koinonia in the New Testament, 108).
Paul's use of KOLvcovia in Philippians has been explored to some extent by Paul Sampley, Julia Fogg,
and Richard Ascough. Paul Sampley attempts to equate KOLVcovLa with Roman societas {Pauline Partnership
in Christ: Christian Community and Commitment in Light ofRoman Law [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980]). His
attempt has been criticized by many scholars as unjustified, for there are no real commercial technical terms
in Philippians to make that cormection necessary. Sampley's proposal, however, has been further developed
by Brian Capper, "Paul's Dispute with Philippi: Understanding Paul's Argument in Phil 1-2 from His Thanks
in 4.10-20," TZ 49 (1993). Capper suggests that "the reason for the interruption of the flow of support from
the Philippians to Paul, evident in the 'thankless thank' of4:10, was Paul's imprisonment itself The
Philippians had viewed this as a breach of their initial confract with Paul [i.e., their societas with Paul], and
had in consequence cut the flow of fiinds" (ibid., 209).
Julia Fogg made Koivcovia one of the major themes ofher thesis, but she does not explore the
meaning of the word in its historical context. She reads theology into the word and defines KOLvtovia as "the
practices, dispositions, and way of reasoning that Paul and the Philippians share with one another"
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4.2.1.1 KoLucduia and Friendship
The Mytileanaean envoys, in a speech recorded by Thucydides, explains why they
chose to revolt against Athens. Their explanation touches upon issues such as the meaning
of justice and the meaning of friendship:
We will first discuss the question of justice and virtue (dpetfiQ), especially as we are
seeking an alliance, for we know that neither does friendship i^\Mmi) between men
prove lasting, nor does a league (KoivcovLav) between states come to aught, unless
they comport themselves with reputed virtue towards one another and are of like
character and way of thinking (oiiolotpottol); for differences in men's actions arise
from the diversity of their convictions (ev tco 6LaA.A.(xooovtL xv\q yi^wptlt;).
(Thucydides, 3.10.1)
Thucydides viewed friendship between individuals and KOLywvia between states as
isomorphic. In other words, he parallels friendship with KOLvwyia. Also, in Thucydides'
view, the existence ofboth fiiendship and KOLVcovta relies on virtue and like manners of
Hfe.
In Plato's Symposium, Pausanias asserts the existence of two kinds of love: common
love and heavenly love. Common love is a debased form of love based on immediate
grafification and sexual desires. On the contrary, heavenly love is based on virtue. Plato
writes, "this love that belongs to the heavenly Goddess. . .compels lover and beloved alike
to feel a zealous concem for their own virtue" (Plato, Symp. 184b). This heavenly love,
Pausanias argues, is a threat to the despofic govemment, for it is against their interest "to
have lofty notions engendered in their subjects, or any strong friendships and communions
{^iXiac, Loxupdg Kal KOLvwyiac); all ofwhich Love is pre-eminently apt to create" (Plato,
("Koinonia Is Soteria: Paul's Theological Reading of Practices in His Letter to the Philippians" [Graduate
School ofEmory University, 2006], 66-67).
Richard Ascough reads KOLvuvia in terms ofvoluntary associations, but this reading fails to account
for the po/w-related terminologies framing the letter. See Richard S. Ascough, Paul's Macedonian
Associations: The Social Context ofPhilippians and 1 Thessalonians (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen
Zum Neuen Testament. 2. Reihe; Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 1 10-60.
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Symp. 182c). Here friendship and KOLvcoyia are freated as identical. Both are engendered
by love that compels to virtue.
Later in the Symposium, Plato reports a speech from Diotima (Plato, Symp. 203b-
209e). Diotima argues that human beings Mke animals seek immortality. While animals
seek immortality through the pregnancy of the body, virtuous persons seek it through the
pregnancy of the soul:
If he [the virtuous] chances also on a soul that is fair and noble and well-endowed, he
gladly cherishes the two combined in one; and sfraightway in addressing such a
person he is resourcefril in discoursing of virtue and what should be the good man's
character and what his pursuits; and so he takes in hand the other's education. (Plato,
Symp. 209b-c)
The result of this pregnancy, according to Plato, would be "a far fuller community. . .and a
far surer friendship" (110X1) peiCo) KOLycovLav...Kal ^ilAv pePaiotepav). The children
produced through such processes will have the highest and fairest part of prudence that
will enable them to regulate cities and households (Plato, Symp. 209a). In sum, through
education�^the instillation of virtue�"community and friendship" will be composed of
people who are prudent, capable of stabilizing the city (cf Plato, Gor. 507e-508a).
Demosthenes in his speech against Philip, chastises the Greeks for their
unwillingness to cooperate and stand together against Philip:
We [the Greeks] are in such a miserable position, we have so entrenched ourselves in
our different cities, that to this day we can do nothing that our interest (xcov
oupcjjepoyTwv) or our duty demands; we cannot combine, we cannot take any common
pledge ofhelp or friendship (KOLycoytay poriBeiac Kal ^vXlac^; but we idly watch the
growing power of this man [Philip]. . .making not an effort for the salvation
(oojOiioexaL) ofGreece. (Demosthenes, 5 Philip. 28)
Demosthenes equates the "community of help" with "friendship," evoking the old Greek
proverb: helping friends and harming enemies. Friendship is a community composed of
people willing to help one another. Also, the community of friendship is characterized by
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the pursuit of common interest and the willingness to cooperate with another against the
common foe. In Demosthenes' view, if only the Greeks would solidify themselves as a
community of friendship could they win that battle against Philip and secure their salvation.
Aristotle claims that "in every partnership (KOLVcovia) we find... friendship (^ilia)"
(Aristofie, Eth. nic. 8.9.1-2; 8.12.1). No community can do without friendship. All
communities are built on the foundation of fiiendship.^^
Arius Didymus in his Epitome ofStoic Ethics defines fiiendship as "a partnership in
life" (KOLvcou'Lay pCou; Arius Didymus, Epit. 51). This defmifion parallels the definition of
harmony (o\)\x^(jiviav), which is defined as "an agreement in beliefs concerning matter in
life" (ibid.) These two concepts�fiiendship and harmony�are closely related, for in Stoic
thought fiiendship exists only among the wise (Arius Didymus, Epit. 1 Im). Furthermore,
wise persons always share knowledge of common goods (Arius Didymus, Epit. 1 lb).
Therefore, harmony and concord always exist among friendship. In stoic thought,
fiiendship implies harmony. In short, Didymus relates KOLvcovLa closely with friendship,
with agreement, and with concord. In Dio Chrysostom's view, fiiendship is to share
community with one another (to KOLVcovglv dllr\XoiQ).
The close connection between KOLvwyia and friendship is also expressed by the
popular Greek proverb: "friends have all things in common" (kolvoc toc i^iXuiv; Euripides,
Orest. 729; Andr. 357; Plato, Phaedr. 279c; Resp. 424a, 449c, 462c; Leg. 739c; Lysis 207c;
Aristofie, fr/z. nic. 8.9.1, 9.8.2; Po/. 2.2.4; Flutarch, Adul. amic. 65a; Quaest. com. 74Se\
Yack takes Aristotle's word seriously and argues that "even in the relatively fleeting and impersonal
communities formed by exchangers and travelers, develop some form ofboth friendship and justice" (The
Problems ofa Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political Thought [Berkeley:
University of Califomia Press, 1993], 34); and that there is a sense ofmutual concem "even in impersonal
and transitory social groups" (ibid., 37). He agrees with Aristotle that "the most important features of any
community are the forms of friendship and justice that develop among its members" (ibid., 54).
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Amat. 767e; DL 6.72; 8. 10; 1 0. 1 1). This proverb is a widely attested in the Greco-Roman
world. Aristides, for example, appropriating Plato's thought, argues that "sharing in
common" is the means to achieve concord:
It is fitting that all things be held in common (kolvoc mvxa) by those who will have
as good a life as possible (KaXXioxa). For where each has separate possessions, what
is expedient for each is also separate. Hence stasis, battles (pdcxai), and disputes
(6La(l)opaL). � -But where men believe that possessions belong to all in common, they
also have a common point of view about them. (Aristides, De pace 65)
Sharing in common is a mark of friendship. It helps to foster common views among
citizens in order to prevent stasis and promote concord. Dio Chrysostom resorts to the
same ideal in his speech on concord. He exhorts the Nicomedians to befriend the Nicaeans
like "brothers who share completely." This action allows both parties to gain greater
wealth, for nothing would be divided and the whole would belong to both (Dio
Chrysostom, Nicom. 45-46; cf 3 Regn. 110; Borysth. 22).
The Romans, Jews, and early Christians also appreciate and appropriate this ideal of
friends sharing all things in common: (1) Cicero, for example, argues that all human
beings are bound together by "reason and speech" (ratio et oratio), united in a sort of
natural fraternity (natura ferarum). Therefore, whatever is not privately owned should be
shared as common property, as the Greek proverb dictates: "among friends all things in
common" (amicorum esse communia omnia) (Cicero, Q^1.51). (2) Philo, rewriting Gen
14:17-24, has the high priest set up a feast for all who joined Abraham's expedition,
celebrating with them in joy, as if the feast were commemorating his own victory. This act
of sharing, in feast and in emotion, is, according to Philo, an act of friendship, for
Kathy Eden, Friends HoldAll Things in Common: Tradition, Intellectual Property, and the Adages
ofErasmus (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). In pages 33-108, Kathy explores how this theme is
played out in the works ofPlato, Aristotle, and Cicero.
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"common" (Koiyot;) is wliat characterizes friendship (Philo, Abr. 235). (3) Acts twice refers
to this theme in Acts 2:44 and in Acts 4:32.^^ The author of Didache wams his church
members not to tum away from persons in need, "but shall share everything in common
with your brothers and sisters" (Did 4:8).^^
To conclude, in the Greco-Roman world, the concept of KOLVoyia is tied closely to
the concept of fiiendship. Whoever speaks of KOLVQVLa, speaks also of friendship.
4.2.1.2 KoLi^coma and the Polis
For Plato, the bestpolis constitutes a community of pleasure and pain (f) fi6oyf)(;
Kttl XuTTric KOLVQVLtt). As such, the polis is a community of friends. This ideal is made clear
in a passage in the Laws:
That State and polity come first, and those laws are best, where there is observed as
carefliUy as possible throughout the whole State the old saying that "friends have all
things in common." As to this condition... in which there is community ofwives,
children, and all chattels, and all that is called "private" is everywhere and by every
means rooted out of our life. . .no one will ever lay down another definition that is
tmer or better than these conditions in point of super-excellence. (Plato, Leg. 739bd;
cf 807b)
The best polis features mutual sharing of all goods in common. Nothing is left private.
Citizens become friends to one another.
KoLvcovLtt in Aristotle's understanding refers to any form of social group, whether
marriage, family, polis, or intemational relationship. Whenever and wherever people come
together and share things in common, they participate in a KOLvcovia.
Karl Olav Sandnes, A New Family: Conversion and Ecclesiology in the Early Church with Cross-
Cultural Comparisons (Studien Zur Interkulturellen Geschichte Des Christentums; Bern: Peter Lang, 1994),
138-41.
The text as a whole reads as follows: "You shall not tum away from someone in need, but shall
share (ouyKOLvcovTioeLi;) everything with yoiu" brother or sister, and do not claim that anything is your own
(ifiLa). For it you are sharers (kolvcovol) in what is imperishable, how much more so in perishable things."
Aaron Milavec claims that KOLvuvCa in Didache resembles a kind of "business partnership." He speaks of
Didache's attempt to build an economic safety net. Aaron Milavec, The Didache: Faith, Hope, & Life of the
Earliest Christian Communities, 50-70 CE (New York: Nevwnan, 2003), 173-228.
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For Aristotle, the polis is a specific form of the genus KoivcovLa. As such, he writes,
"every polis is a sort of KOLvcovLa" (Aristotle, Pol. 1.1.1).^^ Every KOLVcovia is formed with
a view to some good. For example, the household "comes about in the course of nature for
everyday purposes" (Aristotle, Pol 1.1.6). The village comes into existence as an
aggregation of households for the satisfaction of needs beyond daily life (Aristotle, Pol
1.1.7). As the most supreme form of KOLycoyia, the polis encompasses both the household
and the village and exists for the purpose of obtaining the most supreme of all goods, that
is for the sake of good life (Aristotle, Pol. 1.1.8).
In Aristotle's understanding, every being goes through a process of development,
from potential to completion. When the process of development ends, the result is refered
to as the "nature" of that being. Thus, for Aristotle, "every polis exists by nature," meaning
that the polis is the end and mature form of KOLvcovia. All other KoivcovLa are the
constituent parts of the polis.
Dio Chrysostom holds a similar view. He uses KOLvcovLa as a generic term for
marriage {Cone. Apam. 27), family (7 Regn. 40), business association {Cone. Apam. 27),
polis {Borysth. 31; De pace 2), intemational relationship {Nicom. 43), and the universe
{Cone. Apam. 39). The essence ofKOLvovia is the sharing of goods. As such, the term is
associated with friendship and concord, and stands in contrast to envy and strife.
Yack writes, "Aristotle differs from most modem social theorists in that he treats community as a
generic rather than a specific social category. He uses it to characterize all social groups rather than to
characterize one especially close and highly integrated form of social life" (The Problems ofa Political
Animal, 309).
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Cicero defines tlie res publico as res populi (the property of the people; Resp. 1.39,
41, 43; 3.45). It is a partnership for the common good (utilitatis communion sociatus).
Sociatus roughly corresponds to the Greek KOLVcovia.'*'^
To conclude, in the Greco-Roman world, the polis is viewed widely as a form of
KOLVcovLa. Employing the term KOLVcovia in Phil 1:5 and 1:7, Paul thus anticipates thepolis
imagery that frames the letter as a whole.
4.2.1.3 Public, in Contrast to One's Own
The polis as a form of KOLUcovia is also expressed through the Greek concept of "the
public" (toc kolvoc). Citizens of the polis must be actively engaged in politics and in the
affairs of the public life. To confine oneself to the private life is an act of dishonor."*' In the
private life one seeks his or her own advantage. In the public life one seeks the advantage
of the community. In other words, living in the polis, a Koivcovia characterized by
friendship, one must leam to go beyond, ifnot forgo, one's self-interest and seek the
interest of the common good."^^
Thucydides, for example, thinks that "it is the duty of leaders, while equitably
considering their own interests (toc Ibia), to have special regard for the commonweal (toc
kolvoc)" (Thucydides, Hist. 1.120.1). Isocrates praises the Athenians of the past, for they
treated the public affairs with great care as if they were treating their own affairs:
For they did not slight the commonwealth (tqv kolvcov), nor seek to profit by it as
their ovm possession (l6l(ov), nor yet neglect it as the concem of others; but were as
careful of the public revenues as of their private property (olKeicov), yet abstained
from them as men ought from that to which they have no right. (Isocrates, Paneg. 77)
Cicero sometimes uses the communitas for KOLVUvLa.
The Epicureans for this reason are repeatedly scorned by the politicians and the philosophers of the
Greco-Roman era.
Chang, "Paul's Use of Part-Whole Argument of to Sympheron in 1 Corinthians", 95-136.
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He also gives praise to the one who is "more frugal in what he spends on his own
household (tolc; 16lolc;) than in what he pays out for the commonweal (tolc; kolvolc;)"
(Isocrates, Antid ISS)."*^ He thinks that a citizen "ought to be as much concemed about the
commonweal (tqv KOLvwy) as about their own (tcov l6L(oy)" (Isocrates, De pace 13).
Persons who cause troubles in the cities "look upon a state of peace which is for the good
of all (ttiv tolc; alloic, kolvtiv) as a state ofwar upon their selfish interest (tolc; auTcov
L6lolc;)" (Isocrates, P?iil. 73).
Plato radically demands that all things be shared in common leaving nothing in
private ClSloc;): "the city is best ordered in which the greatest number use the expression
'mine' and 'not mine' of the same things in the same way" (Plato, Resp. 462c).
Demosthenes claims that the citizen must leam to "put aside your own private (toc;
lSlkc;) feuds and aim at what is most to the common good (to KOLvfi)" (Demosthenes,
Exord. 12.2) . Centuries later Dio Chrysostom claims that for cities to be stable, citizens
must get rid of the vices of envy, greed, and contentiousness, for these vices "strive to
promote one's own welfare (aii^eLV eauxov) at the expense of both one's native land and
the commonweal (to KOLvf) oupcj)6poy)" (Dio Chrysostom, 2 Tars. 19).
In sum, the idea of KOLVCovLa closely relates to the idea of friendship. KoLvwvLa
involves the act of sharing, a fimction of friendship as the Greek proverb dictates: "friends
share all things together" (kolvoc toc ^iXwv). Friendship is both the necessary and sufficient
condition for the KoivcovLa. Wherever friendship exists, so does KOLVOvCa. Conversely,
wherever kolvcov [a exists, so does friendship. All social organizations involve some form
The contrast between "private" and "public" is found often in Isocrates' public speeches (Isocrates,
De pace 4, 52, 55, 127, 133; Paneg. 1 [concemed with the public even when in private], 15, 57, 78; Areop.
3\, 52; Antid 180, 262, 276).
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of sharing. Thus, every social organization is a form of KOLVQvia. As such, the polis is also
a KOLVQVLtt. Paul speaks of the church as a KOLVQvia, thereby anticipating one of the major
themes of this letter, namely, the church as a polis involving friendship.
Moreover, in the political realm, the concept of the kolvcov ta often involves the
tension between "the public" and "the private."'*^ Political theoreticians, on the theoretical
end, often debate the balance of these two terms. Orators, on the practical end, often urge
citizens to forgo their private interests and show more concem for the public. This tension
between the "private good" and "public good" is found also in Philippians: "Let each of
you look not to your own interests, but to the interest of others" (Phil 2:4). This theme will
be explored in greater detail later in 4.5.4.
4.2.2 "Epyov
In Phil 1:6, Paul expresses his confidence that God "who began a good work (epyov
dyaGov) among you (ev uptv) will bring it to completion (eTTLxeXeoeL) by the day of Jesus
Christ." This section will examine the meaning of the phrase "good work.""*^
The chronological sequence that begins "from the first day" (Phil 1:5), "until now"
(Phil 1 :5), and up to the "completion by the day of Jesus Christ" (Phil 1 :6) suggests that
epyov dyaGov in Phil 1 :6 is related to the kolvcov [a mentioned in Phil 1:5. Furthermore, as a
supporting argument for Paul's confidence in God's completion of the good work, Phil 1 :7
West writes, "the language of KOLvcovia calls attention to and rebukes those members of the
community who forsake the common good in favor of their own self-interest (cf Phil 1:15-17; 2:21)"
("Whether by Life or by Death", 25).
'^^ Hawthome and Martin argues that good works refers to God's new creation when he writes, "As in
the first creation God accomplished his work (ipyov) by his word. . .so now in the new creation God will
accomplish this 'good work' Cepyov dya^ov), that of advancing the gospel by human means and, in this
instance, by the Philippian church" {Philippians, 24). See note 47 below.
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also mentions the KOLvcovia shared between Paul and the Philippians."*^ In other words,
Paul's confidence in the completion of the good work is both triggered by the existing
KOLvcovLa and made confident by the same KOLvuvta. This framing suggests that the good
work is related to the concept of KOLVcoyia. However, interestingly, Paul puts neither a
demonstrative pronoun nor an article on the phrase "good work" for it to refer back to the
KOLvcovLa in Phil 1 :5. Thus, there seems to be both continuity and discontinuity between
these two concepts."*^
For Paul, the Philippians' fellowship in the gospel certainly is a sign that God has
begun a good work in them. However, the work is yet to be completed. Apparently, Paul
anticipates more of their fellowship than simply the sharing ofmaterial goods. To
participate in the ministry shows only the beginning ofGod's work. It is far more
important that the fellowship should grow and become mature in conformity to the gospel.
To participate in the missionary work of spreading of the gospel is one thing; to be fiilly
transformed by the gospel is another. Paul expects them to be part of the fellowship of
Christ suffering and of his resurrection (Phil 3:10). He wants them to become a community
that is pure and blameless (Phil 1:10). And this would require both the work of love (Phil
1 :9) and the work of justice (Phil 1 : 1 1)."*^
Regarding Phil 1 :7 as a ground for confidence see Marvin Richardson Vincent, A Critical and
Exegetical Commentary on the Epistles to the Philippians and to Philemon (ICC; New York: C. Scribner's
Sons, 1897), 8.
O'Brien also finds tension in the text: "The expression [ipyov kya^ov] refers to the new creation
that he had begun in them, while their eager participation in Paul's gospel ministry was not the good work
itself, but clear evidence of this work of salvation" {The Epistle to the Philippians, 64). However, salvation
should be understood in context as the unity of the KOLvtovCa (Phil 1 :27-30), not in general sense of
completing the work of the new creation.
See below 4.2.4 and 4.2.5.
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Concepts related to Ipyov occur frequently throughout the letter. These concepts fr)rm
a thread throughout the letter. In Phil 1:22, Paul speaks ofhis "fruitfiil labor" (Kapirog
epyou) in the flesh, related to the progress of the Philippians. In Phil 2:12 and 13, Paul
encourages the Philippians to "workout" (KaxepydCopaL) their own salvation. The
Philippians have God at their help. God will enable them both to will and to work
(eyepyeXv). In Phil 2:25, Paul introduces Epaphroditus as his co-worker (ouvepyoc). They
together become an exemplar for the Philippians to follow. They show the Philippians
what it means to be a co-worker of another. In Phil 3:2, people who boast in the flesh
become exemplars ofwhat it means to be an evil co-worker. In Phil 3:21, the progress of
the Philippians will be completed according to the "the outworking (ttiv evepyeLav) of his
[Jesus'] ability to subject all things to him."
In the Greek ethical tradition, kpyov plays an important role by taking the meaning of
"ftinction." Every object has a fimction (epyov). The virtue ofan object is none other than
the wellfunctioning of the object?^ Thus, the virtue of the knife is to cut well. The virtue
'''"Epyov in Aristotle's understanding is the characteristic activity ofan object (see also Plato, Resp.
352d-354a). Everything, in Aristotle's view, has an 'epyov. Just as the eye, the hand, and the foot, each has its
own epyov, so the human being also has its own epyov. The human epyov is not self-preservation, nor
generation, nor growth, for these are functions that human beings share in common with animals and plants.
These activities fail to characterize the human being. Nor is intentional motion the 'epyov of the human being,
for that is a shared feature of both human beings and animals. Beyond the mere life ofplants, and the
perceptive life of the animals, human beings live a rational life. The human conduct is characterized as
rational and purposeful. Human conduct is not determined by nature, nor is it determined by perceived
pleasure, but by the desire that is formulated through deliberation according to reason. But then what has this
to do with ethics? Aristotle's answer is as follows:
If then the function ofman is the activity of the soul in accordance with, or not without rational
principle, and ifwe acknowledge the fimction of an individual and of a good individual of the same
class (for instance, a harper and a good harper, and so generally with all classes) to be generically the
same, the qualification of the latter' s superiority in excellence being added to the function in his case
(I mean that if the function of a harper is to play the harp, that of a good harper is to play the harp
well): if this is so, and ifwe declare that the function ofman is a certain form of life, and this an
activity (evepyetav) and actions (-rrpd^eLg) in association with rational principle ([iexd loyou), and say
that the mark of a good man is to perform these activities well (eC) and rightly (KaAco;) and if an action
is well performed when it is performed in accordance with its own proper excellence�from these
premises it follows that the human good is the activity of soul in conformity with excellence (Kax'
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of the flute player is to play the flute well. Speaking of the epyov dyaGov of the Christ-
fellowship, one might ask the question: what is the epyov of the Christ-fellowship? And
what makes it function well (dyaGov)? In the Greco-Roman ethical tradition, the
development of virtue (i.e., to function well or to function in excellence) always involves
the habit of choosing (4.3.3), the use ofpractical wisdom (4.5.2), and the practice of
virtuous acts (4.6.1). These themes are found also in Philippians. They will be explored
later in this thesis. Suffice it to say that the concept ofepyov dyaGov anticipates a string of
concepts related to one ofmajor prominent themes in Philippians, namely, the
development of virtue.
4.2.3 Knowledge and Perception
Paul ends his thanksgiving with a prayer.^� Paul prays for the Philippians, that their
love for one another^' may be informed by the increase of "knowledge and fiill insight"
(eTTLyvoSoeL Kal -rrdoTi aloGrioeL).^^
dpetriv), or if there be several human excellences, in conformity with the best and most perfect among
them. (Aristotle, nic. 1.7.14-15)
Aristotle begins with simple observation. Both the harper and the good harper have the same epyov. The
difference between a harper and a good harper is that the good harper performs his fimction well. From these
simple observations, Aristotle derives the general rule: an individual and a good individual of the same class
both have the same epyov. Their difference lies in that the good individual performs his or her epyov in
excellence. Aristotle then applies this general principle to the human being. The good human being has the
same epyov as all other human beings, namely, to act according to reason. The difference lies in that the good
human beings performs that epyov in excellence. An unqualified exercise of the human epyov, i.e., rationality,
will not make a human being good. To become a good human being one needs to do more than performing
the human epyov. One needs to perform that epyov in excellence in order to become a good human being.
Human beings are made good by their "good epyov."
^� The exordium often involves prayers. Demosthenes, for example, has the following prayer in the
exordium of his letter On Concord: "Accordingly I pray (eiixoiaai) to all the gods and goddesses that what is
best (apLOTov) for the democracy of the Athenians and for those who bear goodwill toward the democracy,
both now and for time to come, I may myself be moved to write and the members of the Assembly
(eKKlriOLdoaoLv) to adopt" (Demosthenes, Ep. 1.1; cf Exord. 25.3; 31.2; 50.1).
^' Love means "love for one another" (Phil 1:16; 2:2; cf 1 Thess 3:12). Some argue that love is love in
general with no limiting object. But Fee rightly claims that: "the context of the letter, however, suggests a
more focused concem." Fee, Paul's Letter to the Philippians, 98.
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The word kviyvwoiQ appears 15 times in Pauline literature (Rom 1:28; 3:20; 10:2;
Eph 1:17; 4:13; Phil 1:9; Col 1:9, 10; 2:2; 3:10; 1 Tim 2:4; 2 Tim 2:25; 3:7; Titus 1:1;
Phlm 1:6). In most instances the word relates to pragmatic matters of conduct rather than
to pure disinterested theoretical knowledge." Hackenberg is correct to claim knowledge as
the "recognition of (the will of) God that is effective in the conduct of the one who knows
God."^"* In Rom 1:28, for example, the knowledge is not disinterested theoretical
knowledge, but knowledge of the will of God that demands moral acts. In Rom 3:20, the
knowledge is to know the acts of sin. In Rom 10:3, Paul speaks of zealous acts not guided
by knowledge. In Phlm 6, the knowledge is about good deeds that can and must be done.^^
Here in Phil 1:9, knowledge is "practical knowledge that informs Christian love."^^ Later
in the letter Paul speaks of the importance of "knowing Christ" (Phil 3:7-8). This
knowledge is not theoretical knowledge; instead, it leads immediately to life in conformity
to Christ (Phil 3:8-1 1). For Paul, to know is to know Christ as the goal ofChristian virtue.
Christ is human at its excellence.^^ To live a virtuous life is to live like Christ.
AioOriOLc; is a hapax legomenon in the NT, but it appears often in Proverbs (LXX)
where it refers to moral understanding.^^ Nonetheless, in the Greco-Roman ethical tradition,
Paul A. Holloway argues this point convincingly when he writes, "In the construction tlvcc
TTepLOO�iJ�LV kv TLVL, it is uot thc subjcct (xLvd) that increases but the object of the preposition ev"
{Consolation in Philippians Philosophical Sources andRhetorical Strategy [Society for New Testament
Studies; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001], 93). This claim finds support in Rom 15:13 and 1
Cor 15:58.
Contra Bockmuehl, The Epistle to the Philippians, 67.
W. Hackenberg, "eTTLyvcjoL?," EDNT 2:25.
Its verbal form eTTLYLvcooKco appears 10 times in Rom 1:32; 1 Cor 13:12; 14:37; 16:18; 2 Cor 1:13,
14; 6:9; 13:5; Col 1:6; 1 Tim 4:3.
Hawthome and Martin, Philippians, 3 1 .
The Greek word for excellence is virtue.
Hansen, The Letter to the Philippians, 59.
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aioGrioLt; usually means "perception." Perception is the faculty that provides the conscious
awareness of one's surroundings (cf. Epictetus, Diatr. 1.27.17, 19). This faculty is shared
between human beings and the animals (Aristotle, Pol. 1.1.10).
In Aristotle's ethical theory, both yvcjOLg and aioBriOLc; play an important role in the
development of virtue. rvcooLg is responsible for setting the goal for the moral life:
Among the ends (xeXog) at which our actions aim there be one which we wish for its
own sake. . .it is clear that this one ultimate End must be the Good (TdyaGov), and
indeed the Supreme Good (to apioTov; cf Phil 3:10 [toc 6La(j)6povTa]). Will not then
a knowledge (yvcooLc;) of this Supreme Good be also of great practical importance for
the conduct of life? Will it not better enable us to attain what is fitting, like arches
having a target (okottov; cf Phil 3:4) to aim at? (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1.2.2)
This same message is repeated more than once in the Nicomachean Ethics (6. 1 . 1 ; 7. 1 1 . 1 ;
10.9.1).^^ Aristotle makes it clear that the purpose ofhis Nicomachean Ethics is to impart
knowledge about moral aims so people who want to live a happy life (which in Aristotle's
understanding is also a moral life) may know that to which they should aspire. For
Aristotle, to aim at happiness is to aim at virtues. The knowledge about the Supreme Good
(which is equivalent to happiness) can be simplified to knowledge about virtues, such as
courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom. Knowledge about these virtues provides the
aims for the moral life.
These aims are to be achieved, according to Aristotle, by means of 4)p6yrioLg
("pracfical wisdom"). OpovrioLg works in the form of the practical syllogism.^� It breaks
down the goal provided by knowledge into sub-goals, and sub-goals into smaller sub-goals.
Olav Eikeland, The Ways ofAristotle: Aristotelian Phronesis, Aristotelian Philosophy ofDialogue,
and Action Research (Studies in Vocational and Continuing Education; New York: Peter Lang, 2008), 272-
74.
''� Richard Sorabji, "Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue," in Essays on Aristotle 's Ethics (ed.
Amelie Rorty; Berkeley: University ofCalifomia Press, 1980), 201-19. See also David Bostock, Aristotle's
Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 123-42.
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until the goal reaches the behavioral level. In each stage the goal constitutes the major
premise; and the minor premise is supplied by perception.^' From these two premises,
practical wisdom derives the sub-level goal. If the practical wisdom functions well, the
sub-goal derived not only will be expedient but also noble and right and compatible with
the ultimate goal. Toward the end of this sequence sense-perception plays an important
role.^^ It supplies the fmal input that determines the action.^-^
So for Aristotle, moral reasoning takes two inputs: one is jviooiq^ which provides
the aim; the other is aloBr[oic, which provides the minor premise. From these two inputs
(j)p6yTiOL(; works to produce "the best" action possible.
Praying for the increase of k-niyvQoiQ and aloGrioLc;, Paul is asking God to provide the
resources for moral reasoning. With these resources at hand, believers will be able derive
"the best" through the Christ informed (^pov^oK; (4.5.2). The constant output of "the best"
is none other than the sign of the virtuous human being. Virtue then becomes the basis of
friendship; friendship, the basis of concord. Thus, knowledge and perception are important
for the well-being of the polis. Their importance is acknowledged also by rhetoricians.
Aristotle: "In a practical syllogism, the major premise is an opinion, while the minor premise deals
with particular things, which are the province ofperception" (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 7.3.9).
Robert B. Louden, "Aristotle's Practical Particularism," in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy
Volume IV: Aristotle 's Ethics (ed. John Peter Anton and Anthony Preus; Albany, N.Y.: State University of
New York Press, 1991).
Sorabji provides an example ofhow this practical syllogism might work: "Our conception of the
good life (to ariston) is a sort ofmajor premise (1 144a-32). Our perception that attack is required.. .is a minor
premise (1 143b3). The conclusion is either an action (attack) or a resolution to attack, which forms a major
premise for further reasoning.... For a final minor premise may be needed of an entirely different kind, one
that is supplied by sense-perception (1 147a26; b9-10), 'here is the enemy.' The ultimate conclusion is an
action...., though the interim conclusions in these cases will be resolutions" ("Aristotle on the Role of
Intellect in Virtue," 208-09).
" Rudolf Bultmann rightly notes that "there is no general distinction between the simple and
compound forms [of yvcoolq] in early Christian writings" ("ylvcookw, yv(I)Oi(;, kxX." TDNT I.IBI-ISS).
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Rhetoricians know that without knowledge and experience, citizens will be unable to
determine what is best for themselves and for the city:
For it is absurd that while those playing at odd and even show intelligence, and that
too when they are guessing and do not see the thing about which they make a guess,
yet those who are deliberating about public matters should display neither
intelligence (^uv�olv), nor knowledge {k-nLoxr]\xr\v), nor experience (�|i-rr6LpL(xv),
although these matters are sometimes of the greatest importance (tcov peyLOTcov),
such as concord and friendship (opovoiac; Kal (JjiA-Cag) of families and states, peace
and war, colonization and the organization of colonies, the treatment of children and
ofwives. (Dio Chrysostom, Consult. Sf^ cf. Herodotus, Hist. 3.81.2; Isocrates, ^reop.
19; Dio Chrysostom, 2 Tars. 28; Aristides, Depace 31)
4.2.4 The Holy Temple City
Abundant love in knowledge and perception is for the purpose of determining the
best. Determining the best in tum has the purpose ofmaking the Philippians "pure and
blameless" (elXiKpLvetc Kal d-rrpooKOTTOL) on the day of the Christ. This is holiness
language. This language is often associated with the language ofedification, for in Paul's
view the church is none other than the holy temple city ofGod.^^
Seeing the church as a holy temple city enables Paul in 1 Cor 3: 10 to speak of
himself as the master builder who lays the foundation upon which is the building of God (1
Cor 3:9). In 1 Cor 3:16a, Paul asks rhetorically: "Do you not know that you are God's
temple and that God's Spirit dwells in you? If any one destroys God's temple, God will
desfroy [that one]." Paul answers his own question when he writes, "For God's temple is
holy, and that temple you are" (1 Cor 3:16b). Again in 2 Cor 6:16, Paul claims that: "What
agreement is there between the temple ofGod and idols? For we are the temple of the
*^ The Greek title for this piece ofwork is irepl xoO pouA.eueo9aL ("On Deliberation"). In the text
Chrysostom also speaks of the importance of ^povrpiQ (Dio Chrysostom, Consult. 1).
The following paragraphs summarize the works of these two scholars: Luke Timothy Johnson,
Scripture & Discernment: Decision-Making in the Church (Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 120-25. Nicholas
Perrin, Jesus the Temple (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2010), 65-70.
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living God." Ephesians 2:19-22 echoes a similar claim when Paul declares both Jew and
Gentile as "members of the household ofGod, built upon the foundation of the apostles
and prophets, Christ Jesus himselfbeing the cornerstone, in whom the whole structure is
joined together and grows into the a holy temple in the Lord in whom you also are built
into it for a dwelling place ofGod in the Spirit" (cf Eph 3:17). In Galatians, the Christ-
followers are asked to choose between the present Jerusalem (the holy temple city) and the
Jerusalem above (Gal 4:21-31).^^ In 1 Thessalonians, Paul prays that the believers may be
strengthened to be "blameless in holiness before God." The term "before God" conveys the
idea of the sacred place. In Romans, Paul speaks of "spiritual worship" (Rom 12:1),
"mutual up-building" (Rom 14:19; 15:2), "priestly duty" (Rom 15:16), and the act of
"building on foundations" (Rom 15:20). Integrating these metaphors is the concept of the
church as the holy temple city ofGod.
Thus, when Paul speaks of "pure and blameless" in Phil 1:10, he is referring first and
foremost to the conviction that the community of believers is God's holy temple city. This
correlation between holiness and temple imagery is confirmed again by Paul in Phil 2:14,
where holiness language is tied closely to the temple-cult imagery. He describes believers
as "without blemish;" Paul is self-portrayed as "being poured out as a libation over the
sacrifice and the offering of your faith."
Therefore, when Paul is praying for "pure and blameless" in Phil 1:9-1 1, he prays
that the community ofbelievers may become a holy temple city made possible by the
social virtues of love and justice. In other words, the polis must be build upon friendship.
Elsewhere in the same letter, Paul speaks of the Law as walls being tore down (Gal 2:18). Also, he
speaks of the Church having "pillars" (Gal 2:9). These are likewise temple language.
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4.2.5 Justice
Tlie final clause in the thanksgiving section (Phil 1:11) specifies what it means to be
pure and blameless: "having produced (Tre-rrXripcoiievoL)^^ the fruit consisting of
righteousness (Kap-rrov SiKaLoouvnc;; genitive of apposition^^) that comes through Jesus
Christ to the praise and glory ofGod (tov Sid 'Ir|oou XpioTou elc; 66^av Kal Imivov
Beou)." The use of the perfect tense places the participle clause in antecedence (temporally)
to the main verb (rjTe). The production of righteousness is identified as the cause or
condition ofbeing pure and blameless (cf Phil 3:6).^� The phrase "through Jesus Chrisf
does not mean that the fruit is produced by Christ, but that they are produced through
Christ, i.e., through the imitation of Christ (cf Phil 3:9). Only through living like Christ
may the fruit of righteousness be produced.
Justice is the chief virtue of the polis. In the Greco-Roman political tradition, the
concept ofjustice closely relates to the concept of equality. Plato in Gorgias claims
through Socrates' mouth that "it is the opinion of the many that justice means having an
equal share" (bUaiov dvai to 'loov exeiv) (Plato, Gor. 488e, 489a). Elsewhere Plato
equates political justice with equality (Plato, Leg. 757c). In agreement with Plato, Aristotle
defines justice as equality (to SiKaiov eoTi to loov) (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 5.1.8; 5.2.8; 8.9;
Middle or passive voice. The perfect participle indicates a completed action that has continuing
results.
Fee, Paul's Letter to the Philippians, 102-03; Silva, Philippians, 51-52.
� Both the OT and the NT often mentions holiness is often mentioned in close relationship to
righteousness. Isaiah 5:16 is a telling example: "And the holy God will show Himselfholy in righteousness"
(npisa ti^p: mnpn bsni). God's holiness is revealed in his righteousness. Like God, the city of Jemsalem is
expected to be both holy and righteous: "blessed be the Lord on his righteous holy mountain!" (eirl 6LKaLov
opoQ TO ccYLOv auToO). The Hebrew text reads somewhat differently: "The LORD bless you, O abode of
righteousness, O holy hill!" (tij-ipn nn pir^i^ ^P"-. Jesus in the NT is called the holy and righteous one
(tov ayLOv Kal 6LKaiov in Acts 3:14). So too is John the Baptist (av6pa SLKaiov Kal aytov in Mark 6:20).
Righteousness and holiness is also placed in juxtapose to one another in Revelations (15:4; 16:5; 22:1 1). Paul
too has placed them in parallel when referring to God's Law (Rom 7:12). Here, as in Isa 5:16, Paul specifies
holiness in terms of righteousness.
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Eth. eud. 7.9.1). In Stoic tliought, justice is associated with equality (DL 7.126). Philo also
associates justice with equality when he writes, "equality is the mother ofjustice (|ir|Tr|p
SLKaLoouvric)" (Philo, Spec.A.21>\); or, to quote another passage, "it is equality which gives
birth (ttiv e^apxov) to justice" (Philo, Plant. 122).^' Philo thinks that 6LKaLoouvr|v means
(etymologically) none other than to divide (6lx(x T6|iV6Lv) bodies and things into two equal
parts (elg lioipa; loag) (Philo, Her. 161-162). Cicero describes the state as an association
or partnership injustice. Furthermore, equality is an essential component of justice (Cicero,
Resp. 1.32.49).
Moreover, fairness and justice often was required ofpublic figures in the Greco-
Roman world. Pericles, for example, in his fiineral speech demands that the advice offered
by citizens should be fair (Looq) and just (SiKato;) (Thucydides, Hist. 2.44.3; cf 5.89.1).
Polybius asks judges to be fair and just (Polybius, Hist. 24.15.3). Dio Chrysostom asks
kings to be fair and just (Dio Chrysostom, 1 Regn. 35).
Justice as fairness and equality places justice in close relationship to fiiendship, for
"friendship is equality" (see 4.5.7). For this reason, Aristotle claims, "ifmen are friends,
there is no need ofjustice between them;" and that "the highest form ofjusfice seems to
have an element of fiiendly feeling in it" (Aristofie, Eth. nic. 8.1.4). Friendship
incorporates justice and goes beyond justice. Friends will never do injustice to one another
but will instead maintain equality between one another, ifnot sacrifice oneself for the other.
Justice is the premier form of friendship; deep friendship sublates justice.
Paul's prayer for a holy community built upon love and jusfice anticipates the theme
of friendship. Friends honor equality (Phil 2:6; 2:20). They refiise to take advantage of one
" P. Vassiliadis, "Equality and Justice in Classical Antiquity and in Paul: The Social Implications of
the Pauline Collection," St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly 36 (1992): 51-59.
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another. They show no envy toward one another. They do not compete with one another in
honor and in wealth. Friends instead show goodwill toward one another. Friends wish the
best for the other and do good to the other, for the others' sake. These ideal acts of
friendship need the sustaining support of virtue. For that reason, Paul prays for a love
informed by abundant knowledge and full perception. Knowledge and perception are the
resources necessary for moral reasoning (4.5.2). Moral reasoning leads to moral choice
(4.3.3) and moral acts (4.6.1). The habituation ofmoral acts becomes virtue (4.9.1). Virtue
sustains friendship and friendship solidifies the community. In sum, Paul prays for a
virtuous love that produces justice and equality, markers offriendship, resulting in a
temple city holy and pleasing toward God.^^
4.2.6 Joy
Joy is repeatedly menfioned in Philippians (Phil 1:4, 18, 25; 2:2, 17, 18, 28, 29; 3:1;
4:1; 10). The sharing ofjoy and sorrow is one of the major characteristics of friendship in
general and citizenship in particular. Plato, for example, notes that the polis is a
community of pleasure and pain (r\ Ti6ovfi�; te Kal l\)-nr\Q KOLvoyia; Plato, Resp. 462b).
Ideally, citizens should "all share one conviction about their own, tend to one goal, and so
far as practicable have one experience of pleasure and pain" (Plato, Resp. 464d; cf. 464a).
Similarly, in the writings ofAristotle, friendship is characterized by the sharing of joy and
sorrow (Aristofie, Eth. nic. 9.4.2; cf Rhet. 2.4.1; Eth. eud. 7.6.9). Authors of the Roman
period hold to the same ideal (Cicero, Fin. 1.67 [For we rejoice in our fiiends' joy as
Note how Cicero ties the state, justice, community, and conmion aim together: "a conmionwealth
(res publica) is the property of a people.... an assemblage ofpeople in large numbers associated in an
agreement with respect to justice (iuris) and a partnership (sociatus) for the common good (utilitatis
communione)" (Cicero, Resp. 1.25.39).
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much as in our own, and are equally pained by their sorrows.]; Seneca, Ep. 35.2-3; 109.5;
Plutarch, ^(iw/. amic. 51b, e; Dio Chrysostom, 3 Regn. 103, 108-109; Philo, Virt. 1.103 ).
Joy stands in opposite to pain, and pain is the mark of the many vices that oppose
friendship. Envy, for example, one of the major causes for strife and stasis, is characterized
as a type of pain. Plato defines envy as "the pain of the soul" (Plato, Phileb. 48b, 50a).
Aristotle gives a similar definition when he writes, "envy is a disturbing pain and directed
against good fortune. . .of one who is our equal and like" (Aristofie, Rhet. 2.9.3; 2.10.1).
Xenophon too relates envy with pain when he writes, "it is the pain or vexation which men
have at the prosperity of their friends, and that such are the only envious persons."
(Xenophon, Mem. 3.9). Authors of the Roman period also relate envy with pain. Cicero,
for example, defines envy as "a pain arising from the prosperous circumstances of another"
(Cicero, Tusc. 4.8.17). Envy as a pain that stands in contrast to friendship is well expressed
by Plutarch:
It is the fortunate man that is a source of pain (Xuiret) to one who feels hate (pLooOvtoc)
as well as to one who feels envy ((j)9ovouvTa). Hence we consider goodwill (eijvoLay)
to be contrary to both, as it is the wish for one's neighbor's prosperity; and hatred
and envy to be the same, since their aim is the contrary to that of fiiendship {^iXdv).
(Plutarch, /�v. od. 1.1)
Many other vices are also associated with pain. Stoics, for example, name pity, envy,
jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, and distracfion as species ofpain
(DL7.111).
In sum, the sharing of joy is a mark of friendship. Thus, Paul's quest for a shared joy
is a questforfriendship (cf John 3:29; 15:11). Also, joy excludes pain, a feature of the
many vices that breach friendship. Envy, for example, is a pain felt towards friends and
neighbors who are of one's equal and alike, desiring to have their prosperity. This desire
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for gain induces pain. Joy excludes both the desires for gain and the pain induced by envy.
Thus, the quest for a shared joy is also a quest for a community that is devoid ofenvy and
greed.
4.3 Philippians 1:12-26
Paul's thanksgiving is followed by a transitional formula,^^ directing the attention of
the recipients to the things "concerning me [Paul]" (id Kat' k\ik). Paul's self-report is part
of the exordium. The exordium conventionally serves three different functions: benevolum
(well-disposed), docilem (ready to leam), and attentum (attentive). Paul's claim to help the
Philippians to choose the best (Phil 1:3-1 1; cf 3.2.3) fulfills the funcfion of attentum. Here
in Phil 1 : 12-26 the emphasis falls on the first two fiincfions {benevolum and docilem). This
passage can be subdivided into two sections: Phil 1:12-1 8a and Phil l:18b-26.
The first subunit (Phil 1:12-1 8a) highlights the relationship between Paul's
imprisonment and the importance of gospel proclamation. The relationship between the
two is set within the contrast between strife and friendship anticipating the major themes of
this letter (serving the function of docilem; 4.3.1). In this first subunit, Paul correlates his
situation with that of the Philippians.
In the second subunit (Phil l:18b-26), Paul presents himself as aparrhesiastes (one
who speaks in TrapprjOLa).^"* This presentation takes up the funcfion of benevolum (4.3.2).
Next, he presents himself as moral exemplar, demonsfrating what it means to choose the
best. This presentation serves both the fiinction of benevolum and docilem (4.3.3).
Presenting himself as a reliable messenger (as aparrhesiastes) and as one who acts in a
" This formula is used also in 1 Thess 2:1; Gal 1:1 1; Rom 1:13; 2 Cor 1:8.
XlapprioLaoxric does not appear often, but is foimd in the works ofAristotle, Philo, Plutarch, and etc.
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reliable manner (as a moral exemplar), Paul wants the Philippians to leam from him and
make progress (ttpokottti) in their morals (4.3.4). This expectation will then lead to the
propositio ofPhilippians urging for a manner of life, friendship, and concord (4.4).
4.3.1 Strife, Friendship, and Suffering for the Gospel
In the first subunit (Phil 1:12-18), Paul repeatedly speaks of the relationship between
his imprisonment and the proclamation of the Gospel.
What has happened to me rather helped to spread the gospel (Phil 1:12)
My imprisonment isfor Christ (Phil 1:13)
By my imprisonment, brothers and sisters dare to speak the word
with greater boldness and without fear. (Phil 1:14)
I have been put here for the defense of the gospel (Phil 1:16)
Intending to increase my suffering in my imprisonment, some proclaim Christ
out of self-ambition. (Phil 1:17)
This alignment between Paul's imprisonment and the proclamation of the gospel is set
within the context of sfrife within the Christian community. This strife is depicted in Phil
1:15-17, a well-stmctured passage made up of two pairs of pei'...6� contrast:
'^TLveg pev Kal Sid (bQovov Kal 'eoiv.
xivkc, 6� Kal 6l' �i)5oKiav xov XpioTov Knouooouoiv
'^ol pev avdiTnc. �l56x�(; otl eic; dmXoYLau tov evayyeALOv Kelpai,
'^ol 66 6^ epiQeiac tov Xpioxoy KaxayYeXXouoiy. ovx ccyudiQ, oiopeuoi BXlij/Li'
cyeCpeiP tolc; Seapolc; pov.
These three verses reveal the motives behind the proclamation ofChrist in the form of a
chiasm. The tme motives are placed in the inner section (Phil 1:15b and 16); the false
motives are placed in the outer section (Phil 1:15a and 17). The motives are embedded in
prepositional phrases placed in a forward position.
The motives also are placed in contrast to one another through the pev . . .66
constmction. The first pair of contrasts (Phil 1:15) occurs between envy and strife, and
goodwill. The second pair of confrasts (Phil 1:16-17) occurs between love and self-
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ambition. The second pair of contrast is expanded by two participle clauses featuring
participles related to "knowledge." "Love" is followed by the noetic participle 6 156x6;;
"self-ambition," by ol6[j,6vol.
This passage serves various different purposes: (1) It compares Paul's situation with
that of the Philippians (cf Phil 1:30). Paul is suffering; so are the Philippians; Paul is
experiencing strife; so are the Philippians. This identification sets the stage for the second
subunit (Phil 1 : 1 8b-26), where Paul presents himself as moral exemplar to show the
Philippians how to choose the best in the midst ofsuffering and strife.
(2) The passage demonstrates the importance of knowledge and love. Both noetic
participles, 6l66x6(; in Phil 1:16 and oLopevoL in Phil 1:17, carry causal connotations.
Thinking leads to action. What is determined in the mind can lead either to love or to harm.
What to think and how to think is crucial. The knowledge that Paul prays for in Phil 1 :9 is
knowledge conditioned by love, a knowledge that would lead one to choose "the best."
Both concepts, knowledge and love, anticipate the major themes of this letter (Knowledge
-> practical wisdom; love -> friendship).
(3) The passage highlights the contrast between envy, strife, and self-ambition on the
one hand, and goodwill and friendship on the other hand. Envy, strife, and self-ambition
anticipate one of the major themes of this letter, namely, the quest for honor and gain (cf
K6p6o(; [Phil 1:21] ^ epLBeia and KevoSo^ia [Phil 2:3] ^ dpiraypoq [Phil 2:6] -> Kauxdopai
[Phil 3:3] ^ K6p6ri [Phil 3:7] ^ K6p6aLya) [Phil 3:8]). The virtue of friendship stands in
contrasts to these vices. The whole letter is structured around these two contrasting values.
A person either engages in envy, strife, and self-ambition and thereby causes harm, or
engages in friendship and thereby promotes unity.
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(4) The passage presents Paul as a trustworthy character. It shows that Paul's focus is
on the gospel. He writes not out ofprivate animosity (Demosthenes, De pace 6) to accuse
or revile others (Demosthenes, Exord. 6. 1, 2). Rather, he is ready to set aside his private
concerns and focus on the things that are of greatest importance (cf Demosthenes, Ep.X.XQ;
Exord. 12, 53; Cor. 277).
4.3.2 HappriOLa and Shame
Citizens in the Greekpoleis regularly gather at the agora to discuss public issues. On
the day of the assembly, the herald would call to all persons present and ask: "who wishes
to address the assembly?" (tl; ayopeueiv pouXexai).^^ All citizens are allowed to respond.^^
This equal opportunity for speech is a privilege of citizens only. Women, slaves, and
foreigners are excluded. This privilege is called LoriyopLa.^^
This concept of equal freedom of speech pairs with the concept of fi-ank speech
(irappriOLa).^^ The word TrappriOLa consists of two components: all, and rhesis, speech,
and means to "say it all."^^ Frank speech is the freedom to say it all, whether praise or
blame, approval or condemnation, exaltation or berating. The referent of the speech can be
Demosthenes, Cor. 170, 191; Aristophanes, ^c/z. 45; Thesm. 380; Eccl. 130; Aeschines, Tim. 23, 27.
Demosthenes, Cor. 213. By "everyone" Demosthenes means "citizens."
''^
Herodoms, Hist. 5.78; Isocrates, Archid. 97; Demosthenes, Rhod. lib. 18; Mid. 124; Epitaph. 28;
Dionysius Halicamassus, rom. 10.15.4; 10.19.1; 4.9.9; 10.26.4; 10.29.5; 7.7.5; 7.42.2; 7.44.2; 10.3.2;
10.1.2; Philo, Prob. 48.1; 49.2; 50.3; 51.3; 51.5; 52.2; 53.2.
Isocrates, Archid 97; Polybius, Hist. 2.38.6; 2.42.3; 4.31.4; 6.8.4; 6.9.5. Cf. Jeffrey Henderson,
"Attic Old Comedy, Frank Speech, and Democracy," in Democracy, Empire, and the Arts in Fifth-Century
Athens (ed. Deborah Boedeker and Kurt A. Raaflaub; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998),
255-73. On Parrhsia: David Konstan, "Parrhesia: Ancient Philosophy in Opposition," in Mythos and Logos:
How to Regain the Love ofWisdom (ed. Albert A. Anderson, Steven V. Hicks, and Lech Witkowski; New
York: Rodopi, 2004), 19-34.
H.-C. Hahn, "Openness, Frankness, Boldness," NIDNTT 2:134. Methodologically, etymology
cannot determine the meaning of a word. However, etymology does help illimiinate the meaning of a word.
David R. Bauer and Robert A. Traina, Inductive Bible Study: A Comprehensive Guide to the Practice of
Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 201 1), 221-24.
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a fellow citizen, an official leader, a policy, or the polis as a whole. Everything is
permissible. Frank speech is the freedom to say whatever one has in mind without fear.
Since meeting and debating at the assembly presents one of the core fiinctions of the
citizen, frank speech therefore becomes one of the essenfial characteristics of citizenship.^^
With this perspective in mind, Euripides' prayer becomes apprehensible: "May the sons
whom I have brought into the world have a free man's frank speech (eXeuBepoLTTappriOLa)"
(Euripides, Hipp. 421). The same high praise for frank speech is found also in authors such
as Demosthenes, who says in his Funeral Speech: "Democracy have many other beautiful
and just things to which those who think rightly ought to hold fast, and especially irapprioLa
from which it is impossible that the truth not be safe and sound, that the truth not be made
clear" (Demosthenes, Epitaph. 26). Frank speech, even in the Roman imperial period, still
was regarded as one of the most precious assets of a citizen (Dio Chrysostom, 2 Tars. 39).
Deeper understanding of this concept requires consideration of an important book
written by Micheal Foucault. In his book Fearless Speech, Foucault argues that TrapptiOLOc
involves five different but related concepts: frankness, truth, danger, criticism, and duty.^'
(1) Frankness. Frank speech is characterized by complete disclosure without reserve.
Parrhesiastes speaks what they have in mind and only what they have in mind. They speak
ofwhat is their own. Such speech features a complete identification between "the subject
*� This is true throughout Greco-Roman antiquity. Public speech and public deliberation is the
occupation of off-duty soldiers. The close relationship between speech and citizenship is expressed in
Roman world, through the Latin term "libertas." Thomas N. Habinek, Ancient Rhetoric and Oratory
(Blackwell Introductions to the Classical World; Maiden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2005), 2.
^' Michel Foucault, Fearless Speech (Los Angeles: MIT Press, 2001), 1 1-20.
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of the enunciation and the subject of the enunciandum (the held belief or opinion)."^^ The
speakers identify with their own speech, and vice versa.
(2) Truth. Frank speech involves speaking the truth, not in the sense of "I think it is
true," but "I know that it is really true":
To my mind, the parrhesiastes says what is true because he knows that it is true; and
he knows that it is true because it is really true. The parrhesiastes is not only sincere
and says what is his opinion, but his opinion is also the truth. He says what he knows
to be true. The. . .characteristic of irappriOLa, then, is that there is always an exact
coincidence between belief and truth. ... I should note that I never found any texts in
ancient Greek culture where the parrhesiastes seems to have any doubts about his
own possession of the truth.^^
In other words, people who speak frankly regard themselves as possessors of truth. They
say it all, and they know that all that is said is true. As such, frank speech features
congruence between the beliefs of the mind, the words spoken, and the truth.
(3) Danger. Foucault observes that while many persons speak the truth, not all are
qualified as parrhesiastes. For example, math teachers and grammar teachers in almost all
circumstances speak the truth, but none of them are honored as parrhesiastes.
Parrhesiastes are those persons who take risk in speaking the truth. They speak the truth to
friends with the risk of losing friendship. They speak the truth to citizens with the risk of
losing popularity. In extreme cases, speaking in TrocpprioLa involves the risk of losing one's
life.
(4) Criticism. Speaking truth and later facing harm because of that truth does not
make one a parrhesiastes. For example, one may inadvertently state a fact in a court which
later becomes a piece ofharmfiil evidence against oneself This act of truth speaking is not
an act of irapprioLa. The missing link between the two forms of speech is criticism. As a
Foucault, Fearless Speech, 13.
Foucault, Fearless Speech, 14.
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parrhesiastes, one speaks the tmth with the intention of criticizing the interlocutor, either
to point out their lacking or to point out their misdeeds. The parrhesiastes intends to
challenge the interlocutor. They do not want to leave the interlocutor untouched by their
speech. Such speech always exhibits a desire to shake up the interlocutor so he or she
might be caught up and be transformed by the truth.
(5) Duty. The one who speaks in frank speech always has the choice to remain silent.
The parrhesiastes is never forced to speak. A forced speech (e.g., under torture) is not a
frank speech. When the parrhesiastes speaks, he or she speaks out of duty, for the good of
their friends and for the good of their community.
Frankness, tmth, danger, criticism, and duty are the essential components of frank
speech. "Boldness," the usual English translation for irappriaLa, fails to capture the
complexity of this word, but "boldness" does highlight one of the most important
dimensions of frank speech, namely the need to stand up against danger. An orator may
encounter many dangers during speech.^"* One of the most common threats is the 96pupog
("turmoil;" "uproar") raised by the assembly.^^ This threat is widely attested in the Greco-
Roman literature. Demosthenes, for example, in his exordium pleas for his audience not to
raise Gopupog in hast, for such an act may deprive them of their own advantage:
Since, men ofAthens, you can choose whatever you wish ofwhat is spoken, it is fair
that you listen to all of them. From the Gopupog when displeased, you may perhaps
deprive yourselves ofmany usefiil ideas; by listening with decomm and silence you
will act on every sound proposal. (Demosthenes, Exord. 4)
As powerfiil as Demosthenes is as an orator, still he cannot avoid the dismpting and
harassing Gopupog. As a result, often orators plead for silence and for pafience in their
Robert W. Wallace, "The Power to Speak�and Not to Listen�in Anceitn Athens," in Free Speech
in Classical Antiquity (ed. L Sluiter and R. M. Rosen; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2004), 221-32.
Acts 17:5; 21:34; 24:18.
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exordium (Demosthenes, Exord. 5.2; Dio Chrysostom, 2 Tars. 2, 4, 6; Nicom. 4, 5; cf. Acts
26:3).
Orators also might fact threats ofbeing violently dragged off the bema and ofbeing
stoned. Xenophon, for example, notes that Plato's brother Glaucon was dragged off the
bema "more than once" (Xenophon, Mem. 3.6.1). Isocrates' speech also provides evidence:
"in the past you Athenians have been accustomed to drive from the bema everyone except
those who speak in favor of your desires" (Isocrates, De pace 3). Chrysostom notes the
danger ofbeing stoned (Dio Chrysostom, 2 Tars. 6). These threats are some of the
recurrent dangers with which an orator must deal when he decides to step up the bema. The
audience has no responsibility of listening to the whole speech.
However, threats are more than physical. Accompanying the noise and the violence
are humiliation and shame. Shame is the real risk that confronts the orator. Physical
threats are but the means to induce shame.
As a result, shame often is mentioned in the context of frank speech (cf 1 John 2:28
[oxG)\i�^ -irappTioLocv Kal pf] aloxuvBupev]; 2 Cor 3:7-18; Prov 1:20-22; 13:5),^^ for frank
speech is above all the defiance of shame. As a speech against danger, and with shame as
the greatest dangers of all, frank speech always has the hallmark ofshamelessness. Frank
speech "is a practice of openness, of a refiisal to hide one's thoughts because of a shame
Philo in one ofhis writings contrasts aloxuvto and irapprioLa in terms ofvirtue and vice: "Let men
who do injurious things be put to shame (aloxuvloetooav), and seeking hiding places and recesses in the
earth, .... But to those who do such things as are for the common advantage (K0LV(j(t)6A.fi), let there be
freedom of speech (TTapprioia), and let them go by day through the middle of the market place where they
will meet with the most numerous crowds, to display their own manner of life in the pure sun, and to do good
to the assembled multitudes by means of the principal of the outward senses, giving them to see those things
the sight ofwhich is most delightfiil and most impressive, and hearing and feasting upon salutary speeches
which are accustomed to delight the minds even of those men who are not utterly illiterate" (Philo, Spec.
1.131). Note the emphasis on the senses of seeing and hearing.
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that would bring humiliation or disapproval in the eyes of others."^^ Shame is the force that
hides and covers, whereas -rrappriOLa is the force that opens and reveals. Shame and
TTappTioia are forces against one another. They check and balance one another.
Shame is the social mechanism that restricts the deviant behaviors of a society. No
society can exist without shame. Shame is the result of leaming to view the self through
the eyes of others. Through shame, community members leam which actions are
appropriate and which are inappropriate. Shame is the force that aligns a person to the
values of a society. This conservative force preserves the traditions of a society, its power
stmcture, its class hierarchy, and its religious ideologies. Frank speech, on the contrary,
ignores the needs of shame. As such, frank speech knows no limits and says it all with no
reservation. Frank speech, exemplified above all by Socrates and Diogenes, is a refusal to
blush.^^ It knows of no traditions, no hierarchies, and no ideologies. Frank speech is
militant. It serves only the tmth. Wherever and whatever tmth demands, it obeys and
speaks.
Shame is a static force, whereas frank speech is a dynamic and revolutionary force.
Shame sets a limit to frank speech, just as frank speech sets a limit to shame. No
Arlene W. Saxonhouse, Free Speech andDemocracy in Ancient Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), 78.
DeSilva rightly notes that honor and shame are the "dominant means of enforcing all those values
that were not actually legislated and of reinforcing those values that were covered by written laws." David
Arthur DeSilva, Honor, Patronage, Kinship & Purity: Unlocking New Testament Culture (Downers Grove,
111.: InterVarsity, 2000), 36. The ancients also know of this function ofhonor and shame: "They are inhibited
not so much by fear of the penalties ordained by law as by the sense of shame with which nature has
endowed man as a certain dread ofjust censure.... Shame, no less effectively than fear, restrains the citizens"
(Cicero, Resp. 5.4).
*' Blush is an ultimate expression of shame. Cicero, for example, notes, "The judgment of the censor
imposed on the condemned scarcely any penalty save the blush" (Cicero, Resp. 4.6.6). In other words, blush
was in itself penalty enough. Similarly, Seneca notes, "Ifwe can cause the man who murdered Cicero to
blush, we will have succeeded" (Elder Seneca, Cont. 7.2.1). Cf Carlin A. Barton, "Roman Blush: DeHcate
Matter of Self-Control," in Constructions ofthe Classical Body (ed. James I. Porter; Arm Arbor: University
ofMichigan Press, 1999), 212-34.
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community can do witliout either. Shame propagates injustice and errors and hides them
from exposure. Frank speech propagates chaos and disorder, setting all things loose from
regulation.
The practice of irappriOLa is best (and paradigmatically) illustrated by the well-known
encounter between Diogenes and Alexander reported by Diogenes Laeritus (DL 6.38; cf
6.32, 44, 45, 60, 63, 68). Alexander represents the summit of human achievement, filled
with wealth, glory, and honor; while Diogenes has nothing but himself
When he was sunning himself in the Craneum, Alexander came and stood over him
and said, "Ask ofme any boon you like." To which he replied, "Stand out ofmy
light." (DL 6.38)
Diogenes is bathing under the sun. The image of the sun recalls Plato's famous allegory of
the cave, where the sun represents truth and reality. Bathing in the sun conveys the
message that Diogenes has a direct relafionship with the truth. His whole being is
conditioned by the truth. He stands in the presence of truth. As such, nothing exists
between him and the truth. He stands face-to-face with the truth. He has the knowledge of
what is true and real. Alexander enters the stage with his back facing the sun, casting
shadows upon Diogenes. Read metaphorically, while Alexander holds the riches of the
world, he knows not the real and the truth. The scene reverses their roles, whereby the one
who has all and is revered by all becomes the one who stands against the truth. Conversely,
the one who has none and is despised by all has direct contact with the truth. The story
ends with Diogenes, speaking as though he were the king, commanding Alexander to leave
his place and return him "the light.
'� Foucault has another read of this story: "Ordering Alexander to step aside so that the sun's light can
reach Diogenes is an affirmation of the direct and natural relation the philosopher has to the sun, in contrast
to the mythical genealogy whereby the king, as descended from a god, was supposed to personify the sun"
{Fearless Speech, 121).
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Dio Clirysostom understood this allegory perfectly well. Thus, in his fourth oration,
he speaks plainly about Diogenes' relationship with the truth. Chrysostom picks up this
story and expands it into a provocative dialogue between Diogenes and Alexander. He
introduces Diogenes with the following words: "Diogenes cajoled no men by flattery, but
told everybody the truth" (Dio Chrysostom, 4 Regn.lO). The setting of the story is again
Diogenes warming himself in the sun (Dio Chrysostom, 4 Regn. 14). Alexander comes
along, attracted by the courage ofDiogenes:
For it is somehow natural for the courageous to love the courageous (ol BappaXeoi
xovQ GappaXeouc; ^iXelv), while cowards eye them with misgiving and hate them as
enemies, but welcome the base and like them. And so to the one class truth and
frankness (totg dA.r|0�La Kal irappriOLa) are the most agreeable things in the world, to
the other, flattery and deceit (tolc; KoXaKcia Kal ij/euSoc;). The latter lend a willing ear
to those who in their intercourse seek to pleasure, the former, to those who have
regard for the truth (dXriGeLa). (Dio Chrysostom, 4 Regn. 15)
Not long after they had entered into dialogue, Diogenes provokes Alexander saying that it
would be hard for him to understand his words, just as it is hard for men with weak eyes to
see the light (Dio Chrysostom, 4 Regn. 18). Similar provocative speeches are raised
repeatedly throughout the dialogue. Diogenes is eager to hurt Alexander's pride, to the
extent that Alexander became furious and wanted to run down Diogenes with his spear
(Dio Chrysostom, 4 Regn. 64). Diogenes shows no fear. Instead, he wams Alexander that
if he kills him, he will have no chance ofknowing the tmth, for "I am the only man from
whom you will get the tmth" (Dio Chrysostom, 4 Regn. 59). This narrative represents the
paradigm of frank speech, namely, speaking the tmth for the good of the others with no
fear.
In the Greco-Roman ethical fradition, authors often portray themselves as
parrhesiastes. Furthermore, they often distance themselves from others, and accuse others
216
ofbeing flatterers who speak only to entertain the audience and gain money. They
themselves, on the other hand, are self-portrayed as friends of their interlocutors and
speakers of truth, present in their midst to give them advice for their well-being.
Isocrates, for example, stresses the difference between TTappTioia and flattering when
he writes, "Give frank speech (TTapprioiav) to those who have good judgment (eu
(jjpovoOoLv), in order that when you are in doubt you may have friends who will help you to
decide (ouvSoKipdoovTac). Distinguish between those who artfiilly flatter (KoA.aK�Uoi^xa<;)
and those who loyally serve you" (Isocrates, AdNic. 2.28). Isocrates associates Trapprioia
with friendship.^' rtappriOLa helps friends make good decisions. In his speech On Concord,
Isocrates criticizes the audience of foolishness, treating those who show no care for their
welfare as practitioners ofTrapprioia, and those who do care, as men who work injury to the
state (Isocrates, De pace 8.14). Despite their foolishness, Isocrates unyieldingly comes
forth "not to seek your favor nor to solicit your votes, but to make know the views I hold"
(Isocrates, De pace 8.15). He is not a flatterer seeking his own advantage or the pleasure of
his audience. He presents himself as aparrhesiastes concemed with the public good
(Isocrates, Depace 8.16).^^
Demosthenes also makes a clear distinction between parrhesiastes and flatterers.
Parrhesiastes are speakers of tmth.^'' They speak out of goodwill for the well-being of the
other:
" "Frank advice given by his friends for his benefit" {Let. Arts. 125).
Frank speech involves risk. Isocrates notes that frank speech involves "reservation and the fear of
arousing ill-feeling" (Isocrates, Evag. 39.2) and "shame" (Isocrates, Big. 22.5). Isocrates pleas his audience
to be patient "with the manner ofmy discourse and with my frankness of speech" (Isocrates, Antid. 179).
Demosthenes, Epitaph. 26.3; Philo, Sacr 12.3; Josephus, A.J. 16.108; 1 Clem 35.2; Plutarch, 716a,
c; Appian, Bell. civ. 5.5.42; Dio Chrysostom, 3 Regn. 3; 4 Regn. 15
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This is the truth spoken with all freedom (xaux' kaxi raXeGf) peid xiao^c, trappTieoLac),
simply in goodwill and for what is best, not a speech using flattery for the sake of
harm and deceit, making money for the one speaking and handing the affairs of the
city to its enemies. (Demosthenes, 4 Philip.16 [J. H. Vince])
In a speech delivered in Athens, Demosthenes chastises the Athenians for being interested
only in flattering speeches, in words pleasant to hear. He, on the contrary, utters truths with
frank speech (tcov dXriBov peid -rrocppTiOLac;) for their true advantage (Demosthenes, 3
Philip. 3-4).^^
For Polybius, irapprioLa is the act of truth speaking practiced by sincere friends, good
citizens, and responsible historians:
Now neither do I think that a man who is timid and afraid of speaking his mind (xoug
pexd TOppriOLac; Xoyout;) should be regarded by those qualified to judge as a sincere
friend, nor that a man should be regarded as a good citizen who leaves the path of
truth because he is afraid of giving temporary offence to certain persons; and in a
writer ofpolitical history we should absolutely refiise to tolerate the least preference
for anything but the truth. (Polybius, Hist. 38.4.3 [W. R. Paton])
Truth speaking always involves dangers, but the dangers must not hinder the parrhesiastes
from speaking the truth.^^
Dionysius Halicamassus contrasts -rrappTiOLa with flattering. IlappTiOLa will not
always sound melodious to its listeners. Nonetheless, pleasant or not, it exists for the good
of others. He expresses his convicfion that he is willing to speak in irappTiOLa even at the
risk of death:
These remarks, whether they are pleasant for you to hear or vexatious, have been
uttered and hazarded by me in all sincerity; and I had rather lose my life by using a
freedom of speech that is advantageous for the commonwealth (TrappriOLoc
Cf. Demosthenes, 3 Olynth. 32; 2 Philip. 31 [I vow that I will tell you the truth with TrappTioCa and
keep nothing back (ok dTOKpiJi|jo^aL)]; Chers. 21, 24, 32; 4 Philip. 53, 54; Fal leg. 237; Aristocr 28, 204; 1
Steph. 79; [Theocr.J 60, 68; [Neaer.J 28; Halon. I; Rhod. lib. I; Epitaph. 26; Exord 27; Ep. 4.1 1.
CI Polybius, Hist. 2.8.9-12 [at the risk of death]; 7.12.9; 1 1.4.9; 11.6.7; 15.1.6; 15.2.2; 18.14.9
[only traitors abolish frank speech]; 18.52.3; 20.12.7; 21.18.4; 21.21.6; 21.23.12; 27.4.7; 27.10.2; 30.31.10,
16; 33.16.6:38.22.3;
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ou|i(t)6poiJori TCO kolvco) than save (oeocooBaL) it by flattering you. (Dionysius of
Halicamassus, Rom. 932.1; cf 9.53.7)
Paul also frequently fashions himself as a parrhesiastes, although NT scholars have not
sufficiently appreciated this claim.^^ In the NT the noun TrapprjOLa appears 31 times; the
verb irappTiOLccCopaL appears nine times. The former appears ten times the Pauline corpus
(2 Cor 3:12; 7:4; Eph 3:12; 6:19; Phil 1:20; Col 2:15, 1 Tim 3:13, Phlm 8); the latter
occurs twice (Eph 6:20; 1 Thess 2:2).^^
In Philemon, Paul claims that he has the -irappriaLa to command Philemon to do what
is fitting. The word means more than "boldness" or "opeimess."^^ Here the word means
David E. Fredrickson, "Parrhsia in the Pauhne Epistles," in Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of
Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World {qA.. John T. Fitzgerald; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996).
Fredrickson's article is divided into two sections. In the first section (165-70), Fredrickson identifies four
different types of free speech found in the Greco-Roman philosophical fradition. These types include free
speech in the Cynic tradition, free speech in the Athenian democratic fradition, free speech in the works of
Demonax and Plutarch, and free speech in the Epicurean fradition. The Cynic fradition emphasizes self-
confidence (166). The Athenian democratic fradition utilizes free speech as a means "to preserve and
improve the city." The orators involved in free speech "must hide nothing, open his mouth, and proclaim the
tmth" (167). In the works ofDemonax and Plutarch, free speech is uttered with a friendly concem, eager to
develop the morals and virtues of their fiiends. The Epicureans understood free speech as a means to
sfrengthen their community. In the second part ofhis article, Fredrickson examines the Pauline use of free
speech. He deals with verses such as: Phlm 8-9, 1 Thess 2:1-12, Phil 1:12-20, and 2 Cor 1-7. The latter
receives the most attention (172-82).
J. Paul Sampley, "Paul's Frank Speech with the Galatians and the Corinthians," in Philodemus and the
New Testament World (ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn Stanfield Holland; Leiden: E. J. Brill,
2004). Sampley infroduces two ideal types of frank speech, one he calls "simple, harsh frank speech;" the
other he calls "mixed frank speech": "Simple, harsh frank speech is sfraightforward and direct, having no
praise intermixed, but consisting simply ofblame. Mixed napprioLa is a combination of frankness and praise"
(297). He examines four Pauline passages: Galatians, Paul's "painfiil letter" to the Corinthians, 2 Cor 1-7,
and 2 Cor 10-13.
Cf David E. Fredrickson, "Paul's Bold Speech in the Argument of2 Cor 2:14-7:16" (Ph.D. diss., Yale
University, 1990); Craig Hovey, "Free Christian Speech: Plundering Foucault," Political Theology 8 (2007):
63-81; Stanley B. Marrow, "Parrhesia and the New Testament," CBQ 44 (1982): 431-46; J. Paul Sampley,
"Paul and Frank Speech," in Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook (Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press
Intemafional, 2003), 293-318; W. C. van Unnik, "The Chrisfian's Freedom of Speech in the New Testament,"
in Sparsa Collecta (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973-1983), 2.269-89.
Peter Thomas O'Brien, Colossians, Philemon (WBC; Waco, Tex.: Word, 1982), 287.
Commentators struggle to understand the meaning of nappTioLa. Peter O'Brien thinks that it means
"openness." As such, he writes, "Philemon's fine Christian character, mentioned explicitly in the preceding
verses, meant Paul could speak openly and with affection." This understanding does not cohere well with the
act of "command." Nor does it explain why Paul would rather choose to appeal Philemon through love.
219
that Paul knows commanding Philemon to accept Onesimus is the true way to proceed, and
he knows also that commanding Philemon involves the act ofbreaking decorum, and while
he knows that such dangers are involved, he nevertheless is ready to speak the truth. The
best way to translate "having TOppriota" is perhaps to use its negative form: "not being a
men-pleaser or a flatterer."^^
In Galatians, after the salutation (Gal 1:1-4) and the cry of astonishment (Gal 1:6-9),
Paul sets forth two rhetorical questions and a statement: "For am I now seeking the favor
(tclGco) ofmen, or of God? Or am I striving to please men (Criiw dvepwiTOLc dpeoKeiv)? Ifi
were still trying to please men, I would not be a bond-servant ofChrist" (Gal 1:10). To
seek the favor ofmen and to please men are the characteristics of a flatterer. According to
Paul's understanding, the servant ofGod cannot be at the same time a flatterer. Instead, the
servant ofGod necessarily speaks the truth. The truth will always be harsh to the hearer
and will not always be pleasing to those who receive it. Contrasting the men-pleaser with
the servant ofChrist places the latter in the position of a parrhesiastes. This role of the
parrhesiastes is precisely the role that Paul wants to cast himself in through the historical
narrative in Gal 1:1 1-2:14.'�� First, he claims his gospel as originating in God's revelation
O'Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 288. Douglas Moo thinks that is has both the meaning of "boldness" and
"openness," with a tilt toward the former idea. Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 402.
Paul's strategy in Philemon looks similar to the advice given by Rhetorica adHerennium: "IfFrank
Speech of this sort seems too pimgent, there will be many means ofpalliation, for one may immediately
thereafter add something of this sort: 'I here appeal to your virtue, I call on your wisdom, I bespeak your old
habit,' so that praise may quiet the feelings aroused by the fi-ankness. As a result, the praise frees the hearer
from wrath and annoyance, and the frankness deters him from error. This precaution in speaking, as in
friendship, if taken at the right place, is especially effective in keep the hearers from error and in presenting
us, the speakers, as fiiendly both to the hearers and to the truth" {Rhet. Her. 4.48).
Sampley rightly observes Paul's eagerness to establish his ethos in the first two chapters of
Galatians: "By noting his past comportment and his on-going concem, Paul commends himself to the
Galatians and puts himself in a position to employ frankness with them. . .The first two chapters ofGalatians
are a refinement ofPaul's fjeog and an offering ofhimself as a model" ("Paul's Frank Speech with the
Galatians and the Corinthians," 299). Sampley, however, fails to grasp the importance of "tmth" in the
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(Gal 1 : 1 1-24). Second, he shows how he maintained that truth of the gospel revealed to
him in the face of the great pillars (Gal 2:1-10). Third, he shows how he maintained that
truth of the gospel in confrontation with Peter (Gal 2:1 1-14). The whole narrative climaxes
with Paul opposing "people from James," Peter, and his fellow-worker Barnabas.
Confronting them all, Paul speaks directly in the face ofPeter before all the members of
the Christian community. He presents himself as an adamantparrhesiastes for the truth
with no fear of intruding the decorum.
The same occurs in Ephesians. In Eph 3:1-13,'�' Paul portrays himself as a
parrhesiastes. He exhibits his knowledge of the truth'�^ and his commissioning by God to
speak the truth to everyone including the rulers and authorities. He suffered the pains of
imprisonment as a result. Nonetheless, Paul is not ashamed of his sufferings; instead, he
considers it as his honor and glory. He identifies his act of proclamation (irpooaycoyri) as an
concept of in Paul's self-representation. Also, interestingly, he overlooks Gal 1:10, the verse that
demonstrates most clearly that Paul presents himself as aparrhesiastes.
Many who work in the field of rhetorical criticism miss the point by classifying Gal 1 : 1 2-2 : 1 4 as the
narratio, assigning it the task of introducing facts indispensable for the case (Quintilian, Inst. 4.2.1 1). For
example, Betz, "The Literary Composition and Function of Paul's Letter to the Galafians," 12-17. First
published in 1975. Smit, "The Letter ofPaul to the Galatians: A Deliberative Speech," 47-51.
Others argue that Paul presents himself as a paradigm. This idea is closer to the truth. It represents a
via media approach. It acknowledges both the importance ofPaul's ethos and the importance of the narrative
as an introduction to the letter. Witherington, Grace in Galatia: A Commentary on St. Paul 's Letter to the
Galatians, 89. B. R. Gaventa, "Galatians 1 and 2: Autobiography as Paradigm," NovTlS (1986): 309-26.
This thesis, however, agrees with Sampley, that the primary purpose ofGal 1:12-2:14 is neither
introductory (Betz, Smit), nor paraenetic (Witherington, Gaventa), but Paul establishing his self-identity as a
parrhesiastes.
Ephesians 3:1-13 begins and ends with the same emphasis: "a prisoner ofChrist Jesus for the sake
ofyou Gentiles" (Eph 3:1) and "my sufferings for you" (Eph 3:13). Both verses speak ofPaul's suffering and
the purpose ofhis suffering. These two sayings form an inclusio to Eph 3:1-13. This suggests that the whole
passage is about Paul's imprisonment, but also on evaluating his imprisonment. The very last sentence "they
are you glory" suggests that Paul wants the Ephesians to evaluate his imprisonment in a certain way.
'"^ To prove that he knows the truth, Paul refers back to what he has written previously in Eph 1-2:
"the mystery was made known to me by revelation as I wrote above in a few words, a reading ofwhich will
enable you to perceive my understanding of the mystery ofChrist" (Eph 3:3-4). Thus, one of the purposes of
Eph 1-2 is to provide warrant to Paul's claim as aparrhesiastes.
221
act of TTappTioia (Eph 3:12).'�^ To suffer for TTapprjOLa is honorable. Thus, Eph 3:13, with
the particle 6l6, draws the conclusion from his act of TTapprioia and assures the Ephesians
that they have good reason to honor his imprisonment.
Ephesians 6:19 restates this same sentiment when Paul writes, "Pray also for me, so
that when I speak, a message may be given to me to make known with TTapprjOLa the
mystery of the gospel, for which I am an ambassador in chains. Pray that I may declare it
with Trapprioia, as I must speak." Again, much emphasis rests on truth (message divinely
given), the dangers of criticism (chains), duty (I must speak), and frankness (message
given and proclaimed).
In 1 Corinthians, Paul repeatedly emphasizes that his speech is not based on
sophistry ("words ofwisdom"; 1 Cor 1:17; 2:1, 4, 5, 13), but instead on the wisdom and
power ofGod. Paul does not emphasize his role as aparrhesiastes in 1 Corinthians, for he
still maintains a good relationship with the Corinthians. Their good relationship is shown
by his quick entrance into the propositio immediately after the thanksgiving without an
extended exordium. He needed no exordium to establish his ethos.
2 Corinthians is completely different. Here Paul displays a massive effort to present
himself as aparrhesiastes .^^'^ (1) The truth of his proclamation is emphasized (2 Cor 4:2;
6:7; 7:14; 11:10; 12:6; 13:8). His knowledge ofGod is emphasized (2 Cor 2:14; 4:6; 6:6;
8:7; 10:5; 11:6). He depicts himself as in the presence of God (2 Cor 2:17; 4:2; 7:12; 12:19)
and in the presence of Jesus (2 Cor 2:10; 4:6; 8:21; cf 4:2; 12:19). (2) The frankness of his
speech is emphasized (2 Cor 1:12; 2:17). Paul repeatedly denies that he is a deceiver
'"^ Louw-Nida: "This noun [irpooaYUYil] denotes the right or opportunity to address someone, with the
imphcation that the person addressed is ofhigher rank or status" L&N 33.72.
Terms for irappriaLa abound in 2 Corinthians: irappTioia (2 Cor 3:12; 7:4; cf 6:11); Gappeto (2 Cor
5:6, 8; 7:16; 10:1, 2); eyKaKeco (2 Cor 4:1, 16). A great deal of scholarly ink has been spilt on this subject.
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corrupting God's word (2 Cor 2:17; 4:2; 7:2; 12:16-18). (3) The climactic statement in 2
Cor 13:8 fully articulates irapprioLa as a duty. Paul writes, "For we cannot do anything
against the truth, but only for the truth." (4) The dangers involved in TOppriOLa are
expressed through the many hardship Hsts (2 Cor 4:8-9; 6:4-10; 1 1 :23-28; 12:10). (5) The
criticisms involved in irapprioLa are articulated in passages such as 2 Cor 3'�^ and 2 Cor 7
and in Paul's claim to build up the fellowship (2 Cor 5:1; 10:8; 12:19; 13:10).'�^
Features of irappTioLa are found also in 1 Thess 2:1-6.'�^ Paul portrays himself as a
proclaimer of truth, for the message he proclaims is the gospel ofGod. He speaks in
frankness, not from error, impurity, deceit, desire to please, flatter, greed, nor glory. He
speaks out of his sense of duty. He is an apostle ofChrist entrusted by God with the gospel.
He speaks in midst of suffering and opposition (danger). And he speaks for the purpose of
exhorting the Thessalonians (criticism).
The word "shame" is found in the 2 Cor 4:2.
The plea to "know yourselves" (2 Cor 13:5) is also a function of irapprioLa. Plutarch notes, "for the
flatterer always takes a position over against the maxim 'know thyself,' by creating in every man deception
towards himself and ignorance both of himself and of the good and evil that concerns himself (Plutarch,
Adul. amic. 49b).
'"^ First Thessalonians 2:1-6 reads, "For you yourselves know, brethren, that our coming to you was
not in vain, but after we had already suffered and been mistreated in Philippi, as you know, we had the
boldness (enappTiOLaadjieea) in our God to speak to you the gospel ofGod amid much opposition. For our
exhortation does not come fi-om error or impurity or by way of deceit; but just as we have been approved by
God to be entrusted with the gospel, so we speak, not as pleasing men, but God who examines our hearts. For
we never came with flattering speech, as you know, nor with a pretext for greed�God is witness�^nor did
we seek glory from men, either from you or from others, even though as apostles of Christ we might have
asserted our authority."
Apologetic: Traugott Holtz, "On the Background of 1 Thessalonians 2:1-12," in The Thessalonians
Debate: Methodological Discord or Methodological Synthesis? (ed. Karl P. Donfiied and Johannes Beutler;
Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2000), 69-80; Jeffrey A. D. Weima, "The Function of 1 Thessalonians 2:1-
12 and the Use ofRhetorical Criticism: A Response to Otto Merk," in The Thessalonians Debate:
Methodological Discord orMethodological Synthesis? (ed. Karl P. Donfiied and Johannes Beutier; Grand
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2000), 1 14-31. Paraenetic: Abraham J. Malherbe, "Gentle as a Nurse: The Cynic
Background to 1 Thess 2," NovT 12 (1970), 203-17; Otto Merk, "1 Thessalonians 2:1-12: An Exegetical-
Theological Study," in The Thessalonians Debate: MethodologicalDiscord or Methodological Synthesis?
(ed. Karl P. Donfiied and Johannes Beutler; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2000), 89-1 13. Self-
recommendation: Johan S. Vos, "On the Background of 1 Thessalonians 2:1-12: A Response to Traugott
Holtz," in The Thessalonians Debate: Methodological Discord or Methodological Synthesis? (ed. Karl P.
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In sum, Paul closely follows the Greco-Roman rhetorical tradition in portraying
himself as a parrhesiastes. He presents always himself as a speaker of truth even in the
presence of immediate danger. And often he insists that he speaks not for gain or for
flattering but for the sake of his listeners. He believes that his and his message exist for the
benefit of others. Paul's self-presentation as aparrhesiastes usually appears at the at the
exordium part of his speech-letter. Here in Philippians, in the exordium part of the speech-
letter (Phil 1:12-26), Paul also presents himself as a parrhesiastes. Surrounded by the
praetorium guards, he shows no fear, but only joy. In face of the immediate danger of
death, he shamelessly and boldly proclaims the truth of the Gospel. This message
proclaimed is for the good of others.
4.3.3 Alpeo)
Having aligned himself with the Philippians (4.3.1), and having presented himself as
a reliable speaker of truth (4.3.2), Paul then presents himself as moral exemplar for
imitation (Phil 1:22-26). He presents himself as caught in the dilemma of "not knowing
(yvQpiCw) which to choose (alprjOopaL)" (Phil 1 :22). He is hard pressed between two
options. One option involves departing to be with Christ; the other option involves
remaining in the flesh. Option one is described as ttoXA-co \iaXkov Kpelooov (Phil 1 :23).
While TToXA-co paXXoy is a typical Greek formula, its connection with a comparative
adjective is rare. This construction is certainly rhetorical. Paul intends to present option
one as a highly preferable and desirable option.
Donfried and Johannes Beutler; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2000), 81-88. Weima notes that "virtually
all recent commentators have rejected the traditional, apologetic interpretation of 2:1-12 and opted instead for
its exclusively paraenetic or exemplary fimction" (115).
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Paul then presents option two, beginning with a post-positive 6e (Phil 1:24). The 6e
marks not only the contrast between departing and staying, but also the value difference
between departing and staying. While departing is highly valued as iroXXcp \xaXXov
Kpeiooov, the 64 immediately places a question mark on its value. Departing is preferable
"but" perhaps there is something that has an even higher value. The value of remaining is
placed higher than departure by the use of the comparative adjective dvayKaLOTepov. The
surpassing value of remaining is expressed both by the comparative form and by the
semantics of "necessity." There is a sense of divine duty.
Finally, at the end of Phil 1:24, Paul adds the climactic prepositional phrase 6l' upag.
The stacking of comparisons finally reaches its apex and lands on the phrase 6l' updc;. This
phrase explains why remaining in the flesh is more necessary than departing. In Paul's
view, "remaining" is an option "more necessary" than "departing," which is already
characterized as "much more better." By presenting "remaining" as an option "more
necessary" than the "much more better" of "departing," Paul presents his choice of
"remaining in the flesh for you" as the best option.
Paul resolves the dilemma of "not knowing (yvcopLCco) which to choose (alprioopaL)"
by choosing that which is "more necessary" beyond "the better." Paul's choice resonates
with his prayer earlier in Phil 1 :9-10, in which he asks God to grant the Philippians the
"knowledge (kmyv6o�i) and insight to determine (6oklp(xC�lv) what is the best." Paul
makes himself a good example ofwhat it means to choose the best, by choosing to remain
in the flesh "for the sake of others." West rightly notes that "Paul's self-debate here is
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exhortative, a preview for the Philippians ofwhat it looks like to engage in practical
reasoning (phronesis) that is shaped by the cross of Christ."'�^
The concept of alpew ("choose") is an important one in Greco-Roman ethics.
Aristotle defines virtue as the "settled disposition of the mind determining the choice of
actions and emotions consisting essentially in the observance of the mean relative to us,
this being determined by principle that is, as the prudent man would determine it"
(Aristofie, Eth. nic. 2.6.15; cf 6.2.2)."� In short, virtue is the habit ofchoosing.
According to Aristotle, choice is a voluntary act. Accordingly, choice is "an act of
which the origin lies in the agent, who knows the particular circumstances (id kkG' eKaota)
[which requires percepfion] in which he is acting" (Aristofie, Eth. nic. 3.1.20).'" The
concept of choice differs from desire (einGupLa), passion (Bupoc;), wish (PouA,r|OLc) and
opinion (66^a) (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 3.2.3). Aristotle explicitly contrasts choice with desire
when he writes, "a man of defective self-restraint acts from desire but not from choice; and
on the confrary a self-restrained man acts from choice and not from desire" (Aristotle, Eth.
nic. 3.2.4)."^ Choice runs counter to desire, for it is a voluntary actpreceded by
deliberation.^^^ Deliberation determines a means to an end. The object of deliberafion must
West, "Whether by Life or by Death", 178. This is noted also by Rollin A. Ramasaran: "Having
prayed and encouraged the Philippians to make proper moral decisions (1 :9-10), Paul offers his own personal
example as a model of discernment in 1:12-26" ("In the Steps of the Moralists: Paul's Rhetorical
Argumentation in Philippians 4," in Rhetoric, Ethic, andMoral Persuasion in Biblical Discourse [ed.
Thomas H. Olbricht and Anders Eriksson; New York: T&T Clark Intemational, 2005], 288).
"""EoTLv apa i] dpeiTi e^ic; irpoaLpeTLKr), kv fieo6tr|TL ovaa tfj irpof; r\\i&c� copioiievr) loyco Kal ox; av
6 ^p6vi\io(; opioeiei'. Sarah Brodie and Christopher Rowe translates it as follows: "Excellence is a
disposition issuing in decisions, depending on intermediacy of the kind relative to us, this being determined
by rational prescription and in the way in which the wise persori would determine it" (Aristotle, Nicomachean
Ethics: Translation, Introduction and Commentary [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002], 117).
"'
Knowing the circimistances is the function of aLoGriaLi; (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 3.1.16; 6.1 1.4).
Paul also contrasts choice and desire here in Phil 1 :22-24.
A good choice would be a choice preceded by "excellent deliberation" which Aristotle calls
(^povr\aic, (see 4.5.2).
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be things in our control and attainable by action. No one deliberates about things eternal
(e.g., the order of the universe) or things irregular (e.g., droughts and rain). Deliberation is
directed toward things that involve both regularity and irregularity. Medicine and business
are good examples of objects of deliberation. Due to the nature of its object, the act of
deliberation will not always yield the same result.
The object of deliberation and the object of choice are the same (Aristotle, Eth. nic.
3.3.17). Choice is the act that directs desire (ope^tt;)""* to the object determined by
deliberation. Thus, choice is a deliberate desire of things in ourpower (PouXeuTLKf) ope^ic;
TQV W T^Lv) (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 3.3.19; 6.2.2; cf 6.2.5-6)."^ The theme of deliberation
will be dealt with by Paul in greater detail later in Phil 2:5 (4.5.2).
4.3.4 npOKOirri
As a speaker of truth (4.3.2), Paul presents himself as a moral exemplar (4.3.3) for
those who are afflicted by discord in the midst of suffering (4.3.1). Paul expects the
Philippians to follow his example. He expects them to curtail their desires for the self, and
replace those desires with the care for others. He expects to see their moral progress
(TTpoKOTTTi) (Phil 1:25)."^ The word irpoKouri frames Phil 1:12-26. In Phil 1:12, it is the
progress of the gospel; In Phil 1:25 it is the moral progress of the believers. This double
"Ope^tg should not be confused with eirLeuiiia.
Some scholars have argued that Paul attempts suicide in Phil 1 : 19-26. But see N. C. Croy, '"To Die
Is Gain' (Philippians 1 : 1 9-26): Does Paul Contemplate Suicide?" JBL 1 22 (2003): 517-31. Croy provides a
sharp criticism against both Droge (A. J. Droge, "Mori Lucrum: Paul and Ancient Theories ofSuicide,"
iVovr 30 (1988): 263-86) and Palmer (D. W. Palmer, "To Die Is Gain (Philippians 1 :21)," NovT 17 (1975):
203-18); the former argues that Paul attempts to commit suicide; the latter argues that Paul bemoans earthly
life and regarded death as gain for it brings release fi-om earthly troubles. The main argument ofCroy's paper
is that "It has not been adequately appreciated that Paul in Phil 1:19-26 uses a rhetorical fi-ope known as
aiTopLoc or SiaTTopTioL;, 'feigned perplexity.' The Latin term is dubitafio or addubitatio. This technique
involves a rhetorical pretense of uncertainty and the posing of a question as a way of sti-engthening or
dramatizing an argument" ('"To Die Is Gain' (Philippians 1:19-26)," 525).
' The emphasis on your {xr\v h\i.Qv) progress makes it unlikely that Paul is referring to the progress
of the gospel (cf Phil 1:12).
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use of the word irpoKOTrri recalls the tension between "fellowship of the gospel" and "the
good work of God" in Phil 1:5-6 (4.2.2). The spread of the gospel is important but equally
important is that believers' lives are transformed by the gospel. This same tension will rise
again in the propositio where Paul urges for a civic life worthy of the gospel ofChrist so
the citizens may together strive for the faith of the gospel (Phil 1 :27).
npoKoirri is a technical term for moral progress in Greco-Roman philosophy."^
Already in Aristotle, there is the categorization of different states ofmoral character:
Superhuman virtue {xv\ uirep fipac dpexT)), virtue (apexT^), self-control (evKpdieLa), lack of
self-control (aKpocoifx), vice (KaKia), beastliness (eripLoiric) (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 7.1.1). But
in Aristotle there is no fully developed theory ofmoral progress. The theory ofmoral
progress will be developed later by the Hellenistic philosophers. In the NT period, the
theory ofmoral progress becomes the common denominator of all moral philosophers,
including: Seneca, Epictetus, Plutarch, and Philo.
According to Seneca, three stages of progress exist for persons who have separated
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themselves from fools and begun to make progress toward virtue (Seneca, Ep. 75). First,
there are those people who have escaped the diseases of the mind but not yet the passions.
The diseases of the mind include vices such as greed and ambition (ut avaritia, ut ambitio).
These people have yet to leam to put their good into practice. Their assurance is not yet
John T. Fitzgerald, Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought (London: Routledge,
2008); Michael B. Trapp, Philosophy in the Roman Empire: Ethics, Politics and Society (Ashgate Ancient
Philosophy Series; Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 28-61. Pierre Hadot notes, "One must always approach a
philosophical work of antiquity with this idea of spiritual progress in mind" {Philosophy as a Way ofLife:
Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault [Maiden, MA: Blackwell, 1995], 64).
Seneca's writing on the stages ofmoral progress is filled with ambiguity, resulting in widely
different interpretations. James P. Ware, for example, sees the first class as the highest class ("Moral
Progress and Divine Power in Seneca and Paul," in Passions andMoral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought
[New York: Routledge, 2008], 267-83). Emma Wasserman, on the contrary, sees the first class as the
lowest class {The Death of the Soul in Romans 7: Sin, Death, and the Law in Light ofHellenistic Moral
Psychology [WUZNT 2. Reihe; Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 2008], 38-39). This thesis agrees with Wasserman.
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tested. According to Seneca, disease refers to tlie perversion of judgment, valuing highly
things that ought not to be valued {Ep. 75.1 1). Second, there are those people who have
escaped both the greatest diseases of the mind and its passions {Ep. 75.14). "Passions" are
objectionable impulses of the spirit. Passions come and go. Ifpassions become habitual,
disease will occur. Third, there are those people who have gone beyond the reach ofmany
of the vices, but not beyond the reach of all {Ep. 75.14). Beyond the third are the wise
people who stand beyond all vices. The first step to moral progress, according to Seneca,
requires putting knowledge into practice: "When shall you put it all into practice? For it is
not sufficient merely to commit these things to memory, like other matters; they must be
practically tested. He is not happy who only knows them, but he who does them" {Ep.
75.7).
Epictetus defines moral progress when he writes, "He who is making progress,
having learned of the philosophers that desire is for things good and aversion is toward
things evil, and having also learned that serenity and calm are not attained by man save as
he succeeds in securing the object of desire and as he avoids encountering the objects of
aversion" (Epictetus, Diatr. 1.4.1). Thus, moral progress entails the knowledge of good
and evil, and the act of attaining good, and the act of avoiding evil. Thus, like Seneca,
Epictetus sternly wams his pupils that moral progress cannot simply consist ofbook
leaming. Moral progress must take place in the acts of choice, refusal, desire, and aversion:
"putting into practice his guiding principles, as the runner does when he applies the
principles ofmnning�^this is the man who in all tmth is making progress" {Diatr. 1.4.20-
21). In the process ofmoral progress, one must leam to deal with the strong emotions such
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as envy and jealousy�^passions which make it impossible for us even to listen to reason
{Diatr. 3.2.3)
For Plutarch, moral progress is like walking toward a destination. The walk is a
long and gradual process. Progress is showed by indicators along the way. One of those
indicators is the pain felt when separated from the study ofphilosophy. The more the pain,
the more the progress. Another indicator is the dissipation of depression and dismay that
troubles many people at the outset of the moral progress. Progress is also evident when the
individual learns to set the advantages of virtue over against extemal advantages, and
leams to dispel "all envy and jealousy and the things that vex and depress many beginners
in philosophy" (Plutarch, Virt. vit. 78e).
The change in discourse can also function as a sign of progress. Progress takes place
when repute, flightiness, ambition, disputations, quibbles, and wrangling are no longer
attractive {Virt. vit. 80b, c); attractive instead is "the kind of discourse which deals with
character and feeling" {Virt. vit. 79c). People who progress in virtue are perceptive and
receptive to all things that conducive to virtue {Virt. vit. 79f). Difference in speaking is also
a sign of progress {Virt. vit. 80c-e). No longer will the individual speak for entertainment;
instead, he or she will avail to the occasion and the subject. People who progress in virtue
also will show character change {Virt. vit. 81b-c). They are no longer like empty cheats
towering aloof; instead, they become mild, silent, and humble.
"' For detailed study ofEpictetus' understanding ofmoral progress see Geert Roskam, On the Path to
Virtue: The Stoic Doctrine ofMoral Progress and Its Reception in (Middle-)Platonism (Ancient and
Medieval Philosophy; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005), 103-24.
See also the helpful summary ofPlutarch's Moralia 75a-86a by William C. Grese, "De Profectibus
in Virtute (Moralia 75a-86a)," in Plutarch 's Ethical Writings andEarly Christian Literature (ed. Hans Dieter
Betz; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978), 1-31.
230
Plutarch suggests self-comparison as the best measure for progress, in which the
person asks, "whether now we are more inclined to feel shame than fear, to be emulous
rather than envious (c|)0oyoG|i6v), more eager for good repute than for money
((t)LA.oxpri|j,aTou|i6y), and, in general, whether in case we err by going to extremes" (Virt. vit.
83f).
Plutarch also emphasizes the importance ofpractice: "the translating of our
judgments (kplo�lc;) into deeds (kpya), and not allowing our words to remain mere words,
but to make them into actions (-rrpd^eLc;), is above all else, a specific mark ofprogress" {Virt.
vit. 84b). Progress includes the need to transform admiration into imitation. The individual
must not merely commend and admire; instead, he or she must emulate and imitate as well
{Virt. vit. 84c). Another important indication ofprogress involves taking sin seriously and
become vexed by the appearance of vice.
Like other Greco-Roman ethicists, Philo acknowledges different degrees ofmoral
progress. He notes also that moral progress requires "continual study and incessant practice"
(Philo, Agr. 1.160). In De Agricultura, Philo distinguishes three stages ofmoral progress:
(1) those persons who have just begin to move toward virtue; (2) those persons who are
making progress; and (3) those persons who had just achieved perfection {Agr. 1.158).
Beginners are like a suitor who wants to marry his woman immediately. They are in
pursuit of education. People in progress are like a planter who grows a tree. They are
devoted to leaming. People who have just attained perfection are like a house builder who
has just finish building a house. They need pracfice to become firm. However, all are
alike, seeking "to live without contention (d(|)Llov�LKG)(;), and not engage in the war of the
Planting and building are also two ofPaul's favorite imageries formoral growth (cf Eph 3:17).
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sophists, which is always stirring up a quarrelsome disturbance (Suoepiv xapaxr\v), which
tends to the adulteration of the truth" (Agr. 1.159). Elsewhere he defines the perfect man as
"competent to eradicate the whole of the angry feelings from the contentious soul (xf\c,
epLOTLKfiQ i|ii)xf|�;) and to make it submissive and manageable, and peaceable and gentle to
everyone, both in word and deed" (Philo, Leg. 3.140). Apparently, for Philo, the
eradication of contention is one of the sure signs ofmoral progress.
Philo also applies this scheme ofmoral progress to his reading of the OT texts. For
example, the cleansing of the belly in Leviticus is read allegorically as descriptions of
moral progress:
The man who is devoted to pleasure goes on his belly, but the perfect man washes his
whole belly [Lev 9:14], and he who is only advancing towards perfection washes the
things in his belly [Lev 1 :9]. But he who is now beginning to be instructed proceeds
out of doors when he is intent upon curbing the passions of the belly by bringing
reason to work upon the necessities of the belly, and reason is called symbolically a
peg. (Philo, leg. 3.159)
"Belly" represents pleasure and desire. The cleansing of the belly represents the cleansing
of desires. The perfect man is clean from all desires.
In sum, all four authors�Seneca, Epictetus, Plutarch, Philo�describe different
stages ofmoral progress. Both Seneca and Philo argue for a three stage scheme: those
persons who have just begun, those persons who are progressing, and those persons who
are close to perfection (or have just been perfected). All four authors insist on the
importance ofpractice (TTpd^eLc). Mere academic leaming will not take the individual far in
moral progress. Moral progress must result from practice. Moreover, all four authors see
the abafing or the restraining of desires and vices as signs ofmoral progress. Of the various
vices diminished or eradicated in the process ofmoral progress, they menfion social vices
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such as envy, greed, ambition, and contention. The cleansing of these vices is a sure sign
ofmoral progress.
Both the emphasis on practice and the emphasis on diminishing or eradication of
social vices are found in Philippians. In this letter, Paul asks not only for the moral choice
(alpew) based moral knowledge, and moral perception, and moral deliberation (((jpovecj;
4.5.2), but also the actual practice ofmoral acts (Phil 2:12-13; see 4.6.1). Also, in
Philippians Paul mentions various social vices with which the community must deal in
order to come together in unity and attain salvation against enemies. These vices include
envy (Phil 1:15), strife (Phil 1:15), self-ambition (Phil 1:17; 2:3), vainglory (Phil 2:3),
contention (Phil 2:14), lust for gain (cf. Phil 1:21; 3:7, 8), lust for honor (cf Phil 3:1-6).
Paul's list of vice is not unlike that of the Greco-Roman ethicists. Like the Greco-Roman
ethicists, Paul likes to see the moral progress of friends, by which they eradicate vices that
hinder them to the life of peace and unity.
4.4 Philippians 1:27-30
Philippians 1:27-30 is the propositio ofPaul's letter to the Philippians. It speaks of
the three major themes ofGreco-Roman ethics:
� Only live your life as a citizen (4.4.1) worthy (4.4.2) of the gospel ofChrist (virtue),
� so that. . .you stand firm in one spirit (4.4.3), with one soul (4.4.4) striving side bv
side (4.4.5) for the faith of the gospel, and not frightened in anything by your
opponents (4.4.6) (friendship).
� This is a clear omen to them of their destruction, but of your salvation (4.4.7-8)
(polis).
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4.4.1 noA-LTeuopaL
The word TToA.LT6uo|iaL does not mean simply "to live" as most English translations
seem to suggest. Already Thayer recognizes its significance and claims that "from
Thucydides down in Hellenistic writers -noXixeveoQai meant to conduct one's self as
pledged to some law of life."'^^ This conclusion is later confirmed by the study of
Raymond Brewer. Brewer draws evidence from the NT period, the Maccabean corpus, the
Letter ofAristeas, Philo, Acts, 1 Clement, Polycarp, Justin Martyr, and Epistle to
Diogenetus, and concludes that "uo/lLTeugoBe is used when conduct relative to some law of
life�political, moral, social, or religious�is signified."'^^
Two additional evidences from important authors of the NT period can be added to
Brewer's collection of evidence: (1) Epictetus, Diatr. 1.23.6; 2.20.27; 3.7.26; 3.9.9; 3.21.5;
3.22.83, 84, 85; (2) Dio Chrysostom, 2 Tars. 15, 28, 29, 34, 36; Nicom. 4; Grat. 9, \ V,Def.
8; Cont. 2, 10, 13; Rec. mag. 6; Regn. 4. Both authors use -iroA-LxeueoGaL in the sense of
fiilfiUing the duties of the citizen.
Ernest C. Miller, unsafisfied with Brewer's conclusion, argues that -irolLxeueoGaL
"tends to connote a specifically Chrisfian idea of the church as the new Israel."'^'' He draws
evidence from the Maccabean corpus and concludes, "-rroA-LTeueoGai is always used with
specific reference to the collecfive life of Jews as Jews, distinct and set apart as God's
'^^ Joseph Henry Thayer, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament (Cor. ed.; New York: Harper
& brothers, 1889), 528.
'^^ Raymond Rush Brewer, "The Meaning ofPoliteuesthe in Philippians 1:27," JBL 73 (1954): 80.
'^^ Ernest C. Miller, "Politeuesthe in Philippians 1:27: Some Philological and Thematic Observations,"
JSNTIS (1982): 76-83. Pheme Perkins also reads in Philippians a contrast between the Christian heavenly
politeuma and the Jewish earthly politeuma. She argues that the Christ-Hymn is Paul's political theology
written "to prohibit Christians from taking advantage of the earthly politeuma of the Jewish community"
("Philippians: Theology for the Heavenly Politeuma," in Pauline Theology, Vol 1 [Minneapolis: Forfress,
1991], 89-104, here 92).
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people." This is a valid conclusion. However, a paragraph later, after he has examined
the use of the word in the Letter ofAristeas, he developed a different and unfortunately
invalid conclusion: "TToALxeueoBaL refers to the Jews living in fidelity to Torah as God's
chosen nation."'^^ Here he reads theology into semantics. Later in the article, he repeatedly
speaks of the "particularly Jewish usage of the verb"'^^ or the existence of "a Jewish
understanding of -iroXLTeueoGau"'^^ These conclusions are invalid. The meaning of the verb
TToXiTeueoGaL never goes beyond Brewer's conclusion as "conduct relative to some law of
life." The connection between -iroXLteueoGaL and the Torah is accidental, due to sampling
bias. The reference to the Torah is not an inherent feature in the semantics of the verb
TToA.LT�U6oGaL. MiUcr commits a basic exegetical fallacy.'^^
How to live as a citizen depends on what kind of iroA-LTeia governs the citizen.
Different -iToA,LT�La requires different duties from its citizens.'''^ The goodness of a citizen is
defined differently by each -rToA,LTeLa. HoXixda expresses a way of life. To become good
citizens, the citizens must leam the requirements of their iroXLieLa and adapt to that
particular standard. This close relationship between the TTO/lLTeta and the life of the citizen
is expressed in various writings ofGreco-Roman period. In Pericles' fiineral oration, for
Miller, "Politeuesthe in Philippians 1 :27," 88.
Miller, "Politeuesthe in Philippians 1 :27," 89.
Miller, "Politeuesthe in Philippians 1 :27," 90.
� This is noted also by Troels Engberg-Pedersen. He claims that Miller's assertion is philologically
wholly unsound ("Stoicism in Philippians," in Paul in His Hellenistic Context [Mirmeapolis: Fortress, 1995],
263nl2).
Life in the ancient Mediterranean world is closely boimd up with the city. People are often
identified by the polis fi'om which they come (e.g., Paul ofTarsus). Aristotle's idiom "man is a political
animal" is perhaps better translated as "man is a being who lives in the polis.'" Every city has its own
particular iroXLieCa advocating a particular way of life. Different TTolLteLa produces different kinds of citizens.
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example, he praises the Athenian -rroA-LTeLa, for it defines a manner of life that has made
Athens a great empire (Thucydides, Hist. 2.36.4).
Isocrates notes that the relafionship between the noXixda and the state is like that of
the mind to the body. The -woUxda is the soul of the state. Isocrates writes, "[It] deliberates
upon all questions, seeking to preserve what is good and to ward offwhat is disastrous"
(Isocrates, Areop. 14). Once the TtoXixeLa, the soul of the state, is determined, the body must
follow its lead. In other words, the noXixda determines the life of the cifizens. As a result,
the life of the citizens inevitably will refiect the character of their xioXixda (Isocrates,
Areop. 28).
Plato holds a similar understanding of the TToA-LTeia. In his understanding, TOA,LT�La is
"a system of laws and practices structuring the life of the citizens."'^' Plato's most
celebrated book, commonly known as The Republic, actually bears the title oiHoXixdm. In
this book, Plato deals with various different issues related to the daily life of the citizen:
education, upbringing, rules governing marriage, the role ofwomen in society, and so on.
noA.LT�La concerns not only the structure and organization of the govemment, but also the
conduct of the individual citizens and their relationships with one another.
Aristotle too describes the x\oX\.xdm as "a city's way of life" (Aristotle, Pol. 4.9.3).
He defines x\oX\.xdoL as "a form of organization of the inhabitants of a state" (Aristotle, Pol.
3.1.1). noA.LX6La characterizes a city. noA-Lieia is the form of a city. Once the i\oX\.xda
changes, the city changes. As long as the TToA.LT�La remains the same, the city remains the
same, even though the size and population may differ (Aristotle, Pol. 3.1.11-14).
Malcolm Schofield, Plato: Political Philosophy (Founders ofModem Political and Social Thought;
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 33.
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Jews holds a similar understanding of -rToA,LT6La. The author of 4 Maccabees, for
example, understands mXixda as the Jewish way of life (4 Mace 3:20; 8:7; 17:9).'^^
Josephus' work Judean Antiquities has Jewish TTolLteia as its major theme. As such, he
writes, "I have undertaken the present work, as thinking it will appear to all the Greeks
worthy of their study; for it will contain all our antiquities, and the constitution of our
govemment {hmxaliv tou iroXLteuiiaToc), as interpreted out of the Hebrew Scriptures"
(Josephus, Ant. 1.5). The Torah given to Moses at Mount Sinai is referred to as a x^oXixda.
He engages his readers in a dialogue conceming the best constitution.'^^ The Jewish
constitution, namely, the Torah, govems all aspects of the Jewish life. It expresses a way of
life.'^^
noA.LT�La is used in a similar way in early Christianity. The author of 1 Clement, for
example, vsrites, "being adomed with a virtuous and honorable manner of life {x\o'k\.xd\.a),
you performed all your duties in the fear of him. The commandments and ordinances of the
Lord were written upon the tablets of your hearts" (7 Clem. 2.8). noA,LT�La refers not only
to the govemmental stmcture but also to the conduct of each individual citizen.
Framing Philippians with the concept of TToA.LT�La (Phil 1:27; 3:20), Paul envisions
the Christ community as an altemative polis standing among and contesting against other
Rightly noted by Henten, The Maccabean Martyrs, 199. Henten, however, approaches the problem
incorrectly, asking whethermXii^'m means "constitution" or "way of life." This distinction is a false
dichotomy.
'^^ Feldman, Judean Antiquities 1-4, xxiv. See also pages xxiv-xxix, where Feldman discusses "the
altemative political constitution" as a unifying theme in Josephus' Judean Antiquities.
Rajak writes, "Josephus accepted the regular Jewish-Greek interpretation ofJudaism as a iroA-LteLa,
or, occasionally, politeuma, a constitutional system.. .the definition also served to evoke the desired moral
and social cohesion of Jewish communifies within the non-Jewish civic structures surrounding them. The
Jewish TToXLteia of the writers, however, is often in large measure theoretical, virtually a city ofGod"
(emphasis mine; "Josephus," 587).
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political entities. This community is characterized by its own particularmlixda.
Citizens are asked to live according to that TToA.LT�La. The Christian noAcreLa is the gospel
ofChris t.^^^ The gospel determines the life of the believer. To become a virtuous citizen,
the Christ-believer must live according to the principles of the new iToA.LT�La and live
worthy of the gospel ofChrist.
4.4.2 'A^LOx;
In the Greco-Roman tradition, the adverb "worthy of (d^Lwc)'^^ often occurs in
connection to either the self,'''^ the city,'^^ the ancestors. These three objects have two
things in common. First, they all contribute to the existence of the citizen.''*' Citizens
would not have come into existence ifnot for their own being, their city, and their
ancestors. As such, these elements are the essential components of the individual's being.
'^^ Bockmuehl writes, "Against the colonial preoccupation with the coveted citizenship ofRome, Paul
interposes a coimter-citizenship whose capital and seat of power are not earthly but heavenly, whose
guarantor is not Nero but Christ. Philippi may be a colony enjoying the personal imperial patronage of Lord
Caesar, but the church at Philippi is a personal colony of Christ the Lord above all (2:10-1 1). The exercise of
their common citizenship, therefore, must be worthy ofhis gospel, which is as it were the 'constitution' of
that kingdom" {The Epistle to the Philippians, 98).
Fowl writes, "Paul is speaking about the ordering of the common life of the Philippian Christians.
As the context makes clear, the standard against which this ordering takes place is not Rome or Jewish law. It
is the gospel ofChrist" {Philippians, 61). The gospel of Christ has replaced the law and the mXixda ofboth
the Jews and the Romans. James Dunn argues, "The law of Christ is equivalent to Jesus' refusal to please
himself {The Theology ofPaul the Apostle, 654).
Ryan K. Balot, "The Virtue Politics ofDemocratic Athens," in The Cambridge Companion to
Ancient Greek Political Thought (ed. Stephen G. Salkever; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009),
271-300.
�
Thucydides, Hist. 2.71 [imworthy ofyourselves or of the fathers]; Isocrates, Archid. 70; Antid. 70
[worthy of a freeman and of the polis]; Plato, Ale. 1 19e [worthy of yourself and of the city].
'^^
Thucydides, Hist. 2.43 [in a manner that befits (-rrpooriKoyTcof;) our city]; Aeschines, Tim. 134; Fals.
leg 46, 1 13; Ctes. 182; Demosthenes, 2 Olynth. 12; [Syntax.] 33; Isocrates, Archid. 2; Antid. 80 [both of the
polis and ofHellas], 119; Dionysius ofHalicamassus, Ant. rom. 4.24.8; 7.51.5; Dio Chrysostom, Cont. 15.
Thucydides, Hist. 7.69; Demosthenes, Symm. 41; Isocrates, Evag. 80 [worthy ofyour father and of
all your ancestors]; Euripides, Heracl. 626.
Ben Witherington rightly notes that "gender, generation and geography served as the major sources
of identity and personality in antiquity" {The Paul Quest: The Renewed Search for the Jew ofTarsus
[Downers Grove, 111.: InterVarsity, 1998], 33).
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Second, these aspects all involve a reference to the self I am who "I" am. The city is the
community ofwhich "I" am a part. The ancestors are "my" ancestors. The life established
as the standard is not externally superimposed upon the self (heteronomie). Rather they are
forms of self-regulation (autonomic). I (we) must live up to my (our) own standards.
Replacing the gospel ofChrist for the self, the city, and the fathers as the standard for
the life of the citizen, Paul makes two claims: (1) The gospel ofChrist is the foundation of
the Christian existence. Christians are saved through the gospel of Christ. They not only
gain a new existence through Christ, but they also participate in Christ, the polis-hody, in
and through which they sustain their existence; (2) To live worthy of the gospel ofChrist is
not to be govemed by some extemal regulations. Rather, to live as a Christian is to live
within Christ, who is "more inward to me than my innermost self (Augustine). Christians
participate in Christ and in his gospel, in his blood and in his body, in his death and in his
resurrection, in his suffering and in his glory. Christ is not extemal to one's being; instead,
Christ is at the center of one's being.
The purpose of "living as a citizen worthy of the gospel ofChrist" is expressed by the
im-clause in Phil 1 :27b:
so that. . . .1 [Paul] . . .may hear. . . that
you [Philippians] stand firm in one spirit,
in one soul striving together for the faithfiilness of the gospel.
and
are in no way intimidated by your opponents.
The purpose is expressed in terms related to the life of the polis. Living in conformity to
Christ is meant to foster a strong bonding between the citizens, so they many stand in "one
spirit" (4.4.3), and "strive together" (4.4.5) in "one soul" (4.4.4) against the "opponents"
(4.4.6). These terms and concepts convey a strong relational bond best characterized as
"friendship."
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4.4.3 One Spirit
Scholars debate whether "spirit" refers to the human spirit or to the Holy Spirit. Good
reasons exist for interpreting "spirit" as the human spirit. First, the chiastic structure
suggests "one spirit" as equivalent to "one soul;"'"*^ Second, in Luke 1:47, the same
parallel between "spirit" and "soul" refers to the human spirit. Third, spirit and soul are
often used interchangeably (cf John 1 1 :33 with 12:27; and Matt 1 1 :29 with 1 Cor
16:18).''*^ Fourth, while Paul uses ev iwev^ia for the Holy Spirit in other places (1 Cor 12:9,
13; cf Eph. 2:18; 4:4), such usage does not conclude that the same usage applies to Phil
1:27, since elsewhere Paul uses the equavalent phrase tco auxco TTveuiiaTL for both the Holy
Spirit (1 Cor 12:8, 9, 1 1) and the human spirit (2 Cor 12:18).
Moreover, similar constructions in Greco-Roman literature are used to refer to human
spirit. Aristotle, for example, claims that the "harmony of the spirit" (oupTryeco) ends stasis
(Aristotle, Pol. 5.2.10; cf Plato, Leg. 708d; Demosthenes, Cor. 168). Likewise, Polybius
claims that "agreement and unity" (oupTTveuoayxeg Kal \xl& yvcopTi) wards off enemies;
whereas stasis ruins the kingdom (Polybius, Hist. 30.2.8-9). Dio Chrysostom claims that
to stabilize the polis, the citizens should "breathe the breath ofharmony" (oupTryeo)). To
achieve this harmony, citizens would need to exterminate the vices of envy, greed,
contentiousness (Dio Chrysostom, 2 Tars. 19). Antiphon claims that "fiiends... are like-
minded, like-spirited C^oa weoyTac;)" (Antiphon, Frg. 49.8). This claim is made in his
speech On Concord.
Hawthome, Philippians, 70; Silva, Philippians, 82.
O'Brien, The Epistle to the Philippians, 151.
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Thus, in view of the evidences above, Jivd^ia most lilcely expresses the harmony
among the citizens necessary to ward offstasis and stabilize thepolis. This harmony is
known as an expression of friendship.
4.4.4 One Soul
In the Greco-Roman world a common saying states, "friends have one soul between
them" (liia i|/uxri; Euripides, Orest. 1046).'*^ Aristotle quotes this saying as a proverb
(TTapOLULai) (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 9.8.2; Eth. eud. 7.6.10; Mor. Mag. 2.11.44). This saying is
widely known by authors of the NT period.'''^ Plutarch, for example, writes that
friendships can exist only between people who are alike:
our friendship's consonance and harmony there must be no element unlike, uneven,
or unequal, but all must be alike to engender agreement in words, counsels, opinions,
and feelings, and it must be as if one soul (pta; il/uxfig) were apportioned among two
or more bodies. (Plutarch, Amic. mult. 96f; cf Cat. Min. 794d)
People who share friendship with one another are close to one another and similar to one
another, to the extent that they are like one soul distributed in two bodies (cf Plutarch,
Frat. amor. 478d). In his treatise on friendship, Cicero expresses the same sentiment, "the
effect of friendship is to make, as it were, one soul out ofmany (unus animus ex pluribus)"
(Cicero, Amic. 92). He claims that human beings naturally seek for friendship to share one
soul with another:
Now if it is evident in animals. . .that they love themselves. . .and, secondly, that they
require and eagerly search for other animals. . ..then how much more, by the law of
his nature, is this the case with man who both loves himself and uses his reason to
seek out another whose soul (animum) he may so mingle with his own as almost to
make one out of two (unum ex duobus)! (Cicero, Amic. 81; cf Ojf. 1.56)
The same expression is found in the Hebrew culture: Cf 1 Sam 18:1 (tos?3 -[niin; ^'^^v'?'!); ^^^ut
13:7 (�^ms:3 -\m -^^-i).
Another way of expressing "friends have one soul" is to say that "friend is another self (Aristotle,
Eth. nic. 9.4.5 feoii. 6 ^iXoQ aXXoc, amoo]; 9.9.1 [tov <^lXov eiepov aiiiov ovra]; 9.9.10 [eiepoe auto? 6
(^LXoc, eoTLv]; Cicero, Amic. 21 [alter idem]; Plutarch, Amic. mult. 93e; cf. Gal 4:12).
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Seneca notes that friendship happens when "souls are drawn together by identical
inclinations into an alliance of honorable desires" (Seneca, Ep. 6.3).
Dio Chrysostom is also familiar with this Greek proverb. He claims that concord is
the greatest good, for in the state of concord citizens are bond by friendship and united as
one soul:
When a city has concord, as many citizens as there are, so many are the eyes with
which to see that city's interest, so many the ears with which to hear, so many the
tongues to give advice, so many the minds concemed in its behalf; why, it is just as if
some god had made a single soul (liiav iIjuxtiv) for so great populous a city. (Dio
Chrysostom, Nicaeen. 5)
Elsewhere Chrysostom uses the image ofmany eyes, ears, tongues, and minds as a
metaphor for friendship (7 Regn. 31-32; 3 Regn. 104-107).'''^ Friends are like another self
Their eyes are my eyes; their ears are my ears; their tongues are my tongue; their minds are
my mind. Friendship is the experience ofhaving "a multitude of souls all fiill of concem in
one's behalf (7 Regn. 32).
Acts also shows awareness of this popular Greek saying. In Acts 4:32, the author of
Acts appropriates many common Greek ideals such as (1) friends as one soul; (2) friends
share all things in common; and (3) the contrast between private ("one's own") and public:
And the congregation of those who believed were of one heart and soul (KapSia Kal
vffuxTi |iLa); and not one of them claimed that anything belonging to him was his own
(ibiov), but all things were common property (aTrayta KOtyd) to them.'"*^
This idea can be traced back to Aristotle, Pol. 3.6.4; 3.1 1.9.
'"^ Brian Capper, "The Palestinian Cultural Context of Earliest Christian Community ofGoods," in
The Book ofActs in Its Palestinian Setting (ed. Richard Bauckham; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1995),
323-56; Jacques Dupont, "La Communaute Des Biens Aux Premiers Jours De L'eglise (Actes 2,42.44-45;
4,32.34-35)," in Etudes Sur Les Actes Des Apotres (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1967), 503-19; Christopher M.
Hays, Luke 's Wealth Ethics: A Study in Their Coherence and Character (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen
Zum Neuen Testament. 2. Reihe; Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 2010), 190-21 1; Alan C. Mitchell, "The Social
Function ofFriendship in Acts 2:44-47 and 4:32-37," J5Z, 1 11 (1992), 255-72. Mitchell argues that Luke
"used these fiiendship traditions in more than a merely descriptive or literary way. Because of their social
implications, they become a vehicle for encouraging the rich ofhis community to benefit the poor, by
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When Paul wants to express his deep affection toward the Thessalonians, he says, "we are
determined to share with you not only the gospel but also our own souls (iclq kuxcov tuxaq)
because you have become beloved ones to us" (1 Thess 2:8). Second Clement 12:3 picks
up the same idiom and relates it to the practice of frank speech that characterizes friendship:
"Now, two are one when we speak the truth one to another, and there is unfeignedly one
soul (pia il/uxri) in two bodies."
Thus, the appeal to "strive side by side with one soul" is the appeal to "strive side by
side in friendship." Chapter 2 has shown that friendship is commonly acknowledged as
the cornerstone of all polies. Apparently, Paul agrees with this coventional wisdom.
Christian friendship, however, differs from other friendships, because of its basis on a
specific type of virtue exemplified by Christ (Phil 1:27). Section 4.5 will explore this
unique friendship in greater detail.
4.4.5 Suy-words
The emphasis on friendship is fiirther enhanced by the ouu-prefix added to the verb
aGXeco.'''^ The "sun-lxun-prefix. . .is often used to suggest the cooperation ofphiloi."^^^
While aQXk(x) is a common word, owaQXku) is not well attested in Greek literature before
the NT period. The ouv-prefix is added most likely for emphasis. Ignatius does the same to
emphasize on the "togetherness" of the early church when he writes, "train together with
transferring to them some of the normal benefits well-off friends took for granted. Luke, then, used the
friendship traditions to imity his community across social lines" (258).
2uv-words in Philippians includes: Phil 1:7 [ouyKOLVcoyog], 27 [ouyaGXeco]; 2:2 [ou|h|/uxol], 17-18
[oDYXKipco], 22 [ouv k\ioi], 25 [owepyoq; ouoTpaxLCOTrig]; 3:10 [oij|i|iop(t)LCco], 17 [ou|i|iL|iriTTi(;], 21 [ou|j,nop(t)0(;];
4:3 [ouCuyog; ouvaGA-eco; ouyepyog; a\)XXa\i^vw], 14 [avyKoivixivkw].
Mary Whitlock Blundell, Helping Friends andHarming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek
Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 73n67. Suv-prefix is noted as a friendship language
by Luke Timothy Johnson and Todd C. Penner, The Writings ofthe New Testament: An Interpretation (Rev.
ed.; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999), 372; R. Metzner, "In Aller Freundschaft: Bin Fruhchristhcher Fall
Freundschaftlicher Gemeinschaft (Phil 2.25-30)," NTS 48 (2002): 119.
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one another: compete together, run together, suffer together, rest together, get up together
(ouYKOTTLaxe aXXr]Xoic, owaQXeixe ouvxpexete oupirdoxexe ouYKOL|ido06 oweydpeoQ^y (Ign.
Pol. 6.1). The ouv-prefix most likely is added here to emphasize on the "togetherness" of
the Christian friendship.
4.4.6 Friend and Enemy
Finally, in contrast to the close bonding of fiiendship ("one spirit," "one soul," and
the ouv-prefix), Paul introduces the opposite concept of "the opponents" (ol dyxLK�L|ieyoL;
Phil 1:28). Later in the peroratio (Phil 3:17-4:2), where Paul rehearses many the concepts
found here in the propositio, Paul mentions the concept of "the enemies" (ol kxQpoi; Phil
3:18). Both concepts (opponents and enemies) refer to persons who oppose the Christian
polis and the Christian way of living. They are the outsiders standing against the insiders.
In the Greco-Roman world, the most basic terminology for the opposition between insiders
and outsiders is the polarity between friends and enemy.
The contrast between fiiendship and enmity recurs as a theme throughout Greco-
Roman literature. Aristotle, for example, contrasts friendship and concord with enmity and
stasis (Aristofie, Eth. nic. 8.4). Dio Chrysostom expresses the same opinion: "strife
(oxdoiv) and enmity (�x9pav) in contradistinction to friendship" (Dio Chrysostom, Nicom.
8). Biblical authors also note this confradicfion. Proverbs 15:17 [LXX], for example, says:
"Better is an entertainment of herbs with friendliness and kindness ((^iXiav koX xdpiv),
than a feast of calves with enmity" (cf Prov 6:1 [LXX]; 27:6 [LXX]). This saying points
to the qualitative difference between friendship and enmity. The worst of friendship still is
better than the best of enmity. James uses this fundamental opposifion to describe the two
different value systems of God and of the world when he writes, "You adulteresses, do you
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not know that fnendship with the world is hostility toward God? Therefore whoever
wishes to be a friend of the world makes himself an enemy ofGod."'^�
Given that friendship and enmity exhibit fundamental differences, the change from
fiiendship to enmity therefore becomes strikingly deplorable.'^' Accordingly, Sirach says,
"Is it not (oux't) a grief to the death (luirri evi eo); Gavdtou) when a companion and friend
turns to enmity?" (Sir 37:2). Paul feels the same grievous pain when he writes, "I bear you
witness that, if possible, you would have plucked out your eyes and given them to me. So
have I become your enemy by telling you the truth?" (Gal 4:15-16).'^^
The qualitative difference between friendship and enmity requires a response of
different attitudes toward friends and toward enemies. The maxim suggests helping friends
and harming enemies.
'^^ For Greek and Romans, helping friends and harming enemies is
not only a duty but also a great honor and a great pleasure.
Luke Timothy Johnson, "Friendship with the World and Friendship with God: A Study of
Discipleship in James," in Brother ofJesus, Friend ofGod: Studies in the Letter ofJames (ed. Luke Timothy
Johnson; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2004), 202-20.
Equally sfriking is the change from enmity to friendship as is the case between Herod and Pilate in
dealing with Christ (Luke 23:12).
'^^
"Telling the truth" is the practice of frank speech and a ftmction of fiiendship. Betz, Galatians,
220-37. In Betz's view, "Gal 4:12-20 is a string of topoi belonging to the theme of 'fiiendship' (irepl d?iXia.c,)"
(221). Recently, Betz's thesis is advanced by L. Michael White, "Rhetoric and Reality in Galatians: Framing
the Social Demands ofFriendship," in Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in
Honor ofAbraham J. Malherbe (ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Thomas H. Olbricht, and L. Michael White; Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 2003), 307-49. White argues that "this passage constitutes one of the principal charges that Paul
brings against his Galatian converts for failing to live up to the social demands of fiiendship and pafronage.
As such, it becomes one of the more important framing elements in the entire letter" (311).
Blundell, Helping Friends andHarming Enemies, 26-59; K. J. Dover, Greek PopularMorality in
the Time ofPlato andAristotle (Berkeley: University ofCalifomia Press, 1974), 180-84; Konstan,
Friendship in the Classical World, 56-59; Marshall, Enmity in Corinth, 35-69.
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4.4.7 Friendship and Concord
Living in conformity to Christ (4.4.1-2) fosters friendship among the citizens (4.4.3-
6). In the Greco-Roman understanding, friendship is synonymous to concord (4.4.7). And
in their understanding, concord alw^ays leads to the salvation of the polis (4.4.8).
In Plato's writing, a dialogue between Socrates and Alcibiades explores the issue of
city management and preservation (ocoCw):
Soc. Well then, what is it that becomes present or absent when a state is improved
and has better treatment and management ?
Ale. To my mind, Socrates, friendship ((jjiXia) with one another will be there, while
hatred and faction (to iiLoetv Kal oxaoml^eiv) will be absent.
Soc. Now, by friendship do you mean concord or discord (opovoiay r| SixoyoLav)?
Ale. Concord. (Plato, Ale. 126a [W. R. M. Lamb, LCL])
For Socrates, apolis is well managed when friendship exists among its citizens.
Furthermore, friendship is characterized above all by concord.
In self-defense Demosthenes asks about the responsibility of the orator:
For he ought to reduce to a minimum those delays and hesitations, those fits of
ignorance and quarrelsomeness, which are the natural and inevitable failings of all
free states, and on the other hand to promote unanimity and friendliness (opovoiay
Kal 4)LA.Lav), and what ever impels a man to do his duty. (Demosthenes, Cor. 246)
Like Plato, Demosthenes asserts that concord and friendship will bring advantage to the
polis. Moreover, Demosthenes puts concord and friendship in close proximity as if they
were synonyms. Many Greco-Roman authors do the same, treating friendship and concord
as hendiadys (Dio Chrysostom, Consult.^; 2 Tars. 45; Borysth. 32; Nicom. 22; Nicaeen. 2,
8; Cone. Apam. 36, 37; Apam. 12; In cont. 6, 14; Plutarch, Num. 20.8.6; Frat. amor. 483d,
490f; Praec. ger. reipubl. 808c; Cor. 35.5; Arisfides, De pace 53, 72; Philo, Praem.XSA; cf
Sir 25; Epictetus, Diatr. 4.5.35). Cicero's writing serves as an example:
[I]f you should take the bond of goodwill out of the universe no house or city could
stand, nor would even the fillage of the fields abide. If that statement is not clear.
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then you may understand how great is the power of friendship and of concord
(amicitiae concordiaeque) from a consideration of the results of enmity and
disagreement. For what house is so strong, or what state so enduring that it cannot be
utterly overthrown by animosities and division?.... in nature and the entire universe
whatever things are at rest and whatever are in motion are united by friendship and
scattered by discord. (Cicero, Amic. 23-24)
Plutarch, for example, writes, "Of the greatest blessings which states can enjoy-peace,
liberty, plenty, abundance ofmen, and concord... there remains for the statesman only this,
always to instill concord and friendship in those who dwell together with him and to
remove strifes, discords and all enmity" (Plutarch, Praec. ger. reipubl. 824C-D).
Similarly, Aristides writes, "Friendship and concord with one another is naturally the
cause of great good for the nation, the leading cities, and each individual city in common,
and on the contrary faction the cause of the most extreme evils" (Aristides, Depace 53).
Finally, there is the testimony from Dio Cassius, "We ought to give up our mutual
enmities or jealousies. ...and return to that old-time state of peace and friendship and
concord" (Dio Cassius, Hist. rom. AA.l^; cf 44.24).
The above quotes all emerge from the Greco-Roman political discourse. All authors
contrast fi-iendship and concord with jealousy, discord, enmity, strife, and stasis
Furthermore, they all acknowledge friendship and concord as advantageous for the polis,
whereas strife and stasis brings evil upon the city. The Greco-Roman world widely and
commonly shares these political ideologies. Paul adopts this ideology and applies it to the
Christian Church. The church is the true altemative polis. The only way apolis may be
saved against its opponents is by citizens coming together in unity and in friendship. No
polis can stand divided. Only friendship and concord can lead to salvation. The salvafion
Cf. Prov 10:12 reads, "Hatred stirs up strife; but friendship covers all that do not love strife." The
same confrast is foimd throughout Prov 17.
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of the Church and its individual members depends not on the individual, but on one
another coming together in friendship.
4.4.8 Concord Leads to Salvation
Friendship and concord leads to salvation. "Salvation" is the word commonly used
for the preservation of the polis (Thucydides, Hist. 2.60.4; 2.61.4; 5.87.1; 8.72.1; Euripides,
Heracl. 402, 1045; Phoen. 898; Herodotus, Hist. 6.19; Isocrates, Areop. 1, 2, 52; Depace
39, 43, 5\;Ep. 9.4; Isaeus, Dicaeog. 37, 38; Plato, Leg. 746e, 946b, 960d; Resp. 465d;
Lysias, Euand 23; Lycurgus, Leocr. 44, 46, 64; Aristotle, Ath. pol 6.3; Rhet. 1.4.12;
Dinarchus, Demosth. 20.1 1; 88.3; 107.6; Diodorus Siculus, Hist. 20.100.3; Dionysius of
Halicamassus, rom. 7.38.1; 9.49.2; 10.28.3; Josephus, 14.402; \9.12;J.W. 1.295;
Dio Chrysostom, Nicom. 7; In cont. 48).
Hawthorne and Martin interpret Phil 1 :28 as, "for although your loyalty to the faith
is proof to them that you will perish, it is in fact proof to you that you will be saved by
God."'^^ In other words, they argue that "the real contrast is not between 'their destmction'
and 'your salvation,'. . . but between the different perceptions of two groups ofpeople.
"'^^
Their argument is based mostly on grammar, but the grammatical arguments prove only
that their reading is grammatically possible. To establish their reading, they need support
from the broader context. An article by Stephen Fowl supplies this needed support.
Fowl argues that it is hard to imagine how the imity of the Philippians could be a sign to
the opponents of their own destmction. Easier, Fowl thinks, that the unity be a sign to the
Hawthome and Martin, Philippians, 12-1A. See also Gerald F. Hawthome, "The Interpretation and
Translation ofPhilippians \:2'Sb;' ExpTim 95 (1983): 80-81.
Hawthome, Philippians, 74.
Stephen E. Fowl, "Philippians 1:28b, Once More Time," \nNew Testament Greek and Exegesis:
Essays in Honor ofGerald F. Hawthorne (ed. Amy M. Donaldson and Timothy B. Sailors; Grand Rapids,
Mich.: Eerdmans, 2003), 167-80.
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opponents of the Philippian' s destmction. He argues that opponents most likely would
view the unity as a mark of stubbomness drawing severe punishments from the imperial
authorities.
The problem with Fowl's argument is his underestimation of the supreme value of
concord and the pervasive ideology of the polis being saved by noble citizens bound by
friendship. Fourth Maccabees, for example, as this thesis has shown earlier, repeatedly
speaks of concord as a weapon that conquers the tyrant. Josephus, for example, has Titus
giving thanks to God for the "mad folly" of the Jews {J. W. 6.409-413; cf 4.376). Titus'
prayer echoes Josephus' opening comment in the Jewish War that Jemsalem fell not
because ofRome but because of civil sfrife. In other words, were it not of the civil sfrife,
Jemsalem would have stood the attack of the Romans. Likewise, Ignatius notes, "in your
unity they [the opponents] will find no opportunity" (Ign. Phld. 2.1). Not only will unity
guard against invasion, it can even overthrow the powers of evil. Ignatius writes, "The
powers of Satan are overthrown and his destmctiveness is nullified by the unanimity of
your faith. There is nothing better than peace, by which all warfare among those in heaven
and those on earth is abolished" (Ign. Eph. 13.1-2). Concord is not only a defensive shield
against invasion, but an active weapon against the intmders. Repeatedly, Greco-Roman
authors viewed stasis as the greatest evil; and concord as the greatest good apolis possibly
could possess.
Thus, to claim concord as "a sign of destmction for them, but of salvation for you" is
not as Fowl argues "hard to imagine," but instead a tme and pervasive ideology shared by
many Greco-Roman authors, knowing that apolis stands or falls on whether the citizens
Ephesians also reflects a similar ideology. The second half of the letter takes the sequence of virtue
(Eph 4:25-5:20), harmony (Eph 5:21-6:9), and victory over powers (Eph 6:10-20).
249
are in concord or in discord. Concord is tlie virtue of tlie polis, the highest good the polis
can possibly obtain. '^^
4.5 Philippians 2:1-11
Paul unfolds the propositio (Phil 1:27-30) in the probatio (Phil 2:1-3:16). In Phil 2:1-
11, Paul twice urged the Philippians to have the same mind (auto (j)povfit�, to ev
(j)poyouvT6c;). These two expressions are variants of the Greek concept of harmony, opovoia,
which is closely associated with the idea of friendship (4.5.1).
However, Paul never uses the compound word opovoia; instead, he always singles
out the verb ((jpoveco, which is a key component in the formation of virtue (4.5.2).
Philosophers either identify phronew with virtue, or as an indispensable means to virtue.
Thus, in using the verb 4)pov6(o, Paul is emphasizing the importance of virtue in friendship.
Paul is asking for the best kind of fi-iendship, a friendship based on virtue (4.5.3).
Furthermore, the virtue that Paul seeks for is one that is exemplified by Christ (4.5.4-
5): A refiisal to overreach (-nXeoye^La; 4.5.6) choosing instead to lower oneself and to
associate with the lowly. The expressions such as loa Gecj and opoCcopa dvGpcoiTwy are
expressions of friendship (4.5.7). They are derived from the Greek proverbs such as
"fiiendship is equality" and "friends are like to like."
4.5.1 Homonoia
Paul often uses the phrase "the same mind" when he appeals for concord. In Rom
12:16, Paul pleads that his recipients might "be of the same mind toward one another (to
Salvation in Philippians is both communal and eschatological (Phil 1:6, 10; 3:20). One entails the
other. There can be no eschatological salvation without a communal salvation. On the other hand, if there is a
communal salvation, then there will be an eschatological salvation. Communal salvation proleptically
anticipates eschatological salvation.
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auTo eiQ aXXr]Xo\)Q (jjpovouvtec)." He also wams them not to be haughty in mind, but to
associate with the lowly. In Rom 15:5, he again encourages the believers "to be of the
same mind with one another" (to auTo cjjpoygLy kv aXXr\XoiQ). This time he adds the
additional criteria of "according to Christ Jesus," specified in Rom 15:1-3:
We who are strong ought to put up with the failings of the weak, and not to please
ourselves. Each of us must please our neighbor for the good purpose ofbuilding up
the neighbor. For Christ did not please himself; but as it is written, "The insults of
those who insult you have fallen on me"
The result and purpose ofhaving this Christ-like-mind is expressed in Rom 15:6 through
the Lva-clause: "so that with one accord (6po0upa66v) you may with one voice (kv kvi
oTopaTi) glorify the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ."
The phrase "same mind" also appears in 2 Cor 13:11 when Paul writes, "Finally,
brothers and sisters, rejoice, set things right (KaTapTiCeoGe), be encouraged (irapaKaMoGe),
be of the same mind (to auTo ^povelxe), live in peace, and the God of love and peace will
be with you." Frist Corinthians 1:10 expresses the same idea with different terms: "Now 1
exhort (irapaKaXQ) you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you all agree
and that there be no divisions among you, but that you be set in order (KaTtipTLopevoL) in
the same mind (kv tq auTco vol) and in the same judgment (kv tt) atJTfi yuupri)." Both
passages mention Paul's exhortation, the need to set things in order, and the need to be in
agreement.
Many of the themes found in the verses above are found also in Philippians. Some
examples include, haughty-minded (Rom 12:6; Phil 2:3; 3:2-1 1), humility (Rom 12:16;
Phil 2:3), Christ-like-mind (Rom 15:1-5; Phil 2:5-11), exhortation (1 Cor 1:10; 2 Cor 13:11;
Phil 1:27), joy (1 Cor 1:10; Phil 2:2), to glorify God (Rom 15:6; Phil 1:11), the presence of
the God of peace (2 Cor 13:11; Phil 4:7-9). These correlations show that in dealing with
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the problem of intemal strife, Paul has developed a body of teaching applied consistently
during his ministry. Furthermore, this body of teaching emphasizes the need to discipline
"the mind." Christ followers must not be haughty-minded; instead, they should have the
"same mind," the Christ-like-mind, characterized by humility. The mind must be trained in
a certain way in order to reflect the mind ofChrist.
Ancient Greco-Roman political theorists also acknowledge the importance of the
"mind" in dealing with political concord. Isocrates, for example, praises the ancient
Athenians: "For not only were they of the same mind ((0|iov6ouy) regarding public affairs
(-rrepl tqv kolvqv), but in their private life as well they showed that degree of
consideration for each other which is due from men who are right-minded (eu (jjpovoDviac;)
and partners in a common fatherland (vaxpidoQ KOLvcovouxa^)" (Isocrates, Areop. 31). The
disposition of the "mind" is important for both the public and the private life of the
individual. The word concord (opovoia) itself reveals the importance of the mind. It
literally means "like-mindedness."'^� The conception behind the word sometimes is
expressed differently as opovoeo),'^' 6p6(t)povoc;,'^^ opoctjpoveo),'^'' or 6po(j)poouyr|.'^'^ These
This is true also for Latin concordia. For the use of etymology see note 79.
Isocrates, Areop. 3 1 ; Paneg. 78, 85 [They were of one mind when the common safety was in
question], 173, 174; Panath. 109, 167, 178, 226, 227, 272; Xenophon, Mem. 3.5.16; 4.4.16; Plato, Resp. 352a
["lack ofharmony" in parallel with stasis\, 545d; Demosthenes, Symm. 36 [as long as they were of one mind
and regarded the Persian as their common enemy, they could count on many advantages]; Aristotle, Eth. nic.
9.6.1 [Aristotle defines concord].
Homer, //. 22.263 [Achilles about to slay Hector says to him: "Hector, talk not to me, you madman,
of covenants. As between lions and men there are no oaths of faith, nor do wolves and lambs have hearts of
concord (6|j,64)pova 9i)|i6v) but are evil-minded (KaKcc ^povkovax.) continually one against the other."];
Theognis, Eleg. 1.81 [those who are of one mind share equally in goods {ayaB&v) as well as hardships
(KaKtov)]; Pindar, 01. 7.6 [harmonious marriage]; 1 Peter 3:8 [to 6e teXo? -irayteq 6|i64)pov6Q ou^iraeet;
(j)Lla6eA,(|)0L eijoirXaYX^'OL taiT6Lv64)poveq]; Ps.-Phoc. 30.
Homer, Od 6.183; 9.456; Herodotus, Hist. 7.229; 8.3, 75; 9.2; Xenophon, Hell.1.5.1; Aristotle, Ath.
pol. 14.3; Polybius, Hist. 32.4; Dionysius ofHalicamassus, [Rhet.] 4.3; Philo, Mos. 1.232; Josephus J. W. 1
2.160; 3.459; Plutarch, Praec. ger. reipubl 813c; ^ra/. 9.7; Phoc. S.4;Ag Cleom. 12.4; 0th. 9.3; Amat.
770a; Dio Chrysostom, Nicaeen. 3, 6; Cont. 13; Aelius Aristides, 221.2; 559.28.
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concepts are associated closely with friendship (4.4.7). However, in Philippians, Paul
never uses any of the compound words to express harmony and concord; Instead, he
repeatedly singles out the verb (j)poyeQ. As such, Paul emphasizes on the dynamic process
ofthinking and the importance ofvirtue in political concord.
4.5.2 Opoveo)
The verb (j)poyea) appears ten times in Philippians, evenly scattered throughout the
letter (Phil 1:7; 2:2 [x2], 5; 3:15 [x2], 19; 4:2, 10 [x2]). There are different modes of
"thinking" ((t)poye(o). Thinking can be either childish or mature (1 Cor 13:11). Thinking
also can be of the flesh or of the spirit, "For the mind set on the flesh is death, but the mind
set on the Spirit is life and peace, because the mind set on the flesh is hostile toward God"
(Rom 8:6-7; cf Rom 8:15). A Spirit-focused mindset leads to life and peace, while a flesh-
focused mindset leads to death and enmity. Thinking also can be set on either earthly
things or on things above (Phil 3:14-15; Col 3:2). Earthly thinking is characterized as an
orientation toward the self (Phil 3:19). It wants to exalt the self over above others (Rom
1 1:20; 12:3, 16; cf Phil 2:3). These passages show that (jjpoyeo) refers not to the specific
contents processed in thinking. Rather, it refers to the modality and orientation of the
thinking.
Thus, when Paul asks his recipients to "think the same," he is not asking his
recipients to have the same thought contents in mind. Rather, he is asking them to have the
same mode ofthinking.
Homer Od. 6.181; 15.198; Dionysius ofHalicamassus, Ant. rom. 2.3.4; 4.25.5; 4.26.1; 9.45.1; Philo,
Hypoth. \92.7; Flacc. 52.5; Virt. 119.3; Praem. 87.5; Mos. 1.7; Plutarch, Fra?. amor 479a; Cic. 33.5; Adul.
amic.70c; Sept. sap. conv. 156c; Amat. 757d; Praec. ger. reipubl. 816a; Dio Chrysostom, Nicom. 15, 43;
Aelius Aristides, 559.26.
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In the Greco-Roman tradition, ^p6vr\aiQ is an intellectual faculty closely related to
virtue. Opovrioic;, for Socrates, is a transcendental insight into the ethical values. The word
is used as a synonymous to virtue (Xenophon, Mem. 3.9.4; Plato, Euthyd. 279a-c; Meno
88a-89a; Phaed. 69a-b).
Plato breaks with Socrates in his late middle dialogues and no longer equates
(JjpovriOLC (or wisdom) with virtue. At this point he begins to think of different kinds of
virtue. Wisdom is but one of the four cardinal virtues (temperance, courage, justice,
wisdom). Nonetheless, wisdom still takes precedence over others, because without wisdom
no moral virtues can develop. In this stage ^p6vr\ovQ is still viewed as a kind of
contemplative knowledge conceming the idea of good (Plato, Resp. 505a). Practical
knowledge is devalued as an inferior type ofwisdom. Only the knowledge of the
philosopher-mlers counts as the proper form ofwisdom (Plato, Resp. 428b-429a).
In his late career, Plato grows more appreciative of the practical and context-based
knowledge. In Philebus, for example, he openly acknowledges the existence of two kinds
of knowledge: "one having regard to the things that come into being and perish; the other
to those that do not come into being nor perish, but are always, unchanged and unaltered"
(Plato, Phileb. 61e). Both types of knowledge are equally important. To find the way home,
the individual needs not only divine knowledge but also knowledge about the human
spheres (Plato, Phileb. 62b). Likewise, to live a good life, the individual needs the pracfical
knowledge of ct)p6yriOLC. Later in Statesman, Plato would claim that practical knowledge
itself is sufficient for the development ofmoral virtue (Plato, Pol 309c).
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Aristotle discusses prudence (^povrpic,) in Book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics along
with other intellectual virtues, including scientific knowledge (e-moTrmri), art (T�xvr\),
wisdom (oocjjLa), and intelligence (vouc) (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 6.3.1).
Prudence is not scientific knowledge, because prudence deals with matters of conduct
open to change; whereas scientific knowledge deals with eternal, invariable objects.
Prudence is not art. Prudence is an act of doing. It produces nothing other than the act itself
Art is an act ofmaking. It produces an end (or an object) that is other than the act itself
Prudence is not wisdom, because prudence deals specifically with the affairs ofmen,
whereas wisdom, a combination of scientific knowledge and intuitive intelligence, deals
with "things of the most exalted," i.e., things true to each and every species. Prudence is
not intelligence, because prudence deals with the ultimate particular things, whereas
intelligence apprehends definition, which cannot be proved by reasoning.
According to Aristotle, prudence is a special kind of deliberative excellence.
Deliberative excellence is the ability to arrive at the right conclusion on the right grounds
at the right time (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 6.9.6). It is the character of a good deliberator to arrive
by calculation at the best of the goods attainable by man (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 6.7.6; cf
6.12.10). Prudence is deliberative excellence in reference to aparticular end. The end
toward which prudence aims, according to Aristotle, is human happiness:
It is held to be the mark of a prudent man to be able to deliberate well about what is
good and advantageous for himself, not in some one department, for instance what is
good for his health or strength, but what is advantageous as a means to the good life
in general. (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 6.5.1)
The good life of happiness, according to Aristotle, resides in virtue. Aristotle claims,
"Virtue ensures the rightness of the end we aim at, prudence ensures the rightness of the
means we adopt to gain that end" (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 6.12.6). Prudence is the means to
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virtue. Without prudence true virtue cannot exist (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 6.13.2-3). However, it
is equally true that without moral virtue prudence cannot exist, for without the correct end,
prudence is nothing but an act of cleverness or knavery (vVristotle, Eth. nic. 6.12.9-10).
Thus, according to Aristotle, "it is not possible to be good in the true sense without
Prudence, nor to be prudent without Moral virtue" (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 6.8.6). Prudence and
virtue are closely tied to one another.
For the Epicureans, prudence is the greatest good. Prudence helps to determine what
is truly pleasurable and what is truly painful. A good life is a life ofpleasure. Thus,
without prudence no good life exists. Cynics also highly value prudence (DL 6.38, 73), as
did the Stoics (DL 7.92, 93; 102; 126).
Fourth Maccabees also speaks frequently of the importance of "right reasoning.
"'^^
Philo frequently mentions prudence as one of the four cardinal virtues {Leg. 1.63; Cher. 6;
Agr. 18; Abr. 219; Mos. 2.185; Praem. 1.160; Prob. 1:67, 70). The four cardinal virtues are
defined as follows: "Prudence appoints them settled limits with reference to what is to be
done. Courage with respect to what is to be endured; temperance with reference to what is
to be chosen; and jusfice in respect ofwhat is to be distributed" (Philo, Leg. 1 :65).
Prudence deals specifically with acts and deeds (Philo, Leg. 1:74). Among the virtues,
Philo values prudence the most. He calls prudence "the virtue of the soul which enjoys the
highest reputafion" (Philo, Leg. 1 .66). It helps to regulate the human life.'^^ It is the
rational part of the soul that constrains the passions and the desires, including the desires
Virtue, according to Aristotle, is a disposition determined by right principle (opBoQ loyoQ)
(Aristotle, Eth. nic. 6.8.4). Prudence is the intellectual virtue that determines the right principle (Aristotle,
Eth. nic. 6.8.4). Thus, virtues are developed by habitually choosing and enacting that right principle that is
determined by prudence.
Philo differentiates between wisdom and prudence: "wisdom has reference to the service ofGod,
and prudence to the regulation ofhuman life" (Philo, Pep 1:81).
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for money, the thirsts for glory, and the covetous ofpleasure (Philo, Leg. 1.75). As such,
pmdence, like the river Pheison surrounding Evilat (Gen 2:1 1), forms a wall against the
foolish desires that are at work in travail. It sieges the desires and destroys them.
In sum, ^p6vv[0\.Q is a faculty closely related virtue. It is either equated with virtue
(Socrates and early Plato) or treated as an indispensable means to virtue (Aristotle and later
Hellenistic philosophical schools). OpovrjOL; is excellence in deliberation. Always, the
objects of deliberation, and thus of ^povvpiQ, are things attainable by action. OpovrjOLc;
deals specifically with acts and deeds. Because of its excellency, the result derived from
(fjpoi'riOLQ will always be "the best" attainable through human agency. According to
Aristotle, ^p6v\\o\.c, takes yvcooLQ and aioGriOLC as its input and works syllogistically to
arrive at a conclusion attainable by action (see earlier 4.2.3). Choice then directs desire to
this action (4.3.3). The final step involves working out this desired action (4.6.1).
4.5.3 Virtue and Friendship
In the Greco-Roman world, friendship is known to be based on three different goods.
Isocrates, for example, writes, "tme friendship seeks three things above all others�^the
magnetic nobility of virtue, the delight of companionship, and the compulsion of need. We
must accept our friends' criticisms, enjoy their company, and help them when called upon"
(Isocrates, Frg. 33.1; cf Demon. 1). Based on this understanding, Aristotle differentiates
three types of friendship: friendship based on pleasure, friendship based on utility, and
friendship based on virtue. Many later Greco-Roman philosophers appropriate this
typology (Plutarch, .4m/c. mult. 94b;'^^ Seneca, Ben. 1.11.1; Cicero, yim/c. 6.22; 8.26; Inv.
'
"[T]rue friendship seeks after three things above all else: virtue as a good thing, intimacy as a
pleasant thing, and usefiilness as a necessary thing." Cf. Plutarch, Adul. amic. 54f, 55d.
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1.50.95; 2.55.176; Fam. 3.10.7-9).'^ While many ancient authors claim the existence of
tliree kinds of friendship, not all types are received positively. Aristotle calls the friendship
of virtue the only true friendship. Stoics and Cynics hold similar opinions. Only the wise
can be friends with one another. Cicero, for example, claims, "It is virtue that brings
friendships into being and holds them in being" (Cicero, Amic. 100; cf 14, 18, 65).
Paul's appeal to have "the same mind" requires thatfriendship and concord (4.5.1) be
rooted in virtue formulated through the use ofpractical wisdom (4.5.2). The mode of
practical wisdom Paul seeks is one that reflects a certain orientation, as indicated by the
Scripture which states, "look not to your own interests, but the interests of others" (|ifi id
eauTCOv eKaoxoc; OKOirouvTec aXXk Kal id �T�po)y eKaoxoi; Phil 2:5).'^^
4.5.4 The Interest of Others
The actual reading ofPhil 2:5, however, is debated. Most English translations add
"only" to the negative clause, and translate the verse as: "Let each of you look not [only] to
his own interests, but also to the interests of others" (nau; cf RSV, net, esv, Niv). The
"only" is added in order to balance "not only" and "but also" (dA.AA Kal). Nonetheless, the
solution can go the other way around. Instead of inserting the "only," some scholars have
chosen to omit the word "also" (Kai) and read the verse as follows: "look not to your own
interest, but the interest of others" (thus, the omission of the Kai in the textual tradition' ^�).
Marshall, Enmity in Corinth, 24-32.
NA27 puts KttL in brackets. But kkl has in fact powerful extemal support, including: ^ N A B C
D^Y075. 0278. 33. 1739. 1881 SDR vg''*^ sy.
'� Hawthome and Martin writes, "This omission [ofKai]... can be defended as required ad sensum"
(Philippians, 80).
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In other words, the balance is reached either by inserting the adverb "only" (not
only. . .but also) or by omitting the Kai (not. . .but). However, a third solution exists, as
proposed by Markus Bockmuehl in his commentary on Philippians:
Grammatically, it is significant to note the absence ofmonon ('only') from the
negative clause: Paul exhorts the Philippians to look out not [rather than 'not only']
for your own rights. In the absence ofmonon, alia kai properly serves to denote
'contrastive emphasis' (Louw & Nida �91.11), meaning 'but actually' or 'but
rather'�not 'but also' (cf similarly LXX Ezra 2:15; Job 21:17; Isa. 39:4; 48:6; Ezek.
18:11; Wisd. 14:22) (emphasis his).'^'
Bockmuehl's solution does justice to both the absence of "only" and the overwhelming
evidence for the existence of Kat. The resulting interpretation also fits nicely into the
literary context. Both the |iri6�y...dA,A,d in Phil 2:3 and the ohx-nXlk in Phil 2:6-7 sets a
strong contrast between self-serving and others-regarding. Moreover, similar teachings in
other Pauline letters all have strong contrastive emphases rather than a soft concessive tone.
In 1 Cor 10:24, for example, Paul urges the Corinthians, "Do not seek your own things, but
that of the other" (pr|6el(; to eauToij Ctit�lt(o klXk to toij �Tepoi)). Also, in 1 Cor 10:33,
Paul writes, "not seeking my own advantage, but that ofmany" (pri Ctit^wv to epauToO
oup(j)opov kXlk TO Tcov volhsiv). Similarly, in Rom 15:1-2, Paul states, "We who are
sfrong ought to put up with the failings of the weak, and not to please ourselves (pt)
kuTOLC dpeoKeiy). Each of us must please our neighbor (eKaoTOc; ripdiv tco ttXtiolov
dpeoKeTO))."
Moreover, in all instances Paul grounds his teaching in the work ofChrist. In 1 Cor
11:1, grounding the teachings in 1 Cor 10:23-33, Paul writes, "Be imitators ofme, as I am
ofChrist." In Rom 15:3, believers are told, "For Christ did not please himself (oux eauTw
Bockmuehl, The Epistle to the Philippians, 113-14.
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fipeoev); but (dA.AA), as it is written, 'The reproaches of those who reproached thee fell on
me.'" Note again the strong contrast between oux.. .dXXd.
Paul's teaching is radical when compared with other Greco-Roman teachings.
Unlike Plato, Paul does not eradicate the boundary between self-interest and the interest of
the other. He maintains that distinction. The believers know both their own interests and
the interest of the others. Their duty is to place the interest of others above their own
interest. Nor is Paul asking the believers to "feel about their common good as if about their
own" (Aristides, De pace 1 1). Nor is Paul advocating a kind of enlightened self-interest,
knowing that whatever is contributed to the whole will contribute also to the self (cf
Epictetus, Diatr. 2.10.4-5). Paul's teaching is radical because he wants the believers to
focus their effort not on the self, nor even on the whole, but specifically on the others. The
believers have no other choice because Christ exemplified this way of life. He died for
others.
4.5.5 The Christ Hymn
Many debates surround the interpretation of this passage.'^'' This thesis will focus on
only one of those debates, namely the debate conceming the function of this particular
passage. The aim is to understand how this passage fiinctions in Paul's overall argument.
Two basic different opinions exist. First is the kerygmatic approach.
'^"^ Notable supporters
'^^ A similar comparative work has been done by Troels Engberg-Pedersen, "Radical Altruism in
Philippians 2:4," in Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor ofAbraham J.
Malherbe (ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Thomas H. Olbricht, and L. Michael White; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2003), 197-
214. He argues that Paul seeks to "develop and establish the perspective of oneself-as-one-of-the-others"
(208). This is an unpersuasive conclusion.
'^^ Include debates such as: (1) Is it a hymn? (2) Was it composed in Greek or in Aramaic? (3) Who
composed it? (4) What was its Sitz im Lebenl (5) What was its religious background? (6) How should it to be
versified? (7) Does the hymn embody an Adam Christology?
The kerygmatic approach argues that the aim of the hymn is to proclaim Christ, not to present
Christ as a moral model to be imitated. Ernst Kasemann, for example, reads the hymn as a soteriological
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of this approach include Ernst Kasemann'^^ and R. P. Martin.'^^ Second is the ethical
approach. Most commentators today support this second approach.'^^ There are good
reasons for advocating the ethical approach.'^^ Bockmuehl, for example, rightly observes
the close parallel between Phil 2.6-1 1 and Phil 2:1-4 suggesting that Paul intends to draw
ethical consequences from the Christ-Hymn.'^^ Granted that this passage does fiinction as a
moral exemplar, the quesfion then remains regarding how this passage fiinctions as a moral
exemplar�especially in terms of virtue and friendship.
L. Michael White argues that "Christ's 'emptying' and 'humbling' himself to take
the 'form of a slave' is being portrayed, at least in part, as an all-surpassing act of selfiess
love�that is, the supreme virtue of friendship. "'^� Karl O. Sandnes agrees with White
and thinks that Phil 2 is part of the "friendship-Christology" articulated in the broader
NT.'^' According to Sandnes, Jesus was known widely as a "fi-iend of tax collectors and
sinners" (Matt 11:19; Luke 7:34). And Jesus often characterizes his relationship with his
followers in terms of friendship (Matt 26:50; Luke 12:4; John 11:11; and especially in
drama that estabUshes the "realm ofChrist." The Philippians are asked to "conduct themselves towards one
another as is fitting within the realm of Christ" ("Critical Analysis ofPhilippians 2:5-1 1," JTC 5 [1968]: 83).
Kasemann, "Critical Analysis ofPhilippians 2:5-1 1," 45-88. Originally published as: "Kritische
Analyse von Phil 2,5-1 1," ZTK41 (1950): 313-60.
Ralph P. Martin, A Hymn ofChrist: Philippians 2:5-11 in Recent Interpretation & in the Setting of
Early Christian Worship (Downers Grove, 111.: InterVarsity, 1997).
'^^
Witherington, Paul's Letter to the Philippians, 136.
�
Stephen E. Fowl, The Story ofChrist in the Ethics ofPaul: An Analysis of the Function ofthe
Hymnic Material in the Pauline Corpus (JSNTSup; Sheffield, U.K.: JSOT, 1990); Larry W. Hurtado, "Jesus
as Lordly Example in Phil 2:5-1 1," in From Jesus to Paul (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University
Press, 1984), 1 13-26; S. J. Kraftchick, "A Necessary Detour: Paul's Metaphorical Understanding of the
Philippian Hymn," HBT 15 (1993): 1-37; Meeks, "The Man from Heaven in Paul's Letter to the Philippians,"
329-36.
'� Bockmuehl, The Epistle to the Philippians, 122.
L. Michael White, "Morality between Two Worlds: A Paradigm ofFriendship in Philippians," in
Greeks, Romans, and Christians (Minneapolis: Forfress, 1990), 213.
Sandnes, A New Family, 86-91.
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John 15:13-15). Moreover, his followers characterized one another as friends (3 John 15;
Acts 27:3). Philippians 2, according to Sandnes, belongs to this grand tradition of
"friendship-Christology," presenting Jesus as a friend who displays two chiefmarks of
friendship, namely spending time together and sharing the conditions of life.' ^'^ Audrey
West develops his thesis in a similar direction. He argues that the dying-for- friends maxim
fiinctions as "a rhetoric backdrop to the Christ Hymn, to Paul's exhortafion, to the models
ofTimothy and Epaphroditus, and even to the negative examples of those who are
'enemies of the cross. '"'^^ Christ's death in Phil 2, according to West, is depicted by Paul
as an act of fiiendship. Christ dies for the sake of fiiends.'^''
This thesis agrees with White, Sandnes, and West that Paul does indeed employ the
language of friendship to depict and interpret Christ's death.
'^^ These authors, however,
have overlooked another important element in this hymn that relates also to the theme of
fiiendship. This element is found in the first verse of the hymn (Phil 2:6).
Before entering into the details ofPhil 2:6, observing first the relafionship between
Phil 2:3 and Phil 2:6-8 is important. These two passages relate closely to one another, both
structurally and linguistically.
Sandnes, A New Family, 89. Sandnes claims "remarkable" similarity between Phil 2 and Lucian's
Toxaris.
West, "Whether by Life or by Death", iv.
West, "Whether by Life or by Death", 136-57.
'^^ This theory is questioned by Peterman, Paul's Giftfrom Philippi, 1 14-17.
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Phil 2:3 Phil 2:6-8
ur\bev Kax' kpiQdiav unSe Kam KevoSo^iav
aXXa
OQ kv \xop^f\ Qeox) uTTapxcov dpiraYpov
TiynoixTO TO d.vai loa Geco,
TT] TaiTeLVo4)poouvri aXXr\Xovc, fiyoupevot
UTrepexovTac; ka\)X(2)V, eauToy eKeycooev pop4)Tiy dohXov Xcc^cov, kv
opoLcopaTL dyGpcoTTcoy yevopevog* Kal
oxripaTL eupeGeU dyGpojirog ^
�TaiTetv(oo6y eauTOV yei^opeyoc; uirriKooc;
pexpt GavaTOu, GaydcTou 6k OTaupoO.
First, structurally, both passages have the same structure: "not A but B." Second,
linguistically, both Phil 2:3 and Phil 2:6-8 share three root words, namely Kcyo-, Ta-rrgiyo-,
and Tiyeopai. Interestingly, these three word-roots constitute the three verbs in Phil 2:6-8.
Paul may have made this arrangement to highlight the importance of these three verbs and
also to highlight the correlation between these two passages. Moreover, the negative
statement in Phil 2:3 (KcyoSo^iay) becomes positive in Phil 2:7 (eauToy keycooey); and the
positive statement in Phil 2:3 {aXXr\Xo\)Q fiyoupgyoi uirepexoyTac; kamCSv) becomes negative
in Phil 2:6 (dp-rraypoy fiyrjoaTo). Paul's v^iting displays cleverness.
Likely, through these structural and linguistic correlations, Paul wants these two
passages to be read in light of one another. Moreover, both passages follow the verb
(\>povku), intending to teach the Philippians regarding right practical reasoning.
In Phil 2:3, the right practical reasoning consists ofnot being self-ambitious, but
being humble. Paul highlights the important contrast between self-elevation and self-
deprecation. Instead of elevating oneself, one should lower oneself and raise others up.
This latter element of lowering oneself easily finds its correlafion in the Christ-hymn.
The language of "empty," "slave," "humble," and "death" all points strongly to the idea of
humility. It is however hard to see how the former element of self- elevafion plays out in
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hymn. Nonetheless, if the above analysis carries weight, then the act of "dpTrayiiov
fiyrioaTo to dvai loa Geco" must be read as an act of self-elevation in light of the "self-
ambition" (kpiQda) and the "vainglory" (Kevo6o^La) in Phil 2:3.
This thesis will argue that "dpirayiioy fiyrjoaio to dvai loa Geco" indeed resembles
the act of self-elevation. Being equal to God, Christ was given the opportunity to exploit
that equality in order to gain advantage for himself, so as to raise himself above that
equality. In Greek ethical-political tradition this act of exploitation is call vXeove^ia.
4.5.6 nileove^La
nXeove^La'^^ is a combination of two words: vXkov and ex^LV, which literally means
"to have more."'^^ In his study of greed and injustice in classical Athens, Ryan K. Balot
claims T\XeoveE,ia as the single and most important term in his field of study.
'^^ The element
of "more" in �nXeoveE,ia implies a standard beyond which the claim to possession is viewed
as an act of excess and unjust. This implied standard, though conceived differently by
different authors, is often expressed through the term of equality Clgoc;). The desire to have
'^^ The word irA.eove^La appears ten times in the NT (Mark 7:22; Luke 12:15; Rom 1 :29; 2 Cor 9:5; Eph
4:19; 5:3; Col 3:5; 1 Thess 2:5; 2 Pet 2:3, 14); irXeoveKxrig (noun) appears four times in the NT (1 Cor 5:10, 11;
6:10; Eph 5:5); irXeoveKTecj appears five times in the NT (2 Cor 2:1 1; 7:2; 12:17, 18; 1 Thess 4:6). Gerhard
Delling writes, "The word group occurs chiefly in the Pauline writings (15 out of 19 instances). The sense
'striving for material possessions' is possible in every case apart fi^om 2 Cor 2:1 1. Where this is the meaning,
takmg advantage of one's neighbor is obviously the main thought" ("irA-eoveKirii;, irleoyeKxea), irXeove^La,"
TDNT 6:271).
'^^ For the use ofetymology see note 79.
Balot, Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens, 4. Studies on irA.eove^La include: David A. Holgate,
"The Topos 'on Covetousness' in Moral Philosophy," in Prodigality, Liberality andMeanness in the Parable
of the Prodigal Son: A Greco-Roman Perspective on Luke 15.11-32 (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic
Press, 1999), 90-130. In this article, Holgate surveys the Greco-Roman teachings on "covetousness," starting
fi-om Plato in the late foiulh century B.C. to the Sentences ofSextus in the second century C.E. The purpose of
the article is "to show the influence of the topos on the parable in Luke 15:1 1-32" (100). Thus, there is in this
article an emphasis on the right use of possession. See also: Abraham J. Malherbe, "The Christianization of a
Topos (Luke 12:13-34)," A^ovJ 38 (1996), 123-35. Other studies include: Gerhard Delling, "TTA-eoykrif;,
TrA-eoyeKieo), irXeove^ia" TDNT 6:266-21A; C. Spicq, "irXeoyeCLa," rZ,AT3:l 17-1 19; Bakke, Concord and
Peace, 172-74; Lau, The Politics ofPeace, 121-23. In this section, irXeove^La will be brought to its broader
political context in relationship to equality, fiiendship, stasis, and peace.
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more than the equal share is wiiat it means to be involved in irJleove^La. Classical authors
often view this act of transgression as the reason behind political strife and stasis. The
proceeding material will present a series of literary evidences to show iileovella as (1) a
violation of equality; and (2) a cause for political strife.
Thucydides associates irXeope^ta with political parties formed not "for the public
good in conformity with the prescribed laws, but for selfish aggrandizement (uleove^ia)
contrary to the established laws" (Thucydides, Hist. 3.82.6).'^� He blames TrXeovg^ta as the
ultimate causes for stasis:
The cause of all these evils was the desire to rule which greed (TrXeoye^ia) and
ambition (4)LA.0TL[iLay) inspire, and also, springing from them, that ardor which
belongs to men who once have become engaged in factious rivalry. Party leaders in
the several cities, by assuming on either side a fair-sounding name, the one using as
its catch-word "political equality (Loovo|iLaq) for the masses under the law," the other
"temperate (o6(^povoc,) aristocracy," while they pretended to be devoted to the
common weal (id KOLvd), in reality made it their prize; striving in every way to get
the better of each other. (Thucydides, Hist. 3.82.8)
Party leaders, while they claim for equality and temperance and common good, in reality
try their best to get more out of others. They refiise to have an equal, fair, or common share
with others. They want to gain as much as possible. Claiming to equality and moderation,
their desire is to have more than equal.
Likewise, Euripides explicitly blames iTA.�0V6^La for strife: "Strife (lapaxri) between
brothers for a woman's sake may rise, or of -rrXeove^La" (Euripides, Iph. aul. 509). Ideally,
brothers should treat one another as equals. To reach beyond equality is to engage in strife.
nieoyg^La as a topoi in discourses on concord is recognized by Klaus Thraede, "Homonoia
(Einh-acht)," /MC 16: 182.
Simon Homblower in his commentary on Thucydides claims that irleove^La is "a key idea in this
whole section [Thucydides, Hist. 3.82-83] and a key word for Thucydides in general" (A Commentary on
Thucydides [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991], 485).
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Isocrates contrasts irA-eove^Ca with equality (Isocrates, Areop. 60) and justice
(Isocrates, Paneg. 183) and names it as a force that destroys friendship and peace
(Isocrates, Panath. 55; Archid. 33; cf Paneg. 17; Phil. 9; Ep. 3.2).
In Plato's Republic, Socrates differentiates the just and unjust based on their act of
overreaching. The unjust, according to Socrates, will overreach and outdo both the just
man and the unjust man. His desire is to get the most out of everything for himself The
just man is different. He "does not seek to take advantage of his like (6|i0L0u) but of his
unlike" (Plato, Resp. 349d). In other words, the just man respects the equality between just
men.
Later in the Republic, in a debate between Glaucon and Socrates, Glaucon challenges
Socrates to admit that all human beings practice justice reluctantly in fear ofpunishment.
Glaucon reasons that if human beings were given the license and power to do whatever
they please, they will be caught:
resorting to the same conduct as the unjust man because of the self-advantage
(-rrXeoye^Lav) which every creature by its nature pursues as a good, while by the
convention of law it is forcibly diverted to paying honor to "equality" (eirl xr]v xou
'loou xLjifiv). (Plato, Resp. 359c)
Apparently, in Plato's view, -uXeoveiia stands in contrast to equality. The just man honors
equality and reflises to overreach; whereas the unjust man scorns equality and desires to
gain as much as possible.
According to Plato, the act of overreaching results from an unbalanced soul.'^' The
unjust man is the one in whom the pleasures "got the better of (irXeov dxov) the original
passions ofhis soul and robbed them" (Plato, Resp. 574a). As a result, the unjust man
This is a common theme in Greco-Roman hterature. Gerhard Delling, "irXeovaCco, uirepirleovdCco,"
TDNT 6:263-4.
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claims the right to get the better of their own parents. If their parents refiise to yield, they
seize (dpirdCco) by force. In times of peace, these people are few in number and perform
only small evils such as stealing and breaking into houses. In times of turmoil, the number
of these people would increase, and the result would become disastrous. Tyrants will
emerge among them, and they will seize and enslave their motherland and fatherland, just
as they have seized their mothers and fathers in their youth. In sum, the act of
overreaching grows out of the soul overreached by pleasure and ultimately will bring
destruction to the polis
Archytas of Tarentum, a contemporary ofPlato, also comments on iTA,�oy6^La.
Interestingly, his comments are remarkably similar to those ofPlato:
Once calculation (Xoyiopoc;) was discovered, it stopped discord {oxaoiv) and
increased concord (6|iovoLay). For people do not want more than their share
(-rrXeove^La), and equality (looxac;) exists, once this has come into being. For by means
of calculation we will seek reconciliation in our dealings with others. Through this,
then, the poor receive from the powerful, and the wealthy give to the needy, both in
confidence that they will have what is fair on account of this. It serves as a standard
and a hindrance to the unjust. (Archytas of Tarentum, Frg. S)'^"*
Like Plato, Archytas aligns stasis with xiXeovelia and injustice, and concord with equality
and jusfice. The assured trust in calculafion also finds its parallel in the early Platonic
wrifings: "should we not quickly settle it [disagreement] by resorting to calculation
{loyio\iov)T (Plato, Euthyphr. 7b).These similarifies suggest that both philosophers are
situated in a common discourse realm.
The unjust person, who craves for more, conducts himself among mankind as an equal of god
(Lo606oq).This phrase is later used by Plato to refer to tyrants.
Another important text on Trleove^ia is in Plato, Gorg. 482c-491d, 507e-508a. For an exposition of
this text, see Balot, Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens, 5-14.
Carl A. Huffman, Archytas ofTarentum: Pythagorean, Philosopher, andMathematician King
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 182-224, 314-17.
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Aristotle also has a share in this common discourse. Most ofAristotle's discussion of
TTXeove^ia appears in the Book 5 ofPolitics, where he deals with issues such as political
revolution (\xexa^akXoi), its causes, and ways to prevent it from happening (lit. "how to
save the constitution").
He begins his discussion with the observation that while constitutions agree that
justice is proportionate equality (to KaT'dvaXoyLay 'looy), they often fail to attain it
(Aristotle, Pol. 5.2). People either focus on "equality" or on "proportionality" and ignore
the compound of "proportionate equality." For example, in democracy, the demos
emphasize "equality" and think that they deserve equality in all aspects, whereas in
oligarchy, the oligarchs emphasize "proportionality" and think that they deserve a larger
share (irXeoye^La) in all aspects. These erroneous views often lead to stasis. Aristotle
generalizes the relationship between equality and stasis:
Stasis is everywhere due to inequality (Sid to dyLooy), where classes that are unequal
do not receive a share in proportion; for generally the motive for stasis is the desire
for equality. (Aristotle, Pol. 5.1.6)
Inequality begets stasis. Justice is the mode of observing the mean that rejects both the act
of overreaching and the act of accepting too little:
Just conduct is a mean between doing and suffering injustice, for the former is to
have too much (-nXeov 'e/eiy) and the latter to have too little C^A-aTToy). . . .Justice is
that quality....when distributing things between himself and another, or between two
others, not to give too much to himself and too little to his neighbor ofwhat is
desirable, and too little to himself and too much to his neighbor ofwhat is harmfiil,
but to each what is proportionately equal Cloou tou KaT' dyaA-oyiay). (Aristotle, Eth.
nic. 5.5.17)
Justice is the virtue that adheres to the principle ofproportionate equality; nXeove^ia is the
vice that desires more than equality.
Another telling example ofhow irA-eove^ia relates to stasis, friendship, and equality is found in
Rhetorica adAlexandrum: "ifyou produce a case [Aristotle is teaching his readers how to use examples] of
268
Dionysius ofHalicamassus, describing the conflict between Romulus and Remus,
writes: "Thereupon greater strife (epit;) arose between them than before, as each, while
secretly striving for the advantage (to vXeov Ixeiv), was ostensibly willing to accept
equality" (Dionysius ofHalicamassus, Hist. 1.87.1). Again vXeove^ia is placed in contrast
to equality and is mentioned as a source for political strife.
Polybius, a second century historian, writes history employing the same concepts
used by the philosophers above. He employs these concepts to distinguish the constitutions
of Sparta and Crete:
For, there being two things to which a state owes its preservation {o6Cexai
TToALxeupa), bravery against the enemy and concord (opoyoLag) among the citizens,
Lycurgus by doing away with overreaching (irA-eove^Lav) did away also with all
discord (6La(|)opdv) and stasis (oxdoiv). In consequence ofwhich the Lacedaemonians,
being free from these evils, excel all the Greeks in the conduct (mXixdeoQai) of their
intemal affairs and in their spirit ofunion (oup(j)pov�Ly xamd).... Cretans, on the
other hand, owing to their ingrained lust for overreaching (-nXeove^iav) are involved
in constant stasis both public and private, and in murders and civil wars (voXe\xoic,
k\i(^\)XioiQ). (Polybius, Hist. 6.46)
Earlier in the same book, Polybius defines overreach as having possession more than
another (Polybius, Hist. 6.45). To get rid of overreach, citizens must share things equally.
Equality is the opposite of overreach. It removes jealousy and stasis from the city and
brings to the city salvation through concord.
Dio Chrysostom devotes an entire speech to the theme of -nXeoveE^ia {De avaritia). In
the beginning of his speech, Chrysostom acknowledges that irXeove^La is a well-known and
patent subject that needs no fiirther exposition. However, because of the neglectful and
inattentive nature of the human beings, they therefore must be reminded repeatedly of its
people overreaching (irXeoveKtLKcoQ) their allies and their friendship {^iXiav) consequently being dissolved,
and say 'but for our part we shall keep their alliance for a long time ifwe deal with them fairly (Loidc.) and on
terms ofpartnership (kolv(j<;)'..." (Aristotle, [Rhet. Alex.] 1429b38).
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evil. riA-eoye^La, according to Chrysostom, is "neither expedient nor honorable, but the
cause of the greatest evils; and that in spite of all this, not one man refrains fi-om it or is
willing to have equal possession with his neighbor Cloov exeiv to Ttelac;)" (Dio
Chrysostom, Avar. 6). Everyone knows the evil of TrXeoye^ia, but still everyone practices it.
Chrysostom equates -irAeove^ia with the unwillingness to be equal with one's neighbor.
Again, the concept of uXeovelia closely relates with the concept of equality. To prove that
�nl�OV�^ia is indeed one of the worst evils possible, Chrysostom quotes Euripides:
At greed, the worst of deities, my son.
Why graspest thou? Do not; she is Queen ofwrong.
Houses many and happy cities enters she.
Nor leaves till ruined are her votaries.
Thou are mad for her!� 'tis best to venerate
Equality (LooTriTa), which knitteth friends to friends.
Cities to cities, allies to allies
Nature gave men the law of equal rights (loov vopLpov),
And the less, ever marshaled against
The greater, ushers in the dawn of hate. (Dio Chrysostom, Avar. 9)
The consequence of uA-eove^La is devastating. It ruins houses and cities. The only method
to prevent vXeovdl'ia is to honor equality, an act that would bind friends and cities and
allies together. Chrysostom agrees with Euripides and emphasizes on the contrast between
equality and TrAeoye^La:
The law ofmen requires us to honor equality (xo loov), and that this establishes a
common bond of friendship and peace for all toward one another, whereas quarrels,
intemal strife, and foreign wars are due to nothing else than the desirefor more
(TTAeiovoc;), with the result that each side is deprived even of a sufficiency. (Dio
Chrysostom, ^var. 10.5)
IlAeovt^La and equality are opposite dispositions leading to different results. Equality leads
to friendship and peace; TrAeove^Ca leads to destmction (Dio Chrysostom, Cone. Apam. 37).
In order for a city to avoid destmction and seek prosperity and security, citizens must leam
See also 2 Tars. 44: "refrain from sfrife and from seeking to gain the advantage."
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to secure justice, honor equality, and prevent any person from overreaching another (Dio
Chrysostom, ^var. 11-12).
IfPhilo had known the works ofDio Chrysostom, he would have expressed complete
and frill agreement, for he himself holds similar opinions:
Good order and equality (to loov) are the seeds of peace and the causes of salvation
and perpetual survival. Inequality (dvLooTTic;) and overreach (^Aeove^La) come
occasions for war, the destroyers of existing things. (Philo, QE 2.64)
Equality leads to peace; overreaching leads to war.'^^
In sum, �nXeov^l'ia is widely regarded as the opposite of equality. Furthermore, it is
widely viewed as one of the major causes for stasis. Often times the act of trleove^La is
described as an act of robbery (dpTrdCw; Plato, Resp. 574b [also kActtw and diraTaco]; Ezek
22:27; T. Dan 5.7; Dio Chrysostom, Avar. 14; Philo, Spec. 1.278; Agr. 83 [dpirayri]; Decal.
171 [dpTOyri]; Did 2:6 [dpTia^]; cf 1 Cor 5:1 1; 6:10; Did 3:5), transgressing the equality
shared between friends and citizens, acquiring honor and gain beyond one's share. '^^ In
short, irAeove^La relates to the concepts of (1) concord and stasis; (2) friendship and
citizenship; (3) desires for honor and gain; (4) acts of "robbery" transgressing "equality."
These concepts related to T\XeoveE,ia are found clustered in and around the Christ-
hymn: (1) the theme of concord and stasis is stressed in the propositio (Phil 1 :27-30); (2)
the theme of friendship and citizenship also is emphasized in the propositio; (3) the desires
for honor and gain is mentioned in the immediate context in Phil 2:3 (epL06La and
KevoSo^Loc) and throughout the whole letter; and (4) the concepts of "equality" and "robbery"
This same language is used to describe natural disasters: "And there is another war not ofhimian
agency when nature is at strife in herself, when her parts make onslaught one on another and her law-abiding
sense of equality (LooTtiToq euvo|ia)TaTT|(;) is vanquished by the greed for inequality (irXeove^La tou dvLOOu)"
(Philo, 5^ec. 2:190).
Gerhard Delling, "irAeoveKTr)?, irA-eoyeKteco, uA-eove^La," TDNT 6:272.
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IS found in Pliil 2:6. It is plausible, therefore, that Paul has composed the Christ-hymn as
warning against the vice of irAeove^ia ("greed") that breaches friendship. Here, friendship
is expressed primarily as equality.
4.5.7 Friendship and Equality
Paul begins the hymn by depicting Jesus as "being in the form ofGod" (kv \xop(^r\
e�Ou mdpxdiv). The word \xop(^r\ appears only three times in the NT (Mark 16:12; Phil 2:6,
7). The word usually refers to the outward appearance of a thing or a person.
Nonetheless, scholars have argued that [iop^r\ can mean more than outward appearance,
and might refer either to "ouoLa=essential attributes" (Lightfoot), "a mode ofbeing"
(Kasemann), "image=status possessed by the prelapsarian Adam" (Dunn),
"Erscheinungsform=the 66^a concept of the Greek Bible" (Behm), "status" (E.
Schweizer).^*^*^ Seeking a precise meaning for this word is perhaps asking too much.^^' The
word might have been used as a catch phrase for all shared commonalities between Jesus
and God, including essence, nature, attributes, character, status, form, and appearance. This
understanding of pop(j)r| coheres well with the friendship language found in context�
"equality" (Phil 2:6b) and "likeness" (Phil 2:7b).^*'^ In the Greco-Roman understanding.
H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H. S. Jones, "|iop(j)r|," LSJ 1 147.
^'^ For discussions and bibliography on this issue see Hawthome and Martin, Philippians, 1 10-14; D.
W. Jowers, "The Meaning ofMorphe in Philippians 2:6-7," JETS 49 (2006), 739-66; H. A. A. Kennedy, The
Epistle to the Philippians (The Expositor's Greek Testament; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1956), 435-36;
O'Brien, The Epistle to the Philippians, 207-1 1 .
SiWa, Philippians, 101.
Tco 6|iOLtp to ojiOLOv (^LXov ("like is dear to like") is a common Greek proverb (Homer, Od. 17.218;
Plato, Leg. 716bc; Symp. 195b; Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 8.1.6; 9.3.3; Sir 13:15-20). Socrates says in Plato, Gorg.
510b: "The closest possible friendship between man and man is that mentioned by the sages of old time as
'like to like' (6 o[ioioq tu 6|i0Lu)."
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tnends are equal to one another and are like one another, for friends share all things in
common.
The description ofChrist as equal to God is a description of a friendship
relationship}''^ Friendship and equality are often equated in the Greco-Roman world.'"'
Plato notes that "equality produces fi-iendship" (Lootric; ^iX6xx\m dTrepydCeraL) and that
this "old and true saying" is "rightly and fifiy spoken" (Plato, Leg. 151a; cf 837a, b).
Plato made this comment while dealing with the issue of "polifical jusfice" (cf Phil 1:7, 11;
3:6, 9; 4:8). Polifical jusfice requires equality: "equality is what we must aim at, now that
we are sefi:ling the State...whoever founds a State...must make this same object [i.e.,
equality] the aim ofhis legislafion....if the State is to avoid involving itself in intesfine
stasis"' (Plato, Leg. 151c, d).
Aristotle shares the same opinion. He claims that the polis needs friendship and
equality. Furthermore, the two characteristics are one and the same: "friendship is equality"
(<\>a6Tr]Q T) LooTTic;; Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.5.5, 9.S.2; Eth. eud. 7.6.9; 1.9.1; Pol 3.11.9; cf
8.13.1; 9.1.1). The Pythagoreans also hold to the same doctrine (lamblichus, Vit. Pyth.
29.162.10, 189-94; DL 8.10, 33).
It has been argued recently by many that laa 9ecp means kingship. But that seems imlikely, for that
would be an implicit endorsement of the "loftiness" of certain members of the Philippian community. Paul is
not asking those who are "on high" to step down. Rather, he is asking the Philippians who are in equal
fi-iendship relationship with one another to respect that relationship and not to overreach, but to sacrifice
themselves for the others. In other words, Phil 2:6 is not an expression ofChrist standing at the apex of the
cursus pudorum (Hellerman), but rather an expression of equality in fiiendship. Erik M. Heen, "Phil 2:6-1 1
and Resistance to Local Timocratic Rule: Isa Theo and the Cult of the Emperor in the East," in Paul and the
Roman Imperial Order (ed. Richard A. Horsley; Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press Intemational, 2004), 125-53;
Joseph H. Hellerman, ReconstructingHonor in Roman Philippi: Carmen Christi as Cursus Pudorum (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 133-35; Mikael Tellbe, Paul between Synagogue and State:
Christians, Jews, and Civic Authorities in I Thessalonians, Romans, andPhilippians (Coniectanea Biblica
New Testament Series; Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell Intemafional, 2001), 253-59.
Fitzgerald, Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship, see index on page 272. Gustav Stahlin,
"
Looq, lootric;, LooiLiioc," TDNT, 3:343-355
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Although the Roman period saw unequal friendship as a common practice, equal
friendship was still widely commended as an ideal. Cicero expresses this ideal fairiy well
when he writes, "it is of the utmost importance in friendship that superior and inferior
should stand on an equality. . .those who are superior should lower themselves, so, in a
measure, should they life up their inferiors" (Cicero, Amic. 19.69, 72).
Paul expresses the same ideal in Rom 12:16 when he writes, "Live in harmony with
one another, do not be haughty, but associate with the lowly." The twice call to "equality"
in 2 Cor 8:13, 14 also features this friendship ideal at its foundation. The church as a
friendship community (2 Cor 8:4) requires rich persons to give to those persons in need, as
Christ sacrificed his riches for the poor (2 Cor 8:9). The aim is to achieve equality among
friends.^�^
Here in Phil 2:6, Paul begins with the description ofChrist being equal with God.
The adverbial use of looc with the dative noun expresses the equality of the members in
comparison, indicating that Christ and God stand equal with one another in respect to
Allen Verhey commenting on 2 Cor 8 says, "There can be little doubt that Paul is commending the
'equality' of friendship with the poor in Judea ...the community is marked not by the economic relationship
ofpafrons and clients but by friendship" (Remembering Jesus: Christian Community, Scripture, and the
Moral Life [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2002], 288-97, here 291).
Similarly, commenting on the Jerusalem collection, Julien M. Ogereau writes, "The political and
socio-economic dimension of Lootric; and Koivcovia... represent the key motives of the entire [collection]
project. ... [Paul] appears to have aimed at reforming the stmctural inequalities of Graeco-Roman society that
were also becoming apparent in the early church by fostering socio-economic Laoirii; between Jews and
Gentiles and by establishing a global, socially and ethnically inclusive KOLvcovCa among them" ("The
Jemsalem Collection as Koivcovia: Paul's Global Politics of Socio-Economic Equality and Solidarity," A^rS'
58 [2012]: 377).
Equality is highly valued in earlier Christianity (cf Matt 20:1-16; Acts 11:17 [God gave the Gentiles
the equal gift as he gave to us the Jews]; Col 4:1 [Masters, grant to your slaves justice and equality]; 2 Pet 1:1
[to those who have obtained a faith of equal standing]). For more on equality in Paul see John Dominic
Crossan, God andEmpire: Jesus against Rome, Then andNow (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), Chap. 4:
"Paul and the Justice ofEquality."
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status or position. This expression of equality is at the same time an expression of
friendship:
The narrative begins in 2:6 with a political community composed ofGod and Christ
Jesus. We are justified in speaking of the relationship between God and Christ Jesus
as a political community ifwe interpret the concept of equality in the phrase "to be
equal with God" in an adverbial sense rather than adjectival. Equality refers to the
way God and Christ Jesus exist with one another rather than the identity of some
quality, often described by commentators as "divinity." Paul is speaking of equality
as equal participation in the governance of the community, or as Aristotle called it,
"reciprocal equality. "^�^
The equality between Christ and God is the civic fi-iendship that Paul has been alluding to
in Phil 1:27-30. As citizens of the Chrisfian /?o/w, Chrisfian should bond and unit together
in friendship, in one spirit and in one soul, thinking the same and having the same love,
and not to exult the self over others by lusting for gain. Friends should be equal with one
another. However, Paul goes further beyond the Greco-Roman ideal. Paul asks not only for
the respect of equality, but for the lowering of the self and the lifting of others.
4.6 Philippians 2:12-18
Philippians 2:12-18 together with Phil 1:27-2:4 frames the Christ hymn. This framing
is made possible by (1) the theme of "present and absence." Both Phil 1:27 (epxopai/
dTTeipL) and Phil 2:12 (mpovaial drrouoLa) meantion this theme. It is used as a rhetorical
device to enhance the force of the imperative command; (2) the use of imperative verbs.
Fowl, The Story ofChrist, 56. Fowl, however, draws a faulty conclusion: "The phrase to elvaL laa
9e(j reflects the status that belonged to Christ. ... Unfortunately for later Christological discussions, the
passage does not move on to elaborate the nature of this equality. Rather, this clause is more interested in
relating Christ's attitude to his exalted position" (ibid.).
David E. Fredrickson, "Pauline Ethics: Congregations as Communities ofMoral Deliberation," in
Promise ofLutheran Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), 121.
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Both Phil 1:27-2:4 and Phil 2:12-18 are structured around imperative verbs.^*^^ Philippians
1:27-2:4 hinges upon two imperative verbs: -rroA-LTeueoGe in Phil 1:27 and TrAripuoaTe in
Phil 2:2. Philippians 2:12-18 also hinges upon two verbs: KaxepYccCeoBe in Phil 2:12 and
TTOLelTe in Phil 2:15; (3) the theme of salvation. Both Phil 1:28 and Phil 2:12 mention this
theme. In both passages, salvation is characterized as "your salvation;" but also at the same
time characterized as the work ofGod; (4) the contrast between friendship and strife. In
Phil 1:27-2:4, the theme of fi-iendship is expressed by various concepts: "one spirit," "one
soul," the ouv-prefix, the common enemy, the like-mindedness, and so on. The theme of
strife is found in the terms such as epiGeLa and KevoSo^ta. In Phil 2:12-18, the theme of
friendship is found in the concept of�i)6oKia (see discussion below); and the theme of strife,
in the concepts of yoyyuopoc; and diaXoyioiioQ-}^^ (5) the imagery of the holy city. The polis
imagery is expressed not only through the contrast of concord and strife, but also by the
militaristic concepts in Phil 1:27-30 and the term mXixdeoQ^ (Phil 1:27). In Phil 2:12-18,
the polis imagery is conveyed through the holiness language, behind which is the concept
of the community of believers being God's true holy temple-city (see 4.2.4).
This section will focus on the interpretation of one single passage, namely, Phil 2:13:
"God who is at work in you, enabling you both to will (xo QkXeiv) and to work (xo
evepyetv) for your goodwill (euSoKta)." This thesis will argue that moral will and moral
praxis are the essential building blocks of virtue (4.6.1) and that both these components are
Philippians is characterized by intersecting sections that have and do not have imperative verbs:
Phil 1-1-26 [no imperatives]; Phil 1:27-2:4(5) [3 imperatives]; Phil 2:6-11 [no imperatives]; Phil 2:12-18 [5
imperatives]- Phil 2:19-29 [1 imperative (toward the end in Phill:29)]; Phil 3:1-2 [4 imperatives];
Phil 3:3-16
[no imperatives]; Phil 3:17-4:9 [1 1 imperatives]; Phil 4:10-20 [no imperatives]. The
sections with no
imperatives are sections where Paul lays out moral exemplars for the Philippians
to imitate.
Ei)6oKLa is associated with the imperative verb KatepYdCeoOe; royy\)a\x6Q and 5iaXoyia\i6c, are
associated with the imperative verb muix�. The hope is that the Philippians will work out the goodwill and
abstain from murmuring and arguing.
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supplied by God, enabling the believers to establish �u6oKLa, i.e., friendship, among
themselves (4.6.2).
4.6.1 The Willing and the Working
The concept of "work" holds a prominent position in Phil 2:12-15. Not only are the
two structuring imperative verbs KaxepydCeoGe ("work out" your own salvation) and
uoLette ("do" all things without. . .) semantically associated with the concept ofwork, but
also God is referred to as the God who is at work (6 kvepyQv), working so that the
Philippians may have "both the willing and the working" (Kal to Qeleiv Kal to kvepyelv)
of the goodwill.
Paul already has talked about the importance ofmoral knowledge and perception
(4.2.3), the importance ofmoral choice (4.3.3), and the importance ofmoral reasoning
(4.5.2), but for moral progress (4.3.4) to take place none of these characteristics are
sufficient. Moral progress requires above all practice (see the conclusion in 4.3.4). Paul is
confident that having the moral knowledge and perception provided by God and the moral
reasoning exemplified by Christ, the Philippians will be able to discern and choose the best.
However, choosing the best is far from enough. What is chosen must be put into practice.
Without practice there are no true virtuous human beings.
"Will" is needed for a choice to be carried out in action. The lack ofwill can be
morally disastrous. The importance ofwill is a much discussed topic in Greco-Roman
ethical philosophy.^'" The classical example of the weakness of the will is found in
Euripides' Medea 1077-80: "I am being overcome by evils. I know that what I am about
^'^ Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol 2: Willing (San Diego: Harcourt, 1971), 55-84. Charles
H. Kahn, "Discovering Will from Aristotle to Augustine," in The Question of "Eclecticism ": Studies in Later
Greek Philosophy (ed. John M. Dillon and A. A. Long; Berkeley: University ofCalifomia Press, 1988), 234-
59.
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to do is evil but passion is stronger than my reasoned reflection and this is the cause of the
worst evils for humans." Euripides' play speaks not only for himself but also for the
common mass:
Most people say that. . .while knowing what is best (yLyvwoKoytag td ^klxvoxa) they
do not will to do (ouk eGe/LeLv TrpdixeLv) it although they could do it but instead they
do something else. And when I have asked why, they say that those who act this way
are acting under pleasure or pain or the power of the things I just mentioned.
(emphasis mine; Plato, Prot. 352d)
Both Socrates and Plato reject this common view, but Aristotle affirms this view {Eth. nic.
7.2.1-5). The technical term for this act ofworking against what one knows is right and
true is dcKpaoia (cf 1 Cor 7:5).^" Paul reflects on aKpaota extensively in Rom 1?^^ Paul
knows well the weakness of the will. Without a strong will, human beings inevitably echo
Paul's desperate cry, "I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do"
(Rom 7:19).
Thus, it is important that God will provide "the willing" so what is chosen as the best
can be worked out in actuality .^'^ The importance ofmoral practice has already been noted
in texts dealing with moral progress (4.3.4). Nonetheless, practice is important not only for
moral progress, but also for virtue itself Practice is an essential component of virtue.
^"
Christopher Bobonich and Pierre Destree, Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus
(Philosophia Antiqua; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2007).
^'^
Stanley K. Stowers, A Rereading ofRomans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1994), 260-84. After citing texts on aKpaoia fi-om Euripides, Plato, Aristotle, Chrysippus,
Seneca, Epictetus, Plutarch, Galen, and Ovid, Stowers concludes, "These texts illustrate how versions of the
saying foimd in [Rom] 7:15 and 19 played a central role in the Greek moral tradition. The words ofEuripides'
Medea were widely cited in this connection. In philosophy and literature alike the words were variously
interpreted in discussions about the roles of the emotions, deliberation, and knowledge of good and evil in
moral psychology. Most aspects ofPaul's discussion in [Rom] 7:7-25 can be paralleled with language fi-om
this tradition" (263-264). See also Stanley K. Stowers, "Paul and Self-Mastery," in Paul in the Greco-Roman
World: A Handbook (ed. J. Paul Sampley; Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press kitemational, 2003), 524-50;
Wasserman, The Death of the Soul in Romans 7, 98-103.
For the relation betvs een potentiality/power {dunamis) and acmality {energeia), see Stephen Makin,
Aristotle, Metaphysics: Book Theta (Clarendon Aristotle Series; Oxford: Clarendon, 2006). In Paul, these two
concepts often appear in the same context (1 Cor 12:10; Gal 3:5; Eph 1:19; 3:7, 20; Phil 3:21; Col 1:29; 2
Thess 2:9). For Paul, the power comes always fi-om God.
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Repeatedly, Aristotle defines virtue as the active exercise of the soul's faculties in
conformity to rational principle" (i|/uxf|(; eyepY�La Kaxd Xoyov r\ \ir\ dveu Aoyou; Aristotle,
Eth. nic. 1.7.14, 16; 1.8.2; 1.8.8). According to Aristotle, the happy man is one who
"realize complete goodness in action'' (xov Kax' dpexT^y xeXeiay eygpyouyxa). He is aware
that some people regard virtue as a disposition, but he disagrees:
No doubt it makes a great difference whether we conceive the Supreme Good to
depend on possessing virtue or on displaying it (ey Kxrioei x\ xprioet)�on disposition,
or on the manifestation of a disposition in action (ev e^ei r\ gyepyeia). For a many
may possess the disposition without its producing any good result, as for instance
when he is asleep, or has ceased to fiinction from some other cause; but virtue in
active exercise (gygpyeiay) cannot be inoperative�it will of necessity act, and act
well (-TTpd^eL Kal eu TTpd^ei). (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1.8.9)
Virtue is not simply a possession or a disposition, and it is not inoperative. It is first and
above all an action.^'"* However, virtue is not only exhibited in action but also learned by
action. Aristotle claims, "moral dispositions are formed as a result of the corresponding
activities" (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 2.1.8); In other words, "we become just by doing just acts,
temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts" (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 2.1.4-5).
Act and disposition form a circular process. Virtue enables virtuous acts; virtuous acts in
tum strengthen virtue.
4.6.2 Ei)6oKLa
The phrase Mp xx\q euSoKtag in Phil 2:13 can be interpreted either as "God's
goodwill" or "your goodwill" (the goodwill of the Philippians).^'^ Almost all English
Cicero writes, "The whole glory of virtue resides in activity" (Cicero, Off. 1.6.19; cf Nat. d.
1.40.110).
For arguments in support of human goodwill see Hav^ome and Martin, Philippians, 142-43; Jerry
L. Sumney, Philippians: A Greek Student's Intermediate Reader (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2007),
53-
54.
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translations translate this phrase as "for his [God's] good pleasure/goodwill." O'Brien
provides four arguments for this rendering:
First, it is not without precedent to find a term such as evSoKia or its synonym
Qekr\\ia being used without modifiers to refer to the good pleasure or will of God.
Certainly the rabbis often spoke of 'the will' or 'the good pleasure' in this way when
they had God's will and purpose in view. Paul himself uses to QeXrwia at Rom. 2:18
to denote 'the will [ofGod]'. So the omission of the pronoun amov ('his') here at
Phil. 2:13 does not rule out the phrase being a reference to the divine good pleasure.
Secondly, the more natural way ofunderstanding the Greek is to take euSoKia as
denoting God's good pleasure, for Geoc; at the beginning of the sentence and UTiep rfjc;
EuSoKiac; at the end refer to each other. Thirdly, a ftirther reference to the will of
human beings in the clause after 9eA.eiv and EVEpyeTv would be tautologous, even
banal. Fourthly, if one takes euSoKLa of the divine good pleasure, it is not necessary to
render uuep by "in conformity with." Grammarians have claimed that UTiep can
specify "the object to which one is aiming" or mean "with a view to . . . his good
pleasure."^'^
Eu6oKLa can refer to the will ofGod, but the present context suggests that it refers to the
Philippians
'
goodwill toward one another. Here in Phil 2: 13, the goodwill contrasts with
the murmuring and arguing in Phil 2:14 just as goodwill contrasts with envy, strife, and
self-ambifion in Phil 1:15-17. Moreover, the parallel between Phil 2:12-18 and Phil 1:27-
2:4 suggests that salvafion through concord and friendship is also in view in Phil 2:13.
Second, to interpret euSoKta as God's goodwill is not necessarily a "more natural way" of
reading the text. It is no less natural to have the article refer back to the pronoun upiv.
Third, euSoKia does not mean "will" in the sense of consciousness or desire, ft means
goodwill toward one another (3.2.5.4). As such, this wording exhibits the language of
friendship in parallel to love (Phil 1:15-16). Thus, it is not tautalogous or banal for euSoKia
^'^ O'Brien, The Epistle to the Philippians, 288.
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to refer to the Philippians' goodwill. Fourth, uirep interpreted as "the object to which one is
aiming" also works perfectly well with "your goodwill."^'
In sum, no strong evidence exists against rendering xf\Q euSoKiag as "your goodwill."
To the contrary, the context strongly suggests xf\Q �u6oKLa; as the friendly act and feeling
toward one another that dispels envy and strife and other vices that cause discord.^'^ This
rendering fits not only with the immediate context (in contrast to the murmuring and
arguing mentioned in Phil 2:14) but also with the overall purpose of the letter, i.e., to foster
concord through virtuous friendship.
4.7 Philippians 2:19-30
The biographical sketches ofTimothy and Epaphroditus in Phil 2:19-30 have been
acknowledged widely as Paul's moral exemplars for the Philippians to follow, and that
both exemplars are modeled after the self-humbling Christ ofPhil 2:5-1 1.^'^ Hansen in his
recent commentary provides a good summary ofhow both characters�Timothy and
Epaphroditus�^have been characterized by Paul as Christ-like-exemplars:
In his recommendations, Paul shows how these two men exhibit the same character
traits that he has been encouraging the Philippians to develop. By his genuine
� '
Yirep interpreted as "for the sake of can fit well as well. Jac J. Mulier, The Epistles ofPaul to the
Philippians and to Philemon (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1955), 91n5.
^'^ All 6oKL- words in Philippians have himian beings as its agent. In Phil 1 :6, Paul prays that God
would grant the Philippians the ability to discern (6oKL|idC6Lv) what is best, so that they can be pure and
blameless (that which is aimed for in 2:15). In Phil 2:22, against the self-seeking characters of others, Paul
lauds Timothy for his mature and approved character (6okl|j,t|v). In each and every case, the 6okl- words are
used to refer to the moral character or the moral discernment of the Christ followers.
^'^ Thus, R. Alan Culpepper writes, "[Paul] wanted the church to see them as examples of church
leaders whose service showed that they had 'the mind ofChrist' within them" ("Co-Workers in Suffering:
Philippians 2:19-30," RevExp 11 [1980]: 353). Similarly, Coursar writes, "Timothy and Epaphroditus may be
worthy models for the Philippians, yet they are but imitators of the Christ of 2:6-1 1, who remains the
generative model for all Christians" {Philippians and Philemon, 66). See also William S. Kurz, "Kenotic
Imitation ofPaul and ofChrist in Philippians 2 and 3," in Discipleship in the New Testament (Philadelphia,
Pa: Fortress, 1985), 113.
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concern for the welfare of the Philippians in a time when everyone looks outfor their
own interests (2:20-21), Timothy illustrates the altruistic attitude Paul desired the
Philippians to have, not looking to your own interests but each ofyou to the interests
ofothers (2:4). When Epaphroditus almost JzeJ because he risked his life in the
service of Christ (2:30), he mirrored Christ, who took the very nature ofa servant
and was obedient unto death (2:7-8). Paul's portrayal of the same traits in Timothy
and Epaphroditus that he saw in Christ and wanted to see in the Philippians gives the
readers reliable guides to foUow.^^"
No doubt Paul intends to portray Timothy and Epaphroditus as imitators ofChrist, for
many of the concepts and terms he uses to depict Timothy and Epaphroditus are adopted
from the Christ hymn. However, Paul intends to make moral exemplars not only out of the
virtuous individuals ofTimothy and Epaphroditus, but also out of the friendship
relationship that he shares with Timothy andEpaphroditus.
In his introduction to Timothy and Epaphroditus, Paul emphasizes the mutual
relationship. Timothy is introduced as a person who is "like-souled" with Paul (Phil 3:20).
Moreover, he serves Paul as a son with a father (Phil 2:22). Epaphroditus is introduced as
Paul's brother, co-worker, and fellow-soldier (Phil 2:25). Moreover, he serves Paul risking
his life (Phil 2:30). In other words, Timothy and Epaphroditus are not commended as
individuals, but as virtuous people working in rich relationship with a significant other.
Like Christ and God in Phil 2:6, they are presented as exemplars ofvirtuous friends.
In the Greco-Roman tradition, friendship is not only theorized and discussed in
abstract, but also taught and commemorated through concrete examples. Some of these
examples are widely shared, geographically and chronologically, to the extent that modem
scholars could speak of a "canon" of friendship.^^' Most of these canonical models are
Hansen, The Letter to the Philippians, 192.
Gottfried Bohnenblust, "Beitrage Zum Topos Peri Philias" (Inaugural Dissertation, Universitat
Bern, 1905), 41; Fitzgerald, Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship, 121-22, 47-48, 55-57, 68; West,
"Whether by Life or by Death", 32-61; Gustav Stahlin, "4)^60), Kata^uA-lu, kxX." TDNT 9:\5\-\5A.
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friends in pairs (Ceuyea (^iXlaQ; "yoked-fiiend;" Plutarch, ^m/c. mult. 93e; cf. Phil 4:3).^^^
This list of "canon" would include: Phintias and Damon ((^ivxiac, Kal Adpcov; Diodorus
Siculus 10.4.2-6; Cicero, Fm. 2.24.79; Off. 3.45; Tusc. 5.22; lamblichus, Vit. Pyth. 234-36;
Plutarch, ^w/c. mult. 93e;); Achilles and Patroclus (AxiXX^q Kal ndipoKloc; Plutarch,
Amic. mult. 93e; Bion of Smyrna, Frg. 8; Dio Chrysostom, Diffid. 28; Xenophon, Symp.
8.31), Theseus and Peirithous(0Tioei)(; Kal He lplGouq; Cicero, Fm. 1.65; Plutarch, .4m/c.
mult. 93e; Bion of Smyrna, Frg. 8; Dio Chrysostom, Diffid. 28; Xenophon, Symp. 8.3 1),
Orestes and Pylades (OpeoTTic; Kal nuAd6r)c;; Cicero, ^m/c. 7.24; Fm. 1.65; 2.24.79;
Plutarch, Amic. mult. 93e; Bion of Smyrna, Frg. 8; Dio Chrysostom, Diffid. 28; Xenophon,
Symp. 8.31; Lucian, Tox. 10), Epameinondas and Pelopidas (EirapeLvwySac; Kal
neAoTTiSag; Plutarch, v4w/c. mw/?. 93e).
The evidences above emerge from a broad array of different authors, including
philosophers, politicians, poets, historians, orators, and novelists. All authors show
familiarity with this canon. Paul likely knew this canon as well, and he might have been
inspired by this canon to develop his own paired examples of friends.
Paul also might have been influenced by the general opinion that the "living voice"
will serve as a better example than those of the past:
The living voice (viva vox) and the intimacy of a common life will help you more
than the written word. You must go to the scene of action, first, because men put
more faith in their eyes than their ears, and second, because the way is longer if one
follows precepts, but short and helpfiil, if one follows patterns. Cleanthes could not
have been the express image of Zeno, if he had merely heard his lectures; he shared
in his life, saw into this hidden purposes, and watched him to see whether he lived
according to his ovm rules. Plato, Aristotle, and the whole throng of sages who were
destined to go each his different way, derived more benefit from the character than
from the words of Socrates. It was not the class room ofEpicurus, but living together
Stahlin, "4)a�a), Kaxai^ikiw, kiX." TDNT 9:113-171. Josephus uses irapaCeuy^'unL to describe the
close relationship between Ananus and Jesus (J. W. 4.322).
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under the same roof, that made great men ofMetrodorus, Hermarchus, and Polyaenus.
(Seneca, Ep. 6.5)^^^
The comparison here is between the "living voice" and the "written word." Certainly,
Paul's letter is a "written word," but Timothy and Epaphroditus are "living voices" about
to be present among the Philippians. As such, Paul shares Seneca's emphasis on real life.
Indeed, Paul stresses the importance ofperception (Phil 1:9) as well as seeing and hearing
life examples (Phil 1:30; 4:9).
In sum, eager to secure concord through friendship based on virtue, Paul provides
exemplars for imitation.'^^'* Like the well-known canon of friendship, Paul exemplifies
friendship through pairs of fi-iends. He also adheres to the general precept that a "living
voice" makes the best exemplar. Moreover, since the discord among Philippians mainly
emerges between two individuals (4.10.2), it is appropriate therefore to show how two
friends should act with one another. For these reasons, Paul provides living examples of
pairedfriends�Paul and Timothy (4.7.1), and Paul and Epaphroditus (4.7.2)�as moral
exemplars.
4.7.1 Paul and Timothy
The theme of friendship looms large in Phil 2:19-30. Speaking ofTimothy, Paul says
in Phil 2:20, "I have no one like-souled (Lo6\|;uxoy)." Anton Fridrichsen argues that
Lo6i[/uxo(; means "social equality."^^^ Panayotis Christou disagrees and claims that it means
Similar advice is given by rhetorical handbooks, for example: "we must take examples analogous
to the point and nearest in time or place to the hearers" (Aristotle, [Rhel. Alex.] 32.1439a.2-3).
^^'^ On Paul's use of imitation in general, see Benjamin Fiore, "Paul, Exemplification, and Imitation,"
in Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook (ed. J. Paul Sampley; Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press
Intemational, 2003), 228-57.
Anton Fridrichsen, "Iaov|n)xoo = Ebenburtig, Solidansch," SO 18 (1938): 42-49.
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"confident. "^^^ Most commentators, unsatisfied witli both suggestions, thinlc that lo6\\!vxoc,
means "like-soul" or "like-mind."^^^ Nonetheless, no one is able to give any substantive
evidence for such rendering. The word looij/uxoc occurs rarely in classical literature.^^^ In
such a case, similar constructions may help to determine its meaning.
(1) friend who is equal to thine own soul (6 ^IXoq b Iooq xf\Q ij/uxfic oou; LXX Deut.
13:7; cited by Philo, Her. 84; cf LXX Psa 54:13-15)
(2) fiiend an equal of one's ovm self (loov Tr\ ijjuxrj xov (^IXov; Let. Aris. 228)
(3) single-heartedly (Looi[njx(oc;) every day they guided his [Paul's] affairs in prayer to
the Lord (Acts ofPaul, Frg. 6.8)^^^
These evidences suggest looil/uxoc; as simply another way of expressing [iia i|/uxfi. In other
words, the term is another name for friendship.^^" Paul may have intended the use of the
loo-prefix as a reference to the relationship between Christ and God (Phil 2:6)P^ The
primary meaning of this word does not suggest that Paul is like Timothy or Timothy is like
Paul; instead, this word emphasizes the genuine bond of friendship between the two men.
Bound by friendship, Paul and Timothy share the same concem for the Philippians.
Both men possess an eagemess to leam about "the things conceming you [the Philippians]
(id irepl upcov)" (Phil 2:19, 20). Paul presents himself and Timothy as friends having the
same mind and exhibiting the same habit ofheart. Both men are practitioners of the virtue
ofhumility mentioned in Phil 2:4 where the Scripture states, "Let each of you look not only
Panayotis Christou, "laovuxoo Phil 2:20," JBL 70 (1951): 293-96.
^^"^
Fee, Paul 's Letter to the Philippians, 265; O'Brien, The Epistle to the Philippians, 3 1 8. The
question then is to ask whether Paul is saying that he has "(i) no one like Timothy, ofhis caliber; (ii) no one
like Paul in his fundamental commitments; or (iii) no one who is equally concemed for the Philippians"
(Bockmuehl, The Epistle to the Philippians, 1 65). Witherington notes that "The term. . .refers to a relationship
involving equality and sameness of character." He translates it as "of the same spirit." Witherington, Paul's
Letter to the Philippians, 172-73.
Christou, "Iaov|A)xoo Phil 2:20," 293-94.
Wilhelm Schneemelcher, New Testament Apocrypha, trans. R. McL. Wilson, 2 vols. (Philadelphia,
Penn.: Westminster, 1965), 378.
"Equality" is an important concept in the Greek-Roman ideal of friendship (4.5.7).
Moulton-Milligan: "perhaps a play upon words with the preceding euij/uxu." MM, s.v. "lo6i|;uxo(;."
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to the things of one's own (id eauiQv), but also to the things of others." They practice
what they proclaim. They become the moral exemplars for the Philippians to imitate.
The phrase id irepl upwv is a rare construction. The exact phrase only appears three
times in the NT, all in the letter to the Philippians. The phrase never appears in Philo,
Josephus, or the Apostolic Fathers. In fact, it never appears in Greek literature before the
NT period.^^^ Paul mentions this unusual phrase twice in Phil 2:19 and 2:20. Likely, Paul
intends to use this phrase as a reference to the propositio in Phil 1:27, where td rrepl upwv
is specified as, "you are standing firm in one spirit, striving side by side with one soul for
the faith of the gospel, and are in no way intimidated by your opponents." Paul is
reminding the Philippians again of the importance of concord and friendship.
In Phil 2:21, Paul again emphasizes the fiiendship he shares with Timothy. He
describes their relationship in terms of father and son. Father-son relationship is not
incompatible with friendship, since the word fiiendship encompasses all kinds of different
relationships including those between parents, brothers, comrades, and benefactors
(Aristofie, Eth. nic. 8.7.1; 8.10.4-6).^^^ Dio Chrysostom calls the father-son relafionship
the "first and highest friendship" (Dio Chrysostom, Cone. Apam. 41). Likewise, Plutarch
says, "most friendships are in reality shadows and imitations and images of that first
friendship which Nature implanted in children toward parents and in brothers toward
brothers" (Plutarch, Frat. amor. 479c-d). Another indicator of fiiendship is the use of the
proposition ouv.
Td irepl plus the genitive personal pronoun is rare also and appears in the NT only in Phil 1 :27;
2: 19, 20; 2 Tim 1 :3. The construction is not found in the OT and in Philo. It is found only once in Josephus.
^" For the important distinction between "friend" (philos) and "friendship" (philia) in Greek language,
see Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World, 9, 55-56, 67-72. The relationship between the two is like the
relationship between "lover" and "love" in modem English.
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This father-son type of friendship is formed for a particular purpose, namely to serve
the gospel (Phil 3:22). This act ofworking together is also a mark of friendship, for friends
will be of one mind, "sharing concem for the same things" (Seneca, Ep. 35.2). Friends
with the same mind coming together to serve the gospel is a restatement of thepropositio
(Phil 1:27-30). Paul gives the Philippians a concrete example of that which he seeks. Paul
and Timothy are friends in the highest regard in that they exhibit the same virtue and the
same habit of heart, choosing to do what is best for others and working together to achieve
that common aim:
Concord (ojiovoLa) also seems to be a friendly feeling. Hence it is not merely
agreement ofopinion, for this might exist even between sfrangers. Nor yet is
agreement in reasoned judgments about any subject whatever. . .Concord is said to
prevail in a city, when the citizens agree about what is advantageous (tqv
ou|i(t)ep6vTa)v), reach the same decisions (rauxa -rTpoaLpwyiaL), and carry their
common resolves into execution, (emphasis mine; Aristotle, Eth. nic. 9.6.1)
4.7.2 Paul and Epaphroditus
Paul begins Phil 3:25-30 by introducing Epaphroditus as his brother, co-worker, and
fellow-soldier:^^"* (1) Certainly Paul leamed the practice of the call of "brother" from his
Jewish fradition. However, the term is not a uniquely Jewish practice. In the Greco-Roman
tradition, citizens are often referred to as brothers. For example, Plato says, "we and our
citizens are brothers, the children all of one mother" (Plato, Menex. 239a; cf Resp. 414d-
415a; Herodotus, Hist. 4.104; Demosthenes, 1 Aristog. 87; Isocrates, Pang. 24-25; Dio
Chrysostom, Nicom. 45-46; Cicero, Off. 1.51). Words such as motherland or fatherland
prevail in Greco-Roman literature.^^^ Calling Epaphroditus his brother, Paul demonstrates
how citizens of the Chrisi-polis should treat one another. (2) Furthermore, the word co-
These titles move from the most general to the most specific. O'Brien, The Epistle to the
Philippians, 330. These three terms appear together in Phlm 1 :2 (d66A.4)ii instead ofkhO^'^oQ), perhaps also for
the sfress on imity.
Also, various cifies in the Greek world are given the name ^ilcLbkX^^ia. (e.g.. Rev 1 : 1 1 ; 3 :7).
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worker alludes to the work ofGod that is God implementing among the Philippians to
work out their own salvation (Phil 1 :27-30; 2:13). The Philippians are called to become co
workers of one another, working together to solidify the safety of the polis. Paul and
Epaphroditus as co-workers functions as an example for the co-working of the
Philippians.^^^ (3) The word fellow-soldier fiinctions in a similar way. The military
imagery refers back to the propositio in which the Philippians are depicted as soldiers
standing side by side defending the opponents (Phil 1:27-30).^^^ The fellow-soldier-
relationship between Paul and Epaphroditus functions as example of how that defensive
work should be done. Moreover, fellow-soldier is often singled out in Greco-Roman
literature as a specific form of friendship. Aristotle, for example, notes that "shipmates and
fellow-soldiers (ouoTpaTLcoxag) speak of each other as 'my fiend' ((j)LXou(;)" (Aristotle, Eth.
Victor P. Furnish argues that oui^epyoQ is used by Paul to emphasize "the unity of the Brethren in
Christ in the service of the gospel" ("Fellow Workers in God's Service" JBL 80 [1961], 366). He thinks that
this is true also of 1 Cor 3:9a, which he translates as: "It is for God that we are fellow workers" (Geou ydp
�0|i�v ouvepyoL) (ibid., 369). According to Fumish, Paul in speaking of ouyepyoq is "concemed about
defining the relationship of the apostles to one another. They are not in competition for status. They are all
6LdK0i'0L; they are all 'equal' [1 Cor 3:8]" (ibid.).
On the military language, see Edgar Krentz, "Military Language and Metaphors in Philippians," in
Origins and Method: Towards a New Understanding ofJudaism and Christianity (ed. Bradley H. McLean;
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1993), 105-27; Timothy C. Geoffrion, The Rhetorical Purpose and the
Political andMilitary Character ofPhilippians, 60-61; Joseph A. Marchal, "Military Images in Philippians
1-2: A Feminist Analysis of the Rhetorics of Scholarship, Philippians, and Current Contexts," in Her
Master 's Tools? Feminist andPostcolonial Engagements ofHistorical-CriticalDiscourse (ed. Caroline
Vander Stichele and Todd C. Penner; Atlanta: Society ofBiblical Literature, 2005), 265-86.
Isaeus mentions fiiends together with fellow-soldiers (ol ^iXoi Kal ol ouoTpaxLcotaL) (Isaeus,
Astyp. 4). Plutarch does the same calling Timonides a friend and fellow-soldier ofDion (Plutarch, Dion. 31.2;
cf Otho 12.1). Josephus also calls fellow-soldiers fiiends (Josephus, Ant. 1.182). Xenophon calls citizens
"fellow-soldiers" who come together "in defense of the common safety and freedom of us both" (uTiep xf\Q
KO\.v\\Q (X|i4)0t6pa)v r\\iQv outripLac xe Kal eXeueep tag) (Xenophon, //e//. 2.4.20). Otto Bauernfeind rightly
notes, "The word [ouoTpaiLCJirit;] takes on something of the nuance ofipiXoC ("oTpaxguoiiai, otpaxeLa,
oxpaiLd, KxX.," TDNT 7:701-7U).
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Finally, the ow-prefix again indicates the relationship between Paul and
Epaphroditus as one of friendship. Their "togetherness" in friendship teaches the
Philippians how they should strive "together" against the opponents (Phil 1 :27-28).
Another friendship topoi in Phil 2:25-30 is the strong emotional care Paul has for
Epaphroditus. Epaphroditus' illness causes Paul great sorrow. Epaphroditus' recovery
eased that sorrow (Phil 2:27). Knowing that Epaphroditus can finally meet those who "he
has been longing for" lessens Paul's sorrow even more (dAuTroiepoc;; Phil 2:28).
Epaphroditus' joy becomes Paul's own joy. In sum, Paul's emotion is deeply invested in
the life of Epaphroditus. This emotional outpouring is a sign of true fiiendship.^^^ Paul has
a genuine and profound concem for Epaphroditus, more than he has for himself. Paul does
not feel sorrow for his own chains, but only for the illness of his beloved companion.
Again Paul demonstrates how to care for another and befriend another.
Friendship involves mutual goodwill. Paul demonstrates his goodwill toward
Epaphroditus through his emotions. Epaphroditus' goodwill, on the other hand, is
demonstrated through his act�^his act of dying for friends.
Three times Paul speaks of Epaphroditus' near-death experience: (1) he was so ill
that he nearly died (Phil 2:27);^"*� (2) he came close to death for the work ofChrist (Phil
2:30a); and (3) he was risking (-rrapapoA.euodpeu'oc;) his life to make up the services (Phil
2:30b). The effect is cumulafive. Paul begins with the passive notion ofEpaphroditus being
stmck down by illness. In the second descripfion Paul adds a purpose statement Sid to
'epyov XpLOToO, as if Epaphroditus' death were intended for a certain purpose. Finally, in
� Hansen writes, "Anyone who has had the experience ofbeing with a close friend who is dying can
easily imagine the agony that these two fnends experienced" (205).
^"^ The phrase liexpL Gai'dxou echoes Christ's death (Phil 2:8).
289
the third description, Epaphiroditus talces a fully active role in risking (irapaPoAeuodiieyoc;;
aorist mid. deponent = act.) his life in order to (iva) make up the services. In this fmal
climactic description, Epaphroditus' death is no longer a passive result of illness but
instead a deliberative act done for a certain purpose.^"*'
Each of these sayings are tributes in honor ofEpaphroditus' powerful friendship, for
no friendship is greater than a friend willing to die for the other .^'^ Plato, for example, says,
"Only those who love wish to die for others." (Plato, Symp. 179b). Achilles is named as an
example, who "bravely chose to go and rescue his lover Pafroclus, avenged him, and
sought death not merely in his behalf but in haste to be joined with him whom death had
taken" (Plato, Symp. 179e). Aristotle says, "the virtuous man's conduct is often guided by
the interests of his fiiends and his country, and that he will if necessary lay down his life in
their behalf (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 9.8.9). Aristofie's saying is echoed by Zeno, who says,
"the Sage will for reasonable cause make his own exit from life on his country's behalf or
for the sake of his fiiends" (DL 7.130). The Epicureans also echo this sentiment when
they say, "the wise man must sometimes die for his friends" (DL 10.120). The first century
Stoic philosopher Epictetus shares the same view:
Hence, when it is your duty to share the danger of a friend or of your country, do not
ask of the diviner whether you ought to share that danger. For if the diviner
forewarns you that the omens of sacrifice have been unfavorable, it is clear that death
is portended, or the injury of some member of your body, or exile; yet reason
requires that even at this risk you are to stand by your fiiend and share the danger
with your country. (Epictetus, Ench. 32.3 [Oldfather, LCL])
The verb iTapapo;i�iJoiiaL is often used in relation to danger and death. There are records ofpeople
risking their lives for fiiends; merchants, for gain; fighters, for victory; a group called the paraboloni, to
nurse the sick and to bury the dead. Cleon L. Jr. Rogers and Cleon L. lU Rogers, The New Linguistic and
Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament (Rev. ed.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1998).
Fitzgerald, Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship, see the index in page 272; Keener, The
Gospel ofJohn: A Commentary, 1004-06; Metzner, "In Aller Freundschaft," 123-26. By far the best resource
on this theme is the thesis written by West, "Whedier by Life or by Death".
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The Roman philosophers are also influenced by the same ideology. Seneca, for example,
says, "For what purpose, then, do I make a man my friend? In order to have someone for
whom I may die, whom I may follow into exile, against whose death I may stake my own
life, and pay the pledge, too" (Seneca, Ep.9.l0; cf. Ep. 6.2). In his treatise on friendship,
Cicero describes Pylades as one who "wished to be put to death instead ofhis friend
[Orestes]" (Cicero, Amic. 24). New Testament writers such as Paul (Rom 5:7) and John
(John 15:13; 1 John 3:16) also mention this ideal of "dying for friends."^'*^
In sum, both Timothy and Epaphroditus are Paul's great companions with whom
Paul shares close friendship. Their friendship is based on their like-mindedness, sharing
the mind ofChrist, "not to one's own interest, but to the interest of others." They come
together and work together for what they deem most valuable, namely the work ofChrist
for others. In other words, their friendship is not based on pleasure or utility, but on virtue,
i.e., the virtue ofhumility.
4.8 Philippians 3:1-11
Paul begins this passage with the phrase to A-olttov. According to the partition theory,
this phrase indicates that Paul is about to close his letter as in 2 Cor 13: 1 1. However, the
^'^^ Keener provides a good summary ofhow this theme works in the Gospel of John: "[Jesus]
illustrate[s] his love for his fnends by speaking ofhow he would lay down his life for them (John 15:13-15).
Likewise if Jesus' disciple friends (John 15:15) love one another as he has loved them (John 15:12), they
must lay down their lives for one another (John 15:13; cf 1 Jn 3:16).
The same Gospel illustrates this
principle earlier when Jesus speaks of going to Lazarus, because Lazarus was their 'friend' (philos,
John
11-11) whom Jesus 'loved' (phileo, John 1 1 :3) and for whose life
Jesus laid down his own (John 11:8-1 6);
Thomas literally understands, and the reader symbolically understands, Jesus' 'going' in ternis of
his death
(John 11:16)" ("Friendship," 384).
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phrase has a more general meaning and does not necessarily signify the closing of a letter
(cf 1 Cor 7:29; 1 Thess 4:1).'"'
4.8.1 The Same Things, Retiring, and Safety
Following the transitional sentence in Phil 3:1a is a much debated statement. Paul
writes, "To write the same things (xd autd ypd^eiv) to you is not retiring (oKvripoy) to me,
but safety (do^aXkc,) for you" (Phil 3:1b). Three concepts require further clarification: (1)
the same things; (2) retiring; (3) safety.
(1) The Same Things. The phrase "the same things" has been interpreted in a variety
ofways. Some scholars think that it refers to Paul's command to "rejoice,"'^'*^ while others
think it refers to Paul's following discourse,^'*^ and still others think it refers to things
written previously in the letter.'^''^
However, in using this phrase, Paul may have all the above elements in view, for the
command to rejoice^"^^ and the contents written before and after Phil 3:lshare a common
aim, namely to foster virtuous friendship so the community can be saved.
SiWsL, Philippians, 144.
^"^ Bockmuehl, The Epistle to the Philippians, 180; G. B. Caird, Paul's Letters from Prison:
Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, Philemon (The New Clarendon Bible; Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1976), 132.
^'^^ Meaning that Paul is about to writing something (i.e., "the same things") identical to what he has
previously said or wrote. But what are the things "previously said or wrote"? David Garland thinks that they
are things spoken by Paul during his ministry among the Philippians ("The Composition and Unity of
Philippians," 164). Victor Furnish thinks that they are things that Epaphroditus and Timothy will share with
the Philippians when they arrive at Philippi ("The Place and Purpose ofPhilippians III," NTS 10 [1963]: 83).
Ben Witherington thinks that they are things Paul has given them before in some form or fashion {Paul's
Letter to the Philippians, 1 84).
^^'^ J. B. Lightfoot thinks that "the same thing" refers to the topic of dissension that "directly or
indirectly has occupied a very considerable portion of the letter hitherto" {SaintPaul's Epistle to the
Philippians [London: Macmillan, 1913], 126).
Cf 4.2.6.
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In using tiiis plirase, Paul may even have earlier oral teachings in mind, for
repeatedly throughout his career he speaks of the importance ofunity (cf Galatians;
Ephesians; Romans; Philemon) and speaks against the evils of envy and strife (cf l.l)}"^^
Thus, this letter likely is not the first fime Paul speaks to the Philippians about Christ's
sacrificing love and how that love promotes unity and shatters the selfambition that causes
discord. In other words, "the same things" refers to that body of teaching that Paul engages
now as always.
(2) Retiring. Commentators have not understood properly the word OKvripoc The
word is most commonly translated as "troublesome."^^" However, this translafion is poorly
attested in the classical literature. Bockmuehl asserts, "the adjective oKvripoc; denotes that
which causes one to shrink or hesitate, hence troublesome."^^ ^ The conjunction "hence"
hardly makes sense. The most well-attested meaning (and perhaps the only true meaning)
for the adjecfive OKvripog is "shrinking" or "fimid." Evidence abounds in classical literature.
For example, Philo in his biography on Moses says that Pharaoh ordered the destruction of
male children, but chose to leave the females alive, for "woman, by reason of the weakness
ofher nature, is timid toward war" (dia (\)\)oewc, aoQkv^mv OKvripov elg TToAepov) (Philo,
Mos. 1:8). In one of Pericles' speeches, he exhorts the Athenians not to be afraid of the
In his attempt to imderstand how Paul arrives at ethical decisions and how he substantiates and
motivates these decisions, Eckhard J. Schnabel chooses to focus on "a topic ofPaul's exhortation to Gentile
Christians which receives extensive treatment" (emphasis mine; "How Paul Developed His Ethics," in
Understanding Paul's Ethics: Twentieth Century Approaches [ed. Brian S. Rosner; Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Eerdmans, 1995], 269). The topic that Schnabel chose was "the exhortation to overcome envy and strife and
to pursue love and peace" (ibid.). This exhortation according to Schnable is found in Gal 5:13-6:10, Rom 12-
13, 1 Thess 4:9-12, 1 Cor 1-4, 1 Cor 6:1-11, 1 Cor 8-10, Phil 1-2.
Jeffrey T. Reed argues that Phil 3:1 resembles what he calls the "hesitation formula" found in the
Hellenistic letters. Thus, OKvripoq means, according to Reed, "hesitating causing hesitation;" aoi^aXkQ in
correlation means "trustworthy, xmfailing" ("Philippians 3:1 and the Epistolary Hesitation Formulas: The
Literary Integrity ofPhilippians, Again," JBL 115 [1996], 63-90). But the evidences for such hesitation
formula are scarce and unreliable.
Bockmuehl, The Epistle to the Philippians, 352.
293
Spartans, since tiiey cannot possibly leam the art of seamanship: "blocked by a large fleet,
they will remain inactive, their skill will deteriorate through lack ofpractice, and that in
itselfwill make them more timid (oKvripoTepoL)" (Thucydides, Hist. 1.142.9). In the same
work by Thucydides, oKvripoc; is aligned with "afraid," "less spirit in fighting," and the
"lost of all self-confidence" (Thucydides, Hist. 4.55.2). Isocrates, in his letter to Antipater,
associates OKvripoc with the loss of confidence (oukctl GappoijyTeg) (Isocrates, Ep. 4.8).
Aristotle uses OKvripog to describe those who refiise to seek proper honor. He calls these
people small-souled (pLKpoij/uxoc;):
The small-souled man deprives himself of the good things that he deserves; and his
failure to claim good things makes it seem that he has something bad about him. . . .
Not that such persons are considered foolish, but rather retiring (oKvripoL); yet this
estimate of them is thought to make them still worse, for men's ambitions show what
they are worth, and if they hold aloof from noble enterprises and pursuits, and forgo
the good things of life presumably they think they are not worthy of them. (Aristotle,
Eth. nic. 4.3.35)
Paul's high regard for humility may have made others think of him as a timid and small-
souled man, unwilling or incapable of eaming honor for him. Paul rejects such a claim.^^^
Instead, he thinks humility will help strengthen the safety of the Christian community.
Moreover, Paul in Phil 3:2-6 goes on to speak about the issue of boasting. He could have
boasted like any other great-souled man,^^^ but he refused to do so, for such boasting goes
against the sufferings of Christ (Phil 3:10).
(3) Safety. What Paul is about to say is "the same" as what he has been saying
previously, and all is said for the purpose of the safety of the Philippians. Safety plays a
cmcial role in Paul's argument. The word "safety" should be understood in relation to the
How NT transformed the value ofhumility, see Allen Verhey, "Humble," ISBE 2:775-778.
^" Meya/toil/uxLa as a Greco-Roman ideal, see John Procope, "Hochherzigkeit (lieya^oilnjXLa)" RAC 15
(1991): 766-796. This word appears abundantly in the works of Josephus.
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polis imagery framing tiie wliole letter (Phil 1 :27; 3:20). Safety is shorthand for what
Paul has expressed in Phil 1:28: "this is evident of their destruction, but of your salvation
(ocoTTipLac;)." In addition, safety relates to Paul's words later in Phil 3:17-21, namely, the
contrast between the destruction of the enemies and the transformation brought about by
the savior (ocoxfipa) Lord Jesus Christ. Safety, in other words, is another way of expressing
the fall of the enemy, and the salvation of the Christian polis. It is achieved, according to
Paul, through the building of virtue, friendship, and concord. Safety and salvation are the
xeXoc; Paul wants the Philippians to achieve.
Many Greco-Roman authors use ko^aXkc, in a similar way to express the salvation of
the polis Isocrates, for example, in his Panegyricus, advises the Greeks to pursue a
course of action to enable them to dwell in greater security (do4)aA.60tepoy). He elaborates
on this advice and specifies how security can be achieved:
It is not possible for us to cement an enduring peace unless we join together in a war
against the barbarians, nor for the Hellenes to attain to concord until we rest our
material advantages from one and the same source and wage our wars against one
and the same enemy. When these conditions have been realized, and when we have
been freed from the poverty which afflicts our lives�a thing that breaks up
friendships (katpiac;), perverts the affections of kindred into enemy, and plunges the
whole world into war and strife (oxdoeic.)�^then surely we shall enjoy a spirit of
concord (opovorioopey), and the good will (euvoLag) which we shall feel towards each
other will be genuine. (Isocrates, Paneg. 173-74)
Safety can be secured only if the Greeks direct their enmity toward a common foe, against
the Persians rather than against themselves. Diverting their desires toward the alien, they
^^"^ According to Joseph A. Marchal, safety/salvation is one of the major themes in Philippians. This
theme is found in Phil 1:28; 2:12; 3:1, 15, 19-20. Joseph A. Marchal, Hierarchy, Unity, and Imitation: A
Feminist Rhetorical Analysis ofPower Dynamics in Paul 's Letter to the Philippians (SBL Academia Bibhca;
Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2006), 163-64.
2" Geoffrion, The Rhetorical Purpose and the Political andMilitary Character ofPhilippians, 151-52;
Demetrius K Williams, Enemies of the Cross ofChrist: The Terminology ofthe Cross and Conflict in
Philippians (JSNTSup; London: Sheffield Academic, 2002), 149-53. Jeffrey Weima
in a recent article argues
that "peace and security" idpT]vn Kal aa<^dXeia) is a popular theme in the
Roman political propaganda
("'Peace and Security' (1 Thess 5.3): Prophetic Warning
or Political Propaganda?" NTS 58 [2012], 331-59).
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will be able expel strife and war from their own cities, and regain friendship among
themselves, which will then bring them joy derived from concord and goodwill. For
Isocrates, a reoriented desire and a rejuvenated friendship is the way toward concord and
safety.
In his speech On Concord, Isocrates relates safety to the practice ofmoderation,
justice, and virtue (Isocrates, De pace 89-90; cf 18). In his Areopagiticus, a deliberative
speech on "public safety," Isocrates pleads the Athenians to return to democracy and
restore the council ofAreopagus. His strategy involves showing how these institutions
have in the past brought Athens great security and doubtless will bring his contemporaries
the same benefit, if they agree to reinstall these institutions. In his praise of the Areopagus,
he says:
For while this Council maintained its authority, Athens was not rife with law-suits, or
accusations, or tax levies, or poverty, or war; on the contrary, her citizens lived in
accord (fiouxiav) with each other and at peace (elpt^vriv) with one another, enjoying
the good will of the Hellenes and inspiring fear in the barbarians; for they had saved
(o�00)k6t�c) the Hellenes and had punished the barbarians....And so, because of these
things, our forefathers lived in such a degree of security {aa^aXdao) that the houses
and establishments in the country were finer and more costly than those within the
city walls. (Isocrates, ^reop. 51-52)
The moral education supervised by the Council ofAreopagus resulted in safety. Education
helps produce virtuous citizens and clears all kinds of social deviant behaviors. As a result,
citizens and allies are brought together in harmony and peace, inspiring fear in the
barbarians. Moral education and the goods it brings are, in Isocrates' view, the only means
to safety. The safety of a city depends on civil education and civil concord.
Aristotle names "safety of the State" as one ofmajor concerns ofpublic deliberative
speech (Aristotle, Rhet. 1.4.12). This concept is used as an equivalent to the "salvation of
the State" (t) ocjiripLa xfic; TToAecjc;). The Epicureans also speak highly of "safety." It is for
296
them the most important political concept. According to the Epicureans, safety is best
achieved through friendship. As such, they write, "Nothing enhances our security so much
as friendship" (PD 28).
Dio Chrysostom also expresses deep concem for the safety of the city. He regards as
his responsibility providing safety for the commonwealth (Dio Chrysostom, Nicom. 2). In a
speech delivered in Tarsus, he more than once asks his audience to secure {aa^cLlT\) and to
make steadfast (pepaiov)^^^ their concord (Dio Chrysostom, 2 Tars. 17; cf 37). His calls
them to foster virtue and friendship among themselves:
For to vie with the whole world in behalf ofjustice (SiKaLoouyric) and virtue (dpeific;),
and to take the initiative in friendship {^vXlao) and harmony (opovoLag), and in these
respects to surpass and prevail over all others, is the noblest of all victories and the
safest (do(t)aA,�OTdTri) too. (Dio Chrysostom, 2 Tars. 45)
In sum, Paul speaks again and again of the importance of living a cmciform life, but this
kind of life mns contrary to the Greco-Roman ideal of the "great-souled man." To the
outsiders, the Christians look as if they were "timid" people, too weak to pursue honor.
However, for Paul, what seems to be "timid" paradoxically protects the "safety" of the
polis?^'^
4.8.2 Beware of the Dogs
In Phil 3:2, Paul wams the Philippians to "watch out" (pXeTTco) for the dogs, the evil
workers, and those persons who mutilate the flesh.^^^ Paul wants the Philippians to be
Bepaiog as an important political concept see Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric ofReconciliation,
105-08.
^" The words "safe" and "firm" are often used to describe fiiendship.
George Kilpatrick argues that pA.6Tra) in Phil 3:2 means "consider" ("Blepete Philippians 3,2," in In
Memoriam Paul Kahle [Berlin: A Topelmann, 1968], 146-48). His proposal is followed by Caird, Paul's
Letters from Prison, 132-33; Hawthome, Philippians, 124-25. Sydney Park (Submission within the Godhead
and the Church in the Epistle to the Philippians [LNTS; London: T&T Clark, 2007], 48-57) also agrees
with Kilpatrick and ties the "the fimction of the Judaizers" closely with the translation of pA-eireie. However,
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aware of those Christians who insist on the need to observe the Jewish Law. The terms
Paul uses to describe these Christians feature intense irony
In the Jewish tradition, Gentiles often are described as dogs (cf Mark 7:27-28; Matt
7:6; 15:26-27). Here the term is not used for Gentiles but in reverse for those persons who
adhere to the strictures of the Jewish tradition. "Workers" in the Jewish tradition refers to
those persons who do the mission work to promote the law of God. Here no longer are
those persons who promote the law of God are called God's good workers. Instead, they
are called workers of evil. Also, Paul may have used the phrase "workers of evil" as a pun
on the phrase "works of the law,"^^� a phrase emphasizing the distinct characteristics of the
Jewish law such as circumcision, food laws, and Sabbath keeping, regulations that often
function as boundary markers to draw a clear distinction between Jews and Gentiles.
This interpretation is a plausible, for "dog," the previous term, emphasizes the quantitative
difference between Jews and Gentiles. Furthermore, "circumcision" (expressed ironically
as "the mutilation"), the term that comes after, is one of the most important boundary
markers setting Jews apart fi-om Gentiles. In other words, "workers of evil" understood as
ones who promote the "works of the law" cohere well with immediate context.
The third and fmal phrase "the mutilation" (Kaiaionri) is widely acknowledged as
Paul's word-play on the word "circumcision" (irepLToiiri).^^^ Though the word KaTaxopri
this tie is unnecessary. Translating pXltreTe as "watch out" does not necessarily make Judaizers into threats
rather than exemplars. Witherington rightly notes that Phil 3:2 is rhetorical. Bonnie Thurston suggests that
pieTCte be translated as "mind" as in "mind your head" or "mind the step" {Philippians and Philemon [Sacra
Pagina Series; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 2005], 112-13).
Silva, Philippians, 147.
Bockmuehl, The Epistle to the Philippians, 188.
James D. G. Dunn, "The New Perspective on Paul," in The New Perspective on Paul: Collected
Essays (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 2005), 89-1 10.
Silva, Philippians, 146.
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does not appear in tlie Septuagint, its cognate KapaTepvco does occur numerous times. It
always refers to the forbidden pagan rite of slitting the skin (Lev 19:28; 21:5; Deut
14:1).^^^ Again, by replacing circumcision with mutilation, Paul inverts the Jewish honor
into pagan disgrace.
No doubt the words Paul uses to describe his opponents are heavily ironic. Honor in
the Jewish tradition is inverted to dishonor. Gain is portrayed instead as loss. However, the
words may convey more than an ironic inversion of the Jewish honor. They carry also an
implicit criticism against the discord caused by the honor-seeking.
(1) Dogs and other forms ofwild beasts, for example, are often used to describe
people who battle and strive against one another. In Galatians, for example, Paul finds that
missionaries promoting circumcision has disturbed (xapdooa); Gal 1:7; 5:10) the
community and left it in the state of intemal strife.^^"* Paul, wanting to bring this
community back to unity, reminds them ofChrist's commandment which states, "you shall
love your neighbor as yourself (Gal 5:14), and wams them not to "bite and devour one
another" (Gal 5:15; this phrase is followed by the verb pAeireTe).^^^ The image used here is
that ofwild beasts fighting against one another. Hans Betz writes, "comparisons of bad
Reumann, Philippians, 462.
Paul calls those who disturb the church ol dvaoxaTOUvxec;. The term dvaotatoo) is used in Acts for
political revoh (Acts 17:6; 21:38).
A similar phrase is found in Plato's Republic, placed in contrast to friendship: "Let us say to one
who asserts that it profits this man to act unjustly, but does not benefit him to do just things, that he asserts
nothing other than that it profits him [1] to make the multifarious beast sfrong by feasting it,
and also the lion
and the things connected with the lion, [2] to starve the [inner] man and to make
him weak, so that he is
dragged wherever either of the other two leads, and [3] not at all to accustom
one [creature] to another or
make them friends, but rather to allow them to bite andfight and devour one another" (Plato, Resp. 588e3-
589a4).
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conduct with the behavior ofwild animals were a commonplace in the diatribe
literature."^^^
Betz's observation is true. Hesiod, for example, claims, "For the son of Cronus has
ordained this law for men that fishes and beasts and winged fowls should devour one
another, for justice (Slktiv) is not among them; but to mankind he gave justice which
proves by far the best {mXXbv dpLOTT))" (Hesiod, Op. 278). Likewise, Dio Chrysostom
depicts those in strife as wild beasts when he writes, "many treat human beings too as wild
beasts and take pleasure in the conflict waged with those of our own kind" (Dio
Chrysostom, Nicom. 17). Isocrates notes that unlike wild animals, human beings are
reasonable beings. They do not devour one another; instead, they live together in cities. He
writes, "we escaped the life ofwild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities
and made laws and invented arts; and generally speaking, there is no institution devised by
man which the power of speech has not helped us to establish" (Isocrates, Antid 253-255;
cf Paneg. 48; Nic. 5-9).^^^ Colotes the Epicurean makes a similar claim:
Those who have established laws and ordinances and insfituted monarchies and other
governments in towns and cities, have placed human life in great security and repose
(doi^dXeiav Kal r\ov>xioLv) and delivered it from many troubles; and if anyone should
go about to take this away, we should lead the life of savage beasts (eripicov), and
should be everyone ready to eat up one another as we meet. (Plutarch, Adv. Col. 30)
(2) The phrase "evil workers" should be read in contrast to the good work God wants to
accomplish among the Philippians (Phil 1 :6). This good work, as has been argued above,
refers to the work of perfecting the Christian community through the building of virtuous
friendship (4.2.2). "Evil" work stands in opposite to God's "good" work. This contrast
Betz, Galatians, 276.
Plutarch disagrees with Colotes, for he thinks that without the law there will still be doctrines of
philosophers that will help keep people away from "mutually devouring
one another and leading the life of
beasts" (Plutarch, Adv. Col 30).
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suggests that evil workers are those who demolish virtue and friendship and promote
instead discord among the Christian community.
(3) The third phrase "the mutilation" literally means "cut off." This occurrence is
not the only time Paul plays on the word "circumcision." In Gal 5:7, Paul uses the word
"cut in" (ev�Koi|f6v) for both "circumcision" and "prevention": "You were running well;
who prevented (ev6K0\|/ey; 'cut in') you from obeying the truth?" In Gal 5:10, Paul uses the
word "cut off ((x-TTOKoiTKo) as a reference to both "circumcision" and "castrate." Paul
possibly uses "cut off to hint not only at circumcision but also at the act of segregating
members from the body ofChrist, or perhaps cutting off the progressive work God has
started among the Philippians (Phil 1 :25; 3:12-16). In the Greco-Roman tradition, stasis is
always viewed as a disease (vooog) that brings the political body to a halt (cf Plato, Tim.
81e-82b; 85e-86a; 88e-89a; Dio Chrysostom, Mcom. 3, 7, 11-12, 13; Nicaeen. 5). Kostas
Kalimtzis argues convincingly that stasis always carries the meaning of "a stop":
[The] connotation ofbringing or coming to a standstill, or stopping was one of the
meanings of the verb 'lotti|j,i, and its passive intransitive form, 'lotaiaaL, from which
the noun stasis is derived. . ..One might add, simply to accentuate the rootedness of
this aspect ofmeaning, that "a stop
"
continues to be one of the primary meanings of
stasis in the Greek language?^^
In other words, stasis, like a disease ceasing the work of an organism, ceases the work
Cepyov) of the polis. Thus, the accusation against mutilation also carries an implicit
criticism against the stasis (in the sense ofbeing "cut off from progress) brought about
through the honor-seeking "circumcision."
Kalimtzis, Aristotle on Political Enmity andDisease, 17-22.
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In sum, these three concepts (the dogs, the evil workers, and those persons who
mutilate the flesh) convey more than a protest against the Jewish honor boast, and include
also warnings against discord and the dangers of opposing God's good work.
4.8.3 Contending for Honor
In Phil 3:2, Paul wams the Philippians against the dogs, the evil workers and those
who mutilate the flesh. Philippians 3:3 specifies the reason for his waming when Paul
writes, "for (ydp) it is we who are the circumcision, who worship in the Spirit ofGod and
boast in Christ Jesus and have no confidence in the flesh {kv oapKl -rreTOLGoTec;)." The final
phrase is repeated twice again in Phil 3 :4 when Paul writes, "even though I, too, have
reason for confidence in the flesh (-rreTTOLBriOLy kv oapKi). If anyone else has reason to be
confident in the flesh (Tre-rroLGevaL kv oapKi), I have more." Apparently Paul opposes these
people here in Philippians because they seek "confidence in the flesh." Instead ofhonoring
God, they honor themselves.
Honor is a dominant value in the Greco-Roman world. Aristotle calls it the greatest
extemal good that great-souled men are eager to pursue:
The greatest extemal good we should assume to be the thing which we offer to the
gods, and which is most coveted by men ofhigh station, and the prize awarded for
the noblest deeds; and such a thing is honor, for honor is clearly the greatest of
extemal good. The great-souled man is he who has the right disposition in relation to
honors and disgraces. . .since it is honor above all else which great men claim and
deserve. (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 4.3.9-12)
Xenophon goes further than Aristotle and claims the pursuit ofhonor as the definition of
accounted men:
In this, man differs from other animals�I mean, in this craving for honor. But they
in whom is implanted a passion for honor and praise, these are they who differ most
Confidence (TTeCecj) and honor boast (KalJxao^iaL) is used synonymously here as in Psa 48:7 [LXX];
Rom 2:17-20; 2 Cor 1:12-15; 10:7-8.
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from the beasts of the field, these are accounted men and not mere human beings.
(Xenophon, Hier. 7.3)
Centuries later, Cicero expresses the same ideology when he writes, "By nature we yearn
and hunger for honor, and once we have glimpsed, as it were, some part of its radiance,
there is nothing we are not prepared to bear and suffer in order to secure it" (Cicero, Tusc.
2.24.58). So central is the value of honor in the Greco-Roman world that human beings are
defined as honor-pursuing beings; to reject honor is not to be a human being. J. E. Lendon,
in his influential study on Roman honor, confirms the centrality of honor in Greco-Roman
Honor was a filter through which the whole world was viewed, a deep structure of
the Greco-Roman mind, perhaps the ruling metaphor of ancient society. To us value
is a consequence ofprice; the Greeks, needing a word for "price," borrowed xtpri
from the realm of honor. Everything, every person, could be valued in terms ofhonor,
and every group of persons: the honor of the Roman senate, of the equestrian order,
or of a court of law, waxed and waned according to who its members were and their
conduct.
Honor, according to Bruce Malina, is "the value of a person in his or her own eyes (that is,
one's claim to worth) plus that person's value in the eyes of his or her social group. Honor
is a claim to worth along with the social acknowledgement ofworth."^^' Honor can be
either ascribed or acquired.^^^ Ascribed honor is honor that resides in the blood. An
individual is honored by being bom in an honorable family and is dishonored by being
bom in a dishonored family. For this reason, good birth often is mentioned as an extemal
good. Also, for this reason, people in the Greco-Roman world stress the importance of
^� J. E. Lendon, Empire ofHonour: The Art ofGovernment in the Roman World (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997), 73. See also Carlin A. Barton, Roman Honor: The Fire in the Bones (Berkeley:
University ofCalifomia Press, 2001).
Bruce J. Malina, The New Testament World: Insightsfi-om CulturalAnthropology (3rd ed.;
Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 30.
Malina, The New Testament World, 32-33.
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genealogy (Cicero, Inv. 1.24.34-35; Quintilian, Inst. 3.7.10-1 1). Biographies therefore
often begin by expressing the ancestral lineage (Suetonius, Aug. 1-6; Tib. 1-4; Calig. 1;
Claud. 1-2; Plutarch, Ages. 1; Pel. 3; Dion 3-4; Josephus, Life 1-6; Matt 1:2-16; Luke 3:23-
38).^^^ Acquired honor come either through virtuous deeds or through the social game of
Challenge and Riposte.'^^'*
Since honor is one of the greatest goods and often is acquired by challenging others,
it often becomes a cause for strife and sedition^^^ Aristotle notes, "civil strife is caused not
only by inequality of property, but also by inequality of honors" (Aristotle, Pol. 2.1266b).
Similarly, Cicero writes, "for while with the generality ofmen, the greatest bane of
fiiendship is the lust for money, with the most worthy men it is the strife for preferment
and glory, and from this source frequently have sprung the deadliest enmities between the
dearest friends" (Cicero, Amic. 34).
Two of the most well-known events in the ancient Greco-Roman world are known to
have been triggered by the pursuit of honor.^^^ The Iliad revolves around the confiict
between Achilles and Agamemnon in their struggle for honor.^^^ The Peloponnesian War
Hellerman, ReconstructingHonor in Roman Philippi: Carmen Christi as Cursus Pudorum, 46-48.
The quest for Jesus' lineage (Mark 6:3; Matt 13:54-57; Luke 4:22; John 7:40-42) shows also the close
relationship between honor and lineage. Malina, The New Testament World, 32.
^^"^ DeSilva, Honor, Patronage, Kinship & Purity, 28-29; Malina, The New Testament World, 33-36.
Bakke, Concord and Peace, 302-15.
^''^ Both Homer's Iliad and Thucydides' History are well known and well read in the Greco-Roman
world According to Mertens-Pack papyrological database
rhtnT//orometheephilo.ulg.ac be/cedopal/inHexauteuranglais.asp). there are extant today 1797 papyri of
Homer and 105 papyri ofThucydides. (By way of contt-ol, there are 124 papyri ofPlato, 45 papyri of
Aristotle, and 209 papyri ofDemosthenes.)
R Jewett, "Paul, Shame, and Honor," in Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook (ed. J. Paul
Sampley; Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press hitemational, 2003),
553.
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IS basically a series of stories about honor contesting city-states being "offended by hubris,
became consumed with wrath and sought revenge."^^^
The pursuit of honor stands also at the center of the stasis addressed by the speeches
on concord delivered by Dio Chrysostom and Aelius Aristides.
In his speech To the Nicomedians, Dio Chrysostom deals with the discord between
Nicomedia and Nicaea caused by the contention for primacy (Dio Chrysostom, Nicom. 24).
Chrysostom repeatedly questions the Nicomedians regarding the kind ofprimacy for which
they are contending. He scoffs at their contending for the "title" of first. He rebukes them
for being foolish (dvoTixot;) and chasing after vainglory (k6vo6o^6(o) and false glory (66^a
il/euSfic) (Dio Chrysostom, Nicom. 29). He ridicules them for acting like a child "ignorant
ofwhat is truly valuable and in their pleasure over what is of least account, delight in what
is a mere nothing" (Dio Chrysostom, Nicom. 37). In Chrysostom's view, a "title" means
nothing. It does no good: "Your governors hand you titles, and call you 'first' either by
word ofmouth or in writing; that done, they may thenceforth with impunity treat you as
being the very lasf (Dio Chrysostom, Nicom. 38). Chrysostom urges them not to contest
for a "title," but to earn the substance deserving of the "title." He writes, "A person wishes
to be dubbed 'first;' very good. Some one really is first, and no matter if another wears the
fifie, first he is. For tifies are not guarantees of facts, but facts of titles" (Dio Chrysostom,
Nicom. 38).
Aelius Aristides' speech On Concord (Or. 23) is addressed to the assembly of
Pergamum in 167 A.D. Pergamum was at that time in contest with other leading cities of
Asia (notably the cifies of Ephesus and Smyrna) vying for first (Arisfides, De pace 11-12).
J. E. Lendon, Song ofWrath: The Peloponnesian War Begins (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 1-
17.
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Aristides notes tliat vying for first is "the greatest source of strife" (Aristides, De pace 12).
Like Dio Chrysostom, Aristides thinks that vying for first is an act ofmadness, for the
empty title brings nothing but the great evil of discord (Aristides, De pace 40). He argues
instead for fnendship and the sharing of common goods (Aristides, De pace 65-79).
Striving for honor causes stasis. Therefore, Paul wams the Philippians not to contest
against one another for honor, since such action would jeopardize the unity and the safety
of the community. Earlier Paul hinted at the competitive striving among the Philippians in
his mention of the vices of envy and self-ambition (Phil 1:15-17), his reevaluation of gain
as Christ (Phil 1 :21), his rejection of self-ambition and vainglory (Phil 2:3), his depiction
ofChrist as one who refrains from overreaching (Phil 2:5), and finally, in his command to
avoid murmuring and arguing that shows discontent (Phil 2:14).
In confrast to those people who strive for honor, Paul establishes himself as an
example for the Philippians. He claims that in regard to honor he was second to none. He
had the ascribed honor of good birth, "circumcised on the eighth day, a member of the
people of Israel, of the tribe ofBenjamin, a Hebrew bom ofHebrews" (Phil 3:5a).
Furthermore, he had the acquired honor eamed through hard effort, "as to the law (Kaxd
v6\iov), a Pharisee; as to zeal (Kaxd CnXo;), a persecutor of the church; as to righteousness
under the law (Kaxd 6LKaLoouvriy xtiv kv v6|aco) blameless" (Phil 3:5b).^^^ Living as a
member of the Jewish TroALxeta, he adhered closely to its law (the Torah). He was an
honorable public man and had excelled as a virmous citizen. According to the Law, he was
a just man. He had uncontested honor.
All three Kaxa prepositional phrases are related to the Law. "Zeal" is related to the Law inl Mace
2:26, 27, 50, 58; 2 Mace 4:2; Act 21:20; cf. Act 22:3;
Gal 1:14.
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However, he discarded all honors for the salce of Christ. He repeats this claim three
times in Phil 3:7-8:
(1) ['AA,A.d] OLXiva. r\v poL KepSr), Tauxa t^ytipdcl 5i.d tov Xolotov C,r\\iiciv. (Phil 3:7)
(2) kXlk [ievoiJVY^ Kal riYoOpaL iravTa Cruiiav eivai 5id to uirepeYov Tf|c yycjoeojc
XoiOToi) 'Inoou tou Kupiou uoi). (Phil 3:8a)
(3) 5t' ov Ta -rrdyTa eCripicoGriv, Kal fiyoijpaL OKuPaXa, \va XpioTov K�p6r|oa} (Phil
3:8b)
The verb fiyoupaL is used each time. The subject of the verb is all-inclusive. In Phil 3:7, it
is the pronoun ootl; (whichever); In Phil 3:8a and 3:8b, it is the adjective irac;. In all three
instances, "all things" are considered as "loss" (Criptav in Phil 3:7, 3:8a; eCripicoGriv in Phil
3:8b). In all three instances, the act of fiyoupai is done for the sake ofChrist Jesus: Sid tov
XpioTov Cnpiav (Phil 3:7); Sid to UTrepexov Trig yvwoeug XpioTou 'Ir|oou tou Kupiou pou
(Phil 3:8a); 6l' ov (Phil 3:8b). Philippians 3:8b is the fmal climactic verse, because it adds
not only the noun OKUpaXa but also a iva-clause extending all the way to the end ofPhil
3:11.
Instead of vying for honor, Paul wants the Philippians to be like him, to know Christ,
and to become a member of the fellowship ofChrist's suffering. By imitating "the
faithfulness of Christ"^^� Paul obtains a righteousness different from the righteousness
obtained through the Jewish Law. "The righteousness through the faithfulness ofChrist"
echoes Paul's prayers in Phil 1:11: "fruit of righteousness that comes through Jesus Christ."
This righteousness stands against the greed for both gain and honor.^^'
Richard Hays reopened the Pistis Christou Debate in 1983 with the publication ofhis dissertation:
The Faith ofJesus Christ: The Narrative Substructure ofGalatians 3:1-4:11 (2ed.; Biblical Resource Series;
Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans 2002). For bibliography on this debate see Michael F.
Bird and Preston M.
Sprinkle The Faith ofJesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical and Theological Studies (Peabody,
Mass.:
Hendrickson, 2010), 309-30; Matthew C. Easter, "The Pistis Christou Debate: Main Arguments
and
Responses in Summary
" CBR 9 (2010): 33-47.
Te-Li Lau, The Politics ofPeace, 123-24. See also Bakke, Concord andPeace, 150-54.
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4.9 Philippians 3:12-16
4.9.1 Athletic Competition
Until this point, Paul already has spoken of the importance ofmoral knowledge
(4.2.3), moral insight (4.2.3), moral goal (specified as Christ in Phil 3:8, 10), moral choice
(4.3.3), moral reasoning (4.5.2), moral will (4.6.1), moral praxis (4.6.1), and moral
examples (4.7). These elements are necessary for the building of virtues. Now the
individual must act persistently in virtue so that the moral act may become habitual as a
new nature. As Aristotle notes, virtue requires, "First of all, he [the person acting] must
know what he is doing; secondly, he must choose to act the way he does, and choose it for
its own sake; and in the third place, the act must spring from a firm and unchangeable
character" (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1 105a3 1-34). The goal is to have an unchangeable character
that always performs virtuous acts. This goal requires training.
In this passage, Paul invokes the imagery of the athletic competition as a metaphor
for moral progress toward completion.^^^ The concept of leXog (Phil 3:12, 15; cf 3:19)
points to Phil 1:6, in which Paul speaks ofGod complefing (eirLxeXea)) the good work
which he had begun in the Philippians. The teleological structure of classical virtue ethics
V. C. Pfitzner rightly claims that Paul is not "outlining a general picture of the Christian life as an
athletic contest in which advance and progress are to be gained only by the continual struggle against the
flesh" (emphasis mine; Paul and the Agon Motif TraditionalAthletic Imagery in the Pauline Literature
[NovTSup; Leiden,: E. J. Brill, 1967], 139). He however goes too far in setting a dichotomy between spiritual
perfection in Christ and moral perfection (ibid., 142). Pfitzner wrongly sets Phil 3:12-16 in a polemic
framework as Paul's apology for his apostolic authority. Here in Phil 3:12-16, Paul is interested not in the
struggle against flesh, but in the building ofvirtue, i.e., to be like
Christ.
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dominates this passage.^^^ Already in Aristotle an analogy exists between moral progress
and athletic competition:
Virtue in active exercise cannot be inoperative�it will of necessity act, and act well.
And just as at the Olympic games the wreaths of victory are not bestowed upon the
handsomest and strongest persons present, but on men who enter for the
competitions�since it is among these that the winners are found, �so it is those
who act rightly who carry off the prizes and good things of life. (Aristotle, Eth. nic.
1.8.9)
This same analogy is widely adopted by later Greco-Roman philosophers, e.g., Diogenes
of Sinope (DL 6.70), Philo {Husb. 26; cf Alleg. Interp. 2.26; 3.71; Spec. 1.7; Sacr. 4; Migr.
Abr. 6; 2.24; Chang. Nam. 12), Epictetus {Diatr. 1.24.3; 2.17.29-33; 2.18.27-28; 3.15.11;
3.22.51-53, 59; Ench. 29.2, 51), and Dio Chrysostom {Virt. (Or. 8)U-\6, 20; Isthm. 12;
Alex. 30). Evoking the athletic imagery, Greco-Roman philosophers intend to convey the
message that moral progress is difficult. It requires total dedication, perseverance.
Alasdair Maclntyre rightly asserts that ancient moral philosophy always had a teleological view of
human nature. The failure ofmodem moral theory lies in its abandonment of the notion of telos:
[T]he moral scheme which forms the historical background to their [eighteenth-century moral
philosophers] thought had. . .a structure which required three elements: imtutored human nature, man-
as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-te/05 and the moral precepts which enable him to pass from one state
to the other. But the joint effect of the secular rejection of both Protestant and Catholic theology and
the scientific and philosophical rejection ofAristotelianism was to eliminate any notion ofman-as-he-
could-be-if-he-realized-his-/e/o\. Since the whole point of ethics�both as a theoretical and a practical
discipline�is to enable man to pass from his present state to his tme end, the elimination of any
notion of essential human nature and with it the abandonment of any notion of a telos leaves behind a
moral scheme composed of two remaining elements whose relationship becomes quite unclear. There
is on the one hand a certain content for morality: a set of injunctions deprived of their teleological
context. There is on the other hand a certain view of untutored-human-nature-as-it-is. Since the moral
injimctions were originally at home in a scheme in which their purpose was to correct, improve and
educate that human nature, they are clearly not going to be such as could be deduced from true
statements about human nature or justified in some other way by appealing to its characteristics. The
injxmctions ofmorality, thus understood, are likely to be ones that human nature, thus understood, has
sfrong tendencies to disobey. Hence the eighteenth-century moral philosophers engaged in what was
an inevitably unsuccessful project; for they did indeed attempt to find a rational basis for their moral
beliefs in a particular understanding ofhuman nature, while inheriting a set ofmoral injunctions on the
one hand and a conception of human nature on the other which had been expressly designed to be
discrepant with each other. {After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory [3rd ed.; Nofre Dame, Ind.:
University ofNofre Dame Press, 2007], 54-55)
The failure of eighteenth-century moral philosophy, according to Maclntyre, led sadly to the dead-end of
Emotivism. Emotivism is the doctrine that "all moral judgments are nothing but expressions ofpreference,
expressions of attitude or feeling" (ibid., 12). In other words, for Emotivism, "this is good" simply means
"Hurrah for this!" (ibid.).
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endurance, hard training, and the exclusion of desirable pleasures. Also, they remind their
readers of the surpassing reward that is promised to those persons who achieve the end.^^"*
Accordingly, in his progress toward completion, Paul forfeits all things irrelevant to
concentrate exclusively on the goal with the hope that he may obtain the true and utmost
precious reward�the "upward" calling ofGod.
John Chrysostom's Homiliae in epistulam adPhilippenses understands Paul's
pursuit explicitly as a pursuit of virtue. Paul, according to Chrysostom, presents himself as
a runner wanting to apprehend all virtue (ttiv dpexTiv dTOoav) {Horn. Phil. 62.270.46). As a
runner, Paul forgets all things behind, for one "who thinks that all is accomplished, and
that nothing is wanting to him for the perfecting of virtue (dpeifjg), may cease running, as
having apprehended all" {Horn. Phil. 62.271.9). Paul teaches the believers therefore "not
how far we are advanced in virtue, but how much remains for us" {Horn. Phil 62.271.22).
Gregory ofNyssa also thinks that this passage refers to the continual growth in virtue. He
writes, "For that divine Apostle, great and lofty in understanding, ever running the course
of virtue, never ceased straining toward those things that are still to come."^^^
Paul's desired goal is resurrection, the complete conformity to Christ. To be virtuous
is to be like Christ. However, to obtain the resurrection, the individual first must share the
sufferings ofChrist and become like him in his death (Phil 3:10). Thus, the pursuit of
Athletic imagery is found often in the NT: "Athletic images conjure up a number of stimulating
associations, including rigorous training or exercise (1 Cor 9:25; 1 Tim 4:7-8), singleness ofpurpose (1 Cor
9:26), delayed gratification (1 Cor 9:25), streamlining for maximum performance (Heb 12:1), self-control (1
Cor 9:27), perseverance (Heb 12:2) and endurance (1 Tim 4:8). Athletic endeavor also involves intense
competition with lofty objectives (1 Cor 9:24) and high stakes (Eph 6:12), and it requires faithfiil adherence
to a prescribed set ofmles to avoid disqualification (2 Tim 2:5; 1 Cor 9:27). In spite of all the hard work, the
end result is transitory fame. But for the Christian the crown to be won is imperishable (1 Tim 4:8; 1 Cor
9:25)" (Leland Ryken et al., Dictionary ofBiblical Imagery [Downers Grove, 111.: InterVarsity, 1998], 54
["Athletics"]).
Gregory ofNyssa: The Life ofMoses, trans. Abraham J. Malherbe and Everett Ferguson (Spiritual
Collins Spiritiial Classics; San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2006), 4.
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resurrection turns out to be a pursuit of Christ suffering. Accordingly, Susan Eastman
claims, "the 'upward call ofGod in Christ Jesus' looks suspiciously like a call to ascend
the cross."^^^
This pursuit ofhumility and ofChrist's suffering is the "one" (etc) thing Paul has in
mind (Phil 3:13b). The purity of the heart is to will one thing (Kierkegaard). Paul
repeatedly emphasizes this point in Philippians. In Phil 1 :27, Paul says, '"Only live your life
in a manner worthy of the gospel of Christ." In Phil 2:2, Paul says, "think one thing." In
Phil 3:8, Paul says, "I have suffered the loss of all things and I regard them as rubbish, in
order that I may gain Christ." Repeatedly, Paul makes life in conformity to Christ the
singlefocus of the Christian life. To be a human, i.e., to achieve human excellence
(=virtue), is to be like Christ (cf Eph 4:13).^^^
Again, in Phil 3:15 as in Phil 2:1-1 1, Paul insist on the virtue ofhumility as the basis
of the unity of the Christian community. Mature persons^^^ should come together and think
of this "one" thing:
What he is therefore calling them to is to live in conformity to the gospel as that has
been spelled out repeatedly in their hearing, and as it has now been repeated in the
Christ narrative in 2:6-1 1 and in his own that has just preceded (vv. 4-14). What he
and they have already "attained" is an understanding of the gospel in which the life
of the Crucified One is the paradigm for those who would be his followers.^^^
Susan Eastman, "Imitating Christ Imitating Us: Paul's Educational Project in Philippians," in The
Word Leaps the Gap: Essays on Scripture and Theology in Honor ofRichard B. Hays (ed. J. Ross Wagner,
Christopher Kavin Rowe, and A. Katherine Grieb; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2008), 437.
Early Christians viewed perfection (cf Matt 5:48; 2 Cor 7:1) and holiness (4.2.4) as the
eudaimonia or the summum bonum of the Christian life. Robert Louis Wilken, The Spirit ofEarly Christian
Thought: Seeking the Face ofGod (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 272-79.
L. L. Welbom writes that xeletoi; is "found in Plato's Laws and elsewhere as a description of the
'perfect' citizen" {Politics and Rhetoric in the Corinthian Epistles, 34-35).
hi other words, it can be used as a
political term. Here, Paul may be referring to those who think they
deserve greater honor and gain in the
Christianpolis. See'also Te-Li Lau, The Politics ofPeace, 104-5.
Fee, Paul's Letter to the Philippians, 361 .
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Philippians 2:12-18 reveals the dual aspect of the work ofGod. While God enables,
Christians are responsible for actualizing and accomplishing that which has been endowed
and envisioned. The same duality also is found here in Phil 3:12-16, which features a sense
of passivity, ofbeing perfected and being laid hold by Christ; and a sense of activeness, of
obtaining and ofpursuing toward the goal.
4.10 Philippians 3:17-4:3
The propositio ofPhilippians states that the salvation of the Christian polis depends
on friendship (Phil 1:27; 4.4.3-4.4.7). In tum, friendship depends on a way of living that is
"worthy of the gospel ofChrist" (Phil 1:27; 4.4.1-4.4.2). This thesis statement is elaborated
in Phil 2:1-11, where concord and friendship emerges from the virtue ofhumility, with
"practical wisdom" {^p6vr\o\.Q) oriented to the advantage of others at its core (4.5). This
concord sustaining virtue needs not only the practice of the mind but also the practice of
action (Phil 2:12-18; 4.6.1). Paul then exemplifies this virtue-based fiiendship through his
fiiendship with Timothy (Phil 2:19-24; 4.7.1) and his friendship with Epaphroditus (Phil
2:25-30; 4.7.2). He also gives negative examples of vices working against concord (4.8).
Here in Phil 3:17-4:3, Paul summarizes his previous writings in Philippians. This
passage can be subdivided into two subunits: Phil 3:17-21 (4.10.1) and Phil 4:1-3 (4.10.2).
4.10.1 Imitafion: Enemy or Citizen?
In Phil 3:17-21, Paul wants the Philippians "to become" (yLveoGe) imitators of him
and "to observe" (okott�lt�) those living according to the examples ofPaul and his
companions. These two imperafive verbs are the two main verbs of this passage (Phil 3:17-
21). Philippians 3:18-19 and Phil 3:20-21 are both subordinated to Phil 3:17 through the
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particle ydp. These two subordinate passages provide reasons for the importance of
imitating Paul and those who follow his example?^"
Imitating Paul is important because there are people who live their lives as enemies
of the cross. If one were to follow their example, the result would be destructive. On the
other hand, imitating Paul and living as a virtuous citizen of the heavenly -noXixda brings
about salvation from the savior Lord Jesus Christ.'^^'
This synkrisis between enemy and citizenship, earth and heaven, shame and glory,
self (belly) and God, destruction and salvation, becomes the warrant for the command to
imitation.'^^^ A person either chooses to be an enemy of the cross and die or to be a citizen
of the heavenly TroA-LTeia and live.'^^^
Commenting on the yap in Phil 3:20, Bockmuehl writes, "The link is at once contrastive and
explanatory. The word order makes it clear that the stress is on our commonwealth, as distinct from that of
the 'many' whose loyalties are to their own appetites and to earthly ambitions. The use ofgar at the same
time indicates a logical cormection, offering the reason both for the call to imitate Paul (w. 15-17, preceding
the parenthetical w. 18-19) and for the fact that those who serve earthly appetites and ambitions find
themselves on the road to ruin" {The Episde to the Philippians, 233).
A similar Two Way teaching is found in Eph 4:17-5:21 followed by a series of imperatives. Cf
Julien Smith, Christ the Ideal King: Cultural Context, Rhetorical Strategy, and the Power ofDivine
Monarchy in Ephesians (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament. 2. Reihe; Tubingen:
Mohr Siebeck, 201 1), 221-42.
Christopher Forbes writes, "The comparison of alternatives was an important aspect of deliberative
speeches, as the comparative benefits of differing policies had to be evaluated" ("Paul and Rhetorical
Comparison," in Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook [ed. J. Paul Sampley; Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity
Press Intemational, 2003], 150).
Heavenly /7o//5 as the ideal polis is not unfound in the Greco-Roman literary tradition. Plato writes
on this theme:
He said "you mean the city whose establishment we have described, the city whose home is in the
ideal; for I think that it can be found nowhere on earth." "Well," said I, "Perhaps there is a partem of it
laid up in heaven for him who wishes to contemplate it and so beholding to constimte himself its
citizen...." (Plato, Resp. 592b).
Similarly, Cicero writes, "if you will only look on high and contemplate this eternal home and resting place,
you will no longer attend to the gossip of the vulgar herd or put your trust in human rewards for your exploits"
(Cicero, Resp. 6.23.25); Aristides, Depace 76 [divine govemment which falls to us]. Also, citizens are often
asked to gaze upon the city and to care for the city. Josephus writes, "gaze at the beauty ofwhat you are
befraying: what a city! What a Temple!" (Josephus, J. W. 4.416). This is similar to Thucydides' call to "fix
your gaze upon the power ofAthens and
become lovers ofher" (Thucydides, Hist. 2.43.1).
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4.10.2 Euodia and Syntyche
Finally in Phil 4:1, from the choice between life and death (Phil 3:17-21), Paul draws
the following conclusion, "Therefore, my brothers and sisters, whom I love and long for,
my joy and crown, stand firm in the Lord in this way, my beloved." This sentence is filled
with intimate and affectionate language.'^^'* Paul calls the Philippians his brother, his
beloved, his longed-for-ones, his joy, his crown, and again his beloved. Clearly, Paul wants
to establish goodwill between him and the Philippians. He intends to draw himselfnear to
the Philippians so they may embrace his advice with greater ease. Based on their intimate
relationship, Paul urges the Philippians to become citizens standing firm against their
enemies.
With the strong inferential particle drawing conclusions (woie) and the strong
emotional language appealing to pathos, it seems that "in [Phil] 4:1 we have reached a
climactic point in Paul's argument."^^^ However, as the propositio indicates, "standing
firm" needs to meet certain requirements. As such, an individual must "stand firm in one
spirit, striving side by side with one soul" (Phil 1:27). In other words, standing firm
requires fiiendship. Thus, Paul's appeal to "stand firm" naturally leads next to the quest for
fiiendship in Phil 4:2-3.
The flow of logic may be summarized as follows: In Phil 3:17-21, Paul summarizes
the whole letter as two ways of life, namely either imitating Paul and thereby obtaining
salvation or imitating enemies of the cross and thereby meeting destruction. This
dichotomy then leads to the warm and intimate appeal to "stand firm" as citizens against
Geoffrion, The Rhetorical Purpose and the Political andMilitary Character ofPhilippians, 204-06.
Garland, "The Composition and Unity ofPhilippians," 162.
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enemies. Finally, Paul concludes the repetitio by requesting the Philippians to stand firm in
virtuous friendship.
3:17 Join in imitating me
3:18-19 For many live as \ 3:20-21 For our citizenship is
enemies ofthe cross ofChrist \ / in heaven, and it is from there\ / that we are expecting a Savior
4:1 Stand firm
in the Lord
\' i/-
4:2-3 I urge Euodia
and I urge Syntyche
to be of the same mind
The importance ofPhil 4:2-3 is signaled not only by the logical flow, but also by (1)
the repeated use ofthe verb -irapaKaA-eo). Paul usually uses this verb to introduce the major
thesis of his deliberative writings (1 Cor 1:10; Eph 4:1; Phlm 9, 10; cf Rom 12:1).
(2) In addition, the appeal "to think the same" is also significant, for the same appeal
is found in both the propositio (Phil 1:27-30) and the introduction to the Christ hymn (Phil
2:1-5), the two most significant passages in Philippians. In both instances the need to be at
one and the same follows the particle lvoc and expresses either purpose or explication. In
Phil 1 :27-30, the urge to live worthy of the gospel of Christ isfor the purpose o/"standing
firm in one spirit, striving side by side with one soul." In Phil 2:1-5, the urge to complete
Paul's joy is specified as "to be of same mind, having the same love, same-souX, and of one
mind." In other words, the importance of oneness and sameness is highlighted
grammatically by being part of the Iva clause attached to the main verb.
(3) Moreover, the appearance of the verbs oxriKeTe and ouvaGA-ea) (along with
�i)aYYe;iLOv) first in the propositio and then here in Phil 4:1 and Phil 4:3 highlights the
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importance of this passage, since these verses are the only places where these verbs appear
in Philippians.
(4) Finally, throughout Philippians Paul gives examples of how friends should work
together with one another. There is the example between Jesus and God (4.5.5-7), the
example between Paul and Timothy (4.7.1), and the example between Paul and
Epaphroditus (4.7.2). These examples are presented in pairs and are meant to become the
model for Euodia and Syntyche.
4.11 Philippians 4:4-9
As part ofthe peroratio, Phil 4:4-9 serves two different functions, namely to refresh
the memory (4.11.1) and to influence the emotions (4.11.2).
4.11.1 Refresh the Memory
Unlike the previous section (Phil 3:17-4:3), in which Paul reminds the Philippians of
his purpose ofwriting this letter in an explicit manner ("1 exhort. . ."), Phil 4:4-9 alludes to
the major themes of this letter in a rather general and implicit manner.
The passage alludes to many of the major themes of this letter, including: (1) the
need to rejoice. The command to rejoice is emphatic and qualified by the local (in Christ)
and a time reference (always). "In Christ" is again a reminder of the unity of the Christian
community; (2) the coming of the Lord. This again reminds the Christian community of
their need to be worked through by God and to progress toward that goal ofbecoming a
frill and mature community (Phil 1:6) involving fiilly mattired cifizens (Phil 3:20-21); (3)
the importance ofthe mind and heart. Everything begins with the heart. It is important to
discipline the heart and to develop habits of the heart that would foster fiiendship, concord,
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and peace; (4) the importance ofpursuing the praiseworthy. The list of goods in Phil 4:8
serves also as a reminder. For some of the goods have already been mentioned earlier in
the letter, for example: just (Phil 1:11) and pure (Phil 1:10; 2:15). The list ends with a
climax on virtue and things that are praiseworthy. Virtue is one of the major themes of this
letter. Things worthy of praise is a reminder that whatever is done should be done for the
praise of God (Phil 1:11); (5) the need for imitation. Paul's request in Phil 4:9 refers back
the various moral examples articulated in the letter. Leaming, hearing, and seeing are the
knowledge and experience that Paul prays for earlier in Phil 1:9 (cf Phil 1:30). Virtue
requires knowledge and imitation; (6) the need for practice. Virtue is not only is
disposition but an act. It is not enough to "think about these things" (Phil 4:8); It is much
more important to "do these things" (Phil 4:9). And it is God who will enable Christians
not only to will but to work the good (Phil 2:13); (7) the peace ofGod or the God of peace.
Twice Paul mentions God as the source of peace (Phil 4:7, 9). And, indeed, it is God at
work in the Christian community (Phil 1:6; 2:13; cf 3:21). His aim is to produce peace in
the community.
4. 1 1 .2 Influence the Emotions
However, this passage serves more than a reminder. A greater purpose is to influence
the emotions.^^^ This aim is achieved by the use of various different rhetorical devices.
This passage is packed with rhetorical devices and is the most rhetorical passage in
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Philippians.
One ofthe major functions oftheperoratio is to stir the emotions (Aristotle, Rhet. 3.19; [Rhet.
Alex.] 34; Cicero, Inv. 1.52.98-1.56.109).
This claim is noted by Jeffrey Weima: "[Philippians] 4:8-9 makes use of several figures of speech
(anaphora, asyndeton, polysyndeton and homoioteleuton) in a rather rhetorical fashion, thereby setting
this
closing material somewhat apart from the preceding text as well as giving it a certain emphasis" {Neglected
Endings: The Significance ofthe Pauline Letter Closings [Sheffield, England:
JSOT Press, 1994], 192).
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'*
Xaipexe kv Kupico iravTOte" vaXiv epu, xatpexe.
TO �iTipi.k-prjL)[a(ov yvdioQmix) TTaatv dv9pc6iTOL(;.
6 Kupiog kyyvQ.
\ir\6kv peptpvaxe, dXX' kv vavzi xfj Trpooeuxtj Kal xfj Serioei pexd euxapLoxia;
xd aLxrifLry.TrY upcjv yv(i)piCkoQ(ji irpoc xov Beov.
^ Kal Ti eloriyn xou 960u f) uuepexouoa iravxa voOv (t)poupf|06L
xdc Kapfiiac uucou' Kal xd voriuaxa uucSv ei^ Xpioxcp 'Ir|oou.
* To XoLTOV, d6eA.4)OL, ooa eoxlv dlriGfj, boa o�pvd, ooa SiKata, ooa
dyvd, ooa iTpoa4)LXf|, ooa 6U(j)ripa, et tlc dpexf) Kal ei iiq eiraLVOc;, xauxa
koyiC^oQe-
^ d Kal �pd9exe Kal -iTapeA,dp�xe Kal fiKouoaxe Kal e'lSexe kv epoi, xauxa
npdggexe-
Kal 6 Geoc xfic eiprivric eoxat
ueQ' uucov.
(1) Tiie text is higlily structured. Pliil 4:4 stands in parallel with 4:6a [imperative verb + ev
prepositional phrase + trav-word]; Phil 4:5a with 4:6b [noun phrase + gen. pronoun +
passive imperative verb + recipient]; Phil 4:7 with 4:9b [peace ofGod/God of peace +
future verb + 2 person pronoun]; Phil 4:8 with 4:9 [both end with the demonstrative
pronoun xauxa + imperative verb].
(2) The passage begins with song of deliverance, in resemblance to OT scriptures such as
Isa 44:23; Zeph 3:14; Zech 9:9.^^^
(3) Philippians 4:4 is rhythmic: xocipexe (3 [syllables]), ev Kupicp (4), rrdvxoxe (3), rrdliv
epco (4), xatpexe (3).
(4) Philippians 4:4 uses epanadiplosis, beginning and ending with the same word.^^^
(5) The inclusive "all" is repeatedly used: rejoice in the Lord "always" (rrdvxoxe); Let your
gentleness be known to "everyone" (rrdoLv); Do not worry about "anything" {\ir\6kv) but
in "everything" (rravxl) let your request be made know to God; the peace of God
surpasses "all" (rrdvxa) understanding.
E. W. Bullinger, Figures ofSpeech Used in the Bible (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1898), 924.
^" Bullinger, Figures ofSpeech Used in the Bible, 245.
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(6) The phrase "the lord is near" (Phil 4:5b) is an example of sentential in elausula.^��
(7) Philippians 4:6 includes an antithesis and a hendiadys (tfi irpooeuxti Kal ifi b^r\o^i),
which is fiirther reinforced by the phrase jiexd euxapLOXiac.
(8) There is a play on word order in Phil 4:7 and 4:9. In Phil 4:7, Paul writes f) elprivr) xou
Geou ("peace ofGod"); whereas in Phil 4:9, he makes the genitive the noun and the
noun the genitive: 6 Geoc xfic elprivric ("the God ofpeace"). The main effect is
clevemess.^*^'
(9) Philippians 4:8 uses anaphora.^"^ The adjectives/nouns in sequence ends either with a
orr).
(10) Philippians 4:9 uses polysyndeton and synonymia.^�^
(11) This passage has no dependent clauses introduced by subordinators, participles, or
infinitives. The sentences in this passage are simpler in structure and easier to
comprehend. They, therefore, have a more direct appeal to the individuals.
(12) This passage has the highest density of imperafive verbs. There are a total of seven
imperative verbs in these six verses.^^"*
Jean-Baptiste Edart, L'epitre Aux Philippiens: Rhetorique Et Composition Stylistique (Etudes
Bibliques, Nouvelle Serie; Paris: Gabalda, 2002), 281, 343.
Hal Womack Dixon, "Functions ofWordplay in Paul's Letters to the Philippians" (Ph.D. Thesis,
The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2000), 153-54.
Bullinger, Figures ofSpeech Used in the Bible, 205.
Bullinger writes, "The repetition ofwords similar in sense, but different in sound and origin."
Bullinger, Figures ofSpeech Used in the Bible, 324.
Casey W. Davis writes, "The grouping of imperatives in Philippians may provide insight into the
rhetorical structure and give some indication conceming the integrity of the letter. The first imperative occurs
in 1 :27. Others occur at a scattered but increasing rate throughout the next two chapters until there is a
bombardment in 4:1-9. Thispattern is exactly what might be expected in deliberative oratory, where the
speaker is increasingly seeking to compel the audience to carry out a specified
action" (emphasis mine;
"Oral Biblical Criticism: Raw Data in Philippians," in Linguistics and the New Testament: CriticalJunctures
[ed Stanley E Porter and D. A. Carson; Sheffield, England:
Sheffield Academic Press, 1999], 114).
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In sum, this passage, with its fabulous rhetoric, intends to stir up the emotions, so
recipients may be moved to accept Paul's advice and act according to his advice. Paul
wants to draw the Philippians to a virtuous life with minds set upon virtue and things that
are praiseworthy. He also wants them to rejoice together in the Lord as friends will do.
Finally, he envisions a community that embraces a God as the source of peace. He wants
the Philippians to embrace this God and live in peace. The climax of this section is found
in the fmal phrase: "and the God of peace will be with you." Fee rightly notes that the
phrase "God of peace. . .in every instance. . . occurs in contexts where there is strife or
unrest close at hand."^�^ Closing this passage with this climactic peace wish, Paul wants to
motivate the church to come together in virtuous friendship and find themselves at rest in
the peace of the God of peace.
4.12 Philippians 4:10-20
With the adfectus (Phil 4:4-9), stirring up the emotions, ending with the climactic
exclamation: "the God of peace will be with you," Paul's deliberative speech comes to its
end. However, Paul does not end his letter on Phil 4:9. He chose instead to add an
additional passage to his deliberative discourse. This added passage is a short treatise on
friendship (Phil 4:10-20), dealing specifically with the issue of giving and receiving which
is undeniably one ofthe most important aspects of friendship. Paul wants the Philippians to
Fee, Paul's Letter to the Philippians, 420.
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leam that tme friendship is not based on the giving and receiving ofmaterial goods,^�^ but
on their relationship with God.^�^
This passage can be subdivided into two sections: Phil 4:10-14 (4,12.1) and Phil
4:15-20 (4.12.2). These two sections have a similar stmcture.^�^ Each section can be
subdivided into three subunits.
Philippians 4:10-14
^�But I rejoiced in tlie Lord greatly, that (otl)
now at last you have revived your concern for
me; indeed, you were concerned before, but
you lacked opportunity.
"
Not that (oi)x otl) I speak from lack
(uoTeprjOLv), for I have learned to be self-
sufficient in whatever circumstances I am. I
know how to get along with humble means,
and I also know how to live in prosperity; in any
and every circumstance I have learned the
secret of being filled and going hungry, both of
having abundance and suffering lack
(uoTepeloOaL).
I can do all things through Him who
strengthens me. Nevertheless, you have done
well to share with me (ouyKOLvcovrioaL'TeQ) in my
affliction.
Philippians 4:15-20
" You yourselves also know, Philippians, that
(otl) at the first preaching of the gospel, after I
left IVIacedonia, no church shared with
(koLvcoL'TioeL') me in the matter of giving and
receiving but you alone; for even in
Thessalonica you sent a gift more than once for
my needs.
Not that (oux oxl) I seek (eiTLCriTco) the gift,
but I seek (eiTL^riTcol for the profit which
increases to vour account. But I have
received everything in full and have an
abundance; I am amply supplied, having
received from Epaphroditus what you have
sent, a fragrant aroma, an acceptable sacrifice,
well-pleasing to God.
And mv God will supply all your needs
according to His riches in glory in Christ Jesus.
Paul does not deny that fnendship involves gift-giving. However, it is not gift-giving that creates
friendship; but friendship that creates gift-giving.
Peterman rightly notes that "[T]he purpose ofPhilippians 4.10-20 is not simply to offer a personal
response to financial support, but rather to offer instruction on the place of such sharing in the life of the
Chrisfian community" {Paul's Giftfrom Philippi, 158).
Pace Peterlin. Peterlin {Paul 's Letter to the Philippians in the Light ofDisunity in the Church
[NovTSup; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995]) argues that the "imease" (209) and the "nervous anxiety" (212) and the
anticipation of "fierce criticism" (214) reveals that Paul is at conflict with the church. Thus, he argues, the
passage cannot be read as a teaching for the church. But Peterlin contradicts himself in saying that "Paul
maintains his irenicism and the mildness of attitude toward the readers" (215). Moreover, Peterlin's depiction
seems to be at odd with Paul's "great rejoice" (Phil 4:10).
Noted also by O'Brien, The Epistle to the Philippians, 536-37; Wolfgang Schenk, Die
Philipperbriefe Des Paulus (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1984), 44-46.
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(1) The first subunit describes the relationship between Paul and the Philippians.
Both start with a short sentence followed by a oil clause. The relationship described is
unilateral: "you have revived your concem for me" (Phil 4:10a); "you were concemed [of
me] before" (Phil 4:10b); "[you] shared with me in the matter of giving and receiving"
(Phil 4:15); "you sent a gift more than once for my needs" (Phil 4:16). In each instance, the
Philippians are depicted as the active givers and Paul as the passive receiver.
(2) The second subunit is Paul's disclaimer. The disclaimers begin with short
sentences, headed by the phrase oux otl. The particle otl echoes the otl of the first subunit.
The short sentences are followed by explanatory clauses that intends to convey tmths about
Paul, who writes, "for I have leamed to be content in whatever circumstances I am" (Phil
4:1 lb) and "but I seek for the profit which increases to your account" (Phil 4:17b). Paul
then elaborates on both statements. Philippians 4:12 enumerates the different
circumstances in which Paul has leamed to be content. Philippians 4:18 describes the gift
from the Philippians as a sacrifice to God that will increase their account.
(3) The third subunit describes the role of God in the relationship between Paul and
the Philippians. God is the God who strengthens Paul to do all things (Phil 4: 13). Also, he
is the God who will satisfy the needs of the Philippians (Phil 4:19).
The fimction and meaning of these two passages (Phil 4:10-14 and Phil 4:15-20)
have been debated by scholars.^�^ This thesis will argue that Paul intends to teach in these
passages how one should live as a member of a friendship community, and especially how
Ken L. Berry, "The Function ofFriendship Language in Philippians 4:10-20," in Friendship,
Flattery and Frankness ofSpeech (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 107-24; Douglas Ezell, "The Sufficiency
of
Christ: Philippians 4," RevExp 11 (1980), 373-81; Abraham J. Malherbe, "Paul's Self-Sufficiency
(Philippians 4:1 1)," in Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness ofSpeech (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1996), 125-39;
Peterlin, Paul 's Letter to the Philippians in the Light ofDisunity in the Church, 206- 1 6; Peterman, Paul 's
Giftfrom Philippi, 121-61.
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one should react to the activity of giving and receiving prevalent in a friendship
relationship.
4.12.1 Friendship, Self-Sufficiency, and God
In the first subunit, Phil 4:10-14, various themes and concepts relate to fiiendship.
First, the concept ofjoy is the emotion that characterizes friendship (4.2.6). Second, the
concept of being "in Christ" serves as the foundation for the Christian friendship (4.2.1; cf
Phil 2:1; 4:2). Third, the concept of "practical wisdom," to which Paul repeatedly appeals,
establishes friendship and concord among the Christian community. Fourth, the metaphor
of "blooming" is used by Greco-Roman authors to describe friendship.^^^ Finally, the gift
characterized as "sharing (ouyKOLVcovrioocvTec;) Paul's distress" echoes the concept of
KOLVQVLa found earlier in Phil 3:10 ("the fellowship ofChrist's suffering"). Fellowship is a
concept closely related to friendship (4.2.1).'^"
Through these concepts Paul characterizes his relationship with the Philippians as a
friendship relationship. The sharing ofjoy, the participation in Christ, the care for one
another, and the fellowship of suffering are all signs of fiiendship showing close intimacy
between Paul and the Philippians.
These concepts, however, relate not only to friendship, but also to the act ofgift-
giving enacted by the Philippians. The Philippians' "revived concem" for Paul is
^'^ Malherbe cites examples from Cicero, Amic. 3l;Off. 1.15.48. See Malherbe, "Paul's Self-
Sufficiency (Philippians 4:11)," 130-31.
Jeffrey Weima affirms that Phil 4:10-20 as intimately related to the letter as a whole: "The closing
joy expression (4:10-20) echoes at least five important themes of the letter: joy, fellowship,
a correct mental
attitude, suffering, and humility....the cumulafive effect of the many links that can be discovered between
the
letter closing and the rest ofthe letter is significant and amply supports the conclusion that Phil 4:8-23 is no
incidental appendix but is intimately related to the letter as a whole. The letter closing ofPhilippians,
therefore, provides fiirther evidence of Paul's practice of constracting the final epistolary sections of his
letters in such a way that they echo the major themes and issues of their respective letters" (Neglected
Endings, 199-200). Weima unfortunately neglects the
theme of fiiendship.
323
demonstrated by their gift giving. Paul's "rejoicing in the Lord" is triggered by the gifts
fi"om the Philippians. The phrase "sharing in his distress" is used to interpret the act ofgift-
giving. Thus, in Phil 4:10-14, Paul describes a close friendship between him and the
Philippians that is exemplified by the act of gift-giving. To help a friend in his or her
distress is one ofthe important obligations of friendship in the ancient society. False
fiiends are those who refiise to provide help in times ofneed.^'^
Paul is pleased with their gift (Phil 1:14).^'^ However, he wants to avoid
misunderstandings. He wants the Philippians to know that while he teaches the need to
sacrifice the self for the interest of others and while he expresses his gratimde for gifts
received, he is not pleading for gifts, for he has leamed to be self-sufficient.
Self-sufficiency is one of the most celebrated moral virtues in the Greco-Roman
world.^'"* Plato, for example, claims that the good man has in himself all the resources for
a good life (autctpKric; -rrpoQ to �U Cf\v; Plato, Resp. 387D). Aristotle agrees with Plato and
argues for self-sufficiency as an indispensable component of happiness (Aristotle, Eth. nic.
1.1.7; cf. Rhet. 1.5.3). Plutarch, like Paul, claims that self-sufficiency enables a person to
endure all circumstances:
^'^ David Konstan, "Reciprocity and Friendship," in Reciprocity in Ancient Greece (ed. Christopher
Gill, Norman Postlethwaite, and Richard Seaford; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 279-301.
This passage has been labeled as "Danklosen Dank." Ernst Lohmeyer, Der Briefan Die Philipper
(14. Aufl. ed.; Kritisch-Exegetischer Kommentar Uber Das Neue Testament. Abt. 9; Gottingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974), 178-83; Joachim Gnilka, Der Philipperbrief Auslegung (4. Aufl. ed.;
HTKNT; Freiburg: Herder, 1980), 173. Gerald W. Peterman vmtes, "The absence ofeuxapLOxelv cannot be
used to argue that Paul censures the Philippians for sending their gift. Form [the] non-literary sources it is
clear that Paul's response to the Philippians' gift is in keeping with the thankless thanks practiced in the first
century Greco-Roman World" ("'Thankless Thanks': The Epistolary Social Convention in Philippians 4:10-
20," TynBul 42 [1991]: 270). This thesis, however, agrees with the David Briones that the "Danklosen Dank"
is intentional rather than conventional. See David Briones, "Paul's Intentional 'Thankless Thanks' in
Philippians 4.10-20," JSNT1,A (201 1): 47-69.
Self-sufficiency is not a unique feature of stoicism. It is lauded by all Greco-Roman ethicists.
Ferguson, Moral Values in the Ancient World, 133-58; Martin Hengel, Property
and Riches in the Early
Church: Aspects ofa Social History ofEarly Christianity (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974), 54-59; Malherbe,
Moral Exhortation, 112-14, 120, 145.
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You will be self-sufficient if you leam what is the honorable and good. You will live
luxuriously amid poverty and be like a king, and you will love the unencumbered life
of a private citizen not less than that ofmilitary or civic office. You will not live
unpleasantly if you become a philosopher, but will leam how to live pleasantly
anjrwhere and from any resources. Riches will gladden you, in that you can benefit
many people; poverty will gladden you, in that you can be without anxiety about
many cares; and reputation will gladden you in that you are honored, and obscurity,
in that you are unenvied. (Plutarch, Virt. vit. lOld, e)
Self-sufficiency is the ability to live with little or no needs?^^ Xenophon, for example says
of Socrates, "he had leamed to moderate his needs (to iieTpLQv SetoGai) to such an extent
that although he possessed very few things, he was very easily able to suffice (apKoOvxa)
on them" (Xenophon, Mem. 1.2.1).^^^ Similarly, Diogenes interprets self-sufficiency as the
moderafion of needs (DL 6.104; cf 2.5.1). Epicurus likewise relates self-sufficiency to the
moderation of needs:
Self-sufficiency too we consider a great good, not so as in all cases to use little, but
that, whenever we do not possess many things, we may enjoy the few {bkiyoiQ), tmly
persuaded that they have the sweetest enjoyment of luxury who stand least in need of
it (ol i^KLOxa tauxric; Seopevoi)... Becoming accustomed to a simple and inexpensive
(dirXatc; Kal ou i[oXm^Xko\.) diet provides health and renders a man fearless in the
face of necessary needs of life. (DL 10.130-131)
Similarly, Paul interprets self-sufficiency as satisfaction with the basic needs of food and
clothing (1 Tim 6:6-8). In contrast to self-sufficiency is the desire for money ((jji^lapyupia;
1 Tim 6:10).
^'^ This is the conclusion reached by William J. Asbell, Jr, "Aytapkeia: Self-Sufficiency from
Parmenides to Boethius" (Ph.D. Thesis, Vanderbilt University, 1996). He writes, "[T]he majority of scholars
define auxapKeia as freedom, independence, or autonomy. None of these terms adequately represents the
meaning of aurarkeia in antiquity.... Scholars who equate self-sufficiency with autonomy are guilty, I suspect,
of confusing aiitapKeLa and autapxta ("self-rule").... Independence and freedom are also inadequate, at least
without a modifying prepositional phrase. Concepts such as eleueepia do often appear in conjunction with
autapKeia in ancient texts. But the two values remain distinct.
At best, self-sufficiency could serve as a
means to freedom. The essence ofautapKeta was negative; according to ancient writers, to be self-sufficient
was to be free from need" (160-61).
Cf Xenephon, Mem. 1 .2.14: "They knew that Socrates was living most self-sufficiently
(autapKeoTata) on very few possessions (xprniccTcov), and that he was most self-controlled in all kinds of
pleasures;" Xenophon, Mem. 1.6.10: "Antiphon, you seem to think that happiness
is luxury and extravagance,
but I believe that to need nothing (^^^6�v6<; aeLoGaL) is divine, and to need as little as possible is most like the
divine."
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Self-sufficiency as the moderation (or the eradication) ofneeds leads the ancient
moralist to the quesfion ofwhether the self-sufficient man needs fiiendship. Ifbeing self-
sufficient is to live with minimal needs, then does the self-sufficient man need
friendship?^ How can these two highly praised and indispensable goods cohere with one
another?^
Already in the works ofAristotle, there is the attempt to clarify the relationship
between the two.^'^ In Aristotle's understanding, self-sufficiency is "not to oneself alone,
living a life of isolation, but also to one's parents and children and wife, and one's friends
and fellow citizens (xolg 4)L/Iol(; Kal -rroXLtaic;) in general, since man is by nature a political
animal (ttoA-ltlkov)" (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1.7.6; cf 9.9.3). Elsewhere, he argues that the self-
sufficient person needs friends, for "the good man will need friends as the objects of his
beneficence" (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 9.9.2). Also, they need friends so they may contemplate
on good actions (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 9.9.5). The same issue continues to be discussed in the
later Peripatetic School (Aristotle, [Mag. Mor.] 2.15.1-9).
Roman philosophers such as Cicero consider the same question:
If people think that friendship springs from weakness and from a purpose to secure
someone through whom we may obtain that which we lack, they assign her. . .a lowly
pedigree indeed, and an origin far from noble, and they would make her the daughter
ofpoverty and want. If this were so, then just in proportion as any man judged his
resources to be small, would he be fitted for friendship; whereas the truth is far
otherwise. For to the extent that a man relies upon himself and is so fortified by
virtue and wisdom that he is dependent on no one and considers all his possessions to
^'^ The Cyrenaic philosophers infamously rejected friendship out of self-sufficiency: "He rejected
friendship also, since it does not exist either among the foolish or the wise, for the former lose it when the
need is taken away, while the wise do not need friends because they are self-sufficient" (DL 2.98).
^'^ Plutarch writes, "Friendship is more indispensable than fire and water (irupog Kal iiSaxoc;)"
("Flatterer 51b"); Similarly, Cicero writes, "we do not use the proverbial 'fire and water' (non aqua,
non igni)
on more occasions than we use fiiendship" {Amic. 6.22). Friendship is more important than the prime
necessities of life.
^" Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility ofGoodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and
Philosophy (Rev. ed.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 343-72.
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be within himself, in that degree is he most conspicuous for seeking out and
cherishing friendships. (Cicero, Amic. 29-30)
According to Cicero, persons who make friends out of lack and poverty fail to appreciate
the beauty of friendship. Only self-sufficient persons fortified by virtue and wisdom truly
can cherish friendship. In other words, the friendship of virtue is the only true and
praiseworthy type of friendship.
Also, according to Seneca, the self-sufficient person "needs many helps towards
mere existence; but for a happy existence he needs only a sound and upright soul, one that
despises Fortune" (Seneca, Ep. 9.13; cf 9.12). In other words, the self-sufficient man
"needs hands, eyes, and many things that are necessary for his daily use, but he is in want
ofnothing" (Seneca, Ep. 9.15). This person knows how to live with basic necessities.
The self-sufficient man, however, according to Seneca, will desire friendship.^^^ Yet,
he is "not attracted to it [fiiendship] by desire for gain, nor yet fiightened by the instability
ofFortune" (Seneca, Ep. 9.12). In other words, the self-sufficient man does not seek
fiiendship based on utility (Seneca, Ep. 9.9). He seeks fiiends "only for the purpose of
pracficing friendship, in order that his noble qualities may not lie dormant" (Seneca, Ep.
9.8). Friends are sought for their own sake and for the great beauty of friendship (Seneca,
Ep 9.12).^^^
Thus, speaking in one breath ofboth friendship and self-sufficiency, Paul intends to
teach: First, one must leam to moderate one's needs. This need for moderation stands in
Seneca writes, "[The wise man] could not live ifhe had to live without the society ofman. Natural
promptings. . .draw him into friendship. For just as other things have for us an inherent attractiveness, so has
friendship. As we hate solitude and crave society, as nature draws men to each other, so in this matter also
there is an attraction which makes us desirous of friendship" (Seneca, Ep. 9.17-18).
In other words, friendship should be based on virtue: "the wise man cannot maintain his mental
standard without intercourse with friends of his own kind�with whom he may share his goodness. Moreover,
there is a sort ofmuUial fnendship among all the virtues" (Seneca, Ep. 109).
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contrast to the desires for gain and honor Paul constantly opposes to in this letter. To live
in a self-sufficient manner means that one is purged of the vices such as (^Qovoq, epiBeLa,
KgvoSo^Ltt, and irleove^La; and of the contentions fomented by these vices. Such vices and
contentions are the obstacles to friendship. Living self-sufficiently, one removes these
obstacles and arrives at friendship. Second, a person must establish a fiiendship based on
virtue. The friendship established between people who live a self-sufficient life cannot be a
friendship based on utility, for both parties in the relationship require little or nothing from
the other. Thus, the fiiendship must be based on something beyond utility.^^^ For Paul, the
Christian friendship is based on the virtue ofhumility. This virtue requires moral
knowledge and moral perception from God, moral practical wisdom exemplified by Christ,
moral empowerment from God, moral examples from fellow Christians, and a moral telos
revealed by God through Christ.
4.12.2 Friendship, Reciprocity, and God
Paul begins this secfion again with an emphasis on the friendship shared between him
and the Philippians. The Philippians are said to have joined in fellowship {kKOiv6vr]oev)
with Paul in the matter of giving and receiving (booic, Kal Xfipij/Lt;) and have given him
gifts to satisfy his needs.
Previously, this thesis has established that the concept ofKoivwyta is closely related
to the idea of friendship (4.2.1). Friends have all things in common (Koivd id ^ikoiv).
Thus, acts of sharing and acts of "giving and receiving" always occur among fiiends.
Fitzgerald writes, "The relationship between filia and autarkeia had in fact been discussed for
centuries by philiosophers,' including Aristotle, the Stoics, the Neopythagoreans, and others, who tried to find
some way to avoid or at least to mitigate the conclusion that friends
are necessarily superfluous for the tmely
self-sufficient individual.. ..Paul follows in the frain of those who want to affirm sfrongly both autarkeia and
filia" ("Philippians in the Light of Some Ancient Discussions ofFriendship," 152-53).
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However, not all scholars choose to interpret the relationship depicted in this passage
as a friendship relationship. Instead, many scholars choose to interpret it as a business
relationship, for they have noticed that the terms that Paul uses here have a particular
financial coloring." Kennedy, for example, argues that dc, Xoyov Sooeax; Kal Xr|pi|/e(0(;
(Phil 4:15) means "to have an account of giving and receiving"; dc, Tr]v xpeiav pot (Phil
4:16) means "to account ofmy need"; tov KapTOv xov -irA-eovdCovxa dc. Xoyov upcov (Phil
4:17) means "interest accumulating to your account (or credit)"; and aTrexw dk vdvxa Kal
-rrepLooeucj (Phil 4:18) means "I give you a receipt for all you owed me."^^^
As a result, some scholars conclude that Paul views "the entire matter [the exchange
between him and the Philippians] as a strictly business affair."^^'^ Nonetheless, Marshall
has criticized this view after examining the relevant Greco-Roman literature:
[G]iven the financial basis of the majority of friendships and the common use of
commercial language and ideas in describing them, it is fair to suggest that the entire
phrase, KOLVcoveXv etc, Xoyov boaeoic, Kal Kal /Iripij/ewg, is an idiomatic expression
indicatingfriendship (emphasis mine).^^^
Peterman' s recent study again confirms this conclusion. He claims that "the nature of
friendship and social reciprocity in the first century allowed the use of financial language
to refer to the mutual obligations of such relationships. These mutual obligations may have
a financial character but they are essentially social obligations."^^^ In other words, using
financial terms in Greco-Roman world to describe the social exchange between friends is
common.
H. A. A. Kennedy, "The Financial Coloring ofPhilippians 4:15-18," The Expository Times 12
(1900): 43-44.
Hawthome, Philippians, 204.
Marshall, Enmity in Corinth, 163.
Peterman, Paul's Giftfrom Philippi, 65.
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Giving and receiving is widely acknowledged as one of the most fundamental social
mechanisms that structures friendship in the Greco-Roman world. Marshall begins his
study on ancient friendship with the title "friendship as giving for a retum."^^^ Harrison
concludes his study on grace with the claim that "reciprocity govemed the entire gamut of
relationships�human and divine�in antiquity."^^^ Likewise, DeSilva claims that grace
encapsulates the ethos ofpatron-client relationship, friendship, and public benefaction.^^^
The word "grace," according to Desilva, is used to describe the willingness of the patron to
grant benefit ("grace"), the benefit transferred from the patron to the client ("gift"), and the
response ofthe client ("gratitude"). In other words, grace summarizes the process of
"giving and receiving." To use Seneca's words, the "most sacred bond of benefits" is the
bond "from which friendship springs (ex quo amicitia oritur^ (Seneca, Ben. 2.18.5).^^�
Friendship in the Greco-Roman world is identified with grace, the reciprocal act of "giving
and receiving" (cf Aristotle, Eth. nic. 5.5.6).
Whenever a friend or benefactor gives a gift, the gift creates a debt on the side of the
receiver. In due time, the receiver must repay his or her debt. Failure to show gratitude is
not only a dishonor but also a crime and often leads to the break down of the friendship.^^'
^�^^ Marshall, Enmity in Corinth, 1-13.
James R. Harrison, Paul's Language ofGrace in Its Graeco-Roman Context (Wissenschaftliche
Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 2 Reihe; Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 2003), 321.
DeSilva, Honor, Patronage, Kinship & Purity, 95-1 19. Chapter 3 is titled: "Patronage and
Reciprocity: The Social Context ofGrace." Desilva rightly notes that reciprocity pertains not only to patron-
client relationship, but also to fiiendship: "Relafionships of reciprocity also occur between social equals. ...
Such relafionships went by the name of 'fiiendship.' The basic ethos undergirding this relationship, however,
is no different from that ofthe relationship ofpatrons and clients; the same principle of reciprocity and
mutual fidelity is the bedrock ofboth" (99).
Troels Engberg-Pedersen, "Gift-Giving and Friendship: Seneca and Paul in Romans 1-8 on the
Logic ofGod's Charis and Its Human Response," HTR 101 (2008): 15-44.
DeSilva, Honor, Patronage, Kinship & Purity, 1 10; Peterman, Paul's Giftfrom Philippi, 88-89.
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Interestingly, while Paul speaks of the social reciprocity between him and the
Philippians, he seems not to be bounded by debts due to the gifts that he has received from
the Philippians.^^^ The gifts create no debt on Paul but a debt on God. The gift is said to be
"a sacrifice acceptable and pleasing to God' and that it is God who will in return satisfy
the needs ofthe Philippians. A two dimensional relationship between Paul and the
Philippians is transformed into a three dimensional relationship. The gift given by the
Philippians and received by Paul is no longer given to Paul but to God. In the relationship
between Paul and the Philippians the gift no longer creates debt but remains as pure grace.
No longer is there the cycle of grace and debt. All gifts within the community are gifts of
grace given out of the virtue ofhumility in conformity to Christ and not out of debt.
In his letter to the Philippians, Paul wants to teach the Philippians that Christ-
followers should leam the virtue ofhumility and should look after one another. Still,
persons should not exploit such relationships, relying on their brothers and sisters for their
well-being. Rather, the one who receives should leam first and foremost to rely on God,
depend on God's mercy and providence, and leam to live a life with moderate needs.
Also, Paul wants the Philippians to leam that when others are in need, the gift or help
given should be understood as a gift to God. The ones who give should not expect gifts in
retum from those persons who receive. The Christian community is not a community
based on debts created through giving and receiving. Rather, the community is based on
the act of joyfiil giving motivated by the virtue exemplified by Christ Jesus.
Peterman repeatedly emphasizes this point when he writes, "obligation is not a concept found in
this epistle [i.e., Philippians]" {Paul's Giftfrom Philippi, 147); "Paul does not refer to the discharge of a
social debt or to his obligation to repay the Philippians" (148); "for Paul die relationship is not best
characterized as one of reciprocal debt" (149); "all talk of debt is absent... and all mention of repayment on
his part is omitted" (148).
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In the end, there is good news for both people who receive and people who give.
Good news exists for the ones who receive because God will strengthen them in all
circumstances. Good news also exists for the ones who give because God fully will satisfy
their every need. God stands at the center of giving and receiving. He is the mediator
between us all.
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CONCLUSION
The conclusion is divided into three sections: (1) summary of content; (2) scholarly
contributions; and (3) future research.
Summary of Content
In Chapter 1, this thesis shows stasis as one of the most important themes in the
Greco-Roman moral-political discourse. Chapter 2 shows that Greco-Roman authors
sought to dispel vice (especially the desires for honor and gain), faction, and stasis through
virtue, friendship, and concord. In their understanding, virtue and friendship saves the polis
from destruction. Chapter 3 argues that Paul's letter to the Philippians is a deliberative
rhetoric on concord. Chapter 4 claims that Paul, like other Greco-Roman authors, intends
to promote concord through virtue and friendship.
Virtue requires moral knowledge, moral perception, moral choice, practical wisdom,
sfrong will, moral practice, moral exemplar, moral goal, and moral training. In the
Christian community, these elements are either supplied by God, or by Christ, or by
fellow-believers. The goal ofbringing these elements together is to produce virtuous
people who think and act like Christ. Friendship, according to Paul, should be based upon
this Christ-oriented virtue. In Philippians, Paul exemplifies this type of virtuous friendship
through the friendships ofChrist and God, Paul and Timothy, and Paul and Epaphroditus.
In Paul's view, the Christian polis can be saved only through the formafion of this virtuous
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friendship. As such, Paul's letter to the Philippians is written as a piece of deliberative
rhetoric to persuade the Philippians to formulate this ideal type of virtuous friendship
among themselves.
Paul begins his letter to the Philippians describing himself as a "slave of Christ Jesus"
together with Timothy. This letter is written to all the saints in Christ Jesus in Philippi and
especially to the "overseers and deacons." The pairing ofPaul with Timothy and the
overseers with the deacons foreshadows the pairings found throughout the letter (Jesus and
God; Paul and Timothy; Paul and Epaphroditus; Euodia and Syntyche). Paul is reminding
the community of the importance of "serving" one another as Christ became a slave
befriending human beings (Phil 2:7). The overseers and deacons need specifically to hear
this message so they may fulfill their duty ofmaintaining the peace of the Christian
community.
Following the salutation is Paul's thanksgiving (Phil 1 :3-l 1). The thanksgiving
introduces the major themes of this letter. Paul gives thanks to God for knowing that God
will complete the "good work" he began among the Philippians. It is evident that the good
work is already in progress, for the Philippians are already in "fellowship" with Paul and
supplying his needs. Nonetheless, the good work still waits to be completed, for true
"fellowship" involves not only the sharing ofmaterial goods, but also the sharing of
friendship based upon the virtue ofhumility. Paul prays precisely for this kind of
friendship in Phil 1:9-1 1. He prays for a "binding-love" (friendship) informed by "moral
knowledge and moral perception" (virtue) working for the best. The goal is to bear the fioiit
of righteousness and build up the holy temple city ofGod (polis).
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In Phil 1 : 12-26, Paul begins to speak of his own situation. The purpose of this
passage is not only to inform the Philippians ofhis own situation, but also to make himself
a moral exemplar for the Philippians to imitate. Thus, Paul situates himself in a situation
similar to that ofthe Philippians. As with the Philippians, he suffers both extemal
opposition and intemal strife (Phil 1:12-1 8a). In the face of such dire situation, he stands
firm as a parrhesiastes and proclaims the tmth of the gospel with no fear (Phil l:18b-21).
As a speaker of tmth, he speaks always for the good of others. He does the same here also.
Here he shows the Philippians how they should act in the face of opposition and strife. In
such situations, one should always display the virtue of choosing the best for others (Phil
1 :22-24). Toward the end of this section, Paul expresses his wish to see the moral progress
ofthe Philippians (Phil 1:25-26).
After the exordium (Phil 1:3-26) comes the propositio (Phil 1:27-30). In the
propositio, Paul speaks of a manner of living (virtue) that will sustain friendship
(expressed through concepts such as one soul, one spirit, the ouv-prefix, and the opposite
concept of enemy). The making of virtuous fiiendship will save the Christian polis from
destmction.
In Phil 2:1-3:16 (probatio), Paul elaborates upon the propositio. At the core of this
virtuous friendship proposed by Paul is the practical wisdom exemplified by Christ. Christ
refiised to exploit his friendship with God in greed; instead, he chooses to lower himself
and befriend persons lower in status. This virtue ofhumility, in Paul's view, is the only
tme virtue that will help solidify friendship and save the polis from destmcfion.
Equipped with moral knowledge and moral perception supplied by God and the
pracfical wisdom exemplified by Jesus, believers should be able to discem the best and
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choose the best. Nonetheless, implementing this choice requires "the will" which God
supplies. With the help ofGod, the individual develops the virtue ofhumility that fosters
"goodwill" among the believers (Phil 2:13). In other words, with the help of God the
believers work out their salvation through virtuous friendship.
Paul then exemplifies this virtuous friendship through his friendship with Timothy
(Phil 2:19-24) and his fiiendship with Epaphroditus (Phil 2:25-30). He also supplies a
negative example ofhow not to act in a fellowship. Accordingly, the individual must avoid
the vice of contending for honor and instead leam to imitate Christ and become a member
of "the fellowship ofhis suffering" (Phil 3:10).
Finally, the individual must continuously put this virtuous fiiendship into practice as
an athlete constantly puts his skills to practice (Phil 3:12-16). To become like Christ in his
suffering and resurrection is the goal for which Christians must strive. To be a complete
and virtuous human being is to have this "one" thing in mind, namely to be like Christ.
Paul begins to conclude his letter in Phil 3:17. The peroratio begins with a call to
imitation (Phil 3:17). A person either imitates Paul and becomes a citizen of heaven
expecting salvation from Lord Jesus Christ, or refuses to imitate Paul and becomes an
enemy of the cross expecting destmction as his or her end. Paul's hope is that the
Philippians would become citizens "standing firm" against the enemies. Standing firm
requires virtuous friendship. For this reason, Paul exhorts both Euodia and Syntyche to "be
of the same mind in the Lord."
The letter continues with a passage rich in rhetorical devices (Phil 4:4-9) intended to
arouse the pathos of its recipients. This passage has "God of peace" as its climax,
propelling the Philippians to do what Paul has taught in this letter.
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The letter ends with a small treatise on friendship, particularly dealing with the
giving and receiving of gifts within friendship. Paul teaches the lesson by example. As
such, he instructs believers to be like him, knowing how to live self-sufficiently, and
always trusting in God's providence (Phil 4:10-14). Also, believers must leam that
whatever is given is given to God and God, himself, will repay those who give (Phil 4:15-
20).
Scholarly Contributions
1 . This thesis reads Philippians in its historical background. Earlier studies on
Philippians and Pauline ethics tend to play down the importance of virtue and read Paul's
ethics through the lens ofmodem ethics. This thesis shows that virtue ethics plays an
important role in Paul's thought and must not be ignored. Future studies on Pauline ethics
must pay more attention to the emic language of virtue, friendship, andpolis.
2. This thesis shows that stasis is a major theme in both Greco-Roman political
thought and the NT. Stasis involves desires for gain and honor that dissolves friendship into
faction. For those who seek to understand the importance ofunity and peace in the NT
ethics, the theme of stasis must not be ignored.
3. This thesis provides new evidence demonstrating that Philippians is a deliberative
rhetoric on concord. It shows, for example, "to determine the best" (Phil 1 : 10) is one ofthe
distinct features of deliberative rhetoric shared by both Paul and the Greco-Roman orators.
4. This thesis proposes a new arrangement for the letter ofPhilippians. This new
arrangement does greater justice to the summarizing function of Phil 3:17-21 and the
motivating ftmction ofPhil 4:4-9.
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5. This thesis shows how Phil 1 :3-26 as the exordium is closely tied to the propositio
ofPhilippians. The key concepts in the exordium are related either to virtue, friendship, or
ihQ polis, anticipating the major themes ofPhilippians. Paul's exordium serves the function
ofdocilem (ready to leam) effectively as is taught by the rhetorical handbooks and
practiced by the contemporary rhetoricians.
6. This thesis shows how pervasive and important is the concept of -rrappriOLa in
Paul's letters. Paul in almost all of his letters portrays himself as aparrhesiastes.
Appropriating Michel Foucault's study on frank speech, this thesis shows that Paul's use
of irappriOLa involves the ideas of frankness, tmth, danger, criticism, and duty.
7. This thesis provides a new reading of the Christ hymn. Christ, according to the
study of this thesis, is presented as a friend ofGod, unwilling to exploit their friendship in
greed, choosing instead to lower himself and befriend the lowly.
8. This thesis emphasizes more than any commentary the fact that Timothy and
Epaphroditus are presented not only as virtuous individuals, but also as virtuous friends of
Paul. Their friendship with Paul serves as examples for the Philippians, showing them how
they are to stand together in "one mind" (i.e., friendship).
9. This thesis shows how Phil 3:17-4:3, ftinctioning as the repetitio portion of the
peroratio, follows an argumentative flow that leads to the fmal climactic appeal in Phil
4:2-3: "I urge Euodia and I urge Syntyche to be of the same mind." Paul's purpose of
writing Philippians is revealed in this fmal appeal. His aim is to reunite Euodia and
Syntyche and to save the Christian polis from stasis and self-destmction.
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1 0. This thesis shows how self-sufficiency understood as the moderation (or the
eradication) ofneeds fits nicely into the theme of friendship and Paul's desire to eradicate
the desires for honor and gain.
Future Research
1 . Future research may wish to apply the same ethical-political paradigm of virtue,
friendship, and polis to other Pauline letters. If this practice of reading proves to be fruitful,
then one should consider rewriting Pauline ethics in terms of virtue ethics.
2. The imagery of the city appears in various NT writings (e.g., Heb 11:10, 16; 12:22;
13:14; Rev 21; cf. 1 Pet 2:4-10). Future research might want to explore how this imagery is
applied in these different writings, and how this imagery relates to the eschatological
vision of a renewed Jerusalem proclaimed in the OT.
3. This thesis is intended to emphasize the similarities between Paul and the Greco-
Roman ethical-political ideologies. Future research might want to explore how Paul adapts
and differentiates typical Greco-Roman ethical-political discourse with his eschatology,
Christology, and OT influences.
4. Like Greco-Roman philosophy, Chinese philosophy is interested also in virtue,
friendship, and polis. IfPauline ethics is indeed best understood in terms of virtue ethics as
this thesis argues, then there may be greater common ground for the future dialogue
between Chinese philosophy and Pauline ethics.
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